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
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

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

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OF

Sir William Monson

IN SIX BOOKS

EDITED

WITH A COMMENTARY DRAWN FROM THE STATE PAPERS
AND OTHER ORIGINAL SOURCES

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M. OPPENHEIM

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

(Life and Bibliography)

William Monson, who has the honour, so far as is known, of having been the first English seaman to write any historical and critical account of the warfare in which he took part, belonged to a respectable but undistinguished family of Lincolnshire squires, settled for several generations at South Carlton, some three miles from Lincoln.[1] The naval historian was the third son of Sir John Monson, the then head of the family, who died in 1593, and of Jane Dighton, his wife.[2] Little is known of Monson's youth, or, indeed, of his whole career, beyond what he tells us himself in the 'Tracts' or what can be gleaned from incidental references in the State Papers and elsewhere. Our ignorance is of the less importance in that we are chiefly concerned with him as a seaman and as a critic, but it must be confessed that what is known of certain

[1] That the family was of good local importance is shown from the fact that Sir John Monson lent 50*l.* on Privy Seal to meet the expenses of 1588. Among the 115 Lincolnshire subscribers only two advanced 100*l.*, thirteen, besides Sir John, 50*l.*, the others paying 25*l.* (Noble, *The Names of those Persons who Subscribed towards the Defence of this Country*. . . . Lond. 1886).

[2] Collins.

other non-professional events of his life is of a character to make us wish that we knew either more or less. The first recorded incident concerning him is his entry as a student of Balliol College, in May 1581, in his fourteenth year, from which we gather that he was born in 1567 or 1568, and Wood says that he was there at least two years.[3] From the scraps of classical lore he displays on occasion it may be inferred that he did not altogether waste his time. The next event was his going to sea in the orthodox way for boys, namely, by running away from home,[4] and in the Churchill text as hitherto printed he is made to say that this happened at the age of sixteen.[5] However, in a new autobiographical fragment,[6] he says that he was 'not fully' seventeen, and if he sailed in September 1585, as printed in Book V., his birthday must have fallen within the last three months of the year, and he was born therefore in 1568. He was 'led thereunto by the wildness of my youth,' he says, and no doubt the exploits of Drake, Hawkyns, and other rovers, common talk by 1585 in many an English village and home, had their natural effect in heating a boyish desire for adventure. Apparently the hardships and hard fighting of his first experience[7] did not disgust

[3] *Athen. Oxon.* The registers of South Carlton, earlier than 1653, are wanting.

[4] 'Without the knowledge of father or mother.'

[5] Book V., sect. *Stratagems at Sea.*

[6] *Add. MSS.* 9298.

[7] Book II., *Letter to the Rt. Hon. the Lord Ellesmere*; Book V., *Stratagems at Sea.* In consequence of the size of this work, and the necessary publication at intervals, only general references to sections can be given until the scattered threads are gathered up in the Index.

him with the sea, for he was again afloat in 1586, although we are not told under what circumstances, except that it was once more in a privateer.[8]

In 1587 he was at sea as captain, and went down to Salee with two pinnaces and a small Spanish prize,[9] and it is possible from this that his escapade had been forgiven, but he is judiciously silent about his professional qualifications for the post. There were no troublesome Board of Trade examinations and certificates necessary in those days, and, he says, 'in this quality (*i.e.* of a privateer) any man may make himself a captain if he put in the security aforesaid,' that is, give bond or surety in the Court of Admiralty not to injure neutrals or allies. That, however, necessitated the enjoyment of property which Monson assuredly did not possess, a certain reputation that he can hardly have made as a subordinate aged nineteen, or else the assistance of his family. His name was not unknown in London or in legal circles, and that circumstance may have smoothed his path. A great-uncle, Robert Monson, who died in 1583, had been a Justice of the Common Pleas, but had been deprived, or forced to resign, because he expressed doubts as to the legality of the conviction of John Stubbs, sentenced, in 1579, to lose his right hand for having published a book on Elizabeth's proposed marriage with the Duc d'Alençon, wherein that child of the Bartholomew was dissected truthfully but impolitely. If his father did not assist

[8] *Add. MSS.* 9298; Book II., *A Voyage by Sir William Monson during the Time he served as Admiral in the Narrow Seas.*

[9] Book IV., *A Comparison betwixt our Ancient and Known Trades*; Book V., *Stratagems*, No. 8.

memory of these sentiments did not prevent his quarrelling with the earl in 1595, and challenging him two years later. He calls himself Vice-Admiral of Cumberland's little squadron of 1589, but describes Captain Lister as the earl's professional adviser, a post which would hardly be compatible, at least in essentials, with the rank he claims.

As Monson's position as a seaman and strategist is considered in the Introduction to Book I., and as he relates his naval experiences with comparative fulness in the 'Tracts,' it will not be necessary here to do more than refer to them in connexion with matters upon which he is silent. In 1590 he remained ashore, the ill-health following the voyage of the previous year keeping him from 'employment or thought of the sea.' The next year he was again with Cumberland, and was taken prisoner,[12] and remained in the galleys, although he does not say that he was put to the oar, and in Lisbon Castle until July 1592. The letter of 12th July, 1592, to Frobiser,[13] which must have been written at the moment of his release, shows that he had not neglected any chance of obtaining information, and that his confinement could not have been very strict to enable him to procure it in such a full and accurate manner. To Frobiser, however, he complains of the customary 'cruel usage' of the Spaniards, but he is curiously silent as to the way of his liberation,

[12] Book I., 1591 *Voyage*.

[13] Appendix of Letters, No. 1. In accordance with the directions of the Council to editors the spelling of all proper names is in conformity with the signature of the individual when that is known.

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possibly have brought him some property, but certainly brought him a stepson.[19] Before his marriage Monson had promised to accompany the Earl of Cumberland in a voyage already arranged, and kept his word, but the consequence was an open quarrel, he having 'proof of what before I had just cause to suspect, viz., the inconstant friendship of my Lord of Cumberland,'[20] in leaving another officer in command, when Monson considered that he was entitled to the office on the earl's departure both by promise given and by his services. We might be able to come to a more definite conclusion if we possessed Cumberland's version of the circumstances that led to the quarrel, but there is some suggestiveness in the fact that in April 1596 Monson suddenly jumped into the command of the Rainbow, a second-rate Queen's ship, and we find him entertaining Essex and many noble volunteers at supper when the news was brought of the fall of Calais.[21] Whatever may have been Monson's deserts, it may be regarded as quite certain that they alone did not obtain for him this sudden advancement into high rank in the Queen's service, for merit without influence was as helpless in the reign of Elizabeth as it was in later ages until the present lofty ideal of impartial promotion, uninfluenced by personal bias, or family and political interest, was attained. More than this, although there had been as yet nothing brilliant or in the least exceptional in his service record, later

[19] MS. Life, by Lord Monson, who quotes documents proving the stepson.

[20] Book I., 1595 *Voyage*; Book V., *Stratagems*.

[21] Book III., *The Ceremony of Wearing the Flag*.

in the year, at Cadiz, he was not only a captain, but Essex's flag-captain, thus passing over the heads of many older and more experienced men. In this and the knighthood given at the same time we may probably see one of the earl's impulsive attachments and desire to favour a man who pleased him. Possibly Monson had set about pleasing him long before he got the appointment to the Rainbow as his reward, and, in view of the rivalry existing between the two earls, we may find in Monson's attachment to a new patron the real cause of the quarrel with Cumberland, which may not have been unwelcome to our hero as an excuse. If we accept Monson's sense of honour at his own estimate there was of course no ulterior motive at work, but subsequent events showed that it was not nearly so keen as he desired it to appear in the eyes of his sons and his contemporaries.

It has been mentioned that the Cadiz voyage brought Monson one of the knighthoods Essex and Howard flung about so profusely, and in the Islands Voyage of 1597 he again accompanied his new chief, still in the Rainbow, which he describes as 'the most rolling and laboursome ship in England,' but which possessed the atoning quality of being exceptionally fast under sail.[22] The Earl of Cumberland had clearly neither forgotten nor forgiven the quarrel of 1595, and some time after the return of the expedition seems to have commented ill-naturedly on Monson's conduct in the matter of the Indian fleet, when the treasure ships escaped into Angra.[23] Rowland

[22] *Cecil MSS.* 10th August, 1597.

[23] Book I., *Islands Voyage*; Book V., *Stratagems.*

Whyte wrote to Sir Robert Sidney on 9th February, 1597-8, 'My Lord of Cumberland by reason of the contrary winds is not yet gone; and upon some occasion, being now at London, Sir William Monson sent him a challenge for having used some disgraceful words of him and his doings upon the coast of Terceras,[24] when the treasure entered in. I do not hear what answer is made.'[25] If a duel had followed it would have been an event of sufficient note to be recorded, and, as Cumberland sailed on his Puerto Rico voyage early in March, it appears that the quarrel was settled peaceably. Monson's naval and other preoccupations during 1597 did not prevent him using his pen, and he appears to have written a paper suggesting to the Queen a settlement on the Guinea coast, following this up now, or shortly afterwards, with another memorial in favour of prosecuting a direct East India trade.[26] There was no fleet sent away on foreign service during 1598, and Monson was not employed in the Channel Guard; in 1599 he commanded the Defiance during the mobilization consequent to the scare of invasion. Again, in 1600 and 1601, he was unemployed, and he appears during these years to have been feeling the effects of Essex's loss of power and subsequent ruin. In the Voyages he does not mention having performed any service during these last two years, and his name is not

[24] Azores. Elizabethan writers, including Monson, frequently use the form 'the Terceras' where we say 'the Azores.' The distinction between the island of Terceira and the group was only indicated by the plural termination.

[25] Collins, *Sidney Papers*, ii. p. 93.

[26] Book V.

found in the navy pay lists, but in Book II. (section, *Names of such Ships as I served in*) the Churchill text gives the Garland in 1600 and the Nonpareil in 1601. Of the three MSS. of Book II. available for collation, one omits the whole list and the other two give the Garland for both 1600 and 1601. During 1600 the Garland and Nonpareil were lying up in the Medway throughout the year; in 1601 the Garland, under Sir Amyas Preston, and the Nonpareil, under Humphrey Reynolds, were units of Leveson's squadron on the coast of Ireland.[27]

Judging by events, Monson, when Essex's star was waning, transferred his attachment to the Howard family, and, through them, to Sir Robert Cecyll. Sir Richard Leveson, a son-in-law of Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham and Lord Admiral, the Queen's old and trusted friend, was now the favourite among the younger admirals, and Monson appears to have succeeded in recommending himself to him and to Nottingham. It is also probable that Sir William was already connected with Lord Henry Howard, afterwards Earl of Northampton, through the introduction of his brother Sir Thomas Monson, and it may well be that it was originally Henry Howard's influence that gave him fresh service, as it was his influence that subsequently gave him the Channel command for twelve years. But there was

[27] In the *Calendar of State Papers* there is a letter of 29th August, and assigned to 1600, which speaks of Monson as in sea command. It really belongs to 1602. Another paper, calendared under 23rd September, 1601, is of 1603.

another member of the Howard family, the seaman Lord Thomas Howard, to whom Monson must have been long known, whose favour was more effectual for the purpose that Monson had in view for the moment. Either at Lord Thomas's suggestion or to satisfy his own ambition, he desired a seat in the Commons, and was returned for Malmesbury in the last of Elizabeth's Parliaments, which sat from 27th October to 19th December, 1601. Lord Thomas had married Catherine Knevet, of Charlton Park, near the town of Malmesbury, and a great heiress; whether or no Monson entered Parliament at Howard's suggestion, it is evident that his return was due to the nomination of Lord Thomas or his wife. Ways and means, monopolies, the support of maimed soldiers and seamen, and the mischief wrought by the Dunkirk privateers, were the chief matters before the House, but no speech by Monson has been preserved, although he was no doubt one of the 'others' who spoke with authority upon the last question.

In 1602, merit or influence, or both, brought him again into command, and he sailed as Leveson's Vice-Admiral to perform the great exploit of his life in the capture of the carrack St. Valentine in Cezimbra Bay, although Leveson's share of the achievement may have been greater than appears in Monson's relation. His position with Nottingham and Cecyll, with the latter of whom he was in direct communication, was now secure, and there was no such sure road to Elizabeth's favour as a rich prize. On his return he was sent for to London, and after a conference with the Queen, Nottingham, Buck-

hurst, and Cecyll, was directed to go to sea again with an independent command as related under the voyage of 1602.[28] During the winter of 1602 he drew up a paper dealing with the best method of prosecuting the war, for Cecyll's information and perhaps at his request.[29] In 1603 he was Leveson's Vice-Admiral when Elizabeth died, and again designated for separate command later. The preparation of Leveson's fleet was hastened in order to render the Channel secure in case of any commotion following Elizabeth's death, and Monson tells us[30] that Leveson was distrusted by the Privy Council, and that it was intended, if there had been any rising against James, that Monson should supersede him under the supreme command of Lord Thomas Howard. It has been said[31] that Monson had himself been in communication with James, but, although not unlikely, the statement lacks authoritative evidence. In any case Cecyll and the supporters of James must have looked upon him as an eminently safe man for their purpose, but there is little doubt that he exaggerates his importance in the proposed combination. It was essentially an age when deference and respect were given to birth and social position irrespective of services, and the presence and persuasions of all the men we now honour as the Elizabethan Sea Kings would not have had as much weight with the seamen as the presence of Lord Thomas Howard. Monson was considered

[28] See also the Appendix E for letters relating to this voyage.

[29] Book V., *A Project How to Make War upon Spain.* He says that it was sent to Cecyll 'by Her Majesty's appointment.'

[30] Book V., *Stratagems.*

[31] MS. Life, by Lord Monson.

trustworthy, but his *rôle* was a secondary one, and without Howard he would have been powerless to influence events. But it should be noticed that there is no evidence whatever about Leveson's inclinations beyond Monson's statement, and there is the obvious unlikelihood that a man so closely connected by family ties, interest, and friendship with the Howards should have dreamed of playing an important part in opposition to them, especially as he was as insignificant politically as Monson himself.

Sir William was not the only member of his family in favour with those in power at the accession of James I. A younger brother, Robert, was knighted; the eldest, Sir Thomas, became Chancellor to the Queen and the King's Master Falconer. But Sir Thomas was the mainspring of the family movement, being closely associated with Lord Henry Howard, created Earl of Northampton in March 1604; and if the seaman's sudden rise into command during the closing years of Elizabeth's reign was primarily owing to the protection of the Howard family, that protection was no doubt at first the consequence of Sir Thomas's connexion with his patron, whose favour was, eventually, to result in sending both brothers to the Tower. When, towards the end of his life, Monson wrote that his disgrace, or, as he chose to call it, persecution, was due only to his 'being thought the bosom friend to a nobleman I much honoured,'[32] he thought that a more shameful tie between them was buried in oblivion. During 1603 Sir Robert Mansell was

[32] Book V., closing paragraph.

in command of the Channel Guard, the only squadron in commission, but in 1604 Mansell, a distant relative of Nottingham, was provided for by being made Treasurer of the Navy, and Monson took his place, 'the 1st July, 1604, the Lord Cecyll signified to me his Majesty's pleasure that I should take charge of his Highness's ships serving in the Narrow Seas.'[33] He must have been as acceptable for the post in the eyes of Cecyll as in those of Northampton, for all three were similarly dishonoured by being in Spanish pay; and although the scanty documentary evidence leaves it uncertain in what month these men were bought, the inference is that they selected Monson as one of themselves and bound by the same obligation. If his interview with Cecyll on his appointment really followed the lines indicated,[34] and was coincident with his purchase, both these star actors must have enjoyed themselves amazingly. That Cecyll, being a professional politician, should have a price in money or office will surprise no one; even Dr. Gardiner is compelled to dismiss him with 'a very moderate standard of morality.'[35] Northampton was an old hand at taking

[33] *State Papers Dom. James I.* xi. 47. It seems possible that Nottingham's influence was sufficient to provide for Mansell but not for both Mansell and Leveson, and that the latter had to make room for the nominee of Cecyll and Northampton. Besides Leveson was too honest for them, but he was consoled by being made Vice-Admiral of England (7th April, 1604), which gave him official rank above Monson.

[34] Book II., *To the Rt. Hon. the Lord Ellesmere.*

[35] In 1600 Essex had openly expressed his belief that Cecyll was taking Spanish bribes. The accusation was thought to be only the malignant slander of a defeated rival, but subsequent knowledge has converted what appeared to be a baseless calumny into at least a suspicion.

Spanish money; he had been in Philip's pay as early as 1582, and, although fitted intellectually to hold his own in any court, had never succeeded in conquering Elizabeth's distrust, and had risen late by virtue of servility first to Essex and then to Cecyll. How, or why, Monson, a gentleman and a seaman, should have so besmirched himself is much more difficult to understand. The ordinary excuse that a man must be judged by the moral standard of his century will not serve his turn, for not only did the secrecy with which the transaction was enshrouded confess a consciousness of guilt, but the reprobation with which such an act was regarded by the men of his own generation—for it was much more generally suspected than he seems to have imagined—disposes of such a plea.

Long before there was any definite knowledge, Sir Charles Cornwallis, the then ambassador, wrote warningly on the subject—to Cecyll of all people[36]—from Madrid; the Dutch appear to have had a shrewd suspicion, if nothing more, which explains the bitter hatred Monson bore them, but it was not, so far as we know, until 1613-15 that James became aware of the whole truth. And then the truth remained buried in the English and Spanish archives until Dr. Gardiner brought it to light forty years ago.[37] It was not until September 1613 that Sir John Digby, then our ambassador to Spain, contrived to secure papers in which the pensioners were referred to, and managed to decipher Monson's

[36] Winwood, *Memorials*, ii. p. 96.

[37] *History of England from the Accession of James I. to the Disgrace of Chief Justice Coke.* Lond. 1863.

name.[38] In December he obtained the whole list, and thought the matter of so much importance that in the spring of 1614 he came to England to communicate with James. In his despatch of 9th September, 1613,[39] he wrote:

I must humbly crave Your Majesty's permission to utter some few words by way of apology, for that I well understand how ill it befitteth a gentleman or an honest man to put jealousies into the heads of princes against their ministers upon circumstances that have not strong probabilities; but when the present danger or inconvenience will not fittingly admit of the delay which is requisite for the sifting of those suspicions, which are not without cause concerned, then I suppose that the prejudice of particular men is rather to be adventured than Your Majesty's service or safety in the least manner hazarded. And this is now the case: for I see a person employed in Your Majesty's service in a place of so great consequence and trust, and that in times of danger if he should be disloyal unto Your Majesty might have so great power to do hurt, being indeed one of the guards of Your kingdom, as may well excuse my giving Your Majesty a caveat to have him carefully looked unto, although my suspicions are not yet come to certain and direct proof. The party is Sir William Monson, Admiral of the Narrow Seas, whom by diverse circumstances and collections I gather to be a pensioner of the King of Spain, as I fear (before it be long) I shall plainly make it appear unto Your Majesty.

In a despatch of 16th December, 1615, Digby returned to the subject, having obtained fresh information. Some had refused to continue to receive as a pension that which they had accepted as a gratuity for furthering the peace, and Digby had ascertained that the Spanish ambassador wrote to his Government that Cecyll[40] and Lady Suffolk were

[38] *History of England from the Accession of James I. to the Disgrace of Chief Justice Coke*, Lond. 1863, p. 84.
[39] *Ibid.* p. 357.
[40] Robert Cecyll, then Earl of Salisbury, died in 1612.

to be bought and sold withal as he would do with shopkeepers, and concludeth his letter with this, that as nothing is to be had of them without money, so for money he thinketh they would sell their souls to Hell. But I may not omit to let Your Majesty understand that by the same letters it appeareth that Suffolk[41] had no hand in any of these practices, for he saith of him that he is a good and honourable gentleman, whom the other two abused and ruled as they listed . . . but the particulars hereof Your Majesty will get the best notice of from Sir William Monson, who hath been the ambassador's instrument to negotiate therein, himself being, and having been, a pensioner to the King of Spain ever since the year 1604. The match being made with him by the Constable of Castile at his return, who then allotted him 4,000 crowns a year pension; and to that effect gave him letters to the Conde de Villa Mediana, dated at Gravelines the 12th September, 1604. Which pension was afterwards by the said Conde de Villa Mediana, upon special occasion for the King of Spain's service, augmented to (Qy. by) 1,500 crowns, and so hath ever since and doth yet continue.

If Digby read his authorities aright,[42] Monson was bought in order that he might influence or persuade others, but that would be ascribing to him an importance that he did not possess either socially or politically. The notorious Lady Somerset is

[41] The Lord Thomas Howard of the reign of Elizabeth, created Lord Howard de Walden in 1597 and Earl of Suffolk in 1603, Lord Chamberlain in the same year and vacated that office (in which he was succeeded by the favourite Carr, Earl of Somerset) when appointed Lord Treasurer in 1614. He was Northampton's nephew.

[42] It may perhaps occur to the reader that Digby might be lying or mistaken. It can only be answered that Dr. Gardiner was of opinion that neither explanation is a possible one.

The Duke de Frias, Constable of Castile, came to and left England in August, but Villa Mediana, who was intended to be resident ambassador, had been here since May. It was the second, therefore, who undertook the bribery, and we may infer that Monson's purchase and his appointment in July had been settled between the ambassador and Cecyll, and that the Constable only sealed the transaction with his approval.

specifically named as one of the persons with whom he negotiated, but what weight could his arguments or persuasions have had with Frances Howard, the wife of the King's favourite, herself favoured by the King, and who would have required to deal with principals? At the most he could have been but a humble agent, a procurer of prices between greater personages. It is more consistent with probability to suppose that the Spanish Government paid him to exercise a very benevolent neutrality towards their own ships, together with the grant of assistance in passing priests and messengers to and fro, and the practice of a very unbenevolent neutrality towards the Dutch; and it must be said that he earned his pay honestly if the word can be used in such an affinity. Other rumours that were flying about in 1615, that he had planned to deliver up the navy to the Spaniards, were, of course, ridiculous enough, and are only of interest as showing that his connexion with Spain was not so unsuspected as he flattered himself. On the question of motive we have no light. It was even more difficult then than now for a captain or admiral to live upon his pay, but there is no indication that in 1604 he was experiencing that overpowering need for money for the sake of others dear to him which renders transgression almost excusable, and that humanity, itself frail, condemns pityingly if it cannot absolve. Moreover, this was no sudden fall before temptation and subsequent repentance, but a secret deceit carried on successfully for a long series of years. One would desire to regard his offence mercifully, for temptation conquers in many ways, and nothing is

more true than the French proverb that 'to know all is to forgive all,' whether it has reference to material conditions or mental temperament. But he has himself made his case blacker by the sanctimonious claim to purity of life and heart that he persistently put forward, and that the world accepted unhesitatingly for more than two centuries. If we compare the facts with passages taken from the 'Tracts,' in which he glorifies his own unsullied, disinterested, and guileless career, even the most solicitous charity is reduced to silence.[43]

Southey, who wrote when these facts were still buried in the silence of forgotten archives, and who accepted all Monson's statements about himself as accurate, nevertheless, with intuitive penetration,

[43] See Book I., *Dedication to Eldest Son*, 'Let me (good son) be your pattern of patience; for you can witness with me that the disgraces I have unjustly suffered . . . have not bred the least distaste or discontent in me . . . my services undervalued and unrecompensed. . . . I was never so base as to insinuate into any man's favour who was favoured by the times. . . . I was never so ambitious as to seek or crave employment or to undertake any that was not put upon me. My great and only comfort is that I served my princes both faithfully.' Book II., *To the Rt. Hon. the Lord Ellesmere*, 'If I had transgressed . . . in the twelve years I served on the Narrow Seas it is very likely his Majesty or the State should have known it. . . . If it shall appear . . . that, either directly or indirectly, I deceived either of my two Sovereigns I will desire the reward of a traitor. . . . The course of my life, and I hoped (if examined) it would prove loyal, honest, and spotless. . . . When all these things shall be considered . . . the integrity of my heart will appear. . . . My comfort is in the saying of David that "my defence is in God who saveth the upright in heart."' Book V., *Stratagems*, 'Malice had a greater power and force against me than the sea . . . envy unluckily and unlooked for seized upon my innocency for being thought a bosom friend to a nobleman I much honoured. . . . I found Fortune more averse to me than most of the others had felt by malicious practices. . . . I served faithfully but have been rewarded unthankfully.'

felt that there was another aspect of his character than that of the honest seaman. 'Monson was a courtier,' he says; 'his long experience of the rough usages of sea life had not rendered him indifferent to the advantages of a flattering and acquiescent demeanour at Court. His attachment to Elizabeth was boundless—but the facility was no less remarkable with which he transferred his devotion to her successor.' Stripped of the glamour of a literary efflorescence, and the luxurious heroism of summer cruises at sea and summer campaigns on land, the time was one of flattery, obsequiousness, and servility, hardened by a thirst for money, at any cost of justice or self respect, new in English history, to which even the present age with its infinitely severer conditions of survival affords no parallel except perhaps among certain small and disdained sections of the body politic.

> Cog, lie, flatter, and face—
> Four ways at Court to win you grace,

sums up the popular opinion of the men surrounding Elizabeth. Treachery, trickery, lies, and subornation characterized politics; theft and fraud were interwoven in the daily relations between the rulers and the ruled; and among the ruled themselves servility and bated breath to superiors were compensated by austerity and bluster to inferiors. The administration of the law, the final test of a nation's progress and civilization, was never more corrupt, not merely as between the Crown and subject, but as between man and man.[44] So far as

[44] Illustrations of these conditions are innumerable among the

the Court was concerned the responsibility was Elizabeth's, but in so far as they affected the nation perhaps these things were the consequences of a period of transition, a national expansion seeking new issues for the currents of national life, to the effects of which the social system had not yet adapted itself. Whatever the causes shaping it, Monson had lived in this atmosphere, and that he had assimilated the manner of thought of the courtier the worldly wisdom of his Dedications to his two sons sufficiently proves. It is no matter for surprise, therefore, that he was no better than his neighbours in crude honesty; the accusation against him is that he was worse in that, in becoming a Spanish pensioner, he was falling below even the moderate ethical standard of his generation, and that his insistent claim to have led an unsullied life adds the stain of deliberate hypocrisy where he might, at least, have been mute. Such extenuation as may be obtained from the fact that, like Cecyll, he is not known to have taken Spanish money before the peace, and that he is not known to have earned it by any active injury done to English interests, he is entitled to. The proba-

MS. documents relating to the reign of Elizabeth. Those who have access only to printed material may read with instruction Abbott's *Bacon and Essex*, chap. i.; Hall's *Society in the Elizabethan Age*; and Buckle's *Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works*, in which the last-named author has collected a mass of information bearing on the subject. Camden (*Annals*), enthusiastic loyalist as he is, gives us a glimpse of the Government methods. Under 1584 he writes, 'There were at this time crafty ways devised to try how men stood affected. Counterfeit letters were sent in the name of the Queen of Scots and left at Papists' houses; spies were sent up and down the country to note people's discourses and lay hold of their words, and reporters of vain and idle stories were credited and encouraged.'

bility is that Digby, or his Spanish authorities, were misinformed in supposing that his wages were given him to suborn others, and that his good offices were confined to injuring the Dutch and facilitating the transit of Spanish troops and supplies as far as was in his power.[45] It is difficult to unravel completely the matted skein of intrigue which delighted the politicians of that epoch, although the main threads are clear. Lady Suffolk, who was one of the greediest for Spanish gold,[46] may have been the intermediary, but, in any case, so far from being the tempter, there is every likelihood that Monson was the tempted, that Northampton or Cecyll, or both, were the villains of the piece, and that had he refused the bribe he would not have obtained the command in the Narrow Seas. In view of the number of officers always thrown out of employment at the conclusion of a long war, many of whom would be eager to take his place and some no doubt equally ready to take Spanish pay, his refusal would have meant permanent professional eclipse.

[45] The Spaniards were not always exact in points of detail. For instance, the ambassador called Monson a Catholic, and although his sympathies were certainly of that colour, it is equally certain that he lived a professed Protestant, though he did not escape suspicion (see Appendix of Letters and this Introduction, *post*, p. xxxii). Probably the ambassador did not draw much distinction between open profession and secret inclination.

[46] 'There was not one courtier of note that tasted not of Spanish bounty either in gold or jewels, and among them not any in so large a proportion as the Countess of Suffolk' (Weldon, *Court of King James*, Lond. 1811, i. p. 338). See also *ante*, p. xxi. The courtiers did not draw invidious national distinctions, for Sully says that although the Spaniards 'set no bounds to their presents, we imitated them in this respect, and even gave pensions to all the most distinguished persons in the Court of King James' (*Memoirs*, ii. p. 431, Bohn's ed.).

Monson was in command in the Channel from 21st July, 1604, until 13th January, 1615-16. The public events of that period are dealt with in his own narration in Book II., and in the accompanying Editorial comments. Of his private life we know little. In 1614 he possessed a house in Charterhouse Square 'adjoining the west gate of the Charterhouse that opens into the old churchyard.'[47] From this it would appear that he had not yet bought Kinnersley, and, some home being necessary for his large family, he fell in with the growing tendency among the upper classes to reside in London. As disinterested recommendations were not characteristic of the era, it is likely that he was aware of a request to Salisbury, from some one unnamed, for a tithe of the turf annually taken from Dartmoor for himself and Monson, 'who is an old servant and never received the reward the late Queen meant for him.'[48] However, there is but one trace of his having received any particular favour during these years, and, indeed, he says that he was never repaid his outlay in entertaining his distinguished passengers at various times. At the close of the Dedication to his elder son he writes that his services had been unrewarded; and in the beginning of the second Book that, after the death of Elizabeth, 'he neither tasted or received either recompense or preferment.' His appointment to command in the Channel was preferment, and in the Privy Seals his name occurs in July and in December 1603 as the grantee of a Crown lease. The lease was the reversion of

[47] Malcolm, *London Redivivium*, i. p. 433.
[48] *State Papers Dom. James I.* 7th November, 1610.

the Crown manor of Gimingham (Norfolk) for a period of fifty years at a rental of 43*l.* 7*s.* 9*d.* a year, and the lease especially mentions that it was made without any fine in recognition of his services to the late Queen. It was to take effect at the death of the then holder, Francis Southwell, or in 1620, when the period for which it was granted to Southwell terminated.[49] Such leases were sought because there was a profit to the grantee on the nominal rent, and there is no evidence or probability that Monson did not have possession in due course of time, or perhaps sold his reversion to his advantage before it fell in.

Monson was superseded on 13th January, 1616, that is to say shortly after Digby's crushing indictment of 16th December, 1615, had been received. Had his protectors still been in power perhaps they might have warded its effects, but Salisbury and Northampton were both dead, Suffolk was powerless, and Lady Somerset was shortly to stand her trial for her own life. Therefore, not only was Monson dismissed, but his connexion with his great friends and suspected connivance with their crimes was to lead him to the Tower, an episode to which

[49] *Ducky of Lancaster Draught Leases* (R.O.), Bdle. 62. Monson was unlucky in being rather too soon as a landholder. The manor of Gimingham included Sidestrand, Overstrand, and reached to Cromer; later he held Skegness (*post*, p. lii.), another 'improving property.' There were Southwells in Norfolk, Kent, Gloucestershire, and Ireland, but Francis was probably a relative of Sir Robert Southwell of Wood Rising, who married a daughter of Nottingham, and if so we have here another indication of the intimacy between the Howards and Monson, for if the grant was not obtained by Nottingham's influence he could certainly have stopped it, as affecting a connexion by marriage, if he had disapproved.

he makes the barest allusion. It will be remembered that Somerset's—or Rochester as he was then—desire to legitimize by divorce and marriage his adulterous love for Frances Howard, Countess of Essex, Suffolk's daughter and Northampton's grand-niece, had been opposed by Sir Thomas Overbury, who seems to have known of circumstances that would have prevented the Countess obtaining the divorce she and her lover desired.[80] By an intrigue she and Rochester obtained his committal to the Tower in 1613, and there he was poisoned. Northampton, who did his best to assist the marriage, died in June 1614, and thus escaped inquiry into his share of the drama, although the case looks dark against him. There were many minor actors, real or suspected, and among them were Sir Thomas and Sir William Monson. It was not until August 1615 that James knew of the accusation against Somerset and his wife, when the former was already falling out of favour. The King then ordered Lord Chief Justice Coke to examine the matter, and when, upon further information, Sir Gervase Elwes, the Lieutenant of the Tower, and Weston, Overbury's personal attendant, were questioned, they both charged Sir Thomas Monson. The details of the great trial are widely known and need not be recapitulated here. Sir Thomas Monson had been Northampton's *âme damnée*, but it is fair to say that Dr. Gardiner considers that 'against him

[80] It was obtained on the ground of the Earl of Essex's physical incapacity. Weldon says that a daughter of Sir Thomas Monson, heavily veiled, personated the Countess of Essex before the jury of matrons empanelled to examine her.

not a particle of reasonable evidence was in existence.' When he was brought to the bar his trial was postponed, and he was eventually pardoned for a crime to which he persistently refused to plead guilty.

On the day of his supersession Sir William was committed to the Tower,[51] and of course his misfortune delighted the Dutch. In February the inhabitants of Dunkirk were inquisitive about his fate, 'they make show to be sorry for his imprisonment, reputing him to be a very honest gentleman, but these be of the Spanish nation who esteem thus of him.'[52] Most of Monson's contemporaries, interested in the news of the day, expressed their ignorance as to the cause of his arrest; those who ventured an opinion naturally associated it with the Overbury murder. The fact that his brother was implicated, and his own close association with the Howards and, perhaps, with Somerset through Lady Somerset, pointed to the probability, and Coke must have borne the contingency in mind when fishing for evidence. The following paper of questions to be put by him to Monson is of an omnibus character, and calculated to lead to other matter in the absence of definite knowledge on the part of the prosecution :—[53]

Queries—

What moved you to recommend your nephew, Gilbert

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[51] *Letters of Geo. Lord Carew*, p. 23, Camd. Soc.

[52] Collins, *Sidney Papers*, ii. p. 344.

[53] *State Papers Dom. James I.* lxxxvi. 7. It is endorsed 'Sir William Monson,' but is divided into two parts, the second half —not here printed—apparently relating to Lady Somerset.

Reresby,[54] to be page to the Archduke, and whether had not Owen, and Stampard his servant, charge under him.

Whether he had not a pension from Spain.

Intelligence with Diego Orteis, the Governor of Dunkirk.

The like with Evan de Maunseder,[55] the King of Spain's Secretary at War in the Netherlands.

He and Captain Chester passed Jesuits, priests, and ill-affected persons in the King's ships into Flanders.[56]

Transports of ordnance, wool, hides, and other prohibited commodities.

His speech publicly at Antwerp about two years ago concerning religion.

Intelligence with one Mr. Richard Baillie, an Englishman residing at Brussels.

It will be seen from this that, besides the matter of the pension, the admiral was suspected of Popery, connivance in carrying forbidden passengers, carriage of forbidden goods, and illicit communication with Spanish officials. Against the charge of Popery Monson defended himself, and proclaimed his ortho-

[54] Second son of Sir Thos. Reresby, of Thryberg, Yorks, and of Mary Monson, Sir William's sister. The lady, who is described as 'a woman of wit, but of a masculine spirit, a too great lover of sack as she grew in years, and unfortunate both to her husband, her son, and her family,' exemplified the Catholic proclivities of her family by turning Papist after her marriage. Gilbert Reresby was certainly a Catholic because he 'was brought up with Isabel, Infanta of Spain, then Governess of the Low Countries, where, afterwards, being out of pagehood, he commanded a company, and after a regiment of foot, there for many years, till following Count Mansfelt in his revolt from the Infanta . . . he lost his command and fled to Paris, where he died many years after in good esteem' (*Memoirs of Sir John Reresby*, Lond. 1875, p. 11). If the pagehood was really given on Monson's recommendation the circumstance is very significant as to his relations with the Spaniards.

[55] Don Juan de Mancicidor.

[56] Captain James Chester only appears in the pay lists as having commanded the Seven Stars, a pinnace, from 21st October, 1615, to 15th January, 1616. He was superseded by Captain Andrew Shilling two days after Monson was removed.

doxy by applying for permission to have a preacher to attend him in the Tower.[57] It was fortunate for him that James was anxious to suppress the business of the Spanish pensions and drew Coke off that scent, and necessarily from the other matters. The baulked Chief Justice could not refrain from a growl: 'What Sir William Monson is your Majesty knoweth, and good many rejoice he is where he is.'[58] So far from leaving the prisoner to the tender mercies of the 'bloodhounds of the Crown,' James did him the honour of taking his case in hand himself, and, in April, Francis Bacon wrote to Coke that the King required all Monson's examinations to be sent to him. This must have been done, his liberation being already decided upon, as a precaution that nothing relating to the pensions should become known, and on 17th July Monson was set free, but not, we may be sure, because James was convinced of his innocence. In the letter to Lord Ellesmere[59] he says that the consequence of his arrest —it can hardly be called prosecution—was that his estate was ruined and his lands seized by forfeiture, but there is no trace in the records of the slightest punishment being inflicted upon him. In the same letter he ascribes his degradation to his forwardness in complaining of the state of the navy and pressing schemes for its reform, to the enemies he had made by his arrest of Arabella Stewart, and to the enmity of the Dutch. 'I did, as I might well do, impute my imprisonment chiefly to them and their friends' prac-

[57] Bayley, *History of the Tower*, p. 558.

[58] *State Papers Dom. James I.* February 8, 1615-16; Coke to the King.

[59] Book II.

tices.' That may have been very well for the country gentlemen for whom the MS. copies of the 'Tracts' were intended, although no doubt some even of them were better informed. The imputation against the Dutch can only be described in one way; and as for Arabella, not only were her friends quite powerless to do him any harm, but nothing could have brought him into more favour at court than his prompt action when her flight was discovered. As for his zeal for naval reform, to which he attributes his downfall, the address to Cecyll on naval corruption [60] to which he ascribes it, assigned to 1603, must have been conderably sub-edited before circulation, as Cecyll died in 1612, and events of 1623 are referred to in it; moreover it is only to be found in two of the MSS. examined for this edition, both of late date. Monson was not the man to say offensive things to those in power while he was in active employment, and if he did criticize it would be with due consideration for official feelings, notwithstanding his own statement that he had aroused the enmity of the Navy Officers. That he had incurred the Lord Admiral Nottingham's ill-will by associating himself with the commission of inquiry of 1612-13 into naval affairs there is no evidence. His name is not mentioned in association with it, and in 1614 his eldest daughter, Jane, married Sir Francis Howard, of Lingfield, Nottingham's nephew, an alliance that would hardly have been made but with the earl's approval. Moreover at this time Monson's second son was in Nottingham's family as the countess's page, which shows that friendly relations existed between them.

[60] *Post*, ii. pp. 237 *et seq.*

Monson certainly possessed the estate of Kinnersley, some three miles south of Reigate, in 1624,[61] but whether he held it at this date and retired there from the Tower is unknown. In 1617 he was called before the Privy Council to advise as to the best form of an attack on Algiers,[62] the Algerine pirates, not content with their depredations in the Mediterranean, having, under the guidance of Christian renegades, recently adopted square-rigged ships and extended their sphere of operations to the Azores and the Channel. His opinion was adverse to the probability of success if it was expected to be obtained from a surprise attack; and, indeed, he seems to have regarded the enterprise as hopeless in any form, but, as in all these papers, there is the doubt as to what was originally said or written, and how far the narration was re-edited under the influence of later events, opinions, or prejudices. In the 'Tracts'[63] the Churchill text says that Nottingham

[61] MS. Life. Probably all his children were born before he became possessed of Kinnersley. John Monson was born at Bugbrooke, 10th September, 1597; Wm. Monson, 2nd February, ⅓⅓⅓, in London; Francis, baptized St. Giles, Cripplegate, 30th January, 160⅓; Anne, baptized 27th February, 160⅚, at Boston; Elizabeth, baptized St. Dunstan's in the West, 27th June, 1605. Lord Monson says (MS. Life): 'I have looked carefully through the Reigate registers and have found no entries at all to the family, though many of the Howards are registered therein.' The most famous Howard of all, Nottingham, the Lord Admiral of 1588, lies buried in Reigate Church, the inscription on the coffin being 'Here lieth the body of Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham, Lord High Admiral of England, General of Queen Elizabeth's Navy Royal at sea against the Spaniards Invincible Navy in the year of our Lord 1588, who departed this life at Haling House, the 14th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1624. Ætatis sue 87' (Manning and Bray, *Hist. of Surrey*, i. p. 321).

[62] Book II.

[63] Book II., *Danger and Uncertainty of Surprising Algiers.*

was in favour of the attempt, and this reading is supported by the only MS. that contains the passage. On the other hand, Dr. Gardiner writes[64] that the Lord Admiral held the same opinion as Monson, and there is an original improbability in supposing that the latter was called up to oppose Nottingham, or that he would not have evaded the necessity. Further, printed text and MS. are both wrong in implying that in 1617 Buckingham was the moving spirit in the affair; it was the Earl of Southampton.

The next incident in Monson's life calling for notice is his connexion, active or passive, with another court intrigue, and it must be confessed that, for a man who laid claim to such spotless integrity of character, he was peculiarly unfortunate in some of the occurrences with which he was mixed up. George Villiers, afterwards Duke of Buckingham, had replaced Somerset as the King's favourite, but he had not risen by favour of the Howards and their faction, who were still struggling for power, and they and Villiers regarded each other with open hostility. If James must have a favourite, the Howards thought, it had better be one of their choice and of their own party, and what more natural than that the family of that faithful dependant Sir William Monson should be thus honoured. After several tentative selections William, the admiral's second son, was definitely preferred, a young man who, as his subsequent life proved, possessed all his father's worst qualities in a superlative form without

[64] *Hist. of England*, iii. p. 70.

one of his redeeming merits. In 1618 the boy was in his nineteenth year, and, as previously noticed, had been a page to Margaret, Countess of Nottingham,[65] the Lord Admiral's second wife, a post which made him known to all the other Howards. The progress of the scheme can be followed in Chamberlain's letters; in January 1618 he notices that some young men, and among them a son of Sir William Monson, 'begin to come into consideration.' A month later the new candidate for honours has shot his bolt: 'most of our young gallants are vanished like mushrooms by reason the day before the King's going to Theobalds the Lord Chamberlain by express order told young Monson that the King did not like of his forwardness and presenting himself continually about him, that his father, Sir William Monson, and his uncle, Sir Thomas, were not long since called in question for matters of no small moment; that his own education had been in such places, and with such persons, as was not to be allowed of; wherefore his Majesty willed him henceforth to forbear his presence, and if he would follow the Lord Chamberlain's advice he would likewise forbear the Court. This was a shrewd reprimand and cross-blow to some who, they say, made account to rise and recover their fortunes by setting up this new idol, and took great pains in pricking and pranking him up besides washing his face every day with posset curd.'[66] The reference to his education and associations was directed at

[65] Baker's *Chronicle*, ed. 1665, p. 718.
[66] Chamberlain to Carleton, 28th February, 161⅞.

the supposed Catholic tendencies of his family,[67] and, to clear himself from the suspicion, 'young Monson, since his dismission, hath frequented the Church and the Communion, whereto the lord of Canterbury is a witness, which he thinks will wash away all imputations and give him free passage.'[68] Dr. Gardiner remarks on this 'often as the holy bread and wine have been prostituted to serve personal and political ends they have been seldom, if ever, made use of for a more degrading object. It is satisfactory to know that nothing was gained by those who stooped to such a profanation.' However, his friends did not yet despair of his chances, and on 27th March Chamberlain writes 'the young gallant I wrote you of is not quite so discarded but that he takes all opportunities to present himself, being well seconded on all occasions by his friends and abettors;' and on 18th April that 'young Monson's friends faint not for all their first foil.' As the intrigue failed the embryo courtier did the next best thing from his point of view—deserted the Howards and attached himself to Buckingham, by whose favour he was knighted in 1623, and subsequently proved the truth of at least half of Fuller's pithy aphorism, that courts 'are pastures where elder brothers are observed to grow lean and younger brothers fat.' Of course when Buckingham's enemies were closing round him

[67] The elder brother, John, was an avowed Papist, 'Sir William Monson's eldest son (not he that should or would have been the favourite) was committed to the Gatehouse on Sunday for arguing on some points of Popery' (Chamberlain to Carleton, 30th May, 1623). At the same time Nottingham described him as 'a most dangerous Papist.'

[68] Chamberlain to Carleton, 7th March, 161$\frac{4}{5}$.

young Monson ratted, and in the Parliament of 1626, in which he sat for Reigate, appears to have made a speech on the sale of Admiralty places, attacking the Duke.[69] In October 1625 he married his old mistress, Nottingham's widow, and the union was distinctly a social elevation for himself and his family; they were married at Reigate, being the centre of the Nottingham property, and 'the next day she rid through the market and hath since made more than ordinary visits to her neighbours to show her new husband.'[70]

The principal interest for us in this little story lies in any light it may throw upon the elder Monson's character. There is not one word in the 'Tracts,' in the Dedication of the first book to the elder son, or in the Dedication of the second book to the second son, that would lead a reader ignorant of the facts to suppose that the subject of the later Dedication had been the centre of a court intrigue, carried on by peculiarly unscrupulous and despicable methods. We have a great deal of worldly wisdom, still more of lofty morality superior to the trivial ambitions, paltry objects, and mean devices common

[69] There are two versions of the gist of his speech. 'By Sir Wm. Monson, that the Lady Nottingham saith the 3,000*l.* was paid and the 1,000*l.* out of the Customs granted on that consideration' (*Parliamentary History to the Restoration*, Lond. 1751, vii. p. 59); 'Sir Wm. Monson, that upon resignation of the Admiralty he was offered Privy Seal had Mowbray annexed received the 3,000*l.*' (Hist. MSS. Commission, App. to 13th Report, *Lonsdale MSS.* p. 13). The subject is evidently the price paid to the Earl of Nottingham when he resigned the post of Lord Admiral in favour of Buckingham.

[70] Hist. MSS. Commission, App. to 4th Report, *Delawarr MSS.* p. 306.

to average humanity.[71] All the virtues are held up to admiration, all the vices are condemned, and, by implication, the very objects for which Sir William Monson the younger was striving, and to those who know anything of the life history of the, later, Viscount Monson of Castlemaine, the contrast between all these noble sentiments and the sordid career they illustrated will not lack the elements of humour or pathos. There are warnings against courtiers and court life it is true, but rather on account of the worldly dangers to be feared than because the life itself was ignoble. Yet notwithstanding the elevated feeling of these Dedications the 'young Monson' of the Howard faction could

[71] Some of the aphorisms in Monson's dedications bear a suggestive resemblance to those by other writers, and certain of the similarities are noticed in the proper places. Among other authors he appears to have read and assimilated Pierre de la Primaudaye's *L'Académie Françoise*, a book of the Montaigne type, of which several translations in English were published between 1586 and 1618. Probably Monson was neither intentionally nor consciously a plagiarist, but applied in other circumstances, and without too close an examination of their source, such reflections as had impressed him in reading and seemed proper to his subject. La Primaudaye writes: 'Children cannot please their parents better than to love one another.' Monson expands this into several sentences (*post*, p. 111), and although the root idea is the same, and he had no doubt read La Primaudaye, it does not follow that he was knowingly paraphrasing the French writer, although the image may never have occurred to him had it not been latent in his mind, though perhaps forgotten by the conscious memory. Monson was not a psychological anatomist, and how far adaptation may proceed before it becomes plagiarism it is not necessary to discuss. He was a practical rather than an abstract thinker, and just as his naval criticisms are based almost entirely upon his personal experience and observation, so his finer thoughts were the offspring rather of his application of other men's deductions to the particular circumstance needing illustration than of any marked analytical insight of his own.

hardly have been thrust forward without his father's knowledge and consent. Monson was, there is every reason to believe, a strict, and perhaps harsh, father; that the second son was an obedient one, even after his marriage, is implied in one phrase used;[72] and the fact that there is no condemnation of any of the younger Monson's previous proceedings is in itself sufficient evidence that what he had done had been done with his father's approbation. The warnings in the Dedication are rather admonitions not to tempt Fate again, or to tempt it cautiously, than rebukes for anything past. In seizing what appeared to be a favourable opportunity to recover his own fortunes and to make those of his son Monson did not sink below the standard of his own or later ages, but here again we have the disagreement between the actual facts and the public claim to a life of unblemished honour in act, and thought, and intention.

The failure of the Howard scheme was followed by the disgrace and prosecution of the Lord Treasurer, Suffolk, who, if innocent of the bribery and peculation with which he was charged, was unquestionably guilty of gross carelessness and inefficiency, and the surrender by Nottingham of his office of Lord Admiral. With the disappearance from power of the Howard family all Monson's hopes of employment must have passed away, and he seems to have resigned himself to an uneventful life at Kinnersley. It was no doubt this enforced leisure, and perhaps the feeling which Sir Richard Hawkyns put into words that 'there hath been little

[72] 'I know my request is no sooner propounded than granted' (Book II., *Dedication*).

curiosity in our country in writing of the discipline of the sea, which is not less necessary for us than that of the law,'[73] which prompted him to write his recollections and criticisms; and he appears to have contemplated at this time only the first book of the 'Tracts,' although he proposed to include in it subjects subsequently enlarged upon in the later books. There are many more copies of the first book in MS. than of the succeeding books; the dated examples are of 1624,[74] which corresponds, roughly, to the eighteen years of peace mentioned in the Dedication to the elder son. During Northampton's lifetime Monson had been frequently in communication with the earl on the subject of the fisheries, in which they were both interested, and to which he continued to give his attention, not, perhaps, without an eye to the injury that might thus be inflicted on the Dutch. In 1623 he was apparently considered an authority on the subject, for in March Lord Carew wrote to Secretary Calvert that he had consulted with Monson and others about one of the many abortive plans proposed to restore the failing industry.[75] In the same year the old Lord Admiral declared that the elder son, John, was a

[73] It is much to be regretted that the treatise Ralegh says that he had written on the art of war by sea, 'a subject to my knowledge never handled by any man, ancient or modern,' has not come down to us. In Ralegh's time there were several treatises on the subject in existence, in both the living and dead languages, although not in English, but being in MS. they were unknown to him.

[74] However *Add. MSS.* 9298 in one passage speaks of 'this of 1622' as the date of writing. As printed in the Churchill edition, Book I. includes passages that must have been written after 164c and are not to be found in any of the MSS. examined.

[75] *State Papers Dom. James I.* 8th March, 162$\frac{3}{4}$.

dangerous Papist, 'neither Garnet, Constable, nor Tobie Mathew is comparable to him.' Nottingham also said that John Monson delighted in striving to pervert people, and that he had turned him out of his house for attempted proselytism.[76] Halling House, where Nottingham died the next year, is not far from Kinnersley, but the Lord Admiral was now helpless to advance or to injure Monson's fortunes; still, under the circumstances, he would not draw too much attention to himself, and there is nothing in the first book that those in authority need have taken ill. The circulation of the MSS. did not injure him, for in the same year the question of the Lizard light was referred to him for an opinion, but he was passed over for the Cadiz voyage of 1625 and the expeditions which followed it, a slight due probably to his bad civil record, his known connexion with the Howards, and perhaps to the attitude of the younger Sir William, rather than to anything that he had written. He disclaimed any feeling of soreness, but the amended text as now printed[77] shows his bitterness towards Buckingham, to whose antipathy he attributed it that he was left in retirement.

Monson says that he had decided at the time of his imprisonment to write an account of his dealings with the Dutch, but neglects to tell his readers that

[76] *State Papers Dom. James I.* 20th May, 1623; Nottingham to the Archbishop of Canterbury. If ill-will existed between Monson and Nottingham this may have been the cause and the time, and not his eagerness for reform (see *ante*, p. xxxiv). He was not likely to quarrel with Nottingham while the Howards had any influence.

[77] Book II., *The Ill-managed Enterprise on Algiers.*

that imprisonment was connected with subjects quite distinct from his conduct towards them. He may have hesitated while so many persons who knew the truth were alive, and although fragments of what is now Book II. are included in Book I., circulated in 1624, the second book, in anything approaching its present form, is of very much later date, and we may be confident that when it was written its dissemination was very much more limited than that of its predecessor, which was scattered broadcast. From the Dedication it would appear to have been written in, or not long after, 1625, the year of William Monson's marriage, but its arrangement as we have it is not the original one, which neither in point of courage nor date could have contained the very unrestrained comments on home administration, domestic events, and foreign expeditions that occurred later than that year. It must have been edited and expanded considerably before, being issued again with the other books—the form in which it is usually found—when he had little to hope or fear from the court or ministers.[78] However much or little the second book contained, its issue appears to have assuaged for the time the desire to write, and nothing more is known to have come from his pen for some years except a fragment on the Fisheries in 1629. He probably did what he could to keep himself in the recollection of those in power, and, in 1631, he was noted as suitable for an appointment as a Commissioner of the Chatham Chest, although in the end

[78] Certain sections of Book II. (*An Introduction to the Earl of Northumberland's Voyage*, and *How to Make War upon Scotland*) were evidently written in or after 1640.

he was not nominated.[79] In 1632 we have another dated paper[80] on Dutch and English fishing, which afterwards became a portion of the sixth book of the 'Tracts,' and in 1634 the advisability of a proposed lighthouse on one of the Forelands was referred for his consideration.[81] On the title-page of the Harleian MS. of 1632 Monson describes himself as 'sometime Vice-Admiral of England.' In the strict sense this must have been untrue, because the post of Vice-Admiral of England, only second in rank and importance to that of Lord Admiral, was held by Letters Patent from the Crown, and there is no record of such an appointment on the Patent Roll or among the Signet Office Bills. Moreover, in the 'Tracts,' Monson not only does not refer to his having held the office, of which he would naturally have been proud, but in Book III., in describing the duties of the various officers of the Admiralty, omits those of the Lieutenants of the Admiralty, or Vice-Admirals, because it 'is a place not extended to any late precedents to manifest itself and therefore omitted.' There was no Vice-Admiral of England between Sir R. Leveson, who died in 1605, and Sir Robert Mansell, whose Patent for life was dated 14th May, 1618, and who outlived Monson. The dignity is sometimes confused with that of the vice-admirals of the coasts who were much inferior, being country gentlemen, belonging to the maritime counties, appointed by the Lord Admiral to safeguard his legal and pecuniary rights, and to

[79] *State Papers Dom. Charles I.* ccxxx. 25.
[80] *Harl. MSS.* 4113.
[81] *State Papers Dom. Charles I.* cclxxxiii. 104.

assist in pressing men and other naval matters. If Monson meant that he had been a vice-admiral of the coast, which is possible, although no reference to his action in such a capacity has been found, or that he had been vice-admiral of a fleet, he knew quite well that in calling himself Vice-Admiral of England he was using a title to which he had no right and claiming an honour that he had never held.

It seems probable that the 'noble friend' to whom the letter on the miscarriages of the Cadiz expedition of 1625 was dedicated was Algernon Percy, tenth Earl of Northumberland, now coming into prominence in naval affairs, and if so we see that Monson had still an eye for powerful protectors. Moreover, his defence of ship money and of the King's policy must have inclined those in authority to overlook any earlier lapses now nearly forgotten. Whatever Monson's merits as an admiral they would not, alone, have sufficed to obtain employment for him again, belonging as he did to a past generation and with younger and better known officers eager for work. His personal feeling at being ignored in 1625 comes out very clearly in his criticisms of the Cadiz voyage of that year. Therefore his appointment as Vice-Admiral of the fleet of 1635 was almost undoubtedly due to the influence of a patron who may have been Northumberland or Archbishop Laud, although the Earl of Lindsey commanded the fleet. He certainly had some connexion and friendship with Northumberland, as the number of MS. copies of the 'Tracts' preserved at Petworth shows, and the earl was equally interested

in the encouragement of the English fisheries and in naval reform. But Monson was also very friendly with Archbishop Laud, and, besides sending him messages, kept a journal of the proceedings of the fleet for his information. The fact that Monson's services were not required when Northumberland himself commanded a fleet the next year may show either that Laud was the patron or that the Admiral had not given satisfaction in every way. He seems, however, to have got on well enough with Lindsey and the Rear-Admiral, Penington, and his self-esteem must have been gratified by the respect paid to his opinions.[82] After they had been at sea a month Penington wrote to Nicholas that 'there had never been the least word of discontent' between himself and Monson, which rather suggests that difficulties had been expected. But naval discipline had degenerated considerably since the days of Elizabeth, and Monson's conceptions of what was fit and proper must frequently have been trying to his colleagues and subordinates. Many of those now at sea under his command had not been born when he was making his reputation, and, besides being always inclined to be a martinet, he was, by 1635, no doubt developing something of the irritability of age and the bias in favour of past times. To have been the subject of his comparisons cannot have altogether pleased the human weakness of the ordinary man, and, as he had been criticizing naval affairs for many years, and could have

[82] 'Hereupon my Lord called a council, and it pleased his honour and the rest of the captains to consent to my directions if we came to fight' (*Journal*).

seen no improvement, he no doubt said so at sea. In Book III.[83] he writes on the subject in a strain of uncompromising frankness, and although a marginal note asserts that it was written before Northumberland's appointment as Lord Admiral, that is before 1638, the fact may be doubted, or, at least, that if written it was circulated. It is certain that when, in January 163$\frac{5}{6}$, he, with other officers of rank, was asked to give his opinions and suggest reforms, he sent in a paper treating of the evils he had noticed in which he expresses himself with calculated moderation;[84] but if he spoke and wrote in private as plainly as to Lord Maltravers he must have made many enemies among those whose interests were affected.[85] Whatever the explanation he never went to sea again; Dr. Gardiner says[86] that the reason that he was not employed in 1636 was that he was a Roman Catholic, but this is a mistake based on the Spanish ambassador's incorrect report to his Government.

Monson passed the remaining seven years of his life in retirement at Kinnersley, and, if we may judge by the shaky character of his signature in 1635, his health was probably failing; it was during this period that the 'Tracts' were expanded and arranged for publication, especially when the political difficulties overwhelming the King made it certain that plain speaking could no longer harm the author. But until those difficulties assumed an

[83] Section, *The Corrupt Abuses used in His Majesty's Service at Sea.*

[84] Printed in Appendix to Book II.

[85] Appendix of Letters, Book II.

[86] *Hist. of England*, viii. p. 156.

acute form he was still employed in consultative matters, perhaps as a retaining fee for his loyalty. In May 1637 a council of war, not the first constituted during the seventeenth century, was nominated to consider plans for the defence of the kingdom and for offensive warfare, with power to appoint officers and have general direction, and Monson was named a member of the Commission.[87] In 1639 he was directed, in conjunction with Wm. Lynch, to hold an inquiry into certain 'insolences' alleged to have been committed by the Dutch, and this is the last time that his name occurs in a public document. The preparation of the 'Tracts' must have occupied much of his time for it seems evident that only the first book, with fragments of the subjects treated in the following books incorporated in it, was written about 1624, and that the other five books were composed towards the end of his life, being either new material or enlargements of short and imperfect papers. For instance, the *Project how to ruin Spain with the assistance of Holland* (Book V.) must have been written before 1630, because the charter of the Providence Island Company was granted in that year, but the section does not occur in any of the earlier MSS. examined. There are no early and separate examples of the later books; they are only found in the complete and finished sets of the 'Tracts.' His work may have been ready for the press, but the times were not propitious for authorship, and he died in February 164$\frac{2}{3}$ without having seen them in print, and was buried on 13th February at St. Martin's-in-the-Fields. His wife

[87] *State Papers Dom. Charles I.* 9th May, 17th June, 1637.

outlived him but he left no will, and administration was granted to the second son, William, now Viscount Monson, although the elder son, John, did not die until 20th August, 1645.[88]

Monson had three sons, John, William, and Francis, the last of whom died young, and some nine daughters. John, who is only noticed by his contemporaries as the 'dangerous Papist,' married Ann Mayne in 1641, and from the deed of settlement in consideration of his wife's jointure we find that his father held, besides Kinnersley, 120 acres of land in the parishes of Minster and Eastchurch in Kent, and the manors of Croft and Skegness in Lincolnshire. Kinnersley and the property in Kent were settled on John and his issue, subject to a jointure of 200*l.* a year to the wife; the Lincolnshire estates were charged with 4,000*l.* for the benefit of the children of John Monson and then in tail male to Lord Monson, or, in default of him and his heirs, to others in turn.[89] This may explain why John, already provided for, does not appear in the administration of the will, and it would appear that the Admiral deprived himself of all his landed property by the settlement. John left an infant daughter, Anne, who married Sir Francis Throckmorton, of Coughton, Warwickshire, and in 1666 they sold the manor of Kinnersley, then containing about 160 acres.[90] William, Lord Monson, after living through a discreditable career, left one son, who died childless, so that the Admiral ceased to be represented

[88] MS. Life. Deeds in possession of the Monson family.
[89] Monson family deeds.
[90] Manning and Bray, *Hist. of Surrey*, ii. p. 197.

in the direct male line. The present Monson peerage was created in 1728 in favour of a descendant of Sir William's eldest brother.

The genesis of the 'Tracts' has been shown to have extended over a long series of years. Very many copies of the first book, sometimes including fragments afterwards amplified into the later books, must have perished, but a sufficient number still remains to show how freely it must have been distributed. It has been shown that the MSS. of the six complete books may all be referred to the closing years of Monson's life, and of these comparatively few examples exist. The list of MSS. collated for this edition is appended below, but it by no means exhausts the number still to be found in private ownership, although it is not probable that further collation would have brought to light any considerable variants.[91] The first appearance of a part in print was in 1682, when that portion of the first book which contains the voyages between 1585 and 1603 was published with Heywood Townsend's Debates in Parliament, and some other matter, under the title of *Megalopsychy, being a particular and exact account of the last seventeen years of Queen Elizabeth's reign, both military and civil. The first written by Sir William Monson, one of the Queen's*

[91] The only important *codex* that the Editor regrets to have had no opportunity to study closely is that at Petworth, belonging to Lord Leconfield, which, on a cursory examination, appeared to be the fullest of all the MSS., and was no doubt given by Monson to the Earl of Northumberland. The late Lord Leconfield refused to send the volumes to the British Museum or Record Office, and the Editor did not feel justified in recommending the Council to go to the expense of keeping a collator at Petworth for some weeks.

Admirals: the second written by Heywood Townsend, Esq., &c. The publisher does not say where he obtained the MS., but it is evidently an early copy of the first book of 1624, and Monson would not have been particularly happy had he been able to see this mangled and truncated publication. However, it may have stimulated curiosity, and have determined Messrs. A. & S. Churchill, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, to print all the six books in their collection of travels published in 1704. They tell us that the text was made up from a collation of two copies of the MSS., although 'without presuming to alter Sir William's sense or design in the least,' but they admit correcting 'abundance of oversights.' It would have been of great interest to have obtained those copies for this edition because, as noticed in the proper places, they evidently contained passages, especially dates, not to be found in any of the MSS. now examined, but they were no doubt purchased for the purpose and destroyed when they had served their end. None of the MSS. now used is in Monson's handwriting, nor is there any reason to suppose that those used by the Churchills were holograph, so that there is no particular inviolability about any one of the MSS., which frequently differ verbally, any more than about the Churchill text. Therefore a text has been made by collation of the MSS. with the Churchill edition, accepting the authority of numbers for minor alterations made, and quoting any variants of importance in footnotes.

It is not known with certainty who edited the work for Messrs. Churchill, but he was clearly a

practised writer and a master of English. Monson's reputation as a writer has gained greatly at his hands, for in the originals the involved, obscure, and unpunctuated sentences run on interminably as in his letters.[92] It has been said that John Locke wrote the Introduction on Navigation for Churchill's collection. Apparently the only foundation for this belief is a passage in Locke's will where, after directing that as Bodley's librarian had done him the honour of asking for his works for the University they were to be presented to the Bodleian, he adds 'Whereas I am informed there is a design of publishing two other volumes as a continuation of the collection of voyages published this year by A. and S. Churchill in four volumes folio, it is my will that my executors shall in my name present to the said Bodleian Library the two intended volumes also when they come out.'[93] Unless Locke had had something to do with the first four volumes there is no obvious reason why he should have ordered the two following ones to be presented 'also' with his other works; but it does not at all follow, and is in fact very unlikely, that if he did write the Introduction he undertook the hack work of editing any of the various items as well. On the other hand it should be noticed that in his Preface to the 'Tracts' the Editor writes, as though he were a well-known man, of 'that brevity which I

[92] The MS. title of *Harl. MSS.* 4113 is a good illustration of Monson's own style, purporting as it does to be 'by Sir William Monson, sometime Vice-Admiral of England and now in agitation,' &c. Of course what is meant is that the formation of a Royal Fishery Corporation was in agitation.

[93] King's *Life of Locke*, Lond. 1829, p. 267.

have always affected when anything has appeared abroad under my own name.' Awnsham Churchill was an old friend of Locke's, but Mr. H. R. Fox Bourne[94] thinks that 'it is not at all likely' that Locke had anything to do with the book beyond advising Churchill to undertake it. The difficulty, however, recurs why, if that were the case, he should have included it among his works, and if he did write the Introduction it is just possible that the 'Tracts' struck him as being especially interesting, and that he may have edited them in particular. Mr. Justin Winsor says[95] that the editor was Caleb Locke, but no such person is known to those best acquainted with eighteenth century literature, and although Mr. Winsor is now dead, inquiry among his fellow workers seems to point to the probability that he passed a printer's error in allowing Caleb to stand for John. The arrangement of the material in the Churchill edition has been retained, for nothing would be gained and much would be lost by any attempt to place the various sections in a chronological sequence corresponding to a probable time of composition. In the MSS. there is no uniformity, the subjects occurring in irregular order, and they are more fittingly left in their present position, and certain portions which occur in the Churchill edition, but are not to be found in any of the MSS., are still preserved in this one. New editions of Churchill's *Voyages and Travels* were issued in 1732, 1744, and 1752, but with no alteration of the text of the 'Tracts.'

[94] *Life of John Locke.*
[95] *History of America*, i. p. xxxiv.

Although Monson had not in his work a leading intention of writing history, he no doubt considered that it was valuable historically, if in a secondary aspect to his criticisms and suggestions. Before the State Papers and other collections of official documents were available, it was of more worth as an authority than it is now, when we know far more of the movements and men that made history and of their secret motives, not only than did Monson, but more than the sovereigns and statesmen of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries knew about each other. Thus his history, limited to contemporary knowledge, and not even that of one of the inner ring, is unimportant, nor, even where he himself was a leading actor, does he seem to have stated all that he knew, but only sufficient to support his case or illustrate his thesis. To his mind he was, as he says, not writing history but applying the lessons to be learned from certain facts in the past as warnings for the future, and doing this not only in reference to his own profession, but also to the wider questions of commerce and politics, on which he pronounces with equal confidence. He drew largely on the Hakluyt and Purchas collections, and on other contemporary publications, for his material in writing about English and foreign voyages and discoveries and the fisheries, but that of course is not a matter of reproach if he used it to throw a new light on old doctrines or to support new views. An editor of to-day would compress the book remorselessly if it were to be printed for the first time, depriving it of much unnecessary, before printed, or erroneous matter, but there would

still remain a large portion of great interest both in relation to the royal and commercial navies and the strategical and tactical conceptions of Monson and his contemporaries. He comes down to us as the first English seaman who has left on record not only an account of the events in which he took part, but also a critical examination of the seamen of his own time and of those who preceded and succeeded him; therefore he holds, perhaps, an unduly high place in our estimation. His opinions will be discussed more closely in the Introduction to Book I., but in considering his position as a critic it is evident that, while his grasp of general principles is, within certain limits, frequently broad and firm if writing peacefully at home, when he commits himself to proposals of his own in the stress of operations his advice is sometimes as contemptuous of the principles of naval war as that of any of those he is most ready to condemn. The plan to attack Spain that he says he drew up at the Queen's request in the winter of 1602[96]—there is always the doubt how far these sections were later 'prepared' for the press in the light of subsequent elaboration and experience—is an illustration of the application of the strategical art in its highest and widest significance, to the winning not merely of a victory but of a peace, to crushing instead of wounding the enemy. On the other hand, in 1597, he deliberately and in writing advises Essex to sail direct to the Azores, leaving the road to the Channel open to a Spanish fleet in Ferrol, advice which can only be explained by a contempt for Spanish power that he certainly did

[96] Book V., *How to Make War upon Spain.*

not feel, an easy acceptance of chances,[97] or a type of mind more fitted to deal with general principles than with particular applications of them. This instance is chosen as being one in which others, his contemporaries, saw more clearly than he; in other questions on which he took a wrong view he was only not in advance of his time, and, after all abatements, there will still remain much that might have been written in the present day, after the experience of nearly three centuries of continuous naval warfare and widely disseminated description of, and comment upon, it.

Monson was not the only Elizabethan seaman who thought for himself, but he has the advantage of having been the only one whose opinions, compiled in an interesting manner and mingled with history, have been handed down in a relatively accessible form. Many able papers lie forgotten among the archives; many Elizabethan sailors of reputation died silent in that they have left no record; but as a strategical theorist he will not compare for a moment with Ralegh or Essex, and although it has been said that the latter's carefully reasoned arguments were probably not his own—a conjecture that I am unable to accept—that cannot be said of the former. We might be better able to determine Monson's true position among English admirals had he ever commanded a fleet against an enemy resolved to fight, or under circumstances of any difficulty; as it is his reputation is rather that of

[97] 'In your return from thence (the Azores) you will find the shipping either in the same state you left them in harbour, or if you meet them at sea you will encounter them upon advantage.'

the pen, which is a reputation won by different qualities from those necessary to victory in high command. That he was foreseeing, vigilant, sagacious, and resourceful, a good practical seaman, and one who had advanced mentally beyond the standard of the mere fighting captain or admiral is certain; whether he possessed those higher qualities which go to make a great commander he had no opportunity of showing. But a man is the product of his temperament and his experiences. Monson has written nothing that would lead us to suppose that Nature had gifted him with the quick perception, the innate capacity to fit the deed to the moment and the moment to the deed which characterizes great seamen and soldiers. In civil life he was cautious and calculating, and satisfied with small achievements; his advice to his sons is to follow the road which leads to little successes and obscure ease. Nor in his professional career down to 1603 had he encountered or recognized any of those eventful opportunities that are seized or made by the select few marked for greatness.

Near the end of his work Monson refers to 'another book that is written by the same author entitled *Certain Considerations that are not Worthy of the Name of History that happened to England since the year* 1588 *and a little before.*' The expression is vague and the passage does not occur in any of the MSS. examined, but there are several copies of the *Certain Observations* in the British Museum Library and elsewhere, and, from various turns of expression and slight allusive evidence it seems probable that Monson was the

writer. The Catholic sympathies of the author are strongly indicated, but as a contribution to history it has no value.

The following MSS. have been collated with the Churchill text in the preparation of this edition, and are quoted by the adjoined letters when referred to in the text:—

Additional MSS. 9298 (British Museum)	A
Bath MS. (Marquis of Bath)	B
Cotton MSS., Titus B. viii (British Museum)	C
Devonshire MS. (Duke of Devonshire)	D
Harleian MSS. 4113 (British Museum)	H
Rawlinson MSS. A 195B (Bodleian Library)	R
Southwark MS. (Bishop of Southwark)	S
Sloane MSS. 43 (British Museum)	Sl. 1
Sloane MSS. 2496 (British Museum)	Sl. 2

Of these, D and Sl. 1 are dated 1624, and A, C, and Sl. 2, like them, examples of Book I., with portions of the following books intercalated, are no doubt of the same period; R is of doubtful date, containing as it does portions of all six books but with much omitted; H is of 1632 but is concerned only with the fisheries; S is apparently Books I. and II. of a late and complete set, and B is a full collection of all six books.

It is necessary to add a few words on the system of editing adopted. There seemed to be but two courses open, either to reprint Monson with all his sins of commission and omission without any correction, or, if corrections were once begun, to carry out the principle completely. The Council assented to the proposal that the latter course should be followed, and if, in consequence, readers consider

that there is too much editing and too little Monson, the blame must be the Editor's. So far as the first book of the 'Tracts' is concerned it seemed impossible to emend and explain without writing what is practically a history of the maritime side of the Spanish war, and that plan was considered preferable to the alternative of leaving the 'Tracts' untouched. It will be observed that the political and strategical aspects of the war have been dwelt upon rather than the details of fighting. The historian is chiefly interested in the plans which deserved victory or merited defeat, and in the political considerations which moulded them. A battle usually decides nothing and never proves anything, for the greatest leader may be disconcerted by accidents that no human foresight could anticipate, which give an undeserved victory to his opponent; and if he wins it only shows that locally and tactically he was superior for the moment to his enemy. Moreover, our knowledge of Elizabethan naval tactics is so slight, being made up chiefly of surmises and probabilities, that there is no real information to be gained from hypotheses based on the scanty and frequently contradictory statements left to us. But in the long run that power will invariably conquer which in the domain of national strategy directs its forces with the widest appreciation of the field to be occupied, the object to be aimed at, and the concentration of its strength—the utilization of national vigour and sentiment—to the main purpose. Like Napoleon's general, the country that makes the fewest mistakes will win, and while the mistake of a lost battle is redeemable, that of lost opportunities and of a policy

which tries a nation beyond its strength and wastes itself on secondary objects, is irretrievable, and always supplies lessons full of the deepest significance.

The thanks of the Council are due to the Curators of the Bodleian Library, the Duke of Devonshire, the Marquis of Bath, and the Bishop of Southwark for sending MSS. to the British Museum for collation; to Lord Salisbury for permitting transcription of Monson's letters from the Cecil MSS.; to Lord Calthorpe for Pedro de Estrade's letter, printed in an Appendix; and to Lord Monson for the MS. life of the Admiral, written by the present peer's grandfather, the sixth Lord Monson, from which several interesting family details have been quoted. Personally the Editor has to express his gratitude to Rear-Admiral Sir William Wharton, K.C.B., Sir W. H. White, K.C.B., Major Martin Hume, and Mr. R. G. Marsden for information on several points belonging to subjects with which they have expert acquaintance, and to Professor Laughton for various helpful criticisms and suggestions.

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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK I.

IF, when Elizabeth lay dying, she reflected upon her nearly lifelong duel with Philip II., she no doubt thought that much of her success was due to her diplomacy, and that that obtained by war had been won by means not of her fleets, but of her troops in the Low Countries, and her steady, if unwilling, support of a revolt of which the consequences, direct and indirect, were a cancer eating into the national life and resources of Spain. It is possible that we, who agree to-day in a profound appreciation of the all-pervading dominion of sea-power, have in fact attributed more importance, as a final means, to the naval operations as a whole of the Elizabethan war than they are entitled to in comparison with those carried on in France and the Low Countries, which slowly bled Spain to death. We can see that it was only naval superiority that enabled the Dutch to resist or Elizabeth to support them, but how far she understood that, or the value of the weapon and the opportunity placed in her hands, and whether if she had understood them the war might not have been ended much more quickly and decisively, is a question that deserves examination. The subject has been to a great extent obscured by the Chauvinism of English historians, who have too often written as though there had been no navy before Elizabeth's and no English naval strategists before Drake, Monson, Ralegh, and their compeers. The necessary corollary of the exaltation of the deeds of the Elizabethan navy is a corresponding exaggeration of the maritime strength of Spain, for there would clearly be little credit in victory over an antagonist admittedly possessing neither a war navy nor trained seamen. It has been acknowledged lately that in 1588

Howard's fleet was superior as a fighting integer to the unwieldy mass of half-armed ships and transports which formed rather an army corps at sea than a fleet; yet the subsequent years of the war are treated not as though Spain had made a giant effort which exhausted its power for offence, but as if it still possessed immeasurable naval resources, and as if it taxed, or should have taxed, the ability of England to hold its own at sea. A Spanish writer says, truly enough, 'The armament of the Armada in 1588 was Philip's last effort and the expiring flicker of his strength';[1] but Elizabeth still continued to treat his naval pretensions with respect, although many of her subjects gauged the situation more correctly. Elizabeth's reputation for wisdom has led historians, who have usually considered maritime transactions as subsidiary to the more striking military and political performances of camps and courts, to accept her implied estimate of the relative value at the time to England of military and naval action; but it may be possible to show that there has never been a period in English history more felicitous for the use of sea-power with crushing effect, nor an English sovereign more happily situated for its employment by reason of her own strength, the naval and strategical weakness of her enemy, and the non-existence of powerful neutrals. In connection, therefore, with Monson's strategical views, we have to consider whether Elizabeth recognized the peculiar advantages of her position, and to inquire not only how naval effort was exercised, but on what lines it could and should have been used.

Much of the laudation bestowed upon Elizabeth follows naturally from the assumptions that the value of sea-power was first recognized during her reign, that she created and organized the navy, and that for the first time in English history sea-power was applied by her admirals on strategical principles; the last proposition being supposed, even if true, in some obscure way to reflect honour upon her. A brief preliminary examination is therefore necessary to show that England possessed navies and naval teachers before the Elizabethan age; that she created nothing either in material force or in

[1] *Mem. de la Real Acad. de la Hist.* vi. p. 304.

organization ;[1] and that the strategy of 1585–1603 differed in no respect in principle from that which had been employed for centuries, except in an expansion over, and an application to, a wider area—an expansion automatically enforced by the greater distance of the enemy and his political circumstances. We shall see how the conditions under which Philip II. made war varied in one most important feature from any hitherto experienced, making it possible for Elizabeth to defeat Spain without landing a soldier on the Continent, and that notwithstanding persuasions from all classes of her subjects—seamen, merchants, and statesmen—she only followed their advice in a half-hearted way, without conviction, without instruction, and without any clear understanding of the methods essential to success.

It seems a platitude to have to say that from the dawn of national history the territorial security and the capacity for offence of an island State must have depended upon its maritime strength, but the necessary consequence that constant physical and geographical conditions, combined with similar political aims acting through successive ages, necessarily produced uniform effects is not so universally understood. Thus we find the rise of English naval power attributed to various sovereigns or to the influence of particular individuals, an error due to the examination of one period to the exclusion of those preceding and following it, when a fuller inquiry would show a series of constructions and destructions following the mutations of foreign and domestic policy. England was a great sea-power before the Norman Conquest; under the Danish kings its fleets commanded the northern seas, and, outside the Mediterranean, it was the only State possessing a permanent and specialized military fleet. After the Conquest came a period of quiescence, for the Norman kings, being masters of both shores of the Channel and at peace with Flanders, required the navy for transport rather than combatant purposes until Philip Augustus acquired Normandy in 1204. That event was the beginning of an era of continental struggle, which culminated in the

[1] 'To regard her as the creator of England's maritime reputation is a mistake too often committed.'—Corbett, *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, i. p. 128.

Hundred Years' War, and was reflected in a period of continuous naval expansion. During all these centuries a Crown navy had existed side by side with the Cinque Ports contingent and the merchantmen which made up the bulk of the combatant fleets, and our kings were very seldom compelled to hire from abroad,[1] as France did from the Mediterranean States, and Scotland from those of the North. It is only from special histories[2] that any idea can be obtained of the uninterrupted character of the naval struggle and of the equally uninterrupted increase in the number of ships available, both royal and merchant, and of improvements in size and construction. In 1340 Edward III. had a fleet of 250 vessels, and the western ports were able to supply seventy of 100 tons and upwards in burden. In the time of Elizabeth a ship of 100 tons was still considered an effective fighting unit. In 1350, at the battle of Les Espagnols sur Mer, twenty of Edward's fleet were fighting ships of his own, a fact which probably had not a little to do with the result, as the Spaniards, although larger, seem to have been merchantmen and loaded with cargo. The attainment of maritime supremacy was followed, as usual, by carelessness in its maintenance, a mistake not confined to mediæval statesmen, when France was reduced to evasion raids and the treaty of Bretigny procured an unstable peace between 1360 and 1369. In 1359 a prince of the royal house of France declared that while his own country had neither ships nor stores, 'the English have more than any other nation in the world,' and we may take it that the reign of Edward III. was, on the whole, one of great naval vigour, and his navy quite comparable in strength, if we allow for the perspective of time, with others which loom larger because nearer to us.

The reigns of Richard II. and Henry IV. correspond to a period of naval depression or destruction due to the domestic events of the period, but with the reign of Henry V. we arrive at another epoch of expansion, so marked indeed that this king has been called the founder of the Royal Navy by writers who have paid too little attention to the work of those who preceded and followed him. Towards

[1] There are only one or two instances.

[2] *E.g.* Nicolas, *History of the Royal Navy.*

1420 Henry V. possessed a fleet of thirty-eight ships, some prizes and some built by himself, of which nine were of from 400 to 1,000 tons in burden, and comprising a total tonnage as great as that of Elizabeth's navy between 1560 and 1570. He possessed—with the armed merchantmen behind the men-of-war—not merely a great navy, but the greatest of his generation, and the maritime superiority of England within its then natural sphere of action can only be compared with that held over a larger area by Great Britain in 1815.[1] With his death followed the inevitable reaction, and we have to pass to the reign of Henry VII. to notice the commencement of the upward swing. Henry, peaceful and far-seeing, perhaps recognizing that he at least would provide no occupation for a navy, took up a position rather of observation than of action. But his steady if slow increase in the number of his own ships, his inauguration of the bounty system on newly-built sea-going merchantmen, and his construction of Portsmouth dry dock and foundation of the dockyard, initial steps as important as any taken by the greatest of his predecessors or successors, prove that he was as much alive as they to the significance of sea-power and the means to obtain it. It may well be that it was his teaching which determined the perpetuation of his policy and its remarkable development by his son, to which, it is not too much to say, Elizabeth owed the possibility of such naval success as she attained to.

The whole of the reign of Henry VIII. was marked by a continuous enlargement of English naval power, and much of the spoil obtained by the suppression of the monasteries was devoted to that object. We have not to inquire here whether Henry's consistent action in this respect was due to a sagacious recognition of the means which had conferred supremacy on England in the past and would maintain it in the future, or was in part only a mechanical compliance with altered military and political conditions. It is sufficient to emphasize the fact that in number, in organization, and in armament Henry fashioned the navy with which Elizabeth fought Spain, but which

[1] It is significant that English merchants first traded into the Mediterranean during Henry's reign.

she did not keep at nearly the strength designed by its creator. During his reign at least eighty-five sea-going vessels, exclusive of galleys and small auxiliary ships, were added to the navy, making it by far the strongest in the world, and enabling him to hold the balance between Charles V. and Francis I. Not only was the number increased, but the build was improved, rendering them faster, handier, and better sea-boats, and the advance in these respects, compared with the ships of the beginning of the sixteenth century, was greater relatively than any corresponding improvements in shipbuilding under Elizabeth. He constituted an Admiralty department, which enabled Elizabeth to send fleets to sea with a quickness and efficiency far greater than that of her unwieldy antagonist. If Drake was able to go to the coast of Spain and to the West Indies it was because Henry had organized the system, the dockyards, and the magazines which rendered movements at a distance possible. The power of a fleet depends upon rapid action, and this, again, rests upon dockyards, magazines, and control, all of which Elizabeth inherited from her father, while Spain had none of them. Above all, Henry revolutionized the armament of men-of-war by putting heavy field and siege guns on board them in place of the small serpentines, possessing no piercing or smashing capacity, that had hitherto been considered sufficient for warships. It would be impossible to over-estimate the importance of this last change, of which Elizabeth reaped the full benefit, for in her time Spain, slow and conservative, had not realized what advantages the heavier armament conferred in tactics by rendering the larger but slower Spanish ships helpless unless they could close with their adversaries while the option of doing so remained with the latter.

So far as the three prime qualifications of a man-of-war are concerned—speed, power of offence, and resisting capacity—Henry attained a success never reached before and hardly since, for in the battleship or cruiser of to-day one or other has to be sacrificed in a larger or smaller degree, and I have shown elsewhere that all these improvements were due to his initiative.[1]

[1] *Hist. of the Administration of the Royal Navy.* That they were due to his initiative is certain so far as the English navy is in question,

It will be instructive to compare this record of facts with other facts even less appreciated bearing on Elizabeth's sense, estimated equally by her acts, of the value of her navy as an instrument of national policy. At the death of Henry VIII. there were twenty-eight sea-going ships of 100 tons and upwards, and, notwithstanding the often-repeated statement that Edward VI. and Mary neglected the navy, a statement intended to magnify the merits of Elizabeth, there were twenty-two of this class in February 1559, three months after her accession. In reality the dockyards had been working at high pressure before the death of Mary in building and repairing on a large scale, and two of the twenty-two were new vessels nearly completed when she died. When Elizabeth died in 1603 there were twenty-nine ships of 100 tons and upwards, so that she had done little more than replace those worn out, for only two were lost to the enemy during the whole reign, and this in spite of the amount of work thrown upon the fleet by eighteen years of war. When she ascended the throne those around her were fully aware of the place held by the navy in the national economy, and Sir Nicholas Throckmorton wrote to the Secretary, the later Lord Burghley, in April 1560: 'Bend your force, credit, and device to maintain and increase your navy by all the means you can possible, for in this time, considering all circumstances, it is the flower of England's garland'; and Camden, judging by general results rather than by inquiry into details, lavishes praise on Elizabeth for her care of the naval interests of the country, but Camden credited the sovereign with all that was done by the subjects. But, however strongly her advisers may have felt it, the hard facts do not show that the Queen realized the potency of a fleet in foreign politics. For ten years Elizabeth stood isolated, Spain observant, and France hostile, balancing between the jealousies those powers felt for each other, and always exposed to the effects of some unexpected combina-

but I am not now so sure that they were due to a perception, amounting almost to genius, of the trend of future naval development, or whether they followed a general tendency shown by most of the maritime powers, and if the root idea did not come, as so much naval progress came, from the Mediterranean. But if Henry was not the originator, he carried the new principles into practice to an extent and with an insight in which he stood alone in his generation.

tion or event. At home her position was equally insecure as an arbiter between two hostile Churches, but there also her danger would have been lessened by the knowledge that a powerful fleet stood between domestic faction and foreign aid. The plots in favour of Mary Stewart, 'the daughter of debate,' the haunting terror behind her throne, were based on the expectation of armed support from her kinsmen the Guises, but the Guises could not send a man without first braving the Channel passage. In these circumstances, if Elizabeth had felt the force of her Councillors' advice, the example of her father, and had understood the shelter and security that a predominant navy would have afforded her during the critical ten years ending in 1570, it may be supposed that she would have applied herself energetically to the task of rendering her maritime strength supreme, as being her shield against attack from abroad and the guarantee of her safety at home. The Navy Accounts tell a different tale. In the eleven years 1560–70 fourteen vessels were added to the navy, but four of these were pinnaces of no fighting value, and of the others three belong to 1560 and three to 1570, so that four ships represent the effective addition of the nine most perilous years of her reign. On the side of finance we have similar evidence that the Admiralty was the department which she thought offered the first opportunity for economy rather than for an expenditure for which she saw no occasion. In 1558 Mary, although crippled by her own and her predecessor's debts, had allotted 12,000*l.* a year for ordinary naval expenses, which included a large scheme, then under consideration, for building new ships and repairing old ones. In 1564 Elizabeth halved this sum at one stroke, and although in 1567 it was raised to 7,695*l.*, and although the yearly average was really greater, her attempts to make the naval expenses merely nominal are evidence of her mental attitude to the maritime arm.

The next period, 1571–84, compares favourably with that preceding it, for twelve vessels were built or rebuilt, and although four of these were only pinnaces, the political conditions which gave the navy its chief value were not nearly so threatening as they had been. Then came the break with Spain, with the necessary consequence of war

by sea, and in 1585–6 we have an imposing list of fourteen vessels launched; but examination shows that one was just over the 100 tons standard, two were ships of strength, and the remaining eleven mere cockboats. The dubious years 1587–8 and the victorious one of 1589, when, if ever, might have seemed the time to add as fast as possible to the effective, in the one case to protect the kingdom, and in the other to reap the fruits of victory, saw the addition of only two capital ships. The year 1590 was a favourable one, for nine vessels were launched, and no fewer than seven of them were ships of more or less force. Two more powerful ships were built in 1596, and, with two large Spanish prizes taken the same year, practically complete the list of fighting ships if we exclude galleys, pinnaces, and other small craft, which only help to make up a list of names. It must be admitted that this is a beggarly array for a sovereign who is supposed to have been imbued with a keen sense of the value of sea-power, who is supposed to have understood its especial efficacy as a weapon against Spain, and who is sometimes said to have been the founder of the modern navy.[1] From 1591 until 1603, while the war was becoming more and more maritime in character and Spain's only chance of success was invasion by sea, the construction of the instruments by which alone the enemy could be foiled and, in turn, beset was almost neglected. As a natural corollary of lessened shipbuilding the three dockyards maintained by

[1] Historians and biographers have fathered the establishment of the modern navy on their particular heroes. The Henries, Elizabeth Drake, and Hawkyns have all had their turn. One enthusiastic biographer credits Ralegh with it, who, if his printed works correctly represent his MSS., had no technical knowledge, and barely knew one mast from another. The preceding sketch shows that the navy was not founded, but grew, and depended for development not on men, whose influence was but personal and momentary, but on geographical conditions and political circumstances. It may be pointed out that as before the close of the sixteenth century we see periods of construction and destruction, so subsequently, these are represented by periods of expansion and contraction of which we have experience in our own day. In 1618 the navy had again almost ceased to exist, but from that time onwards it enlarged until the first Dutch war, which marks the commencement of the really heroic period of English naval history, saw it take its permanent position in relation to the army, and any descent below a certain standard was no longer possible.

Henry VIII. were reduced to two, Portsmouth being allowed to go to ruin.[1] Elizabeth always hesitated to bring matters to a decision by persistent action at sea in strength, involving sooner or later a decisive struggle for mastery, for she feared to risk her ships, and, in view of the small number she possessed, perhaps judged rightly; but that the number was so small shows how little she was imbued with the spirit of her father's policy, inspired as it was with the consciousness that the field of action for England in the future was the sea. That Spain was eventually reduced to a condition similar to that which energetic and victorious sea action could have brought about years sooner, was due, not to her measures, but to the exhaustion consequent to a continental policy too ambitious for its strength and a vicious economic system. There is no sign that Elizabeth ever comprehended the strategic conditions, either national or technical, as far as the navy was concerned. A necessary induction from the relatively slight material strength considered sufficient is either that the Queen never learned that overwhelming superiority of force is necessary to obtain determinative victories and to maintain supremacy on the ocean, or that she deliberately intended only to hold her own at sea, placing her reliance in the auxiliary war she fed in France and the Low Countries. In the result her fleets, so called, were rather squadrons too feeble to force on a decisive settlement, and the navy, as a whole, was too weak to supply the reliefs necessary to maintain continuous action. It will be seen that Elizabeth never understood what the fleets could or could not do, notwithstanding the advice impressed upon her from many quarters; never recognized that she was especially fortunate in being able to fight Spain where it was weakest, and chose, in preference, to make her greatest efforts where it was strongest—on land. On her navy and on her naval expeditions between 1585 and 1603 she may have expended 1,000,000*l.*: her wars by land cost upwards of 4,500,000*l.*,[2] and the proportions

[1] Chatham Yard, which had been proposed nearly ten years before the Queen came to the throne, was founded, but only as a victualling store for the ships lying in the Medway. No shipbuilding or repairs were executed there.

[2] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxxxvii. 59.

fairly represent the confidence she placed in the two arms respectively, for she spent most where she hoped most.[1]

It has been considered a merit in Elizabeth or imputed to her as a fault, according to the point of view of the historian, that her foreign policy was one of opportunism, using events as they occurred for the apparent advantage of the moment and only seeking delay. For the first twenty years of her reign she was able to play off France and Spain against each other, but when the renewal of the wars of religion reduced the former kingdom to a condition of anarchy, she was forced into a position she dreaded and recoiled from, that of the champion and exponent of religious and political opposition to Spain. While she desired to occupy the mediatory attitude of Henry VIII., she found herself compelled to take up that which Francis I. had sustained against Charles V., and the results to France of that rivalry had not been of a nature to encourage a successor. The revolt of the Netherlands was welcome to her when it broke out, for it embarrassed Philip's schemes; but as it progressed it induced fresh perplexities, for there was no prospect for many years that the States would be able to stand alone, and the Queen knew that France would not allow her to retain the sovereignty so often offered to her any more than she could permit it to be held by a French king. To Elizabeth the readiest way to treat these difficulties for the moment seemed to be marriage negotiations with French princes, and her per-

[1] That Elizabeth did not reward one of her seamen hardly proves that she undervalued their services, because her soldiers suffered the same neglect. Henry III. of France once remarked that 'the Queen of England always thinks that every one must be in love with her,' and she considered her smiles a sufficient remuneration for any service. Drake was knighted in 1580, not for his circumnavigation of the world, but because he had filled her treasury with untold wealth, and his achievements of 1585-7-8 evoked more criticism than thanks. Hawkyns and Frobiser, the latter of whom was probably the admiral she most trusted, were knighted by Howard, and other sailors knighted later owed the honour to Howard or Essex. Of the Lord Admiral and Lord Thomas Howard the former gained a step upwards to an earldom and the latter a peerage, but in both cases as favourites and not as admirals. Titles and pensions fell bountifully among the *entourage* of the Court, but there were none for the men—sailors or soldiers—who upheld her throne and made her fame.

formances in this direction did stave off effectual French interference until recurrent civil war with consequent national disorganization reduced France to impotence.

After 1585, Elizabeth conducted her war on the lines of her peace policy, and while Philip never faltered in his intentions and used negotiation only to mask his preparations, Elizabeth fought as though her real victory was to be won by diplomacy. In her own words, repeated more than once, she would only do what was necessary for defence, and depended on a waiting policy to bring successes, through the agency of the Dutch or French, of which she was to reap the advantage. The late Sir John Seeley thought that her prosperity was the result of this policy of comparative inaction,[1] and although it may have been so in the fact, the naval historian may here part company with the general historian as to whether it was the only or the best course open to her. Half-hearted naval war can only be made under the tacit condition that the enemy does no better, and the circumstance that Spain did, and could do, no better is sufficient proof that it need not and should not have been allowed to do so much. So far from having founded a navy, Elizabeth not only succeeded to it, but, when the war commenced, was the possessor, excluding the Scandinavian States, of the only military navy in Europe, that of France being destroyed, that of Holland not yet established, and that of Spain existent only in national conceit and popular fame. If, then, as many Elizabethans thought, Spain could have been more quickly overpowered by sea-power developed to a crushing material superiority and used on a system capable of bringing about definitive results, the praise awarded to Elizabeth for her passive patience in attending events, always a suspected policy, is undeserved. She waited upon the situation; if she had accepted the advice urged upon her by seamen and by civilians, by men of different occupations and of widely separated social rank, who spoke unknown to each other, she could have commanded the situation instead of waiting upon it.[2] It may

[1] *Growth of British Policy*, vol. i.

[2] 'From first to last she never understood that the sea was her sole salvation.' (Clarke and Thursfield, *The Navy and the Nation*, p. 187.)

be urged that Elizabeth had no wish to crush Spain beyond recovery, thus leaving a recuperated France an undisturbed preponderance upon the Continent, but it may be asserted safely that neither Elizabeth nor any of her Council, except perhaps Walsyngham, ever dreamed that their Colossus staggered upon feet of clay.[1] Even Ralegh did not recognize it until years later. To her and to them Spain was, and remained to the end, a world power of overshadowing might, accepted at its own valuation, and to the last she spoke and acted as if she were maintaining an unequal struggle against tremendous odds. Elizabeth no doubt thought it, but after 1588 the result need never have been considered uncertain, and if Spain had been forced to make peace then or shortly afterwards there would have been still a possibility of a national regeneration which would have left it capable of balancing France. As it was, Elizabeth's indecisive measures permitted Spain to fight on until exhausted beyond recovery, and in the seventeenth century it remained a flaccid, helpless organism unable to help itself or its friends, and relying politically on the terror inspired by its former fame.

The continuity of history is as evident in naval as in political affairs, and is subversive of the theory that there was any especial discovery during the reign of Elizabeth of the principles regulating the action of sea-power. Those principles, depending upon ever-recurrent conditions, had been acted upon uninterruptedly from classical times by the nations of the north and south, when the attendant political and geographical circumstances rendered them advisable or feasible; usually, indeed, they were forced into the cognizance of combatant nations as part of the essence of things, and the working of sea-power was an automatic effect of physical and political antecedents. There were Spanish observers who saw the situation as clearly, and advised Philip quite as wisely, as her seamen and soldiers advised Elizabeth. The difference was that Philip had no real navy, and would have had to construct from the foundation both in shipping and in organization; that his subjects were not naturally seamen, were accustomed to summer navigations, and, used to precise

[1] Essex also had a glimmering of the truth, which explains much of his apparent rashness.

galley actions, were more or less ignorant of ship fighting; and that strategically his position was radically weak. On the other side Elizabeth's position was strong, and in *matériel* and *personnel* she possessed, only requiring enlargement, all that Philip lacked.

For many centuries England's only serious maritime antagonist had been France, or the feudatories of the French kings, and the field of combat was confined, therefore, to the waters of the Channel. The survey is obscured by the countless raids from both sides whose object was merely destruction and plunder, but from amid these there stand out certain well-defined movements, frequently repeated, which had as their object the winning of the command of the narrow sea as preliminary to invasion, or attacks on the opposite shore made with an especial purpose in view. The late Admiral Colomb lent the weight of his authority to the opinion that most of these minor movements were only instances of 'cross ravaging' —useless destruction of property—but a close examination of the circumstances attending these raids shows that they were frequently undertaken from both sides, with the quite legitimate intention of destroying ships and stores, and preventing mobilization, and were therefore usually directed against the enemy's military and commercial ports, between which there was no distinction for many centuries. They were usually preceded by stubborn and long-contested fleet struggles for the command of the Channel, and were of the same character as the descents on the French ports after the victory of La Hogue in 1692 had given William III. the control of the Narrow Seas. Command of the sea can be required either as an end in itself, when the enemy can be brought to terms by losing it, or to permit an army of invasion to be transported safely. In the Plantagenet era there was not sufficient commerce, either general or of a special character, to enable a combatant to bring sufficient pressure to bear by destroying or stopping that of the opponent, therefore the only object in gaining the command was to render invasion possible. Leaving less famous kings out of consideration, such great soldiers as Edward III. and Henry V. had little to learn about the application of strategical laws within the limits of their area of action.

They knew quite as well as Parma, as Ralegh, or as Drake, that a defending fleet must be destroyed or neutralized before an invading army can be transported, and that the proper place to look for the defending or threatening fleet is on its own coasts or in its own ports. For this purpose fleets were repeatedly levied, and if they were broken up when the purpose was achieved, it was because no French fleet remained to dispute with them the command of the Channel, because the age of permanent Channel squadrons had not arrived, and because small marauding expeditions could be best dealt with by similar detachments. The capacity of a fleet 'on their own coasts,' to immobilize the Bretons was as well understood by John in 1202 as by Henry VIII. in 1512, and by Drake and Monson, extending it to Portugal, in 1587 and 1602. In 1213 John sent a fleet across to the Swyn which destroyed a French armament lying there in support of the campaign of Philip Augustus against the Count of Flanders, John's ally, and the defeat enforced the French king's immediate retreat. Therefore it is not surprising to find Edward III. in 1340, acting on the advice of his admirals, steering straight over to Sluys to fight the French fleet which menaced his communications. No further fleet operations against France were necessary during Edward's reign, but, for the campaign of Crécy in 1346 he, while sending home the bulk of his fleet, kept 200 ships with him to co-operate along the coast in his march north-eastward from La Hogue, thus enabling him to transfer his base with every day's march, and doing on a small scale what an equal British supremacy at sea allowed Wellington to do in one movement when, in 1813, he transferred his base from Lisbon to Santander.

Upwards of fifty years ago Sir N. H. Nicolas wrote: 'No monarch of England ever took greater interest in his navy than Henry V.,' and the more closely his reign is examined, the truer the statement appears to be. The campaign of Agincourt in 1415 did not involve the question of sea-power, for there was no French fleet to threaten communications. In 1416 and 1417, however, the French Government had made contracts with the Genoese which, for the first time, brought the great Mediterranean carracks into northern waters for fighting purposes, but Henry, like Edward in 1340, took care to

sweep away all opposition before he again entered France. Not only did he do that, but the captured Genoese vessels formed the model for a vast stride forward in the construction of his own ships; and thenceforward we find the increased size, stowage room for stores, and accommodation for men, which made operations at a distance possible. In the case of Henry V. we are not compelled to guess from his actions whether he had acquired a knowledge of the meaning of the command of the sea in its widest sense, but we have the evidence of a contemporary as to the fact. In the *Libel of English Policie*, attributed to Adam de Moleyns, Bishop of Chichester, and assigned to the period 1426–37, the writer says:—

> . . . the King
> Henry the fift what was his purposing . . .
> What hope ye was the King's great intent
> Of these ships, and what in mind he meant,
> It was not else but that he cast to be
> Lord round about environ of the sea.

And after dilating in many lines on Henry's kingly qualities—

> . . . about in the sea
> No prince was of better strenuity.
> And if he had to this time lived here
> He had been prince named without peer;
> His great ships should have been put in proof
> Unto the end that he meant of in chief,
> For doubt it not that he would have been
> Lord and master about the round sea
> And kept it sure to stop our enemies hence.

Then the Bishop entreats the rulers of the country to put aside their quarrels and intrigues and take heed of the navy as the supreme factor making for safety or conquest. If so—

> . . . I will my life put in jeopardy
> But many lands would seek her peace for need
> The sea well kept[1] . . .
> The end of battle is peace sikerly[2]
> And power causeth peace finally:[3]
> Which of England is the town wall.

. . . . . .

[1] *I.e.* be compelled to seek her friendship.

[2] Securely, safely.

[3] *I.e.* the object of war is a favourable peace, which can only be won by sufficient superiority of strength.

> Then as for anything which is without
> England were at ease without doubt.
> The true process of English policy
>
> . . . . .
>
> Is this, that who seeth [1] north, south, east, and west,
> Cherish merchandize, keep the Admiralty,
> That we be masters of the narrow sea.

We see here that the perception of what was necessary for English honour and security was not confined to the sovereign and his immediate advisers, but was equally well understood in a wider circle. National interests did not yet reach beyond the four seas, but even in Monson's time those interests were still the principal ones, and he uses the same illustration in comparing the Channel guard to the watch in a town. No Elizabethan or modern writer has asked more than the Lancastrian bishop. Put into modern prose, and the requirements extended from the English seas to the ocean, the fifteenth century writer's appeals are only those which our greater experience now urges as essential; and like many who speak with authority to-day, he asks for an absolute superiority, and is content with the 'splendid isolation' of unquestioned supremacy.

The reputation of Henry VIII. as an organizer is assured, but we may see in the naval campaigns of 1512–13 that he was not inferior to his predecessors as a strategist. His treaty of alliance with Ferdinand of Aragon arranged 'to keep and defend the sea after their policies,' he to secure it as far as Brest, and Ferdinand from Brest to the Spanish coast. Henry had yet to find out the negative value of Ferdinand's engagements, but he went about his own part with as full a realization of the value of time as the dominating factor of strategy as could be possessed by the most authoritative theorist of the present day. By the end of April 1512 Sir Edward Howard was at sea, and, although Louis XII. had been sluggishly preparing since February, was in full command of the Channel in consequence of the French uncompleted mobilization which Howard was now impeding. In June the admiral was off Brest, and no French ships there or in the other ports dared come out. The position here was very much like that of Drake in 1587, reading

[1] Seeks to rule.

Brest and St. Malo for Cadiz and Lisbon, and the sweeping along of the Norman instead of the Portuguese coast. In each case the process of mobilization was stopped, and vessels in the various ports, not yet ready for sea, compelled to lie helpless while an enemy worked his will. Drake's feat was the more important because Louis XII. had no scheme of invasion in hand, but the fact that Drake was able to do the same thing a thousand miles further to the southward does not imply any great discovery of hidden principles on the part of the Elizabethan seamen, but only increased stowage capacity in the ships. The need for supplies drew Howard back to England in July, but could he have been victualled at sea there seems no reason to suppose that the French would have been able to concentrate at all that year. When he again appeared off Brest in August there were twenty-two French men-of-war collected there, but we get the suggestion of rapid and striking performance on the part of the English in the fact that their appearance was quite unexpected. Both sides claimed the victory in the action which ensued, but all the signs of success were with Howard, seeing that he remained in undisputed control of the Channel and the French coast.

In 1513 Henry had his fleet ready by March, the French being this time equally well prepared, but their readiness was only the completion of their mobilization of 1512. The latter, however, did not venture to contest the lordship of the open sea, but sheltered themselves under the guns of the batteries and castle at Brest. The subsequent proceedings involve consideration of tactics unnecessary to discuss here, but it may be noticed that while Howard favoured a blockade,[1] Henry pushed the maxim, which directs a combatant to find his enemy and fight him, to its logical extreme by ordering his admiral to go in and attack. Howard was repulsed and killed, but French naval inferiority remained just as evident, for they used their success and the English retreat only to enable them to demobilize in peace.

In 1545 Henry intended again to be quicker than the French, but was foiled either by the mediocrity of his

[1] 'To ly and ly still before the Haven of Brest that the navy of France should not come out.'

admiral, the effects of bad weather, or by both. Moreover, Francis I. had been devoting much attention to the development of the marine, and the French navy was now no contemptible foe. The contemporaries of Sir John Hawkyns ascribed to him the honour of showing Englishmen the way to the West Indies, but the French had long preceded the English there, and during the wars waged between Francis I. and Charles V. had been harrying Spanish commerce and sacking Spanish cities in a systematic way that the Elizabethans hardly improved upon. During the reign of Francis, events pointed to France as the enemy Spain had to fear upon the sea in the future; and Francis, like Henry, had acknowledged the spirit of the time by also increasing his naval strength, constructing ports, forming an administration, and arming his ships on the new principles. But, as French ambitions were then more continental than maritime, the navy was one of the first institutions to feel the effects of financial exhaustion and national dissensions, and for half a century or more was to be no source of anxiety to the rulers of England. We see therefore that Elizabeth could back her policy and commence her war not only with the enormous advantage of a relatively efficient navy, but with freedom from fear of the intervention of any other maritime State. We see also that there was nothing new in the plan of securing English territory by acting on the enemy's coasts, and that the maxim that the frontier of a maritime power extends to the range of its fleets, was as well understood centuries before Howard and Drake begged to be allowed to meet the Armada off Lisbon as it is now. The steady extension of the area over which ships were capable of acting, due to their greater sea-keeping power, the result of improvements which made them more seaworthy and better able to stow supplies, had been going on for nearly two centuries before Elizabeth ascended the throne, although it is more obvious in the merchant than in the Royal Navy. But as war fleets were now becoming mobile and homogeneous integers of greatly extended sea endurance, there was more enterprise in using them and in copying the tendency to distant venture shown in the merchant navy. Technical improvements had preceded and rendered possible maritime war

at a greater distance than had hitherto been required; but the Elizabethan admirals did nothing more than practise measures similar to those executed by their forerunners, modified by circumstances peculiar to the opponent, and modifications necessarily induced by those circumstances. The crucial difference between the Spanish and former wars in which England had been engaged, Elizabeth either failed to understand, or, understanding, undervalued its significance in the solution.

Whatever doubts may have existed in high quarters, the English people were, when the difficulties with Spain became acute, full of confidence in themselves and in their navy. Some influential Englishmen already regarded the Spanish spectre with contempt. William Herlle, who was a confidential correspondent of Burghley's as well as in communication with Elizabeth, wrote, in July 1585, to the former that it was 'a great colossus outwards but inwards stuffed with clouts; a man subject to melancholy and, meeting in these years with disgraces, deadly and mortal passions follow. One that keeps all his own reckonings to cover his bare estate from others; and this is the scarecrow of the world that her Majesty hath to contend with.'[1] The Spanish ambassadors have frequent occasion to notice the high spirit of the commercial classes, the growth of trade and shipping, and the reliance felt in them. Nor was the dependence placed in the Royal Navy less marked. When the question of assisting the Dutch against Alva was under debate, it was objected that there were no English troops or officers sufficiently skilled and disciplined to face Spaniards; but to this it was replied that the war would be a naval one, 'Touching the third objection, of lack of fit and expert men for the wars, it could hardly be answered if any enterprise were to be executed but by sea, but such being propounded as chiefly are there to be performed, no prince in Europe is better furnished for that purpose than Her Majesty.'[2] Elizabeth was never able to make up her mind whether it was to be a war by land or sea, and, as Ralegh wrote a generation

[1] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* clxxx. 30.

[2] *Harl. MSS.* 295, f. 21. Compare also John Montgomery's paper (*Add. MSS.* 20,042), who thought of the Queen's ships that 'none of any other region may seem comparable to them.'

later, 'did all by halves.' But at first, perhaps, her hand was forced in 1585, when she was compelled to hasten troops across to the Low Countries to save the Dutch from immediate destruction, and there was no time to await the slower effects of sea-power; once entangled in land operations it was difficult to withdraw, even if she had been convinced that withdrawal was advisable. Therefore the naval war may be divided mainly into three periods, 1585–6, 1587–8, and that following 1588. During the middle period the strategical initiative, that is to say the ability to compel the enemy to make his movements dependent on your own, rested with Philip; during the first and third it lay with Elizabeth, although she took little advantage of it.

When the Queen drifted unwillingly into war in 1585[1] it was without any plan of campaign, and in the hope that diplomacy might at any moment restore peace. Of the three forces, religious, political, and commercial, which had been instrumental in bringing about hostilities, the first was felt, at least during the earlier years of the war, more keenly by the Spaniards than by the English; the second was confined to the ruling classes and those who feared for English independence; and the third affected the merchants and traders whose influence, nurtured by a century of internal peace and progress, was yearly becoming stronger. But the fact that the average price of wheat had more than doubled since the Reformation, and that other articles of necessity or luxury had similarly risen, while wages and rents had not increased in the same proportion, was a much more powerful stimulus towards expansion than any religious or political ideals, or even than the influence of the trading interest. It provided the driving force without which ideas do not move the masses, brought all classes of the community into line, and made the war more national than representative of any particular section of the nation. Beyond a general impression

[1] The explicit intervention with troops in the Netherlands may be considered to mark the commencement of a state of war; the previous action of volunteers on land and privateers at sea could be always disavowed. In 1585 she was prepared to repudiate Drake, and saw no difficulty in doing so; 'if need be,' said she, 'the gentleman careth not if I disavow him.' (*Leycester Correspondence*, Camd. Soc. p. 173.)

that the royal navy was as effective a weapon as it had ever been, and would do its work as well as formerly, there was as yet no definite idea as to the particular line on which it was to act. On the commercial side there was less hesitation, for English shipowners and merchants had been extending their field of commerce for many years, and had been ceaselessly building ships[1] and seeking new markets in which to employ them. Their desires turned longingly towards the West Indies, and were stimulated by the huge profits made by Hawkyns and other interlopers in their semi-privateering voyages to the Guinea coast and Spanish colonial ports, to which they persuaded themselves they had a legal right of peaceful entry.[2] Therefore, the eagerness of the merchants to attack Spanish commerce and force an opening in the West Indies, and the alluring amount of treasure brought home by Drake in 1580, were probably the leading motives in the direction given to the 1585–6 voyage, and Elizabeth's assent to it. Some members of the Government, notably Leycester and Walsyngham, were reckoning on the plunder that Drake would bring back to pay the expenses of

[1] 'They are building ships without cessation, and are thus making themselves masters of the seas.' (Bernardino de Mendoza to Philip, 9th January, 1581.) See also *post*, ii. p. 317, note 15.

[2] The English claim was the inevitable outcome of a commercial expansion which would not be denied, but nothing could well have been weaker in international law. It was based on the ancient treaties between England and the house of Burgundy made before that family obtained the crown of Spain, or the discovery of America. Putting aside the fact that the Spanish sovereigns had consistently rejected any interpretation of the treaties which would extend their application beyond the ancestral States with which they were originally made, the demand of Protestant England was barred by the circumstance that Catholic England, before the Reformation, had acknowledged the division of the new discoveries made by Pope Alexander VI. between Spain and Portugal, and the exclusive right of possession of those powers. A change of national faith could no more legalize a repudiation of national obligations than a change of bankers can free a private firm from its engagements. Exclusive trade was characteristic of early European colonization, and this could only be obtained by closing colonial ports to foreign flags. England and other powers had already adopted the principle themselves in their Navigation Acts, and the first was in the future to carry out the doctrine to an extreme never before practised. Spain, therefore, closed its ports as Russia has recently closed Batoum and Port Arthur, and, unlike Russia, had never made any pretence of throwing them open.

Leycester's expedition to the Netherlands, and thus encourage Elizabeth to continue her more active policy. No doubt the Queen herself had the same object in view, and was all the more ready to consent to a scheme which might give her untold wealth, did not attack Spain where it was strongest, and to her mind was not open war.

Nominally, Drake was to proceed to the Spanish ports, and to demand the release of the English ships embargoed in them;[1] what further instructions he had are unknown, but there is some evidence that, besides plundering the chief colonial towns, he designed to garrison and hold the Havana, or Cartagena, or both.[2] This may have been planned in compliance with the wishes of the merchants who subscribed most of the cost of the expedition, but how far Elizabeth knew of his intention, or whether she fully understood it, is doubtful. Drake could hardly garrison Cartagena without involving her in regular war, and any such decisive step, always repugnant to her, was not one she was likely to permit when the question of peace or war was yet, she thought, in the balance. Considered as a cruise, she was prepared at the worst with the comforting resource of disavowing her admiral; a measure which, she always seemed to think, would extenuate in Philip's eyes any number of insults and injuries done to him. Later, in 1597, she showed that she realized fully, and expressed in striking language,[3] her sense of all the risks and ulterior consequences that would follow the seizure of a trans-oceanic port; whether she realized them now we cannot tell, but it is evident that neither Drake nor Monson did so. Monson's wording[4] leaves it doubtful whether he knew of Drake's purpose, and blamed him or the Queen for the want of men and stores which forced him to abandon it, or whether he was ignorant of the project, but thought that it should have been undertaken. In either case there is no uncertainty of judgment here, but in Book II.,[5] written later than 1624, in which he discusses the relative advantages and disadvantages of merely sacking Spanish towns or of holding them, he ends by

[1] See *post*, p. 126.
[2] *Post*, p. 132, and *Lansd. MSS.* 100, f. 98.
[3] *Post*, ii. p. 50.
[4] *Post*, p. 123.
[5] Section, *The West Indies.*

discountenancing both courses in comparison with purely naval action, 'obstructing their trade by sea,' where he refers to trade in a particular sense. Certainly his second opinion was the better one, and the question as thus posed gives us an opportunity of considering the strategical conditions of the war as a whole.

The object of war being the achievement of such successes as shall force an opponent to sue for peace, it follows that the means employed must vary according to the military and political circumstances of the enemy, and should be applied to induce pressure in the direction where his resistance must be weakest, or the consequences of his defeat most serious. In modern warfare the occupation of a capital or of commercial centres usually paralyses a belligerent; but in mediæval warfare, when the State was a comparatively insusceptible organism, and commerce was undeveloped, a complete exhaustion and possession of the country was commonly necessary to terminate the strife. Hitherto all the great English wars had been with France, and could only be carried on by way of invasion, because neither nation possessed anything but territory at which the other could strike. Occasionally there had been hostilities with Spain, but, as invasion was not possible, and commerce was limited, it was not in the power of either country to bring matters to a definite issue, however much in earnest both may have been. As against France England had been equal, if not superior, in military strength until the general introduction of firearms and a professional soldiery; as against Spain it was now admittedly inferior militarily, but possessed the incalculable advantage of being able to select the theatre of war, and thus meet that power at sea where it was feeblest and had most at stake, and England strongest and had least at stake. As soon as it was recognized that the Dutch revolt could only be crushed in London, Philip was forced to take the offensive by sea, but a maritime offensive necessitated the use of an arm his subjects despised and neglected as far as possible, and the consequent weakness due to the fact that a non-maritime nation was dependent for political strength on a weapon nationally disliked, or at best accepted as an unpleasant obligation, was the faulty place in his equip-

ment for conquest. For Philip, then, the subjugation of England was always the objective; it could only be obtained in one way, and so far, therefore, he was mechanically compelled towards precision in the end in view. For England the objective was not so plain, and during the first two years of the war even the seamen seem to have been undecided as to the especial way in which the navy should be used. Yet however weak Spain was at sea there would have been no decisive advantage gained by meeting it there unless the ocean also offered the means of reaching determinative results; and it was in this respect, due to cardinal racial differences, the preparations of Henry VIII., and the exceptional conditions under which Spanish power was sustained, that Elizabethan Englishmen were so fortunately situated.

Hitherto the utility of the navy had been to clear the way for an army of invasion, which, if an enemy cannot be subdued by naval operations alone, is the only deciding factor. It was obviously impossible to invade Spain, and at first it does not appear to have been clearly seen that stopping the flow of the treasure traffic—it was not even necessary to capture the fleets—would at once reduce it to impotence, and free Western Europe from the terror of Philip's domination. Later, Monson and all the leading seamen and politicians placed all their reliance in such a course, and urged Elizabeth, but in vain, to carry it into effect vigorously. For us the question has been somewhat obscured by applying the term commerce warfare to it—as Monson himself calls it—although commerce warfare has now a different signification.[1] For the first time in history

[1] The term commerce warfare is made now to cover all kinds of ships and merchandize, but as used by the Elizabethans attacks on commerce meant attempts directed against the Flotas. The nearest analogue for to-day would be the intention France is supposed to have in view for the next war, that of striking at the importation of British foodstuffs. On one side the analogy breaks down, for the track of the treasure fleets was limited by controlling reasons of winds and navigation, and they had only Coruña, Vigo, Ferrol, Lisbon, Seville, and Cadiz as possible ports to receive them, while a list of places on the British coasts where a 1,000-ton steamer could discharge would fill a page, and the whole ocean is open to steam. But from another point of view the analogy is closer, for, as the stoppage of the treasure from the New World would have shattered Philip's political designs, dismembered his empire, and brought the counter-

a nation had appeared which possessed a vast oceanic trade, in the sense that though the imports were mainly gold and silver and small in bulk, they were as much the base on which rested Spanish political dominion and capacity

Reformation to a stand, so anything approaching to a food blockade, even incomplete, would subdue Great Britain through the action of the social forces set in motion. In discussing commerce warfare most naval historians insist on its failure against this country in the Napoleonic wars, and in those of the eighteenth century, thus ignoring the mighty economic changes which make the conditions entirely different, and the resisting power of Great Britain so much more unstable. During the eighteenth century the country was self-supporting and the pressure fell chiefly on a few thousands of the trading classes, relatively wealthy, who, next to the landed interest, could best bear it: a foodstuff war will affect many millions of the working classes, living from hand to mouth, necessarily impatient, and thus promises every likelihood of a national cataclysm. And this leaves out of account any check on the import of raw material, which would act more slowly but which, if successful, would be equally disastrous in its effects. The nearest example we have of the effects of successful commerce warfare against a State like our own is that carried on by the Commonwealth against the Dutch in 1654. Holland, having land frontiers, was not touched in the matter of food supply, but the ruin wrought by the loss of the command of the sea, and the consequent interruption to the carrying trade and subversion of the delicate fabric of public and private credit, induced popular commotions which forced the Dutch Government to sue for peace. It is true that Holland, like Spain, although in a less degree, never at any time possessed a war navy commensurate with its maritime needs, or even relatively comparable with our own; and that the England of 1654, thought to be weaker, was really stronger than the United Provinces, just as the England of 1585, apparently weaker, was really stronger at sea than Spain. But, in comparison with its duties and the complex imperial organization it upholds, the navy of to-day is proportionately weaker than that of 1654, for it may be taken as a maxim that no navy is sufficiently strong which does not inspire dread in any possible combination of enemies, or, in other words, that no great commerce can be protected by a navy which is only equal in strength to its possible opponents. Whether the resources of the United Kingdom alone are equal to such a strain is a problem for the political financier to resolve. There seems to come a time in the life of all great commerce powers when the requirements of the defence, which in such a case means the maintenance of an undisputed supremacy over any practicable adverse coalition, exceed the capacity of the nation to respond to, and when such a moment arrives the commerce power only retains its position on sufferance. Historically the doom of Great Britain would seem to be certain, but for the new factor introduced by the existence of powerful and patriotic colonies, an advantage no forerunner among colonizing nations has enjoyed, for hitherto colonies have required protection

for conquest as though that trade had been of world-wide extent and included the manufactured and raw products of Spain and other countries. Limited as it was, Spain's pretensions to world power were supported entirely by it, for without the treasure imports the country would have been reduced at once to the position it held among nations before the discovery of America; and Spain's own resources would not have sufficed to hold the empire together, much less to extend it. The condition was equivalent to the concentration of the trade which maintains the British empire into two articles, and this commerce, unlike the modern carrying trade, was conveyed over a practically fixed course at particular seasons. Therefore the Flota track had to be as essentially Spanish territory as the environs of Madrid, and its closure by a hostile force would be as ruinous to Spain as a complete occupation of its cities, and much more disastrous than defeat of its armies. The Flotas were the trunk nerve through which ran the life force which vitalized the empire to its extremities, and injury to this would reduce the organism to flaccidity; or, to put it in another way, to cut the Flota communication would be equivalent to a blockade of the mother country and the colonies, and the disbandment of the armies, which could not be kept on foot without the gold and silver brought over. An English army, even if victorious, could only defeat the army it faced, seize a district, or capture a city; but a victorious English fleet, controlling the Flota communications, struck at the heart of the whole empire. The Queen was never convinced of the difference between this and former wars, and vacillated between territorial attacks and tentative attempts against the Flotas, carried on without system and in insufficient strength. Elizabeth does not belong to the class of female sovereigns whose domestic virtues are the sole resource of eulogists; but, on the other hand, she was too unimaginative to be really great. She had nothing of the happy audacity of genius which rises superior to rules

instead of being strong enough to join in the defence of the empire to which they belonged. If the colonies, to whom the sovereignty of the sea is as much a matter of life and death as it is to the mother country, see the truth in time and take their share of the responsibilities, the empire may yet afford a new historical illustration.

and precedents, and she wished to conduct her war on traditional lines. In her handling of the navy she showed the same hesitation, indecision, and fitfulness that she displayed in the wider field of general politics, and she also betrays, in her fear for the safety of her ships, that more essentially feminine foible which seeks to obtain large returns with little risks. To her the fleet was never an instrument to be used for imperial purposes, and replaced if, or when, expended, but a personal property to be preserved as a family possession, or a trading capital which was not to be hazarded but all the same was to produce great profits.[1]

Monson thought that the 1585 voyage only served to awaken Philip to his weakness. If that be so it furnished another proof of the insecurity of his ill-knit empire, for in 1603 it was less capable of resistance than in 1585, and Monson's notion, that because some of the West Indian ports were fortified during the war they were on that account safer, is one of his mistakes. Ralegh expressed a wiser opinion when he wrote that a fleet 'cannot be denied to land where it list in England, France, or elsewhere, unless it be hindered, encountered, and shuffled together by a fleet of equal or answerable strength,'[2] and it necessarily follows that although some fortification is indispensable to shield a port from a *coup de main*, it must inevitably fall unless protected by a fleet. In the sixteenth century there was a tendency to ascribe an exaggerated importance to land defences abroad because in European countries they had been found to be of value, since it was overlooked that in the mother countries they were covered by the operations of armies, or, if not so covered, invariably

[1] Legally the navy was the personal possession of the sovereign, and remained so until 1649, since which date the qualification 'royal' has been one of courtesy only. In 1713 the question whether Queen Anne could sell some men-of-war to the titular King of Spain was referred to the Law Officers of the Crown, and they were of opinion that it could only be done if the ships had been built with money proceeding from the hereditary revenues, and not from that appropriated by Parliament. As the sole supply for naval expenditure since 1649 had been from Parliamentary grants, this practically meant that the Crown had no authority to sell that which it used as an agent for the nation, and could only obtain such authority through an Act of Parliament which the Law Officers thought to be necessary.

[2] *History of the World*, Book v., cap. i., sec. 9.

were taken, and that a colonial port required the defence of a fleet as a European fortress did that of an army. A colonial fortress, therefore, is worse than useless unless it can be succoured by a fleet, because it attracts commerce and draws the enemy; and as a colonial nation must be a maritime and commercial one, inasmuch as colonies are based on a war and merchant navy, never any power in the history of the world was less well fitted for its *rôle* than was Spain. The Spaniards suffered from the initial disadvantage that they were a military rather than a maritime race, and had been pushed into maritime expansion by the pressure of circumstances instead of being drawn to it by choice. The ordinary Spaniard disliked the sea, yet success in colonizing depends on naval superiority, and if colonies and mother country are to flourish both military and merchant marine must be proportioned to the extent of the trans-oceanic possessions. In 1585 Spain was the greatest colonial power that the world had yet seen, but the war navy was non-existent, notwithstanding the possibilities intimated by the French raids in the time of Francis I., and the ocean-going merchant fleets were made up of hired ships belonging to other nations.[1] To keep the colonies free from intrusion Philip was trusting to the efficacy of threats and the prestige of his armies. Spanish military success on land, although not unchequered, exercised a most pernicious influence, for, in conjunction with hereditary bias, it induced the Government to put more and more trust in soldiers and less in the navy, and thus racial tendency and the sense of inferiority the seamen were made to feel acted and reacted upon each other in a vicious circle. Even during the war the Spaniards never drew from it the lesson it supplied, and, to the end, did not regard their fleet as itself capable of obtaining decisive results, but only as a vehicle for the transport of the army. Don C. Fernandez Duro thinks that Philip II. disliked the sea owing to his sufferings from sea sickness, and that his prejudice coloured his treatment of seamen and of the navy.[2] His narrowness of view, like that of Elizabeth,

[1] See vol. ii., Appendix B, *The Spanish Treasure Fleets of the Sixteenth Century.*

[2] This author notices that Philip's coffin was made of wood from the keel of a galleon, 'as if it was intended to symbolize that with his body was interred the maritime supremacy of Spain.'

was due more probably to the inability to grasp all that was included in sea-power, and his failures, unlike Elizabeth's, were not redeemed by his subjects' traditional inclination for the sea. In any case his statesmanship was not equal to any attempt to elevate the naval service in its own estimation and in that of the nation, and to the last he continued the same neglect, so that towards the end of his reign he was told [1]

> that they (the Spaniards) do not incline themselves to navigation like others is the cause of these unfortunate events, and I do not wonder at it, as the rewards given to those who serve at sea are not equal to those given to soldiers, which is not right because the labours and dangers undergone at sea are greater than those experienced on land. . . . If naval battles were held in as much estimation as land battles, and as well rewarded, there would be more seamen and soldiers for sea service; but now, seeing that things are the reverse, few are inclined to follow the sea. Yet it is of much importance to attract them, as we have many times seen by experience, for the prince who is lord of the sea will be lord of the land, and only by that means.[2]

The deficiency of seamen was the cause that crews were made up of all European nationalities, pressed or hired into the service, who, if they could not desert, served grudgingly, much more without patriotic enthusiasm, and who, at the best, must have caused much confusion from the mixture of races and languages.

Just as little foresight was shown in preparing the *matériel* of the navy as in encouraging the seamen. Except the galley arsenals there was not a royal dockyard in Spain, and no colonial port was capable of affording more than harbourage and slight repairs to a fleet. Portsmouth dry dock was built in 1496, but in 1596 there was still

[1] *Col. de Doc Inéd. para la Historia de España*, lxxiii. p. 253. Despot as was Philip, it is a mistake to suppose that he did not permit his servants to write to him with extreme frankness, and they sometimes employed the privilege to give him remarkably good advice.

[2] Compare Ralegh, 'Whosoever commands the sea commands trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.' Both versions descend from Themistocles.

Other Spaniards confessed the national dislike and fear of the sea irrespective of reputation and rewards. (See vol. ii. p. 326; Appendix B, *The Spanish Treasure Fleets.*)

not a single dry dock in Spain. Philip's ships were obtained chiefly by embargoing foreign vessels trading to his ports, or by hiring the few built by Spaniards, to whom a bounty on tonnage was paid on condition that they were kept at the disposal of the Crown. Others were contracted for in the Mediterranean ports, and the contract system, with natives and foreigners, became the one on which he had to rely, for the poverty of the Government ruined the few Spanish builders remaining.[1] Don Christobal de Barros, a Spaniard who, in more favourable circumstances, might have been as great an administrator as Hawkyns, pressed the King in vain to organize a Government service and a national navy, but either Philip was blind to the need or the chronic emptiness of his treasury debarred the outlay such a great undertaking would have necessitated. Hawkyns might have pressed Elizabeth in vain had she not inherited a fleet and an administration in working order, and had she squandered her revenues in unessential adventures. As it was, her navy only needed an expansion, which she could not be persuaded to give it. In the greatest fleet Philip had yet sent to sea, that under the Marquis of Santa Cruz in 1582 for the conquest of the Azores, only three ships out of a total of sixty or seventy belonged to the Crown, but the proportion was so ordinary as not then to cause remark. Spanish iron was considered the best in the world, but either the three foundries in Spain and Portugal were insufficient or the founders were not skilful, so that 'they never see cast ordnance of iron but such as be made in England,' and Philip was compelled to pay a high premium to those who would smuggle over English guns. He would have been at a stand to arm the 'Invincible' in 1588 had he not been able to replace with English iron guns the brass guns taken from the Spanish and Italian fortresses to put into the ships. For all the essentials for fitting ships, such as cables, pitch, tar, and masts, he was dependent on the Hansa and Baltic towns, and the same traders supplied him with corn, without which he could not have fed his sailors. Such as it was, even this system

[1] 'For many years the accounts are not made up, and when they are ready most of the creditors are dead and all is gone in costs and fees.'

broke down; it did not grow worse with time, but broke down from the beginning, as might have been expected when a method which had shown its weakness in peace, or against the Mohammedan Mediterranean States, was tested by the necessity of fitting out great fleets against a maritime power in possession of the lines of communication between the Baltic and Spain.[1] After months of preparation and volumes of correspondence the fleets sailed lacking the necessary quantity of every requisite, whether to support life or to take it; and provisions were putrid, shot and powder wanting, and stores deficient before they left harbour.

Although a faulty economic and a too ambitious foreign policy were slowly ruining Spain before Philip came to the throne, the rapidity of the collapse was intensified under him by his failure to realize that, having challenged a contest with two maritime powers, he not only could not conquer, but that Spain could not maintain its place among nations, unless he became the master of the sea, or at least showed himself formidable upon it. It may well be that a great sovereign would have failed in building up a navy and an admiralty in time of war and in face of racial and traditional tendencies, but Philip never at any time regarded his navy as anything but an auxiliary to his troops. Although all his schemes of conquest were based ultimately on his being able to control sea communications in dispute he acted as though his command of the sea were conceded by his opponents, or as though their opposition might, at least, be so easily brushed aside as not to delay his ulterior combinations. If the consequences were disastrous to his military fleets, they were still more fatal to Spanish commerce, for although a power which has proved its maritime superiority may, with great risk, remain on the defensive so far as its trade is concerned, one which has shown inferiority can only do so at the cost of losing its merchant navy. Therefore it is not surprising to learn that when the seventeenth century opened the merchant marine was totally destroyed, and a contemporary

[1] For naval necessaries England also was dependent on the northern powers, but English communications with the Baltic were not even threatened.

Spanish seaman describes the state of things in impressive words:[1]

Within the last twenty-five years there were in Spain more than 1,000 sea-going ships belonging to private owners. Biscay alone had more than 200, which navigated to Newfoundland for cod and whale and to Flanders with wool. And now there is not one. In Galicia, Asturias, and Montañas there were more than 200 pataches which sailed to France, Flanders, England, and Andalusia, trading backwards and forwards, and now there are hardly any. In Portugal they always had more than 400 sea-going ships, and more than 1,500 caravels, amongst which Don Sebastian, without going elsewhere or interfering with the ordinary trade to India, St. Thomas, Brazil, Cape Verde, Newfoundland, and other parts, collected 830 sail for his unfortunate expedition to Africa. Now there is hardly a single ship belonging to private owners in the whole kingdom except some small caravels. In Andalusia we had more than 400 ships, of which 200 sailed to New Spain and Tierra-firme, Honduras, and the Windward Islands, to which, in one fleet, would go sixty or seventy ships; the other 200 sailed to the Canaries, the Indies and Islands, and to other places, loaded with wines and merchandize to the profit and increase of the royal revenue and with great profit to the subject. And all this—and it is a thing that merits serious consideration—has vanished and gone as if an end had been put to it on purpose.

Truly it merited—and merits—serious consideration, for the fate of a commercial power which loses the command of its communications is as certain now as in the sixteenth century, and Time grants no absolution to such a one.[2]

In 1585, however, Spain did not know its weakness, England had not learnt its strength, and Spanish commerce was practically uninjured, although some far-seeing Spaniards were peering uneasily into the future. Bacon's apophthegm that 'the wealth of both Indies seems in great part but an accessory to the command of the sea,' was not yet understood in its full significance, and Drake and his backers thought that they had only to sail to the West Indies, plunder where they pleased, and occupy such

[1] T. Cano, *Arte para fabricar, fortificar, y aparejar naves de guerra*, 1611. See also *post*, ii. p. 94, and App. B, vol. ii. p. 316.

[2] 'Keep the command of the sea as you value the national life. With it you can do everything. Without it you will speedily be blotted out from the list of great countries.' (Colomb, *Essays on National Defence*, p. 229.)

places as seemed proper, without regard to the consequences that occupation involved. Raids by sea are always possible, however marked may be the superiority of the dominant navy, but the occupation of an important strategical point necessarily draws all the enemy's force to it if that enemy is capable of putting one in the field, and the power making the occupation must be prepared for all the issues resulting. Even in 1598 and 1599, when Spain was at its last gasp, the threat of a West Indian occupation roused all the energies of the exhausted empire. Still more quickly would such a menace to its commerce take effect when it had not yet fairly closed with its antagonist. English commerce was not nearly so vital to England as the Flota commerce was to Spain, for, while the English power of offence did not rest altogether upon its maritime trade, Philip could not meddle with England, Holland, or France without the Flotas, nor undertake the invasions for which they were to bring the money. To invade England he had to ensure his commercial communications, and unless he could do so, or unless Elizabeth failed to attack them, his Armada would be deferred indefinitely with less and less likelihood of ever taking shape. Therefore, in 1585, Elizabeth possessed the initiative, for if she struck successfully at the Flotas, and as long as Philip failed to repulse her attacks, the war was transferred to the Atlantic, and Philip could not injure her or any one else until he had conquered there. As early as 1581 one of the shrewdest spectators of the political duel had remarked to his Government that the English would prove dangerous enemies 'if they could seize the Indian fleet . . . the true way to humble the pride of Spain.'[1] But by taking any position

[1] *State Papers Ven.* 9th August, 1581 (Ven. ambassador in Spain to the Doge and Seignory). It will be noticed in the following pages that the despatches of the Venetian ambassadors at Madrid are quoted as of high authority. Their information was extremely good, and obtained, as one of them says, 'by those means which are now common everywhere,' that is to say by theft and bribery, and in at least one case these methods enabled the ambassador to acquire papers from Philip's own desk. Occasionally they were wrong, just as members of the English Government were sometimes wrong about events occurring in England, but on the whole they are not only trustworthy but more reliable than any other contemporary observers, and in their individual opinions they frequently display remarkable sagacity and foresight. That which gives their comments the most

which would intercept the Flota communications Elizabeth, or Drake for her, was challenging Philip to a life and death struggle, and it was certain that all the available strength of Spain would be directed against any place in the West Indies occupied by the English, or any fleet attempting to control the Flota track. Eventually such poor endeavours as were made were of the nature of Flota interception, and the absence of any serious purpose of occupation until the Earl of Cumberland sailed in 1598 with the intention of seizing and holding Puerto Rico, is so far evidence, considered in connection with her views in 1597 about a port so much easier to hold as one in the Azores,[1] that Drake had no authority for any such positive proceedings now. From the naval side, if Elizabeth had seen her advantage and decided boldly, she never had a fairer chance of striking at the Flota than in 1585, for it was one of the richest of the series, and was sailing homewards unsuspiciously. She had kept Drake hanging back six months, and finally let him loose six weeks too late. Moreover, her besetting infirmity of hoarding her own ships was shown from the beginning, for of the twenty-two vessels composing Drake's fleet only two were men-of-war, and the one thing certain about the merchant officers was that they were not reliable when called upon to risk their vessels for any higher object than privateering.

In 1624 Monson wrote that any place garrisoned by Drake might have been 'relieved and succoured out of England,' and by that means the war might have been diverted from Europe. If fought out on the Atlantic it would have been equally diverted from Europe, and it is not easy to perceive what benefit he saw in transferring a land war from Europe to America with the added disadvantage of the Atlantic struggle for maritime superiority, inevitable in either case, thrown in. England could only transfer the land war successfully if it obtained maritime

value is their curiously detached attitude. Beyond the tie of a common religion, a tie which was especially weak in the case of Venice, the Italian States, generally, had no sympathy with Spain, and felt a great deal of political dislike and distrust towards it, so that in their reports to their Government the Venetian ambassadors show as little personal feeling as though they were describing the movements of herds of animals.

[1] *Post*, vol. ii. p. 50.

mastery, and if that were obtained the transference would no longer be necessary, for everything desired could be won without it. Later, when he wrote his second Book, Monson saw some of the other drawbacks, the possibilities of sickness, uncertainty of communication, and difficulty of supplies, but there were larger political and military objections also. In dismissing Parliament in 1593 the Queen told them 'it may be thought simplicity in me that all this time of my reign I have not sought to advance my territories and enlarge my dominions, for opportunity hath served me to do it . . . though it hath not been hard to obtain, yet I doubted how to keep the things so obtained.' Elizabeth might well doubt. If Cartagena or the Havana had been garrisoned in 1585 the whole available naval and military strength of Spain, as yet unbroken, would have converged upon it, and Elizabeth would have had to fight, not when, where, and how she pleased, but within a narrow area and under the circumscribed conditions favourable to Spanish and unfavourable to English tactics. If she decided to hold on at all costs the first step necessary for her to take would have been to quadruple the strength of the navy, preparatory to a series of fleet actions with the necessary reliefs following them, and to raise a proportionate number of men to man the ships. Instead of feeding the Dutch war occasionally with volunteers and troops—or more probably as well as doing so—she would have had to equip a large field force, keep it at a fixed strength, replacing the losses from wounds and disease, and furnish it with munitions and supplies of all kinds. The mere cost was prohibitive, for it would have represented a drain upon the English exchequer that would speedily have brought the country to revolt, submission, or bankruptcy; but as Elizabeth was at this very time allowing her soldiers in the Netherlands to die of hunger and cold from want of pay, food, and clothing, we may easily imagine what amount of attention would have been bestowed on troops in the West Indies. All this was to be done at a distance of upwards of 4,000 miles, along a line of communication flanked by hostile ports and settlements, in contravention of the axiom acted upon for centuries by the English military kings that command of the sea must precede territorial attack. Moreover, the

occupation was to be made amid a population who, if they were willing to buy negroes of Englishmen, were as fanatically inimical, both religiously and politically, as their Spanish cousins, and who would fight the invaders with all the advantages of superior numbers, acclimatization, and local organization. Yet again, the only utility of a captured port would be as a base for a fleet, but its maintenance depended on the supremacy of the navy which would have in any case to fight for the command of the Atlantic. · If that command was gained a fleet acting in the West Indies could make its temporary base anywhere, as Drake and Cumberland did later in 1595 and 1598; if it was not gained the captured port would be helpless without the fleet and would surely have to surrender. Elizabethan colonization was not successful even where there was no armed and civilized enemy to encounter; invasion of the Spanish settlements with the limited financial and other resources available would have been madness. On the other hand, divested of the objective of possession, the voyage became only a plunder raid incapable of inducing any military results. As a commercial privateering speculation it was not likely to be profitable, for it was unnecessarily large, and expensive in character, for mere surprise attacks. Although the West Indies were supposed to be teeming with wealth and Nombre de Dios might be called dramatically 'the treasure house of the world,' it was only during a few weeks of the year, when the silver was collected for embarkation, that any of these towns were worth attention. At other times they contained no more wealth than any small country town in England or Spain, and their destruction could neither pay for the expense of reaching them in force nor affect the strength of the kingdom to which they belonged.

During 1586 Elizabeth did practically nothing, and in 1587 she had lost the initiative, for the Armada was then so far advanced that she had to conform her movements to the necessity for impeding its completion. Drake's proceedings in 1587 call for little comment here beyond noticing that although he was in command of the Spanish coast, it was command by default and not by success—command in default of opposition and not in virtue of crushing it. When Sir Edward Howard obstructed the

French mobilization of 1512 he was also strong enough to have fought any French fleet that might have come out, but if Santa Cruz had been able to get a squadron, of even moderate strength, to sea in 1587, Drake could have done nothing but run. In the latter's fleet of twenty-three sail there were four powerful men-of-war and three merchantmen, capable, so far as tonnage goes, of serious fighting if they were willing to engage in it, but seven fighting ships could not have held the station. Notwithstanding his taunting challenge to the marquis to come out and fight, a bravado no doubt based on his knowledge that Santa Cruz was unable to move a ship, Drake saw the weak point, and, on May 17th, wrote to Walsyngham, 'If there were here six more of Her Majesty's good ships of the second sort we should be the better able to keep their forces from joining,' and we may be sure that the original deficiency was not owing to any want of discernment on his part.[1] The art of strategy consists not only in the selection of the crucial zone of operations, but also in being present in superior force at the point of contact at the right time. Nearly all the most striking failures of the naval war were due to Elizabeth's inability to understand the importance of strength and time as necessary factors; but it must be said also that there is no clear indication that her professional advisers comprehended—at any rate at first—the absolute necessity of crushing strength to bring about definite results. When the Marquis of Santa Cruz did succeed in getting to sea in July 1587, after Drake was in England again, he hastened at once to the Azores to convoy the expected Flota. If Elizabeth had desired to bring matters to a crisis, and had perceived that a captured or destroyed Flota would have deferred invasion indefinitely, she would also have had a fleet there in force. But she was perfectly satisfied with the capture of the San Felipe, saw no further than that a voyage had for once been profitable, and was deterred by the warning that she would risk her ships,[2] although

[1] If the report of a conversation between Leycester and Elizabeth may be trusted (*post*, p. 163), she, as might be expected, was the one person incapable of seeing what Drake had done for her and his country in 1587.

[2] *Post*, p. 151.

English seamanship and shipbuilding could have had little to dread from any weather that Spaniards could face. The Flota did not reach Spain until the end of September, therefore Drake could have been at sea again in time, but as Santa Cruz had at least thirty or forty vessels and the Flota was itself capable of some self-defence, we may take it that a new English fleet would not have effected anything striking, and perhaps would not have escaped misfortune, for it would certainly not have been stronger than the one Drake took to sea earlier in the year.

During 1586 and 1587 the conception that the Flotas were, politically, the decisive strategical point, that, while difficult for Spain to defend, its whole might was bound up in them, and that they, therefore, were the true English objective, was taking shape in the minds of both Englishmen and foreigners. Walsyngham had been much impressed by the shock to Philip's financial credit caused by even the comparatively unsuccessful raid of 1585, and from that time became an ardent advocate of what may be called the Flota policy. The Spaniards were quite as alive to the danger, and, in November 1586, one wrote to Philip that the greatest care was necessary as the English intended to keep a fleet at the Azores and possibly to seize Terceira or St. Michael; and six months later an Englishman at Venice impressed upon Burghley that the Spanish power was 'only maintained with the riches and trade of the Indies, the which, if Her Majesty can only find means to intercept or let[1] them, no doubt the Spaniards will be constrained to come to a very reasonable composition.' In July 1587 Walsyngham tells Burghley 'the only way to bridle their malice is the interrupting the Indian fleets,' and, in the following December, Hawkyns outlined a scheme of offence[2] in which he says of the Indian fleets that 'if we might once strike them our peace were made with honour, safety, and profit.' Hawkyns says that in the plans, or want of them, hitherto pursued, 'there was never any substantial ground laid to be followed effectually,' and condemns the foreign voyages as useless, thus showing that Elizabeth's half and half

[1] To hinder or obstruct.
[2] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccvi. 61.

measures were already arousing criticism from those who believed in England more than she did. However Hawkyns, like many others, seamen and civilians, did not allow for the fact that the Queen's military proceedings always dragged at the heel of, and were subservient to, the foreign policy of procrastination, evasion, and simulated innocence, in which she put faith. He proposed, as an alternative to the raids 'which hath taken bad effect and bred great charge, and we still in worse case and less assurance of quietness,' to keep a fleet of six large and six small ships, which were to be relieved every four months, continually at sea on the coast of Spain or at the Azores, thus anticipating the system recommended by Monson and adopted in 1602, although the force now proposed would have been found too weak to have brought about the results expected.

In December 1587, however, it was too late for plans of campaign requiring time to produce their effects, and the attention of the English leaders was necessarily fixed upon the Armada preparing in Spain. As Ralegh remarked later, nothing had yet occurred to teach Philip his extreme weakness at sea, and the Spaniards might be forgiven for thinking, as most of them did, that if Drake had waited for Santa Cruz to come out his cruise would have had an unhappy ending. Far from feeling himself weak, Philip was acting on the approved principles of those in assured maritime command. The doctrine that the security of ports depends not on garrisons and guns but on sea-power was understood by some of his servants,[1] and possibly, dimly, by himself, but he had left the West Indian ports unfortified, and the navy to guard them had existed only in name until the collection of the great fleet under Santa Cruz which, in the English Channel, was equally to secure the West Indies and subdue the revolted provinces. In 1580 Philip's ambassador at Paris wrote to him that if England could be nullified, 'directly or indirectly, you might consider the States of Flanders con-

[1] See report of Andrea D'Oria on the defences of Cadiz in 1597 (*Col. de Doc. Inéd.* ii. p. 189). D'Oria says explicitly that he has never seen any port so strong but that a fleet and an army of sufficient strength could take it if it was not saved by another fleet. See also Cabrera de Cordoba, *post*, p. 133.

quered.'[1] Indirect means, which included diplomacy, subornation of murder, and encouragement of treason, had failed, and the direct method, which meant pledging a huge stake to Fortune, did not altogether recommend itself to some Spaniards. In December 1586 Mendoza warned Philip that 'in the event of the loss of a great fleet the owner sees himself bereft at one blow of forces, ships, and guns, for they are things hard to replace except after much delay.' A modern writer says that 'the marine of Castile, in spite of many occasions that had shown the necessity for it, had never existed,'[2] and although most English historians do not choose to admit the fact, it was not only true, but some of Philip's own seamen knew it at the time. In 1578 Sancho de Achiniega described the paucity of men in the maritime provinces, and the falling off in the number of ships built on account of the decay of trade and the embargoes for the royal service to which ships were subjected. As the royal fleets, it may be repeated, were made up of armed merchantmen, the fewer of them built the smaller became the stock upon which the Crown could draw. A few years afterwards another of Philip's officers spoke even more emphatically, and with broader insight into the necessities and the dangers.[3] Speaking of the probability that England would grow stronger at sea, he dwelt on the need for creating a real fleet: 'what is most to be feared is that trouble may be stirred up, perhaps very near at home, and consequently it will be necessary for your Majesty to take up a very strong position in marine affairs, and not to beat about the

[1] *Simancas Papers*, 13th February, 1580. It should be noticed here that in 1582 Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and most of Western Catholic Europe adopted the Gregorian reformation of the calendar, by which ten days were deducted. England retained the old style and the practice of commencing the year on the 25th March. Consequently a paper written by a Spaniard on 20th January 1583 would have been dated by an Englishman 10th January 1582. In the following volumes dates from foreign authorities are either new style or are given in the double form of old and new style; those from English papers, if not given in both forms, are old style. An Act for altering the calendar to that used abroad was read twice in the Lords in March 158⅘, but was dropped, and the change was not made until 1752.

[2] Lobo, *Historia General de las Antiguas Colonias*. Madrid, 1875.

[3] *Simancas Papers*, iii. p. 56.

bush and patch things up . . . at present the coasts are in such a condition that it cannot be said that your Majesty's position at sea is strong . . . it is all very well to say that your Majesty has 100 galleys; they may be of some little use in the Mediterranean, but they are of small importance elsewhere.[1] It is clear to me that while the expense of them is constant their utility is only conditional and intermittent.' Dangers should be foreseen and provided against, 'as the very fact of your Majesty being strong at sea would prevent any molestation.' For that purpose he proposed that 100 galleons should be built to be armed with the guns of the fortresses, 'which would be rendered to a great extent unnecessary by the existence of the fleet'; all of which, especially the last two phrases, is unexceptionable and quite modern in its grasp.

To tell Philip to build a hundred ships and, necessarily, to frame a corresponding department to supervise them, was a counsel of perfection, and even if he had been willing he never had the period of peace or the money indispensable for such a complete reorganization. He had to be satisfied with patchwork, and after 1580, when the Portuguese marine fell into his hands, was perhaps sufficiently contented with matters as they stood. A paper of about 1586[2] estimates the maritime strength of Spain at 104 ships of 100 tons and upwards,[3] and that of Portugal at ninety-two of the same character. At Lisbon there were, we are told, 'of great ships belonging to the King and merchants, called carracks, which go to the East Indies and are of burthen from 500 to 1,300 tons, thirteen. There is in Lisbon, for the wars, twenty-six caravels. There is in Lisbon of divers merchants and other ships which go to the ports of Barbary, Africa, Venice, and other places, of the burthen from 100 to 400 tons, thirty-seven ships. There is in the river of Lisbon of divers merchants that

[1] The galley divisions were—Spain, 40; Naples, 40; Sicily, 24; hired from the D'Orias, 13; hired from private owners, 18. After 1580 there was a Portuguese galley division. Owing to the difficulty in obtaining slaves for the oars, the ravages of disease, unseaworthiness, and theft and peculation in relation to the equipment and stores, there was seldom half the nominal force available.

[2] *Harl. MSS.* 295, f. 89; *Add. MSS.* 1026. Translations from a Spanish original.

[3] In 1582 there were 177 English merchantmen of the same class.

are of burthen from 70 to 120 tons which go for the Islands,[1] Genoa, and divers other voyages, thirty-six caravels.' Therefore, besides his Spanish ships, Philip had some 100 more large ones, and as there were eighty out of 100 great ships of this class that came from Peninsular ports in the Armada, we may suppose that in 1588 the resources of Spain and Portugal were still sufficient in quantity.

The quality, as we have seen, was very bad, and that of the officers and crews still worse. There was no one among the leading Englishmen who inflamed the seamen with enthusiasm as an infallible commander, or whose personal qualities inspired devotion as did those of Blake and Nelson,[2] but the men had at least that confidence in their officers, born of experience in voyages made together and of knowledge, that they were conversant with their work.[3] The self-respect of both officers and men was maintained by a mutual consideration and recognition of each other's good qualities within the social demarcations so strongly defined in the sixteenth century. They were free men, and treated as free, for the rapid degeneration of the seventeenth century had not commenced; and there was no theological dyspepsia interfering with the healthy appetite for plunder and prize money which was their chief interest. On board the Spanish ships the sailors were flouted and despised as a troublesome necessity for navigation, but who occupied space that, otherwise, would have been available for soldiers, and who, whenever possible, were sacrificed to the comfort and convenience of the soldiers, humiliated and degraded in their own estimation, and therefore made unreliable by their treatment.[4] To serve in a royal fleet was rendered a painful affliction

[1] The Azores.

[2] The Lord Admiral, Howard, exercised this personal attraction to a certain extent. See *post*, pp. 165, 379.

[3] Towards the end of the reign, when 'gentleman captains' came into the navy, the sailors soon made known their disapproval of the changed conditions.

[4] In a petition from the shipowners of Guipuzcoa in 1588, one of the items of complaint was that the soldiers in the Armada had turned the seamen out of their quarters, leaving them without shelter. The petitioners added that many ships in the Armada had been lost because the military officers dictated to masters and pilots and took the control out of their hands. (Fernandez Duro, *La Armada Invencible*, ii. p. 469.)

to a Spanish seaman, and was made as nearly intolerable as possible by the stupid and galling tyranny of the soldiers. The ships' officers were subordinate to the military officers on board, although the latter might never have been at sea, and the admirals were generals with no sense of naval, as distinguished from barrack-yard, discipline, no understanding of ocean naval tactics, and no ability to manœuvre. There was not even any of what we should call regimental discipline, for officers of the different arms refused to take orders from each other, and unless an officer of high rank happened to be on board each branch would act independently. In nearly every case the training of the admirals had been in the Mediterranean galley divisions and confined to the handling of galleys; when they came to square-rigged ships they were as helpless as a man whose experience had been confined to steamers would be if he were suddenly required to manage a squadron of sailing vessels. There were a few Spaniards—Martinez de Recalde, Brochero de Anaya, Zubiaur, and Bertendona—who, so far as experience went, might claim to be considered professional seamen, but none of them ever showed any instinct for sea affairs or the indefinable *flair* of seamanship possessed by the humblest English privateersman. Their sea practice was never second nature, but a laboriously acquired and always imperfect accomplishment. Santa Cruz and Padilla were strategists, but essentially soldiers; and there were many others who could give Philip good military advice, but were quite incapable of putting it into practice at sea. Therefore, although Philip had his Armada, he had a body without a soul. His officers were not capable of handling it as a fleet should be handled, of acting rapidly in combination, of making swift tactical movements, and striking quickly and heavily. Had they been capable, they would have been fatally handicapped by the character of the ships themselves, slow, heavy, overbuilt, and leewardly, and no match, in any respect, for an equal number of English ships of less tonnage.[1] But the character of the ships was simply the

[1] On 5th July, 1588, Philip wrote to Medina Sidonia: 'I see plainly that the hulks cannot sail to windward.' In the Armada the hulks formed a division of twenty-three vessels carrying 384 guns. The other great ships can have been but little less useless.

practical expression of the national maladroitness in sea affairs generally. The absence of any organized administration caused the delivery of provisions from hand to mouth, insufficient in quantity, and abominable in quality; in all the fleets Philip prepared putrid provisions were diffusing disease and sapping the courage and endurance of the men and the hopes of the commanders even before they sailed. The same lack of magazines and control accounted for the unserviceableness of the stores, the untrustworthy cordage, canvas, and all the many articles necessary to make and keep a ship seaworthy.

In October 1586 the Venetian ambassador at Madrid wrote 'as the fleets of both parties are now so large it is quite possible that a naval engagement may take place. Those who know best, however, being quite aware that it is almost impossible to force on an engagement between great sailing ships, especially upon the open sea, if one of the combatants does not desire it, conjecture that the Spaniards will not risk an encounter until their fleet is more powerful than it is at present.'[1] But Philip could obtain no conclusive results without rendering the English fleet innocuous, and if Elizabeth had undertaken any continuous action against the Flotas or the Azores she would have forced Philip to follow her there, and the naval struggle would then have been decided in the Atlantic in place of the English Channel. That Elizabeth's attempts during 1585–6–7 were casual instead of continuous was due not so much to her hopes of peace as to her economy; she longed for a rich haul in the shape of captured treasure ships, but had visions of getting it without a heavy naval expenditure. With luck one or two might have been taken, and she would have been delighted, but a solitary success would have settled nothing, and for persistent action she had no mind then or later. Philip, if slow, saw more clearly at this stage of his reign, and though his technical strategy is generally condemned he understood

[1] Compare the opinion of a council of English and Dutch admirals held in May 1693, that 'it is hardly possible' to compel an enemy to engage if he has sea room and desires to avoid it. Again, Russell, in July 1694, 'impossible at sea to force an enemy to fight.' These opinions, however, relate only to the bare tactical aspect and the formal, close-hauled, line of battle; a combatant may be placed in such a situation that he must fight or abandon his strategic object.

the requirements of his policy in a national sense better than did his adversary. If his naval strategy was bad it was little, if at all, worse than that of his enemy, and probably had but slight influence in bringing about the catastrophe. It was the inferiority of ships, officers, and men that caused the disaster, and the Spaniards might have looked for a different result if, with the same strategy, they could have exchanged those with their antagonist.

As 1588 marks not only the supreme effort of Spanish offence but the collaboration of all Philip's most skilled servants, it affords a favourable opportunity for the consideration of Spanish strategy at its highest development, and their interpretation of the problem and the way to solve it. The first scheme of invasion formulated by the Marquis of Santa Cruz involved the necessity of providing nearly 600 men-of-war and transports and upwards of 90,000 troops and seamen, and was designed to act direct from Spain independently of the army in the Netherlands. These demands, and above all the cost, seemed to Philip to be prohibitive, and it was decided to utilize Parma's veterans, sending a fleet from Spain to cover their passage by crushing opposition or masking the enemy, and to bring reinforcements. In September 1587 Philip announced to Parma that as soon as the marquis returned with the Flota from the Azores he would collect his fleet and sail for the Channel; and, at this moment, the King does not seem to have anticipated much resistance, believing that his fleet would keep any possible English opposition at bay, and that a position taken up off the North Foreland would prevent an English concentration by cutting communications.[1] It was left to the discretion of the duke and Santa Cruz whether, after the crossing had been effected, the latter should seize a port and destroy English shipping or should confine himself to guarding communications. Philip thought the project easy, and Parma, a much better judge, was of the same opinion if the marquis had come immediately as intimated. The plan is open to various criticisms, but as it was not the final one need not be discussed at length. In October

[1] *Simancas Papers*, $\frac{25\text{th Aug.}}{4\text{th Sept.}}$, 1587.

there were but eight English men-of-war in commission, of which only one was of any strength, and most were only pinnaces; but Philip ignored now, as afterwards, the fact that his heavy ships, requiring at least thirty feet of water, could not get within range of the shallow Flemish ports, and that Parma's boats could not come out to them because between the two would be a swarm of light Dutch vessels manned by the fierce Zealand seamen who would delight in nothing better than a day's play with the helpless soldiers in their sloops and boats. On the other hand, the belief of Parma, the greatest soldier of his generation, that 'it would have been easily effected'[1] is not to be lightly set aside. Philip, with a real perception of the value of time and opportunity, insisted again and again, when Santa Cruz returned, that he should sail immediately, but, with the best will in the world, the General could not go with unseaworthy ships lacking provisions and stores, and the King had finally to resign himself to a postponement until March.

It was not until after the close of this first stage of the enterprise that the question of taking a port as a base comes under discussion, for previously either it had been ignored or it had been taken for granted that the Thames or Medway would afford shelter. In 1574, when Philip had prepared a fleet for invasion under Menendez de Avilés, the Scillies had been marked for seizure, as they were again in the closing years of the century, and that the insecure and confined anchorage afforded by the most storm-beaten spot within the area of operations should have retained its attraction for the Spaniards shows their uncertain knowledge of the geographical terms of the problem and how little they learnt with time. It is difficult, however, to determine what the Spanish leaders had exactly in mind in the autumn of 1587, but it seems probable that in Philip's judgment the port was subsidiary, and rightly so, as far as the Armada was concerned, to the great fleet engagement he anticipated. The historian, Cabrera de Cordoba, tells us that he was sent by Parma to inform Philip that the English seemed in earnest in their desire for peace, and that it would be desirable, if

[1] *Simancas Papers*, 31 January, 1588.

possible, to make it; and Cabrera told Philip on his own account that in his opinion the junction of the Armada with Parma's flotilla was impracticable unless a port, in which Armada and flotilla could meet, was occupied, 'that in this lay the essence of the enterprise,' and that if the port could not be seized the voyage should be relinquished.[1] Unfortunately Cabrera de Cordoba does not give the exact date of his mission, but it must have been during the spring of 1588, and Parma was evidently troubled at seeing that Philip did not seem to recognize how considerably the situation had changed since the autumn of the previous year. Parma believed that Flushing was the only harbour capable of receiving the Armada, but Flushing, as one of the cautionary towns, was held by an English garrison, and to reduce it while the English and Dutch controlled its water communications would have meant an interminable siege. The duke was also impressed by the difficulty, overlooked by Philip, the interference of the Dutch in the shallow waters, over which the flotilla would have to pass to reach the protection of the Armada if this put into any outside port. Therefore, in his view, it was not merely a harbour that was required, but one to which the Armada could come to protect the flotilla from the outset. That was something very different from the proposition, as usually stated by English critics, in general terms, and by Monson with emphasis, that a port was necessary to the Armada, and that its seizure should, in some vague way, have preceded, and been separate from, the main operation. If Medina Sidonia had anchored in the Thames without opposition he would have been no nearer getting Parma across until Howard and the Dutch had been accounted for.

Somewhat earlier than this Santa Cruz appears to have taken an altogether pessimist view of the prospect, for, in November 1587, the Venetian ambassador sent his Government a copy of a letter from the marquis to the King, that he had managed to obtain from Philip's cabinet, in which the former wrote, after referring to the hopelessness of an invasion of Scotland or Ireland: 'As to the issue of an engagement in the open sea, or the possibility

[1] *Hist. de Felipe II.*, iii. p. 288.

of seizing a port, or the chances of effecting a landing, I do not think we can count on them . . . we have no harbours at hand in case of need . . . nor in my opinion would it be such an easy matter to take the Isle of Wight, or any other harbour, for the shelter of our fleet as is represented to your Majesty by those who stake nothing on the risk. Your Majesty must remember that should any misfortune befall the fleet, which God forbid, it would be impossible to put together another such Armada for a long time to come.'[1] All this, like Ralegh's version of the Spanish plan,[2] seems to point to a weak notion of sailing to a port in the hope of undertaking further operations from it; but if this idea existed at one time it was never held by Parma, and was subsequently discarded by Philip himself for the sounder alternative of fighting first and then capturing a port. All the Spanish intentions during the winter of 1587–8 are obscure. On 31st January Parma wrote to Philip: 'Your Majesty is perfectly well aware that I could not cross over to England with those boats, and you very prudently ordered me in your letter of 4th September not to attempt to do so until the marquis arrived, and repeated the order in subsequent letters, adding in every case that I was not to cross if there was any fleet to interfere.' He goes on to say that he is therefore surprised at Philip's dissatisfaction, that having been told not to cross in face of any obstacle he has strictly obeyed, 'and notwithstanding all this you suppose I may be there.'[3] Knowing what we do of Philip's previous intentions declared in his various letters and recapitulated by Parma, there must have been a great deal of misunderstanding somewhere.

Santa Cruz died in February 1588, and was succeeded by the Duke of Medina Sidonia, but the Armada was no more ready for sea in March than it had been in the

[1] *State Papers Ven.* $\frac{\text{28th Oct.}}{\text{9th Nov.}}$, 1587.

[2] 'To invade by sea on a perilous coast, being neither in possession of any port nor succoured by any party, may better fit a prince presuming on his fortunes than enriched with understanding. Such was the enterprise of Philip II. upon England in the year 1588.' (*Hist. of the World*, Book iii. cap. 4, sect. 2.)

[3] *Simancas Papers*, $\frac{31}{11}$ January, 1588.

previous September. The duke's Instructions were dated $\frac{\text{2nd March}}{\text{1st April}}$, and were as follows:—

You will sail with the whole of the Armada and go straight to the English Channel, which you will ascend as far as the cape of Margate, where you will join hands with the Duke of Parma, my nephew. . . . because the success of the business depends on our striking at the root even if Drake should have sailed into Spanish waters with a fleet to harass and divert us, as advices from England render probable, you will not be turned from your course, but continue straight on without seeking the enemy, although you leave him behind you here. But if he follows, or comes within striking distance of you, you may then attack him; as also if you meet the said Drake at the mouth of the Channel, because if their forces are thus divided it would be well to beat them separately, so that they may not be able to unite. If you do not chance to meet the enemy before you arrive off the cape of Margate, and find there only the Lord Admiral of England with his fleet, or even if you find the united fleets of the Lord Admiral and Drake, yours would be superior to both of them in strength: and so in God's name and in such a cause as you voyage in you may fight them, trying to gain the weathergage and every other advantage.[1]

Philip adds that it must be remembered that the enemy will endeavour to fight at long range in consequence of their superior gunnery, and that therefore the Spaniards must try to come to close quarters; for that reason a statement is sent with the despatch describing the English way of employing their artillery. When Parma is across the fleet is to hold the mouth of the Thames and guard communications, but that any other course may be adopted if the two dukes agree that it will be better. Of the same date are supplementary secret Instructions,[2] that if Parma cannot cross, or Medina Sidonia cannot join him, 'you will, after communication with him, consider whether you cannot seize the Isle of Wight.' But this 'on no account' was to be done on the passage up Channel or until the main design had failed.

These Instructions have evoked much sarcasm, not merely from general historians, but from experts. It is therefore worth while asking not only whether they will

[1] Fernandez Duro, *La Armada Invencible*, ii. p. 6.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 14.

compare favourably with the efforts of Elizabeth and her Council in the same direction, but whether they are really so lamentably deficient as is usually supposed in strategical comprehension, and, within Philip's knowledge of their existence, of recognition of the factors and possibilities to be reckoned with.[1] The object of strategy is to be in superior strength at the decisive point, and the decisive point is that absolutely necessary for the one combatant to obtain or for the other to deny him. Here, while the critical station for the English was off Lisbon, the decisive point for the Spaniards was the one commanding the Channel passage between the Flemish ports and the Kentish coast. Philip orders his admiral to reach this with his whole strength and enter into communications with Parma. If the English are foolish enough to be absent—'unready' is the term used in the supplementary Instructions—so much the better; but if, as the King expects, they are there in force, the battle which he hopes will give him the mastery is to be fought. He has heard that Drake is coming down with a detachment into Spanish waters—he evidently has no expectation that the whole English fleet might come—and he sees, quite

[1] It is an illustration of the scant justice that Philip obtains that because the Armada ran out of certain kinds of cannon shot, the deficiency is at once ascribed to his remissness and want of foresight. The English were reduced to fire plough chains instead of shot, but all sorts of excuses are found for Elizabeth. As a matter of fact, Philip was far in advance of his time, for he ordered a provision of from thirty to fifty rounds a gun, and this amount had been usual in the Flotas since 1552 (*Armada Invencible*, i. p. 482; *Ordenanzas Reales para la Casa de Contratacion*, Madrid, 1585). In 1597 Ralegh noticed that no proper proportion of powder and shot was allowed, and, in 1635, Monson, Lindsey, Penington, and others had the matter referred to them for consideration, and decided that the supply for flagships ought to be from thirty-five to fifty rounds, and for other ships from thirty to forty rounds, so that half a century later Philip's standard was hardly reached. In January 1691 an Order in Council directed that 'during this present war' ships were to be provided with eight rounds of powder and fifteen of shot in addition to the customary forty. Even in 1692 the fleet preparing for the West Indies was supplied with sixty rounds a gun, as something exceptional and requiring an especial order. However, it is highly probable that the artillery stores, like the others in the Armada, although ordered on paper were deficient in quantity, and so far Philip must share with his predecessors the responsibility for the absence of a proper departmental organization.

rightly, that no mischief done along the coasts by a detachment in the absence of the Spanish fleet can affect the main issue to be decided in the Channel, and therefore Medina Sidonia is to ignore anything so inconsequent to the ultimate object. If, however, Drake comes within reach of the duke, or if the former is met at the mouth of the Channel, where he will practically form part of the main English fleet, then he is to be attacked, for Philip sees all the advantages of destroying the enemy in detail. Although there is no explicit direction to fight before arriving off the North Foreland, the expression 'if you do not chance to meet the enemy before you arrive off the cape of Margate' certainly implies that Philip expected battle to be joined if any portion of the English fleet was encountered in the passage up Channel; and elsewhere he refers to this expected battle as the chief thing.[1]

The Instructions are here open to exception, in that, theoretically, Medina Sidonia should have been ordered to seek out and finish with the enemy before undertaking ulterior operations which depended on his success in battle; but it may be reasoned that his presence in the Straits of Dover would save time by forcing Howard to be there, just as the presence of an English fleet at the Azores forced the Spaniards to be at the Islands, and that if the English did not appear the Armada was strong enough to cover the crossing while masking any threatened opposition.[2] Philip speaks only of Howard and Drake, overlooking Lord Henry Seymour and the Dutch. Other letters show that he included Lord Henry Seymour's in Howard's fleet, a junction which happened in fact, and the Dutch he consistently ignored, not only in 1588, but long afterwards, when they had made their maritime power felt. There is no written evidence that Philip had ever faced the difficulty of dealing with the light draught Dutch vessels which would hold the shallow waters between the Armada and Parma's shallops; if he did, we may sup-

[1] 'The essence of the business.' Philip to Cardinal Albert (*Simancas Papers*, iv. p. 188).

[2] On $\frac{1}{11}$ July Martinez de Recalde wrote to Philip: 'So far as I understand, the object of the Armada is to meet and vanquish the enemy by main force,' if he will fight. But 'otherwise we have to proceed to the Downs and there join hands with the Duke of Parma's force in Dunkirk, whose passage across we are to protect.'

pose that he thought that the twenty-seven pinnaces of under 100 tons in the Armada, together with some of its smaller vessels, would be able to deal with them. But, although documents are silent, it is even harder to believe that Parma disregarded such a vital question than that Philip and the Spanish seamen neglected it. Nothing could be better advised than Philip's order 'on no account' to seize a port before the decisive battle had been fought. One occupied before the battle could neither be held nor safely used until after the action, while if the Spaniards were victorious they could take as many ports as they pleased. If, however, the result of the voyage up Channel was doubtful, if Parma was unable to cross or Medina Sidonia unable to join him, then a port might be taken with a view to further operations. This may have appeared feasible when the political situation was taken into account —if, as Philip had reason to hope, the presence of a Spanish force occupying English ground would have given life to Catholic revolt. But otherwise, as a purely military phase of the expedition, it was undeniably bad, for the enterprise as a whole belonged essentially to the class of attempts to combine divided forces in which failure to form a junction must be the signal for instant retreat. Assuming that Medina Sidonia had taken Portsmouth or the Isle of Wight, it would have been, supposing that there had been no Catholic rising, to find himself blockaded by sea and besieged by land, with insufficient troops and dwindling stores, until the time came for a desperate effort to cut his way out, which may or may not have succeeded. He could have received no reinforcements from Spain within any useful period of time, and Parma must have looked on helplessly. Of course if, as Parma desired, Flushing, or any friendly port in which the flotilla would have been sheltered from the beginning under the wing of the Armada, could have been entered, the whole question would assume a different aspect, but the possession of such a port would have altered the character of the entire campaign.

That Medina Sidonia broke down utterly in carrying out his orders is so far Philip's fault, in that he insisted on retaining a commander who protested his own incompetence. But it may be surmised that Diego Flores de

Valdes, who was the duke's responsible adviser, was the evil genius of the expedition, although the King himself indicated a portion of the real cause of failure, more potent than tactical errors, in his warning about the English gunnery, and the gunnery was but one branch of the general superiority that has been discussed. At first the duke seems to have grasped, to a certain extent, the spirit of his Instructions. On $\frac{19}{29}$ May, 1588, he wrote to Philip: 'The opinion of those whom I have consulted here is that the best course would be to break up the enemy's sea force first. . . . I recognize the advantage of keeping the army intact, at least until I have beaten the enemy. . . . If I find no obstacle in the way I will not divide the Armada, or seek the enemy, but will push forwards to join hands with the Duke of Parma.' After the meeting they would set about the task on land, and 'I look upon this as quite easy when we have beaten the enemy at sea,' so that Medina Sidonia, like Philip, was then prepared for the preliminary great battle at sea. However, the succeeding passages of the letter show a less thorough comprehension: 'In case, as your Majesty says, Drake with his fleet should fortify himself at Plymouth, or any other port, in order to let me pass on and then come out and attack me between his fleet and their other one which they have sent against the duke,[1] I have taken every precaution, as will be seen by the formation I have adopted. Either of the two horns of our formation (half-moon), with their supports and two of the galleasses which accompany the first four ships would be able to cope with one of the enemy's fleets, whilst I, leading, could cope with the fleet in front.' He thus contemplates leaving Drake behind him in Plymouth, the situation which the Spanish leaders thought on $\frac{29}{19}$ July had actually arisen, and that Philip had guarded against by ordering an attack if the Englishman was met in the Channel; and if followed, the duke seems to intend only to carry on a running fight. This was altogether different from the energetic action promised in the first portion of the despatch. As time passed on Medina Sidonia appears to have become still more confused, and, on $\frac{21\text{st May}}{10\text{th June}}$, wrote to Parma that

[1] Of Parma

the King 'has ordered me not to turn aside, and even if I am impeded, simply to clear the way and proceed to join hands with you, advising you when I reach the English coast, so that with a knowledge of my whereabouts your Excellency may bring out your fleet.' Not only had Philip ordered nothing of the kind, but this rendering was in direct contradiction to Medina Sidonia's own letter of $\frac{29}{19}$ May, when he proposed to push on only if he met with no opposition and anticipated having to fight before joining Parma. Well might the latter, on receipt of this, write to Philip that Medina Sidonia 'seems to have persuaded himself that I may be able to go out and meet him with these boats. These things cannot be.'[1] Parma adds that he would be 'very anxious' if he thought that dependence was being placed on that course, for even if the passage was free it would be great good luck if many of the boats crossed in safety. Philip notes on the margin of this letter of Parma's: 'God grant that no embarrassment may come from this,' which seems to indicate that down to this date, at any rate, the Instructions of 1st April had not been changed.

If there was any misunderstanding there was still time to clear it up, and if Medina Sidonia, ignorant and inexperienced, failed lamentably in time of action, his letter of $\frac{14}{4}$ June[2] is sufficient to free him from the charge of folly at the Council table. Yet on $\frac{23}{13}$ July, off the Lizard, he writes to Philip that he will stay off the Isle of Wight until he has heard from Parma, 'as the plan is that at the moment of my arrival he should sally forth with his fleet without causing me to wait a minute. The whole success of the undertaking depends upon this.' The success of the undertaking depended on his rendering the English fleet incapable of interference and, unless his Instructions had been altered at the last moment, it is inexplicable that, after the interchange of letters and Philip's comments, he should have been under the impression that anything else mattered. Twenty-four hours later he had again reverted to the intention of pushing steadily up Channel, but always with the expectation that Parma would come out to him, and, as far as we

[1] *Simancas Papers*, $\frac{14}{4}$ June, 1588. [2] *Post*, p. 168.

know, his divisional admirals, who are usually acquitted of incapacity at his expense, were aware of his determination to place his whole reliance on Parma's action and made no sign of disapproval at the time. He wrote again and again to Parma in this sense, complaining of receiving no reply, but on $\frac{\text{28th July}}{\text{7th August}}$ the latter communicated with Philip, remarking drily, 'To judge from what the duke says, it would appear that he still expects me to come out and join him with our boats, but it must be perfectly clear that this is not feasible'; and from this we may infer that, so far as Parma knew, the original Instructions were still in force. Yet if Medina Sidonia was disobeying orders he was preparing to do so before the fighting had begun and given him any reason or excuse, and almost contemptuously defying his sovereign.

Philip's plans might have been more definitely and clearly expressed, but whatever was good in them was marred by his admirals; Elizabeth's were egregiously bad, but, fortunately, were mended by her admirals. During the winter of 1587–8, when there was no immediate threat from Spain, Elizabeth showed unaccustomed boldness, even intending, or pretending to intend, to send Drake to the coast of Spain again, but as the winter ended and the danger became greater her preparations slackened, for the naval situation was dominated, as ever in her mind, by the political, and in February she had fresh hopes of peace. Moreover, in Burghley, the Queen had always at her side one who, if not Drake's personal enemy, regarded him as a dangerous firebrand, and it is not unlikely that much of the vacillation and misapprehension of the situation she displayed in the summer was, if not due to, at least intensified by, this influence, of which there are traces but no direct proof.[1] The local preparations for defence against the Armada may be considered to have commenced with the council of war held in November 1587, which Monson discusses fully,[2] and while the members were sitting Drake was commissioning ships at Plymouth, but in Monson's belief nothing serious was intended.[3] Negotiations with Parma had been dragging on through

[1] *Post*, pp. 163, 167. At this time Burghley was protecting Borough from Drake's animosity, see *post*, p. 150.

[2] *Post*. ii. p. 267, *et seq.*

[3] *Post*, ii. p. 283.

1587, but had been taken up again more earnestly in September, and it is quite incredible that Elizabeth proposed impairing any chance of peace by active measures, although it is quite likely that she was willing to keep Drake obviously straining on the leash as a threat. As the prospect seemed more hopeful, so much the less became the likelihood that he would be allowed to go, and by February 1588 not only were his orders cancelled, but the crews of the ships in commission were reduced. We shall now never know whether Elizabeth was really deceived by Parma's simulated friendliness in 1587–8, or whether she also was finessing all through; if the former was the case, her guarded conduct in not giving fresh provocation when she was asking for an armistice can be understood, especially in view of her increasing dread of the power of Spain. If Drake had sailed in March possibly he could have repeated his performance of the previous year in immobilizing the still unconcentrated Armada for a time, but as he was to be given only seven Queen's ships, of which two were pinnaces, he would have been too weak to attack any of the Spanish divisions in their ports. Any criticism of Elizabeth's decision to stop Drake must depend on the amount of faith she was placing in Parma's protestations, but that is a point that cannot be cleared up; no amount of faith in him, however, will justify her further step of discharging most of the crews got together.

On 10th March Howard, stirred by the unanimity of the reports from Spain, passionately denounced Elizabeth's 'slack dealings' and seeming want of prevision, but at this date she was apparently in her most optimistic mood about the course of the negotiations. She could not, however, have been wholly at ease, for on 25th February a committee of the Privy Council had evolved a plan of campaign of their own. Philip's 'most commodity,' they thought, 'shall be to invade England and Ireland jointly at one instant . . . he also may be probably advised to send some small numbers of skilful captains and soldiers into Scotland.' For answer they propounded the division of the English force into two main fleets, one to be kept in the Channel, and the other 'towards Ireland and Spain,' with subsidiary diversions of small expeditions—to the Azores to intercept

the Flota, and to Portugal, after the Armada had sailed, to raise a revolt in favour of Don Antonio. Compared with this Philip's strategical idea was perfect. The English navy, none too strong united, was to be divided and subdivided, and so placed that one main portion would be certain to be to leeward on any wind that would bring the Armada, and might be kept out of the radius of action altogether. The raid to Portugal Philip had taken into consideration and properly dismissed as a bye issue. To send part of the navy to the Azores when, however successful it may have been, it would be far too late to affect the result of the campaign, was to offer the Spaniards every advantage they could desire; it would have been of little profit if the Azores squadron had come home loaded with silver to find a Spanish Viceroy in London. The Council hoped that an expedition to the Azores would force Philip to detach part of his fleet there, and perhaps cause an entire change of purpose. After the years of preparation and millions of ducats Philip had lavished upon the Armada he was not likely to be diverted more than momentarily, if at all; but as a matter of fact the Flota of 1588 did not leave the West Indies until after the Armada had sailed, so that, knowing it to be wasted time, he would have ignored an English movement to the Western Islands which would have had no effect whatever, if only because want of supplies would have forced a return long before their presence could have been of any strategical value. The vague and rambling character of the Council's conceptions is indicated by their ignorance of the fact that there would be no Flota to intercept; in their failure to see that the junction with Parma, and not Scotland or Ireland, was the pass-key to the Spanish plans; and in the confused language—the 'may be,' 'might be,' 'perchance'—with which the members evade the necessity of giving positive opinions.[1] The only point on which they speak confidently is the advantage of dividing the main fleet, and

[1] The five members of the Privy Council who formulated this plan, or to whom it was referred for examination and who approved of it, were Burghley, Leycester, Sir Chr. Hatton, J. Wolley, afterwards Chancellor of the Order of the Garter, and Walsyngham. That the first four should have been satisfied that they had drawn up a masterly paper can be understood, but that Walsyngham should be found rowing with them is more difficult to explain.

that was the most dangerous one of the three proceedings suggested.[1]

In view of the proposal to go after the Flota, for which Elizabeth always hungered though she would never hazard a fair stake for it, and her express order of 9th June—a natural sequel of the forecast the Council commenced with above—that Howard should take up a position which would protect England, Scotland, and Ireland, there is little doubt that we may see in this scheme her direct influence, although the voice was that of the Council. This product of the combined wisdom of the Crown and its advisers does not seem to have been at once promulgated, for it was not until 30th March that Drake gave his 'poor opinion' of it. Whatever he may have thought, or expressed to his intimates, the names behind it, actual and guessed, were too weighty for the plain speaking it merited, and he confined himself to recommending a better course. Whether he developed this from his own reasoning upon the position or from a knowledge of the many examples in the preceding centuries of English history, he concluded that the plan of being first and seeking the enemy instead of waiting for him, was the one to follow here: 'If there may be such a stay or stop made by any means of this fleet in Spain that they may not come through the seas as conquerors . . . then shall the Prince of Parma have such a check thereby as were meet.' Except by implication he does not touch upon the proposed division of the fleet, but he would have it as strong as possible 'to seek God's enemies and her Majesty's where they may be found,' and, instinctively, or taught by experience, impresses upon the Council that 'the advantage and gain of time and place will be the only and chief means for our good . . . for

[1] There is an earlier Minute of Instructions drawn up for Howard and dated 15th December, 1587 (*Foljambe MSS.*, p. 109, Hist. Man. Com., App. to 15th Report, pt. v.). This also proposed to divide the fleet to protect England, Scotland, and Ireland, and contemplated the possibility that Parma might undertake independent action. The writers, however, saw that a small force would be sufficient to keep Parma, unaided, in check, and did not suggest excursions to Portugal and the Azores. Probably these Instructions were never even sent to the Admirals, at least officially, in view of the cessation of defensive measures Elizabeth must have been contemplating in the middle of December.

that with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more good upon their own coast than a great many more will do here at home.' Time, place, and the strength antecedently asked for are the factors and secret of success, but he had perhaps put the precept too tersely and barely to permit it to have its proper weight in the minds of Elizabeth and the Privy Councillors, who were accustomed to rate ideas according to the number of words in which they were expressed.

On 10th April there is a note that the four largest ships of the navy, the Elizabeth, White Bear, Triumph, and Victory, were to be ready by 19th May, which seems a small fact to mention, but is really an important one as betraying the Queen's growing anxiety, for, to save expense, she had kept them uncommissioned in the Medway since February in spite of Howard's appeals. On 13th April Drake, in reply to some questions put by Walsyngham that he was ordered to answer direct to Elizabeth, wrote to her and again enforced the necessity of being in strength off Lisbon. It is noteworthy how he clings to his dogma about time and place, almost in the same words as in the letter of 30th March, showing how clearly he saw into the heart of the thing and how deeply these essentials were impressed in his mind as a primary necessity:

> The advantage of time and place in all martial actions is half a victory, which being lost is irrecoverable. Wherefore if your Majesty will command me away with those ships which are here already, and the rest to follow with all possible expedition, I hold it in my poor opinion the surest and best course, and that they bring with them victuals for themselves and us to the intent the service be not utterly lost for want thereof; whereof I most humbly beseech your most excellent Majesty to have such consideration as the weightiness of the cause requireth, for an Englishman being far from his country and seeing a present want of victuals to ensue, and perceiving no benefit to be looked for, but only blows, will hardly be brought to stay.[1]

[1] Perhaps Drake was thinking of the desertion of the crew of the Golden Lion in 1587 and their excuse of want of victuals. On this subject it is interesting to compare Mendoza's comment to Philip in 1583, that English ships 'have to sail loaded with victuals considering the way Englishmen eat, and they can only bring half a cargo home for the same reason.'

On the same day Howard, who was then at his house at Hackney, wrote to Burghley that he would have been glad to have seen him, for 'it was fit that I should make your lordship acquainted with her Majesty's resolution touching the service of the seas;' but the resolution was the purely tentative one that Howard should move westward to Plymouth with his fleet. In mid-April the Commissioners and Parma were still making long and affectionate speeches to each other, and Elizabeth was not yet prepared to disturb their pleasant relations by any proceeding so discourteous as sending a fleet into Spanish waters under a commander of such brusque and indelicate methods as 'that Draak'[1] affected. Drake does not appear to have received any answer to his letter of 13th April, but moved by the alarming reports coming in, he wrote again, unasked, to the Queen on the 28th. After detailing the news and begging her forgiveness, but saying that his sense of duty compelled him to write seeing the imminent danger, he went on, 'if a good peace for your Majesty be not forthwith concluded—which I, as much as any man desireth—then these great preparations of the Spaniard may be speedily prevented as much as in your Majesty lieth by sending your forces to encounter them somewhat far off, and more near their own coasts, which will be the better cheap for your Majesty and much the dearer for the enemy.'

As time wore on the gospel preached by Drake was finding a more attentive ear, for, whether she was becoming disillûsioned or whether she recognized that Parma and Philip were her masters in diplomacy, Elizabeth was getting restless even under Parma's tactful hand, and either as the result of Drake's last letter or in pursuance of a previous resolve, he was summoned to the Court. There is no record of the discussion that must have taken place, but as some Council resolutions of 10th May refer to the Lord Admiral's Instructions as existing still in the old bad form of expectation that he would take some position that would 'impeach any attempt in Ireland, in Scotland, and in England,' it would appear that Drake had not yet altogether overcome opposition. But, by these resolutions,

[1] Parma's expression.

Howard was also to employ the fleet as he 'thought meet,' and such a wide permission would cover a more effective strategy than that conceived by the Privy Council, leaving the Admirals practically a free hand while enabling the Queen and Government to blame them for any failure. On 23rd May Howard joined Drake at Plymouth, and the former intended to take the first fair wind to run southwards with the united fleets. But it is only organization that renders strategy possible, and although Drake might advocate the right course its execution depended upon such commonplace necessaries as biscuit, meat, cheese, and beer, for which the Admirals had to rely upon the foresight of the Government. Throughout the year, notwithstanding their continual requests and warnings, they had never been supplied except in small quantities and at the last moment. At this very time Seymour was scornfully asking Walsyngham what was the use of only a month's victuals as a supply when much of it would be expended before its transhipment was completed. Therefore, on 28th May, Howard found that he had but eighteen days' provisions on board and that the victuallers he expected would be delayed indefinitely.[1] Yet 'tarry we must not . . . go we will though we starve; the fault is not mine,' wrote Howard, but the inexorable argument of empty casks had to be conceded, and the Lord Admiral, instead of going down to Portugal, now intended to lie in the Channel to await the victuallers which ought to have preceded him to Plymouth.

Westerly gales not only prevented any run southward, but drove the fleet back to Plymouth, and there Howard received fresh Instructions, dated 9th June, emanating directly from Elizabeth, that he was not to go to Portugal but 'to ply up and down in some indifferent place between the coast of Spain and this realm, so that you may be able to answer any attempt that the said fleet shall make either against this realm, Ireland, or Scotland.' This precious design, a retrogression on even the limited freedom of action given by the Council on 10th May, and founded on the idea of occupying the junction of roads over which an enemy must necessarily pass, is particularly feminine in its rounded generality and indifference to the hard facts of

[1] Laughton, *Armada Papers*, i. p. 186.

winds and bearings, even if Ireland and Scotland were likely marks. To Elizabeth a fleet was like an army, and if necessities of transit bound the latter to follow roads, so, she appeared to think, they must the former; and if an army could advance to an attack why not the English fleet, indifferent to winds! How deeply the belief was ingrained in her is shown by the document of 25th February, and how little the Admirals were surprised and how thoroughly they understood that she was still hankering after this condemned proposition is indicated by the curious fact that although Howard did not receive this despatch of 9th June until the 14th, he answers it by anticipation in a letter to Walsyngham of the 13th: 'It is a hard matter and a thing impossible for us to lie in any place, or to be anywhere, to guard England, Scotland, and Ireland.' He must have known from experience what line of reasoning Elizabeth was likely to take and conjectured what was happening. He goes on to say to Walsyngham that 'if the wind had been favourable to us we had been long since before their doors,' but as the victualling ships he was expecting on the 28th May had not yet arrived he was practically helpless whatever quarter the wind blew from. By the exertions of Marmaduke Darell, of the Victualling Department, twelve or fourteen days' provisions had been obtained, but those, and the remains of the eighteen days' supplies existing on 28th May, were all available, and were quite insufficient for any effective cruise.

On 14th June the weather was still keeping Howard in port, and in a letter of that date to Walsyngham he recurs to the cruise to Spain:

> The opinion of Sir Francis Drake, Mr. Hawkyns, Mr. Frobi ser, and others that be men of greatest judgment and experience, as also my own concurring with them in the same, is that the surest way to meet with the Spanish fleet is upon their own coast, or in any harbour of their own, and there to defeat them.

It should be noticed that it does not follow because Drake's letters, insisting on the correct movement to Spanish waters, are the only ones known to us that he was the sole, or necessarily the original, advocate of it. At Court Ralegh was urging the same course. The other admirals were in accord, and perhaps made their opinions

known, but the step was so manifestly correspondent to the successful cruise of 1587, and the system, centuries old, of going to find the enemy, that it could not have appeared exceptional to them, and certainly there is no sign of dissent from one of them at any time. It may well be that their support turned the scale; the Fenners would agree with Drake to the full, but Hawkyns was occupied with his duties as Navy Treasurer, and Frobiser, although Elizabeth valued his advice greatly, was but a painful letter-writer, and seems to have avoided the exercise as much as he could. We have seen that in December 1587 Hawkyns recommended that a fleet should be kept continually on the Portuguese coast, and though this had no especial reference to the Armada, the underlying idea is the same as in the precise application urged by Drake.

On 15th June Howard answered the preposterous despatch of the 9th, and recapitulated the old arguments, which need not be repeated here, but he defines the object more lucidly than before: 'I would not land in any place to offend, but they should well perceive that we came not to spoil but to seek out the great force to fight with them . . . the seas are broad, but if we had been on their coast they durst not have put off to have left us on their backs.'[1] This is the theory of the 'fleet in being' in its wide and rational sense, as meaning that the Spaniards could not proceed with their invasion while Howard in

[1] There is one very perplexing passage in this letter: 'Sir, you know it hath been the opinion both of her Majesty and others that it was the surest course to lie on the coast of Spain.' Every atom of evidence available goes to show that Elizabeth held an exactly opposite view, and that consent, with difficulty dragged from her, was afterwards revoked; and the use of 'others' must mean that some besides Drake advised the same course, which is likely enough. Howard was not a luminous writer, but obscurity will not reverse the meaning of a whole phrase as worded here. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in a succeeding sentence, 'it was thought by her Majesty that we might go into Lisbon to defeat them.' Elizabeth may have thought that if the seamen could fight the Armada at sea on the coast they could just as well go up the Tagus, an operation which would appear more neat and certain to her, and in that case there would be no possibility of the Spaniards evading the fleet, which she feared. But the Admirals had never intended to give the Spaniards every tactical advantage by closing with them in a port, and it may have been difficult to make Elizabeth understand the difference between their proposals and her reading of them.

strength, and undefeated, was following them, but Philip also had recognized that, and his instructions were that, in such circumstances, Medina Sidonia was to fight. Monson's comments on this voyage represent perhaps his worst work, not merely because so much of his information was wrong, but because on the facts, as he knew them, he reasoned wrongly. To him Medina Sidonia's greatest mistake was in not hugging the coast of France, and so slipping by undiscovered;[1] and that being done successfully and a junction with Parma effected, 'how easy a thing had it been, after their joining, to have transported themselves for England.' When Monson wrote this he seems not to have had the faintest perception that a crossing could not have been attempted in the neighbourhood of an unbeaten fleet, for if Howard at Plymouth had been evaded in passing he was potential at any moment, and the same wind that took the Spaniards up Channel would bring him after them. Even the much-criticized Philip knew better than this, but Philip is a target for naval critics while Monson is accepted as authoritative. The supposition that Medina Sidonia might have got past unobserved is an unduly large one. Both Howard and Drake were fully sensible of the value of scouting, and although they were unsuccessful in obtaining news from the coast of Portugal it does not follow, and is much less likely, that they would have failed in the Channel. Monson thoroughly understood the necessity for carrying the war into the enemy's country, the need for a fleet on the Spanish coast, but there is not a word in the 'Tracts' which shows that he appreciated the tactical value of the 'fleet in being' as laid down by Howard on 15th June. Howard sees that 'they durst not have put off to have left us on their backs'; still less could they have pretended to cover the transport of a flotilla with him on their backs, but to Monson evasion, the feeblest and most dangerous form of naval action, was to be followed by the crossing notwithstanding Howard's presence, and he not only sees no risk in it but regards it as easy.[2]

[1] Philip had ordered the exact reverse, a passage along the English coast as more open.

[2] The term 'fleet in being,' originally used by Torrington, was extended by the late Admiral Colomb as a specific definition of an inferior

Howard's letter of the 15th June crossed a Privy Council despatch of the 17th restoring him his full liberty of action. Elizabeth's demand for an armistice had been refused in any form that she could accept; Cardinal Allen's *Admonition* had just been published and a translation made by Parma's order for distribution in England; and the Bull of Sixtus V. issued denouncing the Queen as a bastard and usurper, and conferring her kingdom on Philip. These things may have gone towards undeceiving Elizabeth and deciding her to be less careful about refraining from active measures; once the process of illumination had commenced it progressed rapidly, and, on 29th June, she wrote to her Commissioners that, 'having discovered that this treaty of peace is entertained only to abuse us, . . . we cannot think it honourable to continue longer,' and they were to demand a categorical disavowal of Allen's book from Parma, together with a promise to punish those circulating it, or to leave the country. But Elizabeth now knew fairly well what to expect, and from 17th June the seamen were unmuzzled; as a detachment of the Armada was at that date making the Scillies it was full time. On the 22nd June Howard acknowledged the despatch of the 17th, and promised to act 'with judgment'; weather was still keeping him in port, but his fleet was useless without the victualling ships which had not yet appeared, and but that the ingenious Mr. Darell had managed to procure provisions for another four or five days, 'we had been in some great extremity.' The delay now was not Elizabeth's fault, for the constant westerly winds had been keeping the victuallers to the eastward; but it was her fault that they had not been ready when the wind was fair, and that when they did come they would only bring a month's supplies. Howard said that, working at the usual rate, provisions for seven or eight days out of the month would be wasted in the time expended in transhipping, but when the victuallers actually appeared on the 23rd he and his

and beaten fleet, which, although not able to fight, could prevent by the threat of its interference ulterior operations by the victor. It seems obvious, however, that if a fleet is capable of action it does not differ from any other fleet, and that if it is incapable it is not 'in being.' Discussion has since widened the first restricted definition, and it is now usually applied to a fleet powerful enough to fight, or too powerful to be neglected.

men rose to the occasion, and by keeping at it night and day he expected much of the supplies to be transferred within twenty-four hours or little more.

Even with the full month's stores, and perhaps a reserve for two or three days still on board, the time was cut dangerously close. Allowing at least twelve days for the outward and homeward passages [1] there was little more than a fortnight available for operations off Lisbon or Coruña, and success would depend on finding the Armada at sea. If it was not ready, or did not choose to come out, there would be nothing for Howard to do but to go home at the end of the fortnight; and if the wind was then adverse to the northward run, or if, being favourable, the Armada followed the English, the latter would in either case find themselves in a terrible plight. There had been no moment during the spring when the state of their stores would have allowed the Admirals to carry out the strategic idea except at tremendous risk—the risk of finding themselves following the Armada, or face to face with it in the Channel, with starving crews. The fleet had been provisioned only from hand to mouth throughout the year, notwithstanding the warnings and entreaties of the Admirals, although the Victualling Office was quite capable of working on a large scale, and although Elizabeth was directly told of the urgent connection between any active proceedings and supplies, and the letters written on the subject by Howard and others to Burghley and Walsyngham must have come under her notice. Taken alone, it might be held to be an intentional economy in the expectation of peace, but the fact that when Howard sailed into Plymouth on 23rd May, with permission to go to Portugal, provisions for only one month were to meet him there, shows how she failed to understand what was a necessary part of the operation.[2] As a woman, if not as a sovereign, it might be excusable in Elizabeth to be ignorant of the

[1] In August 1805 Decrès, the Minister of Marine, begged Napoleon not to order Villeneuve to leave Cadiz with only two months' provisions on board 'because M. D'Estaing, I believe, took seventy or eighty days to come from Cadiz to Brest' (Thiers, *Consulate and Empire*, Lond. 1876, i. p. 654). In 1585 Drake took thirteen days from Plymouth to Vigo Bay.

[2] With what he had on board he would have been victualled for six weeks, but only by putting the men 'six upon four.' At the usual

details of organization, or even of the elementary truth that strategic execution is only feasible as based upon organization; but when the seamen told her that a month's victuals were put on board ships for only the trip from the Thames to Portsmouth, that her father provisioned his fleets for six weeks for the Channel,[1] and begged her not to hazard a kingdom in defiance, not of recondite arguments, but of common sense and their experience and knowledge, it is difficult to suppose that she was guided by anything but the confidence of her vanity, and that want of imagination which enables monarchs or ploughboys to risk consequences with the stolid equanimity which comes of inability to picture them.[2]

The fleet was now supposed to be provisioned to 20th July,[3] and Howard and Drake were authorized to furnish Darell with money to obtain another month's to take them on to 18th August. The arrangement was purely local, although the country round Plymouth was known to be swept bare, but for any indication given by the Queen or Council until very late the question of supplies might have been a minor and unimportant detail.[4] When Howard put to sea on 24th June he, like every one else, was under the impression that the Armada was nearing England, and therefore took up a position in the Channel, gradually working outside it. On 4th July Drake was of opinion that the Spaniards that had been up north had gone back, and he therefore urged a return to the original plan of visiting the Portuguese coast, but there seems to have been some doubt about following it now, and it was not until the 7th that the decision was suddenly come to and put into effect. There were then,

allowance he was provisioned to 18th May, and the Armada was expected out on the 15th, 'if it be fit to be so it passeth my reason.' (Howard to Burghley, 8th April.) See also Drake, *ante*, p. 60.

[1] They might more truly have said two months.

[2] See also *post*, p. 175.

[3] Other letters (*Armada Papers*, i. pp. 249, 270) make the date 14th July, but I have adopted the most favourable one. It is even probable that Howard was not supplied to the 14th, for in his haste to get to sea he did not wait to empty all the storeships, but ordered them to follow him.

[4] On 2nd August an attempt was being made to get provisions and powder up from Berwick. (*Acts of the Privy Council.*)

nominally, provisions for thirteen days on board, but many of the ships were already in difficulties,[1] and, as by the time the fleet arrived on the scene of action there would have been little more than a week's victuals remaining in it, after which the crews would have to be supplied from the enemy's country or starve, it may be considered fortunate that the wind did not then permit the movement to be carried out. Certainly, if the Admirals had to devote their energies to finding food for their men and adapt their proceedings to that necessity, they could have paid no attention to the Armada, nor could they have followed and fought it on its journey north. Even in the Channel Howard's freedom of action was trammelled by his stores,[2] but there he could at least put into a friendly port: what would have been his state on the coast of Portugal with no provisions, no friendly port, and the enemy at sea in force? Whether or no he applied it to the true reason, Howard was surely right when he wrote later, 'God blessed us with turning us back.'

The events of 1588 restored the initiative to Elizabeth, and it was now in her power to undertake territorial attack or to reduce Spain to bankruptcy by systematic action against the Flotas, which Philip would be unable to resist as he could not get a fleet to sea. In Spain the Flota attack was expected: 'Those who understand declare that if Drake were now to go to the Azores he would not only ruin the whole of the India traffic but could quite easily make himself master of those Islands, . . . and if the Azores were captured that would be the end of the Indies.'[3] For once Elizabeth was of the same mind, and was willing to send a squadron to the Azores, ignoring, in her fine disregard for detail, the fact that ships which had been many months in commission required repairs and refitting before going on an ocean voyage. As to the general principle, even before the Armada had been beaten Englishmen were advising her in the same sense: 'Do not think

[1] Laughton, *Armada Papers*, i. pp. 242, 263.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 257, Howard to Walsyngham: 'Had I not then been driven in for lack of victuals we had met just with some of them not far off Ushant.' He is referring to the Spanish squadron which made Scilly about 21st June.

[3] *State Papers Ven.* $\frac{1}{11}$ November, 1588.

to have any quietness with the King of Spain as long as his money comes out of the Indies. It is easily to be redressed';[1] Lord Henry Seymour held the same view, and Hawkyns repeated his advice of December 1587. But, as Thos. Cely wrote, 'If I could do her Majesty any service so that it were to cost money, or that if charges should arise upon it, never speak of it, for she will never consent unto it,' and this is the probable explanation of the preference for territorial attack by limited liability company in 1589.

Seeing the dreadful and unexpected blow the fate of the Armada had dealt to Spain, the decision to undertake territorial attack was good, since the opportunity had arisen, and promised much more immediate results than the comparatively slow effects of a silver blockade. Unquestioned superiority having been obtained, the selection of the field of action was a part of national rather than of technical strategy, but Elizabeth was governed in her choice and in the method by the feature of relative expense rather than by the promptings of statesmanship. As the strategic and political questions connected with this and the subsequent expeditions are discussed in the notes appended to the several voyages, they need not be dwelt upon here, but the character of the Instructions[2] given to Drake and Norreys deserves repeated notice. We have seen the vacillation and indecision with which Elizabeth treated the situation in 1588, but her apologists can say that she was then influenced by political considerations. Here there was no such disturbing element, yet her directions are vague, general, and, in a sense, contradictory, for, while expecting and ordering everything, they failed to pause on the dominant strategic note—the occupation of Lisbon and restoration of Don Antonio, in which all the rest would have been included. Like so many other of her instructions, and, in fact, so much of her State policy, they are made up of 'if's' and 'but's,' full of restrictions and ambiguities, lay stress on the secondary because unable to single out the principal, and render the commander liable to impeachment whatever course he adopted, for they were so worded that he could do nothing that might not be

[1] *Armada Papers*, i. p. 264.

[2] *Post*, p. 195

twisted into transgression. That it is not possible to undertake an operation that will fulfil all requirements at once Elizabeth never learnt, and just as little that simplicity, conciseness, and directness are the soul of instructions as of the strategy and tactics they direct to be put into execution.

Elizabeth frequently appealed to the God of Battles, but, unlike Frederick II., she did not remember that He is also the God of strong battalions—and fleets. She still craved for the Flota, and thought her object might be attained vicariously by Cumberland and Frobiser in 1589. Cumberland's squadron was too weak even if the generalship had been passable; Frobiser's was not only weak but he was back in England before the bulk of the Flota arrived in Spain. These two faults, weakness and absence of sustained co-ordinated action—sporadic attempts—were the besetting sins of her naval warfare, due either to inability to perceive what was necessary or fear of risking her ships. In 1590 the Queen, daunted by her sad experience of territorial attack, showed an inclination to take up the plan recommended by Hawkyns, but, as usual with her, adopted the body and killed the soul of it. Hawkyns had proposed a fleet throughout the year. She sent him and Frobiser to sea about June, after the Flota had arrived home, and they were recalled in September and October, while, with what Mr. Corbett calls 'a fatuity that to us is inconceivable,' they had been supplied with but two months' stores, and there was no intention of sending more out to them.

The year 1590 was marked by an event of which it would be impossible to exaggerate the political and strategical importance, that is, Parma's invasion of France and Philip's consequent entanglement in another great war. Hitherto he had fed the civil war by money and intrigue, thus sparing himself the drain on his more material resources and exciting as little national feeling as possible. Now, politically, by arousing the spirit of patriotism, he united many hesitating elements against himself and brought France into the struggle as an open ally of England. Strategically, from the moment Parma entered France, he or any of his successors became a *quantité négligeable* as a co-operating factor for the invasion

of England, for their forces were not enough to maintain their hold on the Netherlands and France, much less to detach divisions to assist an expedition from Spain. There is no sign, however, that Elizabeth ever recognized this, and she lived in the same tremors as when Parma, with his army in hand and Holland at bay, had been awaiting the Armada. She did not perceive that she was now free to carry on offensive war in any direction, or if she perceived it did not understand that it was the road to peace.

Lord Thomas Howard's voyage of 1591 is perhaps the most impressive illustration of Elizabeth's failure to adapt means to the end in view, for this time she knew that Philip would be able to send a fleet of some strength to meet and convoy the Flota from the Azores. The station held by Hawkyns in 1590 on the Portuguese coast was now to be economically occupied by Cumberland at his own expense with a squadron too weak for anything but purposes of observation or occasional privateering. Yet the main body under Howard, which was to capture the silver at the Azores and beat off any attempt at rescue, consisted of only five men-of-war of strength with a later reinforcement of two others and six armed merchantmen, although Elizabeth believed that, with its own convoy and Bazan's protecting fleet from Spain, the enemy would be counted not by tens but by scores. Clearly there was no cognizance of the need for fighting for the mastery of the seas around the Western Islands, though if it had been understood another blow, as overwhelming in its effects as the destruction of the Armada, might have crushed Philip's first attempt at recovery and the war again been brought within measurable distance of its end. Elizabeth never believed in the navy, not merely as her seamen, but as her civilian subjects believed in it, and always feared to trust to it. She did not even believe in it as foreigners—friends and enemies—did, and from Huyghen van Linschoten's observations at the Azores at this time, and his description of the dread it inspired in the Spaniards, we may measure the opportunities she was throwing away.[1] The main advantage of the initiative, the ability to concentrate on a

[1] *Post*, p. 249.

decisive strategical point and force the enemy to fight at a disadvantage—here with a shattered and disorganized navy instead of with veteran land troops—was thus wasted; and, instead of preparing to fight the great sea battle which would have given her the command of the Flota route, she equipped a squadron just big enough to tempt misfortune by drawing superior force to it. Even privateering by isolated ships would have been more effective, for, by reason of the north-east trades and the fear of the unknown sea to the north, the homeward course of the Flotas was confined at its widest part to between the 30th and 40th parallels, starting from and impinging upon fixed points at the Florida Channel and Cape St. Vincent, so that the track in which privateers could work was sharply defined. In fact, it was narrower still, for the trend of the prevailing winds in the latitude of the Azores forced every fleet bound for Cape St. Vincent to be careful not to fall to the south of them, and Spanish seamanship was not bold enough to cast far to the north, even if the necessity for sighting the Islands in order to ascertain the position, in the absence of longitude, could have been avoided. In this very year privateersmen were cruising successfully in West Indian waters, and if it be added that although forbidden in theory to call at the Azores, want of stores, bad seamanship, and bad workmanship in rigging and building, compelled every Flota to do so, we see that material and geographical conditions combined to qualify Elizabeth to cut the treasure communications, and as Spain must hold them or perish politically it was always in her power to force on a decisive conflict for the command of them when she chose.

One reason for her hesitation may be found in the circumstance that in the opinion of many of her advisers the conquest and occupation of one or more of the Azores was indispensable to enable the fleets to act from a local base, and she more than once gave expression to her dread of a responsibility of that nature.[1] It is true that the objections to a settlement at the Azores were the same in kind, although hardly in degree, as those to Drake's proposed settlement in the West Indies in 1585,[2] and that the

[1] *Ante*, p. 36; *post*, ii. p. 50.

[2] *Post*, ii. p. 50.

question of victualling endurance loomed as large for sixteenth century fleets as that of coal endurance does for those of to-day. In 1591 it was intended to solve the difficulty by sending Lord Thomas Howard supplies from England, but that could scarcely be done for fleets of the strength necessary for a conclusive trial and meant to remain out or to be relieved until a final decision had been obtained. All the leading Elizabethans emphasized the necessity for a base, but, to their minds, a base always meant a fortified city and port to be held, as it were, in state. But, as has been previously remarked, a fleet which has obtained the command of the waters in which it is operating, or which is only holding its own in disputed command, can make its own temporary base where it pleases, and, if it has sufficient shelter, is as well off as if it held any settled port not possessing a dockyard. In such circumstances it enjoys the further advantage of experiencing no anxiety about its base, which requires no defences and no garrison, being dependent on sea superiority, and can be quitted and re-occupied at pleasure. It must be admitted, however, that such harbours are not numerous in the Western Islands, all suffering from more or less serious drawbacks. The Spanish centre was Angra, in the Island of Terceira, the only well fortified port in the group; and Angra would have required a division of land troops, breaching guns, and a siege in form to reduce it. If Angra was foregone it would have been requisite for any English fleet to take up a position to the westward in order to intercept the Flotas and carracks bent upon making it, and to be to windward of it and of any Spanish relieving force. The only suitable anchorage to the west was the bay of Horta, said to be the best harbour in the Azores, and from there pinnaces could have watched Angra, and for any Spanish fleet approaching it from the eastward, in almost any wind. In 1597 Elizabeth, with doubt and hesitation, at last accorded the permission to seize an island, and it cannot be said that her misgivings concerning such a step were unreasonable. But none of her advisers appears to have known that a proceeding of the kind, entailing indefinite consequences and responsibilities, was unnecessary, and was not even preferable to the less serious operation of allowing the fleet to make its own

base. And as the Queen, in the tentative attempts she made upon the Flotas, was never represented in nearly sufficient strength, it is quite certain that she did not realize that any adequate endeavour, whether it was made by seizing an island or in a less determined form, would have necessitated a great increase in everything connected with the navy and an uninterrupted building policy.

There is a fragmentary letter of Frobiser's in existence,[1] written in answer to the Lord Admiral's request for his opinion, which shows that the need for superior force was present in the mind of one of the leading seamen. Frobiser, however, was in favour of a station off Cape St. Vincent or in the Florida Channel in preference to the Azores, and if the victualling problem could have been treated satisfactorily, in which he seemed to see little difficulty, no doubt the West Indian position was the best of the three. On the question of strength he writes:

> My opinion is there may be no less than eight g[ood ships][2] of the Queen's Majesty's and twelve good merchants, and all th[e private] men-of-war[3] that may be gotten to accompany them . . . for, although eight good ships of the [Queen's] Majesty's will be able to beat them, they shall be able to [fly from too] few of them, for when they come to fly it is the number that takes them, for when every ship makes shift for her[self it is the] multitude must perform the chase . . . the Queen's Majesty were better bestow a hundred th[ousand] pounds to overthrow them if she gain not one penny by [it than to] let them pass,

and the last phrase represents the point of view of statesmanship on which it were to be wished that Frobiser had expanded more, although he would not have convinced Elizabeth. An anonymous writer[4] pointed out that no result could be obtained from a war that was little more than defensive, and that Philip lived in daily fear that Elizabeth would take the Azores and stop the Flotas, whereby he was furnished from 'the continual springs of gold that are in his Indies, which ever fill up again his emptied coffers.' His coffers were emptier than Englishmen imagined,[5] and even the unarrested flow from the Indies could not meet his needs. During 1592 and 1593

[1] *Cott. MSS.* Otho E. viii. f. 266.
[2] Enclosures within brackets are conjectural insertions.
[3] Privateers. [4] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccl. 91. [5] *Post*, p. 320.

Elizabeth undertook no operations of any importance, but delegated her duty to Cumberland and the privateers. In 1594 she again left Cumberland to cruise, while she sent Norreys and Frobiser against the fort at Brest. During these three years Philip was glad enough to be left in comparative peace, while frightening her with alarms about his preparations for a new invasion.

Philip's strategic sense deteriorated extensively after 1588, when he lost his most competent professional advisers, men like Santa Cruz, Oquendo, and Martinez de Recalde, and fell under the influence of his civilian secretaries. It had been impressed upon him continually that a port was necessary, and he set about translating the advice in his own way by procuring one in Brittany for his next attempt. There is a considerable difference in the kind of port required for a fleet which is acting with purely naval objects, such as Elizabeth might have undertaken in the Azores, and one intended to be a base for invasion. In the latter case the port must be fortified or protected by an army in the country attacked, and must be an arsenal capable of affording all kinds of material help in the way of fittings and stores to the troops and fleet acting from it. A mere anchorage, such as Blavet, would be sufficient for a fleet which aimed only at obtaining the command of the Channel but would be useless as a base for invasion, which must be situated on English ground and be within striking distance of some vital point.[1] More-

[1] *E.g.* William I., in 1066, threw up entrenchments at Hastings before advancing to the scene of the battle; the English invasions of France were only possible because of the possession of bases on the coast; Cortes, in 1519, founded Vera Cruz as a *place d'armes* before advancing on Mexico; Wellington, in 1809, made Lisbon his base for supplies and reinforcements. If Napoleon really meant invasion in 1804–5 he was prepared to lose his communications and throw himself *en l'air*, for although he might have obtained the Channel passage by surprise, the equivalent of Trafalgar would have been fought within a very few days afterwards. As Admiral Colomb observes, Napoleon's statements are so contradictory that no certain conclusion about his intentions can be reached, and it is not necessary to inquire here whether he was in earnest. But through all his utterances shows the belief, which he shared with Philip and Parma, that one battle and domestic revolt would have settled the matter; probably all three would have found themselves very much mistaken. Napoleon completely miscalculated the resisting power of Spain and Russia under invasion.

over, the possession of Blavet, Brest, or any other French port, would not advance Philip an iota until he had gained the command of the sea. He was no nearer his end with a base nominally at Blavet than when it was at Lisbon, for the possession of an intermediate halting place did not alter the primary fact that he must fight for his passage to or from it, and in one way was rather a disadvantage as having no strength of its own and serving as a guide to the enemy's fleet when looking for his. If he gained the command of the sea he could go to any English port he liked and an intermediate one was superfluous. If he failed to gain it a Breton harbour was of no use, and, being unfortified, could not even serve as a refuge. The case of an English fleet at Horta was not a parallel one because it would not have been taken up with any purpose of territorial attack. Philip had known, in 1588, that it was necessary to obtain sea superiority before invading, but in subsequent years his plans seem to have been all grounded on the supposition that the English fleet was non-existent or could be evaded, and in his projects of 1596 and 1597 the Breton ports had no place.

Elizabeth's treatment of the threat thus held out was perhaps the weakest phase of her naval policy. She may not have understood, or she may not have cared to risk, action at the Azores or in the West Indies, but there is no excuse for permitting herself to be terrorized by the impotent menace of unfortified ports within reach of the Channel guard and only held by troops, themselves fighting for a foothold in Brittany, who were entirely dependent on evasion communication with Spain. She allowed herself to be intimidated for four years, wailed to Parliament and to all who would listen of her imminent danger, wasted upwards of 250,000*l.* in unnecessary military operations in Brittany, and then, in an access of resolution, finished with Philip's Breton dreams in two months. If she had undertaken in earnest, in 1590, to cut the Spanish communications with Brittany, Philip's troops would have disappeared from warfare, disease, and privation unless he had fought seriously to reopen those communications, and he had no fleet with which to do that.

In 1595 Elizabeth's inclinations swung back to territorial attack. At first the objective talked of was Spain

itself, but she yielded to Drake's persuasions to venture another voyage to the West Indies. If it be true, as Monson says, that Drake proposed to hold Panama, it shows that he still failed to grasp the conditions of trans-oceanic conquest, for if the intention of 1585 to garrison the Havana was bad all the arguments against it applied with ten-fold force to Panama. The Havana, at any rate, was in direct sea communication with England, but Panama was separated from the nearest Atlantic seaport —which, necessarily, would have to be held also—by thirty-five miles of the most difficult and unhealthy country in the world. Every single attempt to get into touch with the Atlantic port from Panama would have to be made at the point of the sword against hostile Spaniards and Indians, while disease would have swept off its scores and hundreds of the garrison. Then, when the Atlantic port was reached, the sea problem discussed in relation to the 1585 voyage would arise. None of the accounts of this 1595 expedition gives any intimation that the collateral necessity of occupying Nombre de Dios or Puerto Bello had occurred to the leaders, and it is more likely that Drake's intention was simply to plunder Panama and find an excuse to evacuate it. Even if held it would not cut the Spanish treasure communications, the strategical advantage urged, unless the military force was strong enough, which it could never be, to operate all over the Isthmus, for the Spaniards were not absolutely confined to the Panama-Puerto Bello road, although that was the shortest and most convenient. But the military force could never have been strong enough to keep open the one track between Panama and Puerto Bello. What monthly reinforcement of troops would have been required by an English governor to make good the waste of warfare and disease, and to maintain his grip on the Pacific and Atlantic ports, must be a matter of opinion; but, taken in conjunction with the related naval expansion that the scheme would have compelled, it is plain that it was far too large for English resources even if it had promised commensurate advantages.

It is not clear whether Drake and Hawkyns knew when they sailed that a Spanish fleet was likely to come after them; but if so, they were doing exactly what Philip

has been condemned for doing in 1588, that is, making a territorial attack in defiance of an unbeaten fleet, and, unlike Philip, making no provision to meet and defeat it. It was known before the Admirals sailed that a fleet was preparing in Spain, and, although there were many contradictory rumours, the probability that Philip, always extremely sensitive about the West Indies, would send it after the English, must have been present in many minds. Ralegh thought it certain and regarded with terror the possibility that the Spaniards might fall on the fleet while the greater part of the troops were away towards Panama, and had Delgadillo de Avellaneda got to sea in time that might have happened. There is no direct evidence that Drake knew that the Spaniard was shortly expected in the West Indies, but as Baskerville certainly knew immediately after Drake's death, the presumption is that the latter was aware of it, and regarded it as a justifiable risk. It is not an invariable restriction to deal with every situation according to theoretical rule if there are good reasons for deviating from it, and while the discretion and responsibility for deviation must rest with the commander, there may frequently be circumstances in which, if it is not the best, it is a permissible course. In this instance, no doubt, Drake, aware of the quality of Philip's fleets, regarded the force remaining with him at Puerto Bello as a match for anything that could appear there.

Although the Earl of Essex disclaimed any honour or responsibility as originator of the Cadiz voyage of 1596, if he did not suggest, he warmly supported it, and there is little question that his repudiation was more political than real. Elizabeth limited her purpose to the destruction of Spanish shipping and magazines and the interception of the Flota; Essex and his confidants intended not only to take Cadiz, but to hold it, and thus make it difficult or impolitic for her to leave it. The Queen's renewal of more energetic measures in 1595 and 1596 was probably due to Essex's influence, but in the Instructions we see the old fault in the expectation that one fleet was to perform all that she desired, and that events were to occur in the order that would render the sequence possible with the margin of time allowed by the supplies. When Essex sailed he left behind him a despatch to be forwarded to the Privy

Council, in which he declared and defended his intention of garrisoning a Spanish port, and incidentally enunciated his strategic confession of faith. He begins by pointing out that 'it hath been the wisdom of all times rather to attempt and do something in another country than to attend an enemy,' and that the prudence of the advice was proved by the fear with which the Spaniards regarded the possibility of an English invasion. But if the counsel of prevention is good, an eye (the earl said) must also be had to opportunity, and none offered so temptingly as at present, 'when he hath declared his ambition to command the seas and yet so divided his forces . . . and all so dispersed in several places, as if at any time we might do good that way it is now.' Then Essex advocates the Flota war: 'The hurt that our state should seek to do to him is to intercept his treasure, whereby we shall cut his sinews and make war upon him with his own money; and to beat him, or at least discontinue him, at sea, whereby her Majesty shall be both secured from his invasions and become mistress of the sea.'

All this is unexceptionable; the recommendation to attack the enemy in his own waters,[1] to destroy him in detail, to gain the command of the sea by offering him battle or forcing him to refuse it, and to strike home by arresting the treasure traffic, included everything that could be attempted by a purely maritime policy. The question then arises why, if Essex saw so clearly the potency of an unmixed naval war, he should go on to uphold an accessory operation which would tax the military strength of England and, on his own showing, was unnecessary. In support of the 'continual diversion,' the occupation of Cadiz, he can but press the same reasons he gives for naval action; and it would appear that although he stated the terms so clearly, he did not altogether see the conclusion to which they led. For this there is probably more than one explanation. As a soldier it was his business to think that the object of naval warfare is to clear the way for the army, and he was entirely under the influence of soldiers; again, as a soldier, he was eager to

[1] An offensive, be it noticed, in which Essex sees nothing new, but the contrary.

distinguish himself by some military exploit, and such an operation as he was asking for would be his first independent command; as a politician he may well have thought that the possession of Cadiz would have been a means to persuade Philip to peace producing quicker results than the slower methods of naval war, which had not yet been very successful in a positive sense.

Essex saw only two drawbacks to his advice, the risk and the expense. The latter, he thought, would be little, and eventually the place might be made to return a profit, but he is prudently vague as to the methods. The risk, he pointed out, was not the same as though the post had been chosen under compulsion with the defence of the kingdom depending upon it; if necessary it could be evacuated with little loss, and certainly without national injury, but that to recover it, while the English commanded the sea communications, would overtax the whole strength of Spain: 'I doubt not but after he had once tried what it were to besiege 2,000 or 3,000 English in a place well fortified, and where they had a port open, he would grow quickly weary of those attempts.' Remembering the ghastly siege of Ostend, a place much less defensible than Cadiz, which cost Philip III. and the Archduke Albert tens of thousands of lives to take because the Dutch controlled the sea communications and could renew troops and stores, Essex's argument, admitting his premisses, is not unsound. The preliminary doubt is whether it was necessary, and whether the same objections that existed to the seizing of the Havana or of Angra did not present themselves here, although, of course, with diminished force. If Elizabeth's financial resources, expended mainly in Holland, were barely equal to the war as she was carrying it on, they could hardly meet the vastly increased outlay that the levy of troops, their supplies, the transport, and the consequent naval expenditure would involve. The seamen and statesmen who supported the Flota warfare intended it to replace military operations, not to be additional to them, and it is evident that had not Essex's judgment been biassed by his personal ambition he would have taken the same view. To hold Cadiz required, as Essex saw, the unquestioned command of the local sea communications; but if Elizabeth increased her

navy to the extent essential she could as well use it on the larger scale and for the larger purposes she had been so long importuned to attempt.

Whether Elizabeth might not have got tired of holding Cadiz before Philip got tired of besieging it is an inquiry that cannot be answered, but it should be noticed that it was not a strategical position of indisputable positive value like Angra or the Havana. The possession of the port would not help her much towards success in capturing the Flotas or in blocking their passage. Its denial to the enemy was of some moment, especially if Essex gauged the political effects accurately; but it was of little use as an auxiliary and a base to the English fleet, for, as an immediate consequence of its occupation, the Flotas would have been directed to Lisbon, and a fleet at Cadiz, having to weather Cape St. Vincent with the prevailing westerly winds reigning there, was to leeward of its prey. It might well have proved that in most instances a fleet would make Cape Roca in a shorter time from Plymouth than from Cadiz, for, besides the difficulty of weathering St. Vincent, the ruling winds on the coast of Portugal are northerly during the summer, and, in the old sailing ship days, fleets bound north from Lisbon were usually driven out to sea far to the south and west before they caught the south-west wind which took them north again. Therefore, if a base was to be taken anywhere, a more advantageous one could have been selected on the coast of Portugal or Galicia. But Essex appears to have been attracted rather by the renown he hoped to win by holding Cadiz in Philip's despite than by strategical considerations, and Elizabeth seems to have had some suspicion from the first that, instead of the latter, 'honour and virtue,' her paraphrase of personal ambition, were his real motives.[1]

In 1597 Elizabeth was brought, almost against her will, to authorize the seizure of one of the Azores, but the movement was made subsidiary to the attack on Ferrol and on the Flota. The circumstances attending the Islands voyage are so fully discussed in the notes appended to Monson's text that it is not necessary to examine them again here. It may be noted, however,

[1] *Post*, ii. p. 12.

that although the fleet was now strong enough so far as the Flota was concerned, the radical vice of fitful action was as conspicuous as ever. It happened that the arrival of Essex at the Azores coincided with the appearance of the treasure fleet, but had that not been the case there was no preparation for sustained proceedings; and, in reality, the operations of 1597 required two powerful fleets, one for Ferrol and one for the Azores, but the Queen's backwardness in building ships had made that impossible. The Islands voyage was the last of the expeditions on a large scale. In 1598 the Earl of Cumberland sailed with the intention of conquering and settling Puerto Rico, and probably with Elizabeth's knowledge and approval, but we have no means of ascertaining what her ulterior intentions were in case of success.

The results of the Queen's own ventures had not been very encouraging, and, from 1597, the Irish revolt grew in intensity and became a serious drain upon the exchequer, so that she was more than ever inclined to stand only on the defensive. Mo.eover, the peace negotiations carried on intermittently from 1598 were a further excuse for delaying any considerable effort. Nothing was done during 1599, except yield to a panic of invasion for which there was little reason, but in 1600 Sir Richard Leveson was sent to the Azores with a few ships to meet the homeward bound East Indian carracks, which escaped him. Shortly after Leveson's return the Venetian ambassador at Paris received a visit from the secretary of his English colleague, who, by order of the Queen, desired to negotiate a loan in Venice. The secretary explained that she 'was resolved to come to a substantial peace or to urge a vigorous war with the King of Spain, for she is aware that it is not to her advantage to remain, as at present, on the defensive only.'[1] It may be doubted whether the real object of the loan was not the expenditure mounting up in Ireland rather than any idea of renewing offensive war, for there was no preparation for an ocean cruise in 1601, although the prospect of a Spanish invasion of Ireland was not credited until August at the earliest. In 1602 Elizabeth resumed the offensive by adopting Hawkyns's recommendation of 1587

[1] *State Papers Ven.* 7th October, 1600.

and arranging to keep a fleet on the Spanish coast for at least nine months of the year, revictualling or replacing it from England at intervals. The good effects showed at once in the capture of a rich carrack: Spain could organize no resistance, and if the plan had been executed on a still larger scale in 1603, as intended, the results might have shown Elizabeth with startling quickness what opportunities she had missed in the previous years.

In 1602 Elizabeth accepted the principle, but was not yet educated up to the execution. Leveson sailed a month later than had been resolved, and thus nearly missed the Flota, while when he fell in with it at the last moment he was far too weak to obtain any success. In 1599 an Englishman at Lisbon wrote to Robert Cecyll: 'Is it possible that as God has given the Queen power by ships and valiant subjects to be the commander of the sea, yet that in fifteen years' wars she has never provided to intercept the King of Spain's India fleet, which would be a great weakening of him.'[1] A contemporary Spanish historian said that it was 'a mysterious thing that with so many fleets sent out and their eagerness in the search—some sent to the Indies, some keeping the Islands, and others off Cape St. Vincent and elsewhere—never one Flota fell into their hands, although they mostly came negligently and worn by the long voyage.'[2] But there was nothing mysterious about the failure. The causes which baulked Leveson in 1602 had been at work all through. Although the Elizabethan navy was never strong enough for a scientific concentration on the Spanish coast and at the Azores, it was not even used to the extent available, and therefore was never in sufficient strength at the point of contact. If the war was to be a naval one it was an absurdity to keep ships fit for sea, and required at sea, lying up in the Medway; if it was not to be a naval one it was equally absurd to expend many thousands of pounds in equipping squadrons to do work for which fleets were requisite, work which, so far as the chance of plunder went, could just as well have been carried on by privateers and single cruisers. From this point of view it will be instruc-

[1] *State Papers Dom. Elix.* 1½ April.
[2] Herrera, *Historia General*, Madrid, 1612, iii. p. 730.

tive to compare the number of ships of 300 tons and upwards available in the more purely cruising years with those actually commissioned :—

	Available	Commissioned
1585	16	4 (of which 2 kept in the Channel)
1586	19	5 („ 1 „)
1587	19	9 („ 5 „)
1590	23	13 („ 3 „)
1591	24	9 („ 4 „)
1592	23	2 („ 2 „)
1593	23	4 („ 2 „)
1594	21	4 (of which 2 in the Channel and 2 at Brest)
1595	21	10 („ 4 „)
1598	24	5 („ 5 „)
1599	24	17 („ 15 „ and Ireland)
1600	23	4 („ 2 „)
1601	23	10 („ 10 „ and Ireland)
1602	23	13 („ 4 „)

Thus we see that year after year most of the men-of-war were employed 'to keep Chatham Church when they should serve their turn abroad,' in Howard's words, and the consequence was that the Admirals had either to fly, like Lord Thomas Howard in 1591, when a Spanish fleet appeared, or, like Leveson in 1602, were too weak to attack a Flota successfully when they met it. The other principal cause of failure was, as has been shown, the lack of continuity of action, due either to Elizabeth's ignorance of the necessity or her fear of forcing on a decisive issue. Altogether the English leaders did wonderfully well with the small strength placed at their disposal, but that shows how prodigiously inefficient Spain was at sea, how enormously superior the English were in *personnel* and *matériel*, and is Elizabeth's severest condemnation in that she did not do more.[1] She was not in any sense—either

[1] There is no reason to suppose that Spain, in 1585–1603, was either more or less capable as a naval power than before or afterwards. For two generations previously the French had, on a small scale, been teaching Europe how vulnerable Spain was at sea. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries its impotence was proverbial. In 1805 Villeneuve wrote to the French Minister of Marine : 'All my delusions did not vanish until the day when I saw the Spanish ships which are joined to mine . . . then I was obliged to despair of everything.' But Spanish seamen were not more inept in 1805 than in

politically or personally—a very truthful woman, but her repeated declarations that she longed for peace were genuine enough; she had in her hands the means to obtain it, and was continually instructed how to use them, but failed to understand that the navy was more effective than the army or intrigue. Bacon wrote that, 'being master of the sea leaves a nation at great liberty to act and take as much or as little of the war as it pleases.'[1] Elizabeth was practically mistress of the sea, but took a great deal more of the war than she pleased because she could not be made to believe that, as between England and Spain, sea victories were of much greater efficacy than the more obvious and dramatic land victories.

In the 'Tracts' Monson, like the greater men who have been referred to, is a thorough-going supporter of the Flota warfare, but there is no evidence that he recommended it before 1602, when its advantages must have been common knowledge. The paper which he says he drew up by the Queen's order in 1602 is, in principle, a repetition of the advice given by Hawkyns in 1587, but he improves on his teacher by his insight into the possibility and benefits of destroying the Spanish squadrons in detail, or preventing their concentration by taking advantage of the geographical situation of their ports and their administrative mismanagement.[2] But he had an illustration of this also before him in Drake's campaign of 1587. Further, if the Churchill text may be trusted,[3] he was the only one among

1505 or 1605. Native and foreign historians have blamed the later Kings of Spain for not creating a navy, and have reasoned as though there had been some degeneration traceable, in this respect, to bad government. There had been no degeneration; the failure was in a sense congenital, due to a national inaptitude for the sea, which some Spaniards had themselves noticed before events caused foreign nations to recognize it. (See App. B.) The Spanish Mediterranean wars had been fought by soldiers in galleys, and when, in 1492, Spain became an ocean power by surprise, it had had no training for the part although possessing the same opportunities as other nations with a sea coast. Thus at the first challenge it fell. The later Kings of Spain might build ships and, with the assistance of English and French shipwrights, they did build very fine ones, but they could not make seamen.

[1] *Works*, ed. 1733, i. p. 240.

[2] Appendix of Letters, No. 3.

[3] The paper addressed to Cecyll (Bk. V., *How to War upon Spain*) does not appear in any of the MSS. collated for this edition.

his contemporaries, besides Frobiser, who saw, or at least explicitly stated, the need for sufficient force, for he would have had forty-five ships, of which eighteen were to be men-of-war, at sea at once, divided into three fleets, one at Cape Roca, one at Cape St. Vincent, and one at the Azores. These fleets were to be kept at sea from March until November, but in practice it would have been found to be necessary to retain the one at the Azores through the winter if Philip III. had preferred evasion to combat. In the former case the Flotas would have tried the winter passage, although the results from weather would probably have been as disastrous to Spain as those from battle and capture.

Monson was thoroughly indoctrinated with the virtue of the offensive and the belief that the more Spain was troubled in its own waters the less it could trouble England at home, but he was more uncertain in his utterances relating to territorial attack. We have seen that at first he regretted that Drake failed to make an occupation in 1585, but afterwards qualified his opinion; later still he reverts to the project of a settlement with the assistance of Holland[1] and chooses the Island of Providence, on the coast of Honduras, as the base from which the continent might be attacked. The conditions in the middle of the seventeenth century were of course very different from those obtaining in 1585. By 1635 Spain had been long found out, and, besides the Dutch, the buccaneers were advertising her decrepitude daily. To have taken the island would have been possible, not merely for England and Holland, but for England alone, as Jamaica was taken a few years afterwards, although Jamaica was held for a long time rather by reason of Spanish naval weakness than of English naval strength. From Providence Monson would have taken and held Panama and Cartagena, but, as before, ignores the terrible tax in men and money such garrisons and the consequent continental warfare would have caused, and, in addition, forgets his own minor objections stated in the second book of the 'Tracts';[2] while his arguments as to the results to be expected are general and perhaps

[1] Book V., *How to Ruin Spain with the Assistance of Holland.*
[2] *The State of the West Indies.*

illusory, and the necessary preliminary command of the sea, if present at all in his mind, is only implicit.

It may be said that in the case of Spain in the seventeenth century there was no need to allude to a patent fact known to every one, but there is the same silence in his *Project how to War upon Holland*,[1] in which he dwells upon the importance of defending the English ports, and would 'by all means possible' seize Flushing. It is only after that has been effected that he considers the necessary sea battles, and does not appear to draw any connexion between them and the territorial descent proposed. Although he hated and feared the United Provinces he entirely failed to estimate their strength; he desired and expected to end the war with one battle,[2] but would divide the English fleet into three separate portions to protect the various southern roadsteads and capture the Dutch merchantmen. He appreciated all the superiority that geographical position gave England, but if he had lived to see the first two Dutch wars he would have learned that the task was to tax English resources more hardly than he supposed possible; and that the Dutch wars, like the Spanish one, could be fought out to a decision without land attacks. Against Spain commerce warfare had always continued coincidently with more serious operations; against a strong naval power, and one whose commerce was general, it had to be suspended until the command of the sea was won or surrendered.[3] Monson, reasoning from the Spanish war, did not perceive that his three squadrons would have more important work to do than looking after Dutch Indiamen, and that they would not be required locally to protect the southern ports if they found the Dutch military fleets.

Monson's limitations in discussing these points are due to the circumstance that he reasoned almost entirely from his Spanish experiences, unlike others of his contemporaries —notably Ralegh and Essex—who drew their illustrations from a wider field. In other instances he went wrong

[1] Book V.

[2] 'I wish we never present them at the first encounter with less force than to determine the quarrel.'

[3] Except that the Dutch naval movements were frequently conditioned by the necessity for protecting their convoys, and, in this sense, several of the campaigns were commerce warfare on a gigantic scale.

because he had not the gift of prophecy, and could not foretell impending changes. When he wrote about a war with France there was no sign that, within little more than a generation, that country was going to become a great naval power, and Monson treated the inquiry under the then existing conditions of its inferiority. However, here again he anticipates that France might succeed in invasion simply if the English were driven to leeward for the moment by unfavourable winds, and he would obviate this danger by his favourite remedy of a division of the English strength into three fleets in the principal southern ports, and he thought that each fleet would be strong enough individually to deal with any force that France could send to sea. But, much more sagaciously, he goes on, 'our surest course will be with some ships to beleaguer their harbours of rendezvous in France a good distance from the shore for fear of embaying. We must consider that such winds as serve to bring them for England make a secure road upon that coast to ride in; and such winds as are dangerous to keep that shore make it impossible for the French to put out of harbour.' This is an interesting anticipation of the tactics of blockade, which reached their highest development nearly two centuries later, and fairly describes Lord Howe's system of falling back to Torbay before westerly gales. St. Vincent's more drastic method of keeping his station off Brest in all weathers Monson would have thought impossible for ships as he knew them.

When Monson investigated the course of action proper to be followed against an alliance between France and Holland he had no previous experience to guide him, and his conclusions therefore deserve the more attention.[1] He would again divide the English force into three portions, stationed at the Downs, at Portsmouth, and at Guernsey; and, with his reminiscences of the weak squadrons that escaped disaster at the hands of Spaniards, he has evidently no notion of any danger in division against the Dutch. He proceeds to say that any wind that would enable the French to make a Dutch port would bring the English at their heels, but it is astonishing to find that he eliminates the Dutch from the inquiry altogether. No one

[1] Book V., *How to Prevent the French and Dutch Meeting.*

knew better than himself that Holland did not require passively to await assistance from France, and that of the two alternatives the Dutch were more likely to relieve the French by joining them than the French the Dutch. Yet Holland is not mentioned in the problem, although, as Monson stationed his squadrons, that in the Downs would certainly have been overwhelmed if the Dutch moved westward. When the situation actually arose in 1666 it was treated on different lines, correctly in theory but wrongly in practice, owing either to a misunderstanding of the orders from London or bad generalship. If the Dutch were to be ignored the proper function of the Downs and Portsmouth squadrons was concentration where the French were known to be—as he himself proposed in the quotation in the preceding paragraph—and not division at ideal but perilous distances. He defends the situation of his squadrons by asserting that they could always get to sea soon enough 'considering what time they (the French) must have to embark their men and provisions,' as if vessels intending to go to sea waited until the last moment for their crews and stores.

In consequence of the 'Tracts' having been written at various periods, and having lacked the revision that an author can give only in print, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain his real beliefs, for his utterances are occasionally contradictory. In writing of the possibility of a Dutch surprise attack on the Medway[1] he takes it for granted that they could 'suddenly put eight or ten thousand men on the Kentish shore,' without the gathering of troops and ships to convey such a force having aroused the least attention in England. Yet, in 1624, he laughed to scorn the possibility of England fitting out a fleet for a voyage without the Spaniards obtaining information, although communication between England and Spain was so much more difficult than between England and Holland. In the one case he was generalizing from actual knowledge; in the other theorizing to support a personal hatred. When the Dutch attack on the Medway did come, in 1667, surprise was the one excuse barred to King and Government.

[1] Book V., *The Safety of his Majesty's Navy.*

There is very much more that Monson has written which is open to criticism, and, in the main, the value of his work must depend on his inductions drawn from observation and experience in the war in which he took part, and not on his analysis of naval, military, and commercial situations and contingencies, for which he lacked the necessary information, breadth of view, and impartiality. Within the narrower limit the 'Tracts' deserves a high place, for if some of his conclusions are questionable they are at least arguable, and are more frequently characterized by a complete grasp of the conditions and logical consequences. Thus, as strategical laws are persistent in all ages, and if followed out bring men of widely separated periods to like results, he sometimes appears startlingly modern in his conclusions, although in reality they are just as startlingly old. He was totally devoid of imagination, and therefore never travelled very successfully out of the region to which his personal experiences were a guide, and he belonged to the class of seamen, much more common than is supposed, careful, cautious, and calculating in every relation of life professional and private. There was nothing of the typical dare-devil seadog about him, and although he and Drake, having to deal with similar conditions, might have come to a similar determination, they would have reached it by far different roads. It is much more likely that they would have differed hopelessly, for Monson was akin to Borough in temperament, and, where Drake would have acted with the insight of genius, omitting or unable to explain the middle stages, Monson would have plodded step by step according to rule, and have failed to discern or to interpret those intangible realities which belong to human nature and national idiosyncrasies rather than to material facts. Incidentally Monson gives us his gospel as an admiral: 'There are three principal things to be required in a sea action—the first is providence to learn the design of an enemy to prevent him, the second is secrecy to keep the enemy from intelligence, and the third is how to work for the advantage of wind and weather.' All this is exemplary, and more than once he emphasizes the importance of scouting, which, with other useful things, he had been taught by practice, but something more than a strict conformity to rule and precept, common to the

average painstaking admiral, is required to attain pre-eminence. The kind of excellence he possessed is indicated again in his reference to the fact that he had a list of all Philip's fighting ships, with their sizes and strength.[1] In other words he was his own Intelligence Department, and he was probably the only Elizabethan seaman who had gathered such information and understood its value, in which he was far in advance of his time. But while a Carnot and a Napoleon may equally seek such knowledge and appreciate its importance, the ability to use it depends on gifts which industry may improve but cannot originate, and it may be doubted whether Monson, burthened with maxims and precedents, had those gifts, or could ever have risen to the height of a great opportunity. Whatever his skill it was the product of practice and study; he lacked the inborn endowment of genius. In originality, intuition, insight, the nobler qualities that enable their possessors to gauge men and events, anticipate results, or forestall consequences, he was deficient; and just as much in that finer sense of sympathy and enthusiasm which place a man *en rapport* with the intellectual and spiritual currents of his age, and, as in the case of Essex, may carry him fast and far and almost give the commanding influence of genius.

[1] *Post*, ii. p. 260.

A

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A

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THE

PREFACE

HAVING had the perusal of these naval tracts of Sir William Monson, as well to compare two copies together, and supply the defects of the one out of the other, as to correct what might be found in them amiss, either through the negligence of transcribers or the author's want of time to revise his work, yet without presuming to alter Sir William's sense or design in the least, but only to make the whole fit for the press, I thought it necessary to give the reader some little information concerning the work before he enters upon it, but with that brevity which I have always affected when anything has appeared abroad under my own name, and which I am much more inclined to, being to speak of what must give praise or dispraise to another, and not to me who am no way concerned in it.

Some nice persons will, perhaps, at the first reading of this work, find fault with the language, and wonder that Sir William, who was a gentleman by

birth, and so great a man as an Admiral, should answer their expectation so little in that particular. I cannot, I must confess, vindicate the language: but it was not my province to alter it; and as for the author, it must be considered that, though born a gentleman, he spent most of his time at sea, a very unfit school for a man to improve his language. For the same reason we may suppose he was not much a scholar, but of excellent natural parts, and a great master of the art he professed, as will sufficiently appear by this work and is enough to recommend it. Besides, we must not expect that the days of Queen Elizabeth could form a man to the language of our time; and though Sir William lived till the civil war in the reign of King Charles I., it is to be observed that he was then in his declining age, when for the most part men rather mind what they say than how they say it.

The work therefore, though perhaps not so pleasing in style as some might desire, is correct, and clear from abundance of oversights, which, as I said before, had either crept in through the fault of transcribers or for want of the author's due revising it. Nor was it proper to alter the style, but to allow the author to deliver himself in his own way; for should discerning persons find Sir William Monson speak the language of this time precisely, having never before appeared in print, they might be rather apt to believe these tracts supposititious than his own lawful offspring.

There is another thing, which perhaps will seem unpardonable, and not without just cause if judges be rigorous; and is, that there are some mistakes, or to speak plainly, falsehoods to be found in these tracts. What I can say to this is, that they are most, if not all, in things then not better known; as for instance, the affairs of the East and West Indies, concerning which many extravagant stories were formerly told which time and experience have disproved. Besides, we must not be too rash in supposing everything false which does not seem probable to us; for there might be many accidents or occurrences in those days which might be really true and undoubted, though to us they seem preposterous and strange. And it is farther to be observed, that these errors are not in things whereon the credit of the subject matter depends, but only in such as fall in by-the-by, and wherein Sir William was either imposed upon by authors then in credit, or by living persons whose reputation might be untainted.

I will not pretend to give a character of the author, or more of his work, which every reader has as much right to judge of as myself, and perhaps is better able. What little I have said, as to those two points above, is not to apologize for the work, or to prepossess the reader, but only to prevent his being too hasty in condemning, because some men are naturally so precipitate that they are apt to take a prejudice to a book upon the first dislike; which they may afterwards, upon second thoughts

and more mature deliberation, find both useful and delightful. Nor is there any need to give an account what the work is, as I thought once to have done, because it would be a needless repetition of the contents, in which every man may at one view see the heads of all these tracts; besides that every book has a short argument, yet sufficient to show what it treats of.

Sir William Monson to his Eldest Son *

DEAR SON,—The use of dedicating books is ancient; the parties to whom they have been dedicated hath been out of respect to great persons, either for protection or remuneration, to familiars out of friendship and affection, to children out of nature and admonition. To which end I commit the reading of the following discourse to you, that beholding the eighteen years' war by sea, which for want of years you could not then remember, and comparing them with the eighteen years of peace in which you have lived, you may consider and collect three things: the one, that after so many pains and perils, God has sent life to your father to further your education; by the second you may value his recompenses and rewards with his deservings; that by the third you shall have just cause to abandon the thoughts of such dangerous and uncertain courses; and that you may follow the ensuing precepts, which I recommend to your often perusal.

By the first whereof I will put you in mind of the small means and fortune I shall leave you, that you may rate your expenses accordingly. And yet as little as it is, it is great to me, in respect I attained to it by my own endeavours and danger; and therefore nobody can challenge interest in it but myself, though your carriage may promise the best possibility.†

* B reads 'to my eldest son'; D, and Sl. 1, 'to his son.'
† B, 'possibilities.'

Beware you presume not too much upon it, that thereby you grow disobedient to your parents, for what you can pretend, is but the privilege of two years of age above your younger brother; and in such cases fathers are like judges, that can and will distinguish of offences and deservings according to truth, and will reward and correct as they shall see cause.

And, because you shall know it is no rare nor new thing for a man to dispose of his own, I will lay before you a precedent of your own house, concurring in all points with yourself, that so often as you think of it, you may remember it with fear and prevent it with care.

The great-grandfather of your grandfather was a knight by title and John by name, which name we desire to retain to our eldest sons. God blessed him with many earthly benefits, as wealth, children, and reputation. His eldest son was called John, after his father, and his second William, like to yourself and brother; but upon what displeasure I know not (though we must judge the son gave the occasion), his father left him the least part of his fortune, though sufficient to equal the best gentleman of his shire and rank, and particularly the ancient house called after his name. Upon his other son, William, he invested so much as your uncle now enjoys. Both the sons whilst they lived carried the port and estimation of their father's children, though it fell out that the son of John, and nephew to William, became disobedient, negligent, and prodigal, and spent all his patrimony, so that in conclusion he and his son extinguished their house, and there now remains no memory of them. As for the second line and race, of whom your uncle and I descended, we live as you see, though our estates be not great, and of the two mine much the less, notwithstanding

it is as I have said the greater to me in respect I achieved it with the peril and danger of my life. And you will make my satisfaction in the enjoyment of it the greater if it be attended with that comfort I hope to receive from you.*

The next thing I will handle shall be arms. Know that wars by land or sea are always accompanied with everlasting dangers and disasters, and seldomtimes rewarded with deservings. For one soldier that lives to enjoy that preferment which becomes his right by antiquity of service,† ten thousand fall by the sword and other casualties; and if you compare that computation with any other calling or profession, you will find much difference and the danger not so great. Though arms have been esteemed in all ages, and the more as there was most use of them, yet you shall find they have been always subject to jealousies and envy: jealousies from the State, if the general grow great and popular; subject to envy from inferiors, who, through their perverse and ill dispositions, malign other men's deservings.

The advancement of soldiers is commonly made by the election of counsellors at home, whose eyes cannot witness a man's merits, so that a man is advanced as he is befriended, which makes the soldier's preferment as uncertain as his life is casual.

Compare the estate and advancement of soldiers of our time but with the mean and mercenary lawyer, and you shall find so great a difference that I had rather you should become prentice to the one than make profession of the other.

* The MSS. read 'you will make my joy the greater if it be attended,' &c., but the Churchill version in the text is more satisfactory.

† B, D, Sl. 1, and Sl. 2 all read 'that lives to require his right by antiquity of service.'

A captain that will seek to get and gain the love of his soldiers, as his greatest praise and felicity, of all other vices must detest and abandon covetousness. He must live by spending as the miser does by sparing, insomuch as few of them can obtain that means by war wherewith to maintain themselves in peace; and where wealth is wanting preferment fails.

Soldiers that live in peaceable islands, as we in England, are undervalued, because people see not those dangers which make them necessary, as others do where wars are practised.* And the good success in our wars has been such as makes men attribute our victories, not so much to valour as to chance and fortune, which they imagine must necessarily concur with our actions. I confess the base and ill behaviour of some soldiers has made them and their calling the less esteemed; for the name of a captain, which was ever wont to be honourable, is now become a word of reproach and disdain. Soldiers may have reputation, but little credit; reputation enough to defend their honours, but little trust in commerce of the world: and not without cause—by reason their assurance is the worse by how much their danger is the greater.

Learning is as much to be preferred before war as the trade of a merchant before that of the factor. By learning you are made sensible of the difference betwixt men and of their abilities, and will be able to judge between the good and the bad, and how to walk accordingly. By learning you attain to the knowledge of heavenly mysteries, and you may frame your life accordingly, as God shall give you grace. By learning you are made capable of preferment, if it concur with virtue and discretion; and

* 'Soldiers in peace are like chimneys in summer.'—Burghley's *Precepts.*

the rather because you are a gentleman by birth, and of good alliance; which I observe, next to money in this golden age, is the second step to preferment.* For one that is preferred by arms, there are twenty by learning; and indeed the soldier is but a servant to the learned, for after his many fought battles, and as many dangers of his life, he must yield account of his actions, and be judged, corrected, and advanced, as it shall please the other.

You may wonder to hear me extol learning so high above my own profession, considering the poor fortune I shall leave was achieved by arms. It is enough therefore to persuade you what I say is not conjectural but approved: for, if I did not find this difference, the nature of a father to a son would make me discover to you which were more probable and profitable for you to follow.

Good son, love soldiers for your country's sake, who are the defenders of it; for my sake, who have made profession of it; but shun the practice of it as you will do brawls, quarrels, and suits, which bring with them dangers, doubts, and distastes.

There are many other things to be shunned as being perilous both to body and soul; as quarrels, and the occasions of them, which grow by the enormities and abuses of our age. Esteem valour as a special virtue; but shun quarrelling as a most detestable vice. Of two evils it were better to keep company with a coward than a quarreller; the one is commonly sociable and friendly; the other dangerous in his acquaintance, and offensive to standers-by. He is never free from peril, that is conversant with a quarreller, either for offence given to himself, or to others wherein he may be engaged.

A true valiant man will have enough to defend

* B, D, Sl. 1, and Sl. 2 read 'next to this golden age is the second advance.'

his own reputation without engaging for others, for all are not valiant that will fight; therefore discretion makes a difference betwixt valour and desperateness. Nothing can happen more unfortunate to a gentleman than to have a quarrel, and yet nothing so ordinary as to give offence. It draws with it many mischiefs both to body and soul: being slain he is in danger of damnation, and not much less if he kill the other, without great repentance. He shall perpetually live in danger of revenge from the friends of the party killed, and fall into the mercy of the prince and law where he lives; but if, for fear and baseness, he avoid and shun a quarrel he is more odious living than he would be unhappy in dying.

Drinking is the foundation of other vices; it is the cause of quarrels, and then murders follow. It procures swearing, whoredom, and many other vices depend upon it. When you behold a drunkard, imagine you see a beast in the shape of a man.* It is a humour that for the time present pleases the party drunk, and so bereaves him of sense that he thinks all he does delights the beholders; but the day following he buys his shame with repentance, and perhaps gives that offence in his drunkenness that makes him hazard both life and reputation in a quarrel. No man will brag or boast so much of the word reputation as a drunkard, when indeed there is nothing more to a man's imputation than to be drunk.

A drunkard is in the condition of an excommunicated person, whose witness betwixt party and party is of no validity; nor he capable of office in the commonwealth. Avoid, good son, the company of a drunkard, and occasions of drinking, then shall

* 'There never was any man that came to honour or preferment that loved it, for it transformeth a man into a beast.'—Ralegh, *Instructions to his Son.*

you live free without fear, and enjoy your own without hazard.

Whoredom is an incident to drunkenness, though all whoremasters are not drunkards. It is a sin not washed away without the vengeance of God to the third and fourth generation. Besides the offence to God, it gives a disreputation to the party and his offspring. It occasions a breach betwixt man and wife, encourages the wife oftentimes to follow the ill example of her husband, and then ensues dislike, divorce, disinheriting of children, suits in law, and consuming of estates.

The next and worst sin I would have you shun is swearing. I do not advise you like a puritan, that ties a man more to the observing of Sundays, and from taking the name of God in vain, than to all the rest of the commandments; but I wish it first for the avoiding the sin itself, for the plague of God hangs over the house of the blasphemer. Swearing is odious to the hearers: it gives little credit to the words of him that uses it: it affords no pleasure as other sins do, nor yields any profit to the party. Custom begets it, and use must make one leave it.

For your exercises, let them be of two kinds: the one of mind, the other of body; that of the mind must consist of prayer, meditation, and your book. Let your prayers be twice a day, howsoever you dispose of yourself the rest of the time: prayers work a great effect in a simple and penitent heart.

By this I do not seek to persuade you from such exercises and delights of body as are lawful and allowable in a gentleman; for such increase health and agility of body, make a man sociable in company and draw good acquaintance. Many times they bring a man into favour with a prince, and prove a preferment to one's marriage; they are often a safeguard

to a man's life, as in vaulting suddenly upon a horse, or in running and escaping an enemy.

I will especially commend to you such pleasures as bring delight and content without charge; for such are fitter for greater men than one of your fortune to follow.

Hawking and hunting, if they be moderately used, are, like tobacco in some cases, wholesome for the body, but in the common use both laboursome and loathsome: they both alike bring one discommodity (as commonly vices do), that they are not so easily left as entertained. Tobacco, by nature, is hot and hurtful to young bodies and stomachs; that proceeds from the heat of the liver, which naturally you are subject to. It is offensive to company, especially the breath of him that takes it: it dries the brain, and many become fools with the continual use of it. Drunkards and tobacconists are ranked together, and not improperly, both of them being hurtful to the commonwealth with too much use and exercise.*

Let your apparel be handsome and decent, not curious nor costly. A wise man is more esteemed in his plain cloth than gay clothing. It is more commendation to be able to buy a rich suit than to wear one. A wise man esteems more of a man's virtues and valour than of his vesture, but seeing this age is fantastical and changeable you must fashion yourself to it, but in so mean and moderate

* Apparently Monson was no smoker, but the habit had been taken up with avidity during his lifetime, which no doubt explains his bitterness. In Ben Jonson's *Every Man in his Humour* we read that in 1595 tobacco was 'an herb generally received in the courts of princes, the chambers of nobles, the bowers of sweet ladies, the cabins of soldiers.' Middleton says 'there is no gallant but hath a pipe to burn about London,' and in 1598 Chamberlain writes of 'certain mad knaves that took tobacco all the way to Tyburn as they went to hanging.'

a manner as to be rather praised for frugality than derided and pitied for prodigality. He that delights in curious clothes is an imitator of a player, who measures his apparel by the part he plays. And as players appear upon the stage to be seen of the spectators, so do the gallants proclaim their bravery in open assemblies. Whilst I live, and you do not marry, I shall temper this expense, but when I die, remember what I say: seek advancement rather by your carriage than curiousness; the one is everlasting, the other like a flower fading.

Frame your course of life to the country and not to the Court; and yet make not yourself such a stranger to great persons, as in assemblies they should ask others who you are. I confess the greatest and suddenest rising is by the Court; yet the Court is like a hopeful and forward spring that is taken with a sharp and cold frost, which nips and blasts a whole orchard except two or three trees; for after that proportion commonly courtiers are preferred. And he that will live at Court must make his dependency upon some great person, in whose ship he must embark his life and fortune; and how unfortunate such men are oftentimes themselves, and how unthankful to their followers, we want not precedents.*

He that settles his service upon one of them shall fall into the disfavour of another; for a Court is like an army, ever in war, striving by stratagems to circumvent and kick up one another's heels. You are not ignorant of this comparison by what you know of me, whose case will serve you for a perspective-glass, wherein to behold your danger afar off,

* 'Remember always that thou venture not thy estate with any of those great ones that shall attempt unlawful things, for such men labour for themselves and not for thee.'—Ralegh, *Instructions to his Son.*

and more mature deliberation, find both useful and delightful. Nor is there any need to give an account what the work is, as I thought once to have done, because it would be a needless repetition of the contents, in which every man may at one view see the heads of all these tracts; besides that every book has a short argument, yet sufficient to show what it treats of.

sakes, as you are bound by nature, but especially for mine, whose they are. Remember you are all indifferent to me,* but that God chose you from the rest to be a strength and stay to them. Think you cannot honour your father more, being dead, than in showing affection to them he most loved; and nothing will more approve you to be mine, than love and kindness amongst yourselves. You owe a thankfulness to me, besides that I am your father, in that I seek your advancement above theirs; of which obligation I will acquit you, conditionally you perform it to them. For because man cannot himself live ever he desires to live in his posterity, and if I had a hundred sons my greatest hope must depend upon you, as you are my eldest; and, seeing my care is of you above the rest, do not make me so unhappy as to give the world occasion to say I left an unnatural son. My one and only request is, be kind and loving to them, who, I know, by their disposition, will give you no cause of offence. A discourtesy from you will be as sharp to them as a razor from another.

Be courteous and friendly to all, for men are esteemed according to their carriage. There is an old and effectual proverb, 'The courtesy of the mouth is of great value, and costs little.'† A proud man is envied of his equals, hated by his inferiors, and scorned by his superiors; so that betwixt envy, hate, and scorn, he is friendless. Many times a man is condemned to die out of presumption, especially when it concurs with an evil opinion of his carriage: in that case how much doth it concern one to have love, reputation, and estimation!

There cannot be a greater honour than to gain a

* *I.e.* equally loved.

† A Spanish proverb, 'Cortesia de boca mucho vale y poco costa.'

man's enemy by a courtesy: it doubleth the friendship that is done to another, and obligeth him that receives it. Love is a thing desired by a king from his subjects, by a general from his soldiers, and by a master from his servants. He that has it is rich by it; it maintains peace in time of peace, and is a safe bulwark in time of war.

Do not buy this love with the ruin of your estate, as many do with prodigal expenses, that in the end are requited with pity and derision. Let your expense be agreeable to the wearing of your clothes, better or worse, according to company, or the journeying your horse. The less way you go to-day you may travel the farther to-morrow, but if you go every day a long and wearisome journey your horse will fail, and you be forced to go afoot. And so will it be in your expenses: if you do not moderate them according to days and companies your horse and you may travel faintly together.

If you be prodigal in anything let it be in hospitality, as most agreeable to the will of God; you shall feed the hungry, relieve the poor, and get the love of the rich. What you spend among your neighbours is not lost, but procures their love and help when you have need, and thereby you shall find friendship in the country as available as favour at court.*

If you are called to any place of preferment, do justice with pity; revenge not yourself of your enemy under colour of authority, for that shows baseness and will procure you hatred. In money matters favour your country,† if it be not against

* 'Let thy kindred and allies be welcome to thy house and table . . . for by this means thou shalt so double the bond of nature as thou shalt find them so many advocates to plead an apology for thee behind thy back.'—Burghley's *Precepts*.

† 'Do favour in the expense of your country,' &c., A, B, D, Sl. 1.

the present profit of the King; for many times his name is used for the gain of other men.

Study the laws, not to make a mercenary practice of them, but only for your own use, the counsel of your neighbours, and the government of your country. Hold the laws in reverence next to the King: for that commonwealth is well governed where the King is ruled by the laws, not the laws by the King.

Be not presumptuous in your command; yet seek to be obeyed as you desire to obey, for as you are above others, others are above you. Give your mind to accommodate controversies among your neighbours and you shall gain their love, which will more avail you than the hate of the lawyers can hurt you.

Punish idleness and other vices, as well for that they are such as for example's sake. Gain love by doing justice, and hate offering wrong, though it were to your immediate profit.

If you marry after my death, choose a wife, as near as you can, to equal you in calling, years, and condition; for such marriages are made in heaven, though celebrated on earth. If your estate were greater your choice might be the freer: but, where the preferment of your sisters must depend upon your wife's portion, let not your fancy overrule your necessity. It is an old saying, 'He that marries for love, has evil days and good nights.' Consider, if you marry for affection, how long you will be raising portions for your sisters, and the misery you shall live in all the days of your life, for the greatest fortune that a man can expect is in his marriage.*

* 'If thou have a fair wife and a poor one assure thyself that love abideth not with want . . . for I never yet knew a poor woman, exceeding fair, that was not made dishonest by one or other in the end.'—Ralegh, *Instructions to his Son.* Monson,

A wise man is known by his actions; but where passion and affection sway that man is deprived of sense and understanding.

It is not the poverty or meanness of her one marrieth that makes her the better wife; for commonly such women grow elevated, and are no more mindful of what they have been than a mariner is of his escape from a danger at sea when it is past. You must value your wife by your own carriage, for a wise and discreet husband makes an obedient and dutiful wife. Beware of jealousy; for it is a vexation of mind, and causes laughter from your enemies. Many times it is occasioned by the behaviour of the husband towards other women: in that case do like the physician—take away the cause of the infirmity; if not you are worthy to feel the malady. Jealousy is grounded upon conceit and imagination, proceeds from a weak, idle, and untempered brain, and the unworthiness of him that is jealous many times makes a woman do what otherwise she would not.

If God be pleased to give you children, love them with that discretion that they discern it not, lest they be emboldened too much upon it. Nourish and feed them in things that are good, and correct them if they offend. The love of God to man cannot be better expressed than in proof of one's children; for they are either comforts or crosses to their parents, and yet education is a great help to nature.

Let your children make you to abandon the delights and pleasures of the world, in respect of the comfort and joy you receive by them. Make account then that summer is past, and that the

like most seamen, was regardless of Socrates: 'Let a man take which course he will (marry or not marry) he will be sure to repent.'

melancholy winter approaches; for a careful and provident father cannot take delight in the world, and provide for his children.

For a conclusion I will recommend two principal virtues to you; the one is secrecy, the other patience. The unsecret man never lives in safety, and of all others is an unfit servant for a prince; for many times they are trusted with things the revealing whereof may cost them their lives and hinder the designs of their masters. It is a folly to trust any man with a secret that can give no assistance in the business he is trusted with. Counsellors of State, and generals of armies, of all others ought to be most secret, for their designs being once discovered their enterprises fail. Silence was so much esteemed among the Persians that she was adored for a goddess. The Romans kept their expeditions so secret as that alone was a principal cause of their victories. But of all others trust not women with a secret, for the weakness of their sex makes them unsecret. Be patient, after the example of Job, and you shall find yourself a true servant of God. Patience deserves to be painted with a sword in her hand, for she conquers and subdues all difficulties. If you will take advantage of your enemy make him choleric, and by patience you shall overcome him.

Marcus Aurelius, being both emperor and philosopher, confessed he attained not the empire by philosophy but by patience. What man in the world was so patient as our Saviour Himself? By following whose example His ministers have converted more by their words, than all the persecuting emperors could deter by rigour or cruelty of laws. The impatient man contests with God Himself, Who gives and takes away at His will and pleasure.

Let me (good son) be your pattern of patience.

For you can witness with me, that neither the disgraces unjustly done me, my estate by my misfortune ruined, my health by imprisonments decayed, and my services undervalued or unrecompensed, have not bred the least distaste or discontent in me, or altered my resolution from my infancy. That is, I was never so base as to insinuate into any man's favour, who was favoured by the times; I was never so ambitious as to seek or crave employment, that was not put upon me. My one and only comfort is, that I served my princes both faithfully and fortunately. But seeing it was not so accepted, I can as well content myself in being a spectator as if I were an actor in the world.

The Epistle Dedicatory of the First Book, to such Gentlemen as are the Author's intimate friends, that shall read these small Treatises.*

It is proper to all discourses not to comprehend more in one book than the subject whereof they are to treat, because variety of matter may breed confusion and forgetfulness in the reader. And though the ensuing work treats of several nations, several matters and accidents, and of several times and ages, yet all tends to sea-actions and men of that profession, as namely, the first discovery of countries, the settling a course of trade betwixt remote nations, the success of many warlike expeditions by sea, and several admonitions, and other particulars therein mentioned.

I have divided them into six books: in the first and second I place the acts and enterprises of Englishmen, in respect of the deserved honour the world attributes to them by sea; secondly, in duty being bound to prefer my own country before all others, wherein I cannot be taxed or challenged of partiality; and, thirdly, because the actions and journeys of the English will give light to ensuing ages, by comparing them with times past for advantage of time to come, if there be occasion.

In the third book I set down the office of the Lord High Admiral of England, and all other inferior

* Sl. 1 has 'this treatise following.'

officers belonging to him, and his Majesty's ships, from the highest commander to the meanest sailor.

In the fourth book I touch upon divers discoveries and conquests of the Spanish and Portuguese nation. But I will forbear to say anything of them in particular till I come to the place where I am to treat more at large of their acts and enterprises.

In the fifth is handled projects, which I dedicate to the projectors of this time, not to honour, but to display them and their infamous courses against the commonwealth.

In the sixth I discover the benefit of fishing upon his Majesty's coasts of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and with what ease it may be undertaken by his Majesty's subjects.

Many things contained in these six books are no other than collections of other authors; and my labour is no more therein than theirs who gather diversities of flowers out of several gardens to deck a seemly and sightly garland.

I intend not that many shall read them; and such as do I will esteem in my highest degree of dearing, because such will make a favourable construction of the errors that shall escape me, or conceal and hide the disabilities they shall find in me.

I have no end but my own pleasure and my friends' delight, if this yields them any; if not, yet my love ought not to be the less esteemed, considering my intention in offering it. What it shall fail in perfection you shall find in my affection and service ever devoted to you. And so, farewell.*

* The Epistle in the text is, allowing for the former editor's modifications, practically the same as B, which is the only MS. containing a full one. Sl. 1 (see title pages) speaks of four books only, omitting the third and sixth, but in other respects is nearly the same as the fuller version, and the Churchill editor would

seem to have had a copy of that and of B before him in preparing for the press. In A there is a substitute for the Epistle, reading as follows :

'These ensuing voyages treat of services already past, but at my death I intend to leave you a few lines to the effect following, which perhaps may serve your country to some stead, and make me remembered who is unworthy now of remembrance.

'The first is how to make war upon Spain by sea, either offensive or defensive.

'The second how to war upon Holland if they give occasion.

'The third how to secure his Majesty's navy in harbour of Chatham.

'The fourth a project how to decay the Hollander's fishing without show of hostility.

'The fifth how to increase 200 sail of ships in England.

'The sixth and last how to convert the lewd people of this nation to galleys, and the use and profit of galleys.

'And so with God's blessing and mine I leave you.'

As the foregoing seems to be addressed to his son and not to his friends, we may assume that A is of an earlier date than B or Sl. 1.

BOOK I.

A yearly account of the English and Spanish Fleets, set forth one to annoy the other, from the year 1585, *when the War with Spain first began, till the year* 1603, *when King James made his happy entrance into this Kingdom, showing the Designs, Oversights and Errors on both English and Spanish sides, with the names of the Queen's ships and commanders in every Expedition*

Sir Francis Drake's Voyage to the West Indies, A.D. 1585. [1]

Ships.	Commander.
The Elizabeth Bonaventure.	Sir Francis Drake.
The Aid.	Captain Frobiser.
	Captain Carleill, lieutenant-general by land. [2]

Upon knowledge of the embargo laid by the King of Spain in the year 1585, upon the English ships, men, and goods found in his country, her Majesty

having no means to help or relieve her subjects by friendly treaty, authorized such as received hindrances and losses by the said arrest to seek redress at the hands of the subjects of the King of Spain. And to that end gave them letters of reprisal, to take and arrest all ships and merchandizes they should find at sea, or elsewhere, belonging to the vassals of the said King.

Her Majesty at the same time, to revenge the wrongs offered her, and to prevent the King of Spain's preparations made against her, made ready a fleet of twenty-five sail of ships, and employed them under the command of Sir Francis Drake, as the fittest man, by reason of his experience and fortunes tried in sundry actions. [3]

It is not my intent to set down all the particular accidents of the voyages treated of, but only to show the services done, and the escapes and oversights past, as a warning to those that shall read them, and to prevent the like errors hereafter.

This voyage of Sir Francis Drake being the first undertaking on either side (for it ensued immediately after the arrest of our ships and goods in Spain), I will deliver my opinion and conceit of it before I proceed any farther.

One impediment to the voyage was that to which the ill-success of divers others that after followed is to be imputed, that is to say, the want of victuals and other necessaries fit for so great an expedition. For had not the fleet by chance met with a ship from Newfoundland, laden with fish, which relieved their necessities, they would have found their extremity greater than they could well have suffered. [4]

The service performed in this action, was the taking and sacking San Domingo in Española, Cartagena in Tierra-firme, and St. Augustine in

Florida, three towns of great importance in the West Indies. This fleet was the greatest of any nation but the Spaniards themselves that had been ever seen in those seas since the first discovery of them; and if it had been as well considered of before their going from home, as it was happily performed by the valour of the undertakers, it had more annoyed the King of Spain than all other actions that ensued during the time of the war.[5]

But it seems our long peace made us inexperienced of advice in war; for had we kept and defended those places when in our possession, and provided to have been relieved and succoured out of England, we had diverted the war from this part of Europe into America. For at that time there was no comparison betwixt the strength of Spain and England by sea, by means whereof we might have better defended them and encroached upon the rest of the Indies, than the King of Spain could have aided or succoured them.

But, since, we see and find by experience that those places which were then weak and unfortified are now so strengthened that it is bootless to undertake an action to annoy the King of Spain in his West Indies, as shall appear by a discourse in the third book.[6] And though this voyage proved both fortunate and victorious, yet considering it was rather an awakening of the enemy than a weakening of him it had been far better never to have been undertaken unless upon better grounds, advisement, and with greater forces.[7]

[1] Monson's lists are retained (with corrected spelling), but are frequently worthless. More accurate lists are, as in this instance, appended in the notes; the following one is from Bigge's *Summary Discourse* (Hakluyt's *Voyages*) and *Harl. MSS.* 366, f. 146:—

Ships.	Men.	Tons.	Commanders.
Queen's Ships:			
Bonaventure .	300	600	General, Sir Francis Drake; Captain, Thomas Fenner.
Aid . . .	130	250	Ed. Wynter.
Armed Merchantmen:			
Primrose . .	200	400	Vice-Admiral, Martin Frobiser.[1]
Galleon Leicester .	200	400	Rear-Admiral, Francis Knollys.
Tiger . . .	90	200	Lieut.-Gen., Christ. Carleill.
Sea Dragon . .	90	140	Henry White.
Thomas . .	100	200	Thomas Drake.
Minion . .	90	200	Thomas Cely.
Bark Talbot . .	90	200	Baily.
Bark Bond. . .	80	120	Robert Crosse.
Bark Bonner .	80	120	George Fortescue.
Bark Hawkyns .	80	120	Wm. Hawkyns
Hope. . . .	80	120	Ed. Careless (or Wright).
White Lion . .	80	140	James Erizo.
Francis . . .	45	60	Thomas Moone.
Vantage . .	40	50	John Rivers.
Drake . . .	—	—	John Vaughan.
George . . .	25	40	John Varney.
Benjamin . .	30	50	John Martin.
Scout . . .	20	30	Ed. Gilman
Galliot Duck . .	12	20	Richard Hawkyns.
Swallow . .	30	50	Bitfield.

Eight pinnaces sailed with the fleet and ten others were carried ready to be put together.[2]

[2] There was also a force of infantry—ten or twelve companies—under the command of Christopher Carleill as lieutenant-general, with Anthony Powell as sergeant-major, and Captains

[1] Frobiser was 'expressly commanded by her Majesty to serve in that voyage,' and was subsequently awarded a gratuity of 150*l.* (*Acts of the Privy Council*, 12th May, 1588).

[2] In the Harleian list the fleet is divided into ships and barks, vessels of 120 tons and upwards being entered under the first heading.

Morgan and Sampson as corporals of the field. The whole force of soldiers and sailors numbered some 2,300 men. The chief duties of the corporals of the field were those of aides-de-camp. The sergeant-major was an officer of high rank, and his multifarious duties are described in a paper of 1518;[3] besides attending to details of organization, he had to arrange the formation of the troops previous to an engagement, and 'serve with his own person in the forefront of the battle[4] and to lead the battle.' In 1588 the sergeant-major was paid ten shillings a day, and the corporals of the field only four shillings, so that there was a great difference in rank. About the period of the Civil War the sergeant-major became a regimental officer, a compound of adjutant, colonel's secretary, combatant officer, and teacher of tactics and strategy,[5] but there remained a sergeant-major-general on the staff.

[3] Towards the end of 1584 Elizabeth commissioned Drake to equip a fleet, perhaps because the possibility of an invasion under Guise appeared to be more imminent;[6] later, as the result of one of her ceaseless changes of view, it was countermanded. In the spring of 1585, in consequence of a dearth in Spain, Philip invited the importation of wheat, promising immunity to the vessels bringing it over. However, he issued an order on 29th May to seize all such vessels and imprison their crews, the ships, guns, and stores being destined to strengthen the fleet preparing under the Marquis of Santa Cruz. This flagrant breach of faith was answered by the issue of letters of reprisal under an order of 9th July, 1585, directed to the Lord Admiral; the letters were only to be given to persons who could prove that they had suffered by the seizure, but then they might act 'as if it were in the time of open war,' giving bond not to injure neutrals or allies.[7] Amongst the Admiralty Court papers there is one which, although partly destroyed, gives the amounts in which many of the towns were damnified, or what the merchants and shipowners belonging to them declared to be their losses. London stands for 39,100*l.*,

[3] *Harl. MSS.* 4685.

[4] *I.e.* the main body, the centre of a sixteenth-century field formation.

[5] Warde, *Animadversions on Warre*, London, 1639.

[6] *Chancery Misc. Rolls*, $\frac{238}{33}$, Letters of Privy Seal, 23rd December, 1584, authorising preparation of eleven ships, four barks, and twenty pinnaces.

[7] Reprisals might be *general*, to all subjects, or as here, *special*. So far from implying a state of war, international jurists hold that they are only possible in a state of peace. They are probably a survival from the time when sovereigns were unable to control the action of their powerful feudatories, and the State whose subjects were injured had to choose between open war or permitting private recovery. This instance, however, is peculiar, in that the injury was the act of the head of the State himself, and not of his subjects.

Ipswich 29,000*l.*, Bristol 29,300*l.*, Southampton 7,000*l.*, Barnstaple 6,000*l.*, Plymouth 3,500*l.*, Exeter 2,600*l.*, Lyme 2,000*l.*, Yarmouth 1,200*l.*, and others in smaller sums. If these claims were not exaggerated, they suggest a flourishing commerce, seeing that the Spanish was only one branch of a growing system of trade now tending to spread over all Europe, and naturally seeking outlets across the ocean.[8]

In the meantime events in the Netherlands were also forcing Elizabeth's hand. France had refused to help the Dutch under the limitations the Queen had persuaded the latter to insist upon, and, as a consequence, she was called upon to redeem her promise to help them herself. Antwerp was in the last agony, and in fact surrendered on 12th August, two days after the treaty with the Dutch was signed, and the fall of Antwerp seemed to bring the nascent Dutch independence within a measurable distance of its end. English troops were hurried over to the Low Countries, but Drake was already preparing his fleet, under a commission bearing date 1st July, 1585, ostensibly to demand the release of the English ships and men detained in Spain. The expedition was a joint-stock venture, the subscriptions amounting to 60,400*l.*, of which Elizabeth gave 10,000*l.* in money, and the Aid and Bonaventure, valued at another 10,000*l.*, a ridiculously extravagant estimate. It appears that Philip had an exact account of the fleet sent to him, although after it had sailed, by Bernardino de Mendoza, his ambassador in Paris, who had been formerly ambassador in England and expelled by Elizabeth. Mendoza maintained a very efficient spy system in England; in this case he sent over a Frenchman and 'he made friends with Drake himself and arranged to go in the fleet; he gave him the slip.' Philip, replying to Mendoza, noted that the information obtained agreed with that sent to him from Vigo, 'where the daring of his attempt was greater than the damage he was able to effect.'[9]

[4] It can scarcely be accidental that in all the voyages in which Drake was in chief command, there was a lack of care or of

[8] *Ad. Ct. Misc. Bks.*, 978. I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. R. G. Marsden for this and several other valuable references to Admiralty Court papers. Mr. Marsden is of opinion that at this period the Judge of the Admiralty Court exercised no check on the claim made by any applicant for letters of reprisal. The earliest instance known to him of the Judge exercising authority in that direction is of the reign of Charles I. The proofs of the claim were taken on oath, but no questions were asked, and it seems that the possessor of letters of reprisal might go on recouping himself for an indefinite time without being called to account provided he did not cause any acute diplomatic difficulties.

[9] *Simancas Papers*, Mendoza to Philip, 17th October, 1585; and Philip to Mendoza, 29th December, 1585.

organization in such an important matter as the victualling of his crews. In his voyage of circumnavigation, by the time he reached Port St. Julian, and long before entering the Straits of Magellan, 'mussels were good meat, yea, the seaweeds were dainty dishes'; in this voyage of 1585 the deficiencies have been attributed to his hasty departure. The actual departure was hasty, but he had had two and a half months for preparation since being officially commissioned, and, probably, had been preparing for a longer time unofficially. In 1587 the crew of the Golden Lion mutinied because they were 'spoiled for want of food'; and with respect to this incident it should be noticed that, on the one hand, large quantities of provisions were wilfully destroyed at Cadiz because there was no transport to carry them away, and, on the other, that such a plea would have been foolish effrontery from the men had the ship just been provisioned there. Of the 1589 voyage an apologist for the Generals says that the troops never wanted victuals 'for two days together,' a favourable view which is in complete disagreement with all other accounts; but Drake, when sailing, wrote that he started with only four or five weeks' provisions, and that he was relying on the harvest in Spain and Portugal to supply his necessities. The result was a death roll, from disease and privation, of at least 6,000 men. But the most striking illustration of this defect in Drake, as a leader, is to be seen in his last expedition of 1595–6. He and Hawkyns, as joint admirals, each equipped his own half of the fleet, and while that of Hawkyns was sufficiently well supplied to permit a direct run to the West Indies, Drake's half was so badly furnished that Hawkyns was compelled to consent, against his judgment, to the descent on Las Palmas. There were several causes at work, any one of which foredoomed the enterprise to failure, and the time thus lost at the Canaries was one of them.

[5] For remarks on Monson's review of the strategy of this voyage see the Introduction to Book I. The principal dates and facts may be now summarised. Drake sailed from Plymouth on 14th September and anchored outside Vigo Bay on the 27th; there he demanded the release of the men, ships, and goods detained under the embargo. The governor of the Bayona Islands informed him that the embargo had been already raised by Philip's order. After some plundering and a little fighting he sailed on 9th or 11th October for Palma, but either before or shortly after leaving Vigo he had learnt from a Spanish prize that the New Spain fleet had arrived at San Lucar on $\frac{1}{18}$ September, and that from Tierra-firme on $\frac{1}{15}$ October, so that that hope of booty was gone.[10] Failing to land at Palma at the first attempt, he stood

[10] Herrera, *Historia General*, Madrid, 1612, iii. p. 11. The New Spain fleet of 1585 brought 880,000 pesos of gold (Ternaux-Compans,

away for Gomera, and thence to Santiago in the Cape Verde Islands, where he arrived 16th November, and, landing a strong force the same evening, entered the town the next day, finding it abandoned. After waiting fruitlessly for a week for offers of ransom which never came, Carleill marched inland on San Domingo, and finding that also abandoned, it was burnt after an occupation of one day. The conduct of the men was very good,[11] but there being evidently nothing to be gained by a longer delay, Santiago and Porto Praya were fired, and the Admiral sailed on 26th November for the West Indies, arriving at Dominica on 21st and St. Christopher on 24th December. During the passage across the Atlantic a terrible epidemic, probably a malignant malarial fever of Cape Verde origin, swept through the fleet, killing hundreds of men and temporarily or permanently disabling many more. From St. Christopher Drake sailed to San Domingo in Española, and by a combined land and sea attack carried the town on 1st January, 1586, Spanish dilatoriness having given him the advantage of surprise, although, according to one account, the enemy had time to close the narrow entrance to the harbour by sinking three ships.[12] Philip's *aviso*, with despatches of $\frac{1}{11}$ November, 1585, giving warning of Drake being at sea, did not arrive until $\frac{\text{31st Feb.}}{\text{3rd Mar.}}$, 1586, but the Marquis de Villamanrique, the Viceroy of New Spain, received intelligence of the capture of San Domingo, by 'an English pirate,' shortly before $\frac{1}{11}$ February, although he does not seem to have then known who it was. The

Voyages, 1st series, vol. x. Appendix), or about 3,000,000*l.* in present values. Doubtless the Tierra-firme fleet was still richer. The general opinion in Spain was that the Flota only escaped by being dispersed by bad weather, and it was called 'the fleet of the miracle,' so little did they expect its safe arrival.

[11] 'The English injured no person, neither men, women, nor children (*S. P. Ven.* 19th February, 1586, Ven. Amb. in Spain to Doge).

[12] *S. P. Ven.* 30th May, 1586. Cabrera de Cordoba says that Don Christobal de Ovalle, the governor of Española, was warned in December by a ship from the Cape Verde Islands, but gave no credence to the news and made no preparations (*Hist. de Felipe II.*, Madrid, 1876, iii. p. 177). Herrera says the same, and gives the date, $\frac{1}{11}$ December, of the arrival of the advice boat. Another contemporary authority, Fray Pedro Simon, who wrote in 1625 about Drake (*Noticias Historiales*, Bogota, 1892, pt. v. p. 102), says that Ovalle confiscated the property of the Portuguese, who brought the news from the Cape Verdes as a punishment for spreading ridiculous rumours. Simon also says that there were not more than 1,000 men available, and these armed only with ancestral weapons, few and defective, handed down from their fathers the *Conquistadores*. This is very likely to be true, as the island had been at peace since shortly after the discovery and conquest.

marquis immediately warned all the coast towns, and hurried down troops and munitions of war to San Juan de Ulua to be sent to the Havana; but down to $\frac{13}{23}$ March, the date of his letter to Philip II. from which these details are obtained, his intentions had been frustrated by the obstinacy of Don Juan de Guzman, the General of the Flota lying at San Juan, who, 'guided by interest and prejudice and not by the necessities of the occasion,' refused to place suitable shipping for the service at his disposal. An imperative order from the Audiencia of Mexico, the highest legislative and judicial body of the country, was to go down with this despatch, but the marquis thought it very likely that Don Juan would still refuse obedience and that the Havana would be hazarded.[13] The incident throws an instructive light on an administrative system of which the weakness frequently paralysed resistance; in this case Viceroy and Audiencia were at one, but it often happened that they were at daggers drawn, and then every function associated with government came to a standstill.[14] All powers united, when it pleased them, in stultifying or ignoring the orders and legislation of the mother country, which, from 1492 onwards, never had sufficient material force at command to compel obedience.

After destroying part of the town Drake accepted a ransom of 25,000 ducats, and left San Domingo on 1st February, 1586;[15] on the 6th he was off Rio de la Hacha, and on the 11th appeared before Cartagena, one of the wealthiest cities of the Spanish colonies, rendered so strong by nature and art as to appear almost impregnable to a *coup de main*, although when less well fortified it had twice been plundered since its foundation in 1531: by Robert Baal or O'Vall in 1543, and by Martin Cote—who should probably be Jacques Sore, a Norman seaman of some renown—in 1560.[16] As the English were expected here the Spaniards had had time to strengthen the existing fortifications with earthworks and especial defences.[17]

[13] *Cartas de Indias*, Madrid, 1877, p. 353 *et seq.*

[14] Notwithstanding their lofty titles, the Viceroys were only the presidents of the Audiencias, and had not long been endowed with the higher dignity. The Spanish system was to make every official a check upon some other, and the members of the Audiencias usually fulfilled that part of their duty.

[15] 'We . . . burnt all their images of wood; broke and destroyed all their fairest work within their churches' (*Bib. Reg.* 7, c. xvi. f. 171). Pedro Simon says that Drake palisaded his defences in the streets with the images of the saints, so that the Spaniards would not fire, preferring a weak defence to sacrilege.

[16] J. M. Groot, *Hist. . . . de Nueva Granada*, i. p. 28. This author says that they were both French.

[17] A vessel despatched by the Casa de Contratacion at Seville had

As Drake ran along the narrow neck of land separating the sea from the lagoon, 'flying black banners and streamers menacing war to the death,'[18] he picked up two negro fishermen, from whom he learnt the details of the preparations made for him by the governor, Pedro Fernandez de Bustos.[19] In after years Cartagena became a nest of forts and batteries, of which the ruins are still impressive, but at this time only the city itself was fortified, with the addition of the outlying fort at B and the breastwork at D. The Boca Grande and the Boca Chica were apparently both open to passage, and the first, offering a wide and easy entry compared with the narrow and tortuous Boca Chica, seemed the natural path to take. Of the two English accounts on which we have to rely, one[20] gives only a vague description of the passage into the lagoon, but a description which certainly describes the Boca Grande, if the distances are to be accepted, while the plates originally issued with the pamphlet show the Boca Grande invitingly open and easy; the other[21] gives no information at all on the subject. However, the authoritative statement of a modern Spanish writer is that 'in 1558 the construction of two forts was commenced at the entrance of the Boca Grande, but the work was discontinued, the closure of the channel having rendered it needless.'[22] In that case Drake must necessarily have gone in by the Boca Chica.

brought a warning towards the end of December (Herrera, *op. cit.* p. 17). Notice had also been sent from San Domingo, where Drake had openly announced his intention (Simon, *op. cit.* p. 110).

[18] Groot, *op. cit.* p. 187.

[19] *Ibid.* However, the governor had no experience of warfare, and the responsibility fell upon Don Pedro Vique, the commander of the galleys, 'there was no other competent leader' (Cabrera de Cordoba, *op. cit.*).

[20] *A Summary and True Discourse of Sir Francis Drake's West Indian Voyage* . . . published by Mr. Thomas Cates (Hakluyt, *Voyages*, xv. p. 208, ed. Goldsmid), but mostly written by Captain Walter Bigges. He writes: 'the harbour mouth lay some three miles toward the westward of the town whereinto we entered.' . . . That is about the distance of the Boca Grande from the town, the Boca Chica being some eight miles farther.

[21] *Bib. Reg.* 7, c. xvi. f. 166 (British Museum).

[22] J. P. Urueta, *Cartagena y sus Cercanias*, Cartagena, 1886. The description of the ports in the Indies in 1587, by Baptista Antonio, of which there is a translation in Hakluyt (*Voyages*, xv. p. 239), is hopelessly contradictory. He is made to say of the Boca Grande that it is 'where all the ships do enter into the said harbour,' and of the Boca Chica that 'to enter into the harbour you must go through this channel.' Whatever they felt for Spaniards the Elizabethans showed little respect for Spanish. The most conclusive evidence, to my mind, is the fact that Pedro Simon, who lived at Cartagena shortly after-


CARTAGENA
HARBOUR
A English Fleet.
B Chain and Fort.
C Landing place of English troops.
← Line of English advance.
D Stone breastwork armed with five heavy guns and defended by 300 men.
E Galleys enfilading line of advance.
F Carleill's attack on breastwork.
CARTAGENA
MANGA I.
BOCA GRANDE
TIERRA BOMBA ISLAND
BOCA CHICA
Fte San José
Alcornoque
Naparapa

velopment and execution of his designs; he is likely to maintain his superiority for some time to come, for no steps are being taken here, not because they do not care, but because of the great deficiency of all kinds of stores.' Hitherto Spain had been taken at its own valuation, and had been regarded as being as powerful at sea as on land, and this searching out of the weak places in its armour came as a surprise, and almost as something in the nature of an accident that could not recur. On 19th February, 1586, the Venetian wrote to the Doge that 'Lisbon is in an uproar on account of the mischief he has done, so too Castile, yet there are no signs of preparations.' On 8th March he returns to the subject of Portuguese discontent and of the scorn felt by the people for Philip's ministers and for Santa Cruz, 'who is on his way to Lisbon; he enjoys no reputation among the people, but is the object of their contempt,' for not only was Drake inflicting unknown injury, but the Portuguese coast was blockaded by English and Dutch privateers.[29] In April, when Drake was leaving Cartagena, the fleet intended to fight him was mobilizing at Lisbon, but was not expected to be ready before July.[30] On 25th June the ambassador writes that these deeds of Drake 'offend the soul of all good people, and the ministers declare they will take the affair seriously in hand, and will send a strong fleet to those parts,' which, in view of the deeds and the date, sounds quite Gilbertian. A contemporary historian, Cabrera de Cordoba, remarked more sensibly that the English success was due to the absence of a Spanish fleet, 'so that it appears that the security of these places depends upon the presence of the King's fleets . . . employed quickly, forestalling them [the enemy] and not being forestalled by them.'

Drake brought home plunder to the value of 67,000*l.*, including 5,146*l.* in gold, 34,133*l.* in silver and silver coin, 3,205*l.* of pearls, ordnance valued at 6,792*l.*, and copper, lead, bells, &c. The soldiers and sailors must also have done very well in the way of loot, if a Spanish estimate, which puts the losses at Cartagena alone at upwards of 100,000*l.*, be correct. After paying the men their thirds in lieu of wages, there remained sufficient to refund fifteen shillings in the pound to the adventurers, so that, from their point of view, the expedition was not an unqualified success. Of the ordnance brought back eighty-one pieces were handed over to Sir William Wynter to be put on board men-of-war,[31] and among other spoil were many galley slaves, French and Turkish,

[29] In January 1586 Santa Cruz wrote to Philip that 'since last August the English, without exaggeration, have injured your Majesty's subjects to the amount of more than one and a half millions'—presumably ducats.

[30] *S. P. Venetian*, 12th and 23rd April, 1586.

[31] *Chanc. Misc. Rolls*, $\frac{2}{33}$.

liberated at San Domingo and Cartagena. Two hundred Frenchmen were sent back to their own country, and the Privy Council communicated with the Turkey Company about returning one hundred Turks, and how they might be presented by the ambassador to the Grand Seignior, 'whereby their lordships are persuaded that they may both draw on greater favour and liberties unto themselves than they yet enjoy, and also procure the release of some of the captives of the English nation there.'[32]

[6] Monson was exceptional among Elizabethan seamen in that to him Spain was always a Colossus instead of 'a colossus stuffed with clouts.' He would have taken the Spanish rather than the English view of a paragraph in a 'News from Spain' of 16th January, 1586, 'the secretary and the Conde de Virata in talk did demand whether the Queen's Majesty of England did know the King of Spain's forces, and whether it made not her and her people to quake.'[33]

[7] I think that Mr. Corbett is the first writer who has noticed (at any rate Monson does not speak of it) that there was another fleet at sea in 1586 under Sir John Hawkyns. There are very few references to it because it brought home little or no plunder, although it was doubtless as effective in causing loss and disorganization in Spanish commerce as other better known and more profitable expeditions. Hawkyns's instructions were signed on 6th August,[34] and he must have been at sea shortly afterwards, as on $\frac{7\text{th Aug.}}{6\text{th Sept.}}$ and $\frac{18}{8}$ September three vessels were taken off the Portuguese coast whose masters describe him as having altogether eighteen ships, of which four were Queen's men-of-war of 800 tons each, 'like the galleons of Portugal in appearance.'[35] One of these captures, or another prize, was a Flota ship of 150 tons from New Spain, and the deposition of Francisco de Valverde, taken in her off Cape St. Vincent, and who remained a prisoner in England until the commencement of 1588, has been printed by Captain C. Fernandez Duro.[36] This man also describes Hawkyns as having four Queen's ships, and as a fact the information was nearly correct, the fleet consisting of:—[37]

[32] *Acts of the Privy Council*, 4th August, 1586.
[33] *S. P. Dom. Eliz.* clxxxvi. 20.
[34] *Acts of the Privy Council.*
[35] *Simancas Papers*, 11th October, 1586. As the Nonpareil dated from 1584, the Lion from 1582, and the Revenge from 1577, the Hope being the only old vessel of the five, we may take this as very fair evidence that the ships of the new model did not strike a Spanish seaman's eye as presenting any great difference from those to which he was accustomed, at least above water.
[36] *La Armada Invencible*, ii. p. 508.
[37] *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2223.

Ships.	Tons.	Commanders.	Period of Commission.
Nonpareil.	500	Admiral, John Hawkyns	1st August–31st October.
Lion .	500	Vice-Admiral, William Borough	1st August–25th October.
Hope .	600	Thomas Fenner	1st August–30th October.
Revenge .	500	Edward Berkeley	1st August–8th November.
Tramontana	150	Benjamin Gonson	8th August–10th December.

The remainder of the fleet must have consisted of armed merchantmen and tenders. What instructions Hawkyns had cannot be ascertained from any English source, but the Venetian ambassador in France, who was probably very well informed, wrote to the Seignory, 'the Queen of England learning that some ships had left Brittany sent Gianichi,[38] a famous corsair, with twenty-two sail, to watch their movements and to assure the safety of English shipping. But on learning that these French ships had put into Brouage and that their object was to protect that place from the attacks of the garrison of La Rochelle, she gave that corsair leave to go buccaneering against Spanish shipping.'[39] The 'War of the Three Henries' was raging in France at this time, and there may have been some intention of giving Henry of Navarre active help, or of protecting him if utterly defeated.[40] But it is more likely that the fleet was prepared with an eye to La Rochelle, which was devastated by the plague and only weakly garrisoned by the Huguenots.

[38] An Italianate version of Juan Achines, the Spanish form of John Hawkyns.
[39] *State Papers Ven.* 24th October, 1586.
[40] Strype's *Elizabeth*, iii. Book 2, cap. 3.

Sir Francis Drake's Second Voyage to the Road of Cadiz and towards the Terceira Islands, A D. 1587. [1]

Ships.	Commanders.
The Elizabeth Bonaventure.	Sir Francis Drake, General.
The Lion	Sir Wm. Borough, Vice-Admiral.
The Rainbow . . .	Captain Bellingham.
The Dreadnought . .	Captain Thos. Fenner.

HER MAJESTY had advertisements by sundry intelligences that while the King of Spain was silent, not seeking revenge for the injuries the ships of reprisal did him daily upon his coasts, he was preparing in the meanwhile an invincible army, as they termed it, to invade her at home. [2] She thereupon sought to frustrate his designs by intercepting his provisions before they should come to Lisbon, which was their place of rendezvous, and sent forth Sir Francis Drake to the same intent with a fleet of thirty sail, great and small, four whereof were her own ships.

The chief adventure in this voyage (besides those four ships of her Majesty's) was made by the merchants of London, who, after the manner of all merchants, sought their private gain more than the advancement of the service; neither were they deceived of their expectation as it fell out.

Sir Francis Drake being informed by two ships of Middleburg, that came from Cadiz, that a fleet with victuals, provisions, and other habiliments of war was riding there ready to take the first opportunity of a wind to go to Lisbon and join with other

forces of the King of Spain, by which he thought was intended an invasion for England, he directed his course for Cadiz road, [3] where he found the advertisement he received from the ships of Middleburg in every point true. Upon his arrival he attempted the ships with great courage, and performed the service he went for, by destroying all such ships he found in harbour, as well of the Spaniards as other nations that were hired by them. And by these means he utterly defeated their mighty preparations which were intended against England that year 1587. [4]

The second service performed by him was the assaulting the castle of Cape Sagres, upon the utmost promontory of Portugal, and three other strongholds, all which he took, some by force, and some by composition. Thence he went to the mouth of the river of Lisbon, where he anchored near Cascaes, which the Marquis of Santa Cruz beholding, durst not with his galleys approach so near as once to charge him. [5]

Sir Francis Drake perceiving that though he had done important service for the State by this fortunate attempt of his, yet the same was not very acceptable to the merchants, who adventured only in hope of profit, for their condition is to prefer gain to themselves before any respect of service or security to the kingdom, therefore from Cascaes he stood to the Terceira Islands to expect the coming home of a carrack, which he had intelligence wintered at Mozambique, and consequently she was to be home in that month. [6] And though his victuals grew scarce, and his company importuned his return home, yet with fair and gentle speeches he persuaded, and so much prevailed with them that they were willing to attend their expected hope certain days at the Islands. And by this time, drawing near the island

of St. Michael,* it was his good and great fortune to meet and take the carrack he looked for; [7] which added more honour to his former service, and gave great content to the merchants, to have a profitable return of their adventure, which was the thing they principally desired. This voyage proceeded prosperously, and without exception; for there was both honour and wealth gained, the enemy greatly endamaged, the merchants fully satisfied, and our country sufficiently secured for that year.† [8]

* In A is an erasure after St. Michael, 'by 30 leagues.'

† The last passage, 'the merchants . . . year' occurs only in Sl. 1.

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[1] The true list is as follows:—[1]

Queen's Ships.	Tons.[2]	Men.[2]	Commanders.
Bonaventure . .	600	1,020	Sir Francis Drake, General.
Golden Lion . .	500		Wm. Borough, Vice-Admiral.
Dreadnought . .	400		Thos. Fenner.[4]
Rainbow . . .	500		Henry Bellingham.
Spy	50		Alex. Clifford.
Makeshift . .	50		John Bostocke.

[1] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cc. 1.

[2] It should be understood that the tonnage in these lists is purely approximate. Something will be said on the subject when Monson discusses it in Book III. of the 'Tracts'; but besides the fact that, until 1582, there was no rule formulated for calculating tonnage, that of the Queen's ships went up when it was a question of dividing prize-money by 'thirds' (of which the tonnage took one), and that of merchantmen when they were hired by the Government at so much a ton by the month, or when their owners claimed the building bounty given on ocean-going vessels.

[3] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cciv. 46. This paper is a statement of tonnage, men, and shares for the division of the plunder of the San Felipe; it is, therefore, uncertain whether it represents the muster roll when the expedition sailed, or only the survivors at its return. However, as 770 men of the Queen's ships (exclusive of the crew of the Golden Lion who were mutinous) were awarded a gratuity of two months' pay when paid off, although it is not certain that the gift was not afterwards revoked (*State Papers*, ccvi. 4) the figures above probably represent the full complements. Although its deeds do not evoke mention, there was a land force of eight or ten companies of soldiers with Drake, under the command of Captain Anthony Platt (*State Papers*, ccv. 53, and ccvi. 4). Many men of the crews deserted

London Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Commanders.
Merchant Royal .	400		Robert Flicke, Rear-Admiral.[5]
Susan . . .	350		—
Edward Bonaventure	300		—
Margaret and John .	200		—
Solomon . . .	200		—
George Bonaventure	150	894	—
Thomas Bonaventure	150		—
Little John . .	100		—
Drake . . .	80		—
Speedwell . .	50		—
Post . . .	30		—
Sir Francis Drake's Ships.[6]			
Minion . . .	200		—
Thomas . . .	200	619	—
Bark Hawkyns .	120		—
Elizabeth . .	70		—
Lord Admiral's Ships.			
White Lion . .	140	115	—
Cygnet . . .	25		—

[2] Philip was not exactly silent, since from August 1586, permission, never before granted, although recommended by Mendoza in 1581, had been given to Spanish subjects to set out at Plymouth, and their places were filled by soldiers (Drake to Walsyngham, 2nd April, 1587); the desertion was on so large a scale as to induce Drake to write to all the justices at hand to have the country searched for them, in order that they might be tried at the assizes. The Act of 18 Henry VI. cap. 19, which made desertion by soldiers a felony, had been extended to seamen and gunners by 5 Eliz. cap. 5, but at this period, and for long afterwards, it did little but hold the penalties *in terrorem* over them, and did not affect their independence of action if they were content to forfeit their pay. There is a curious corroboration of Drake's difficulties in this respect, which shows how well the Spanish Court was informed, in a letter from Mendoza to Philip: 'The reason there was so much difficulty in getting men for this expedition was that Drake paid them so badly last time, taking all the plunder for himself, on the pretence that it was for the Queen' (*Simancas Papers*, 19th April, 1587). His explanation may have been wrong, but Mendoza was well informed as to the fact.

[4] Afterwards Vice-Admiral when Borough was displaced.

[5] According to Mr. Corbett (*Drake and the Tudor Navy*, ii. p. 66) *ex-officio* Rear-Admiral as commodore of the London squadron. But Robert Leng, who wrote a valuable account of the voyage (*Camd Misc.* vol. v.), says that Thomas Fenner was Rear-Admiral.

[6] Belonging to, or hired by, Drake.

privateers.[7] Moreover, although from Monson's phrasing it might be supposed that the enterprise of England was a sort of happy thought suddenly conceived, it had been really in consideration for nearly twenty years, and for the last three years had been taken seriously in hand. In 1574, but for the sudden death of Pedro Menendez de Avilés and the disorganization of his fleet by the appearance of an epidemic which, at the time, was desolating Spain,[8] the attempt, in all probability, would actually have been made. If Philip hesitated so long it was not because he was unconvinced by those advisers who urged that the revolted Netherlands were to be subjugated in London, and that England could only be conquered on the sea, but because he was always embarrassed by want of money and was still more perplexed by the questions of *la haute politique* inextricably interwoven with either the attempt on or the conquest of England, and of which a full understanding can only be obtained by studying the work of the historians who have written of the political history of this period.

However the execution of Mary Stewart on 8th February, 1587, while raising some fresh political difficulties, in other respects cleared Philip's path, the West Indian raid of 1585–6 was a warning that a power with fewer pretensions than Spain could not have ignored, the preparation of the Armada seemed approaching completion, and all Western Europe was watching for the shock of conflict expected this year, in which Spain, it was thought, would only strike for empire but England for existence, and when Elizabeth would at last be compelled to risk the fleet which, the Venetian ambassador wrote, 'is the very kernel of her power and reputation.' The Queen's measures were, as usual, undecided in intention and slow in action. Bernardino de Mendoza persistently reported to Philip that Drake was out of favour after his return, but whether or no that was the case, he was permitted to arrange with Don Antonio for an expedition to seat that pretender on the throne of Portugal, to visit the Netherlands to obtain a Dutch contingent for the same purpose, and even to open communication with the Porte by means of presents to the capitan-pasha, in pursuance of an idea of obtaining Turkish co-operation which seems intermittently to have been often present in the minds of English statesmen. The force of the threatened alliance was, perhaps, better recognized abroad than here, for even in 1584 it was thought in Spain that Philip would not embark in any enterprise until he was assured of the attitude of Turkey, then recovering from the disaster of Lepanto. But Don Antonio was thrown

[7] *State Papers Venetian*, 6th August, 1586.

[8] A spotted fever, *tabardete*, probably typhus (J. de Villalba, *Epidemiologia Española*, Madrid, 1802).

over, the Turkish intrigue led to nothing, and the Dutch refused any formal help; and although Mary Stewart lay under sentence of death during the winter months, and the attitude of France and Scotland was menacing, the navy pay-lists do not reflect any alarm by showing an increase of the few cruisers doing police duty in the Channel. However, it was decided in December to mobilize a fleet early in 1587, and Captain Robert Flicke, 'upon suit made and licence granted,' had equipped ten ships for the purpose of intercepting the outward bound East India fleet from Lisbon.[9] Subsequently Flicke's squadron formed the bulk of Drake's force, but of course these preparations did not prevent Don Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, Ralegh's prisoner, bearing with him, when he left England after an interview with Elizabeth, informal proposals for peace.[10] If the mass of English people regarded Spain with fear, Philip, on his side, was anxiously watching England and asking Mendoza again and again for every fragment of information bearing on the movements of Drake and the English fleet. In this instance the secret was unusually well kept; the squadron was rapidly collected at Plymouth in March, and even Mendoza was unable to ascertain Drake's instructions. On $\frac{8}{18}$ April, a week after Drake had sailed, he wrote to the King: 'The friend assures me that . . . no living soul but the Queen and the Lord Treasurer knew what the design was to be,'[11] and Philip's first warning about Cadiz only came with the news of the attack on that port.[12]

[9] *Adm. Ct. Misc. Bks.*, 983, No. 167.

[10] Sarmiento de Gamboa had been taken by one of Ralegh's privateers when returning to Spain to obtain assistance for the settlement founded in the Straits of Magellan, intended to prevent any more English following Drake's lead into the Pacific. He told Mendoza that Ralegh offered Philip his services and desired to sell him a ship (*Simancas Papers*, 8th January, 1587). It is very likely that Ralegh did offer to sell Philip a ship, just as Frobiser had proposed to help him to surprise Flushing, and Hawkyns had offered to bring over the English navy to him, and just as enterprising observers in the streets of London to-day offer to sell some passers by 'a little dog,' or a diamond ring. It was the early Elizabethan form.

[11] *Simancas Papers*, 19th April, 1587. 'The friend' was Sir Edward Stafford, the English ambassador in Paris, who is said to have been in Spanish pay. Major Martin Hume, the editor of the *Calendars of Simancas Papers*, considers Stafford's treachery clearly proved (vol. iv., Preface), but twenty years ago M. Forneron examined and rejected the theory that he was the traitor, and Mr. A. F. Pollard (*Eng. Hist. Review*, xvi. p. 574) has also thrown considerable doubt upon it recently. So far as we are concerned, it is sufficient to notice that the man, whoever he was, was extremely well informed, and was no doubt a Government official.

[12] Captain C. Fernandez Duro (*Armada Española*, iii. p. 12) says

The fleet, it will be observed, was made up of Queen's ships, London merchantmen, and vessels equipped by Drake and the Lord Admiral. No doubt Elizabeth found the temptation irresistible when she perceived that she could obtain the merchant squadron by a stroke of the pen and at no cost to herself. Certainly it was no moment for cruising after outward bound East Indiamen, and Flicke plumes himself on his patriotism, 'albeit to his disadvantage by altering of his pretended voyage, preferring her Majesty's service before his private gain,' although he can hardly have been the only, or even the chief, disburser in such an expensive undertaking. Whether it should be regarded as a royal fleet or as a private venture is a moot point,[13] but there is no doubt that the Admiral held the position and exercised the authority of an officer acting on a direct commission from the Crown.[14] His formal instructions are not existent, but they are substantially recited in a letter of 21st April, 1587, from Walsyngham to Stafford :—

'To impeach the joining together of the King of Spain's fleet out of their several ports, to keep victuals from them,[15] to follow them in case they should be come forward towards England or Ireland, and to cut off as many of them as he could, and impeach their landing; as also to set upon such as should either come out of the West or East Indies into Spain, or go out of Spain thither.'

that Philip had warning direct from England of the proposed attack on Cadiz, but this author is doubtful whether the notice was in time or whether it was neglected. Cabrera de Cordoba (*op. cit.* iii. p. 249) only says that Philip knew, months before, of the preparations.

[13] The question is fully discussed by Mr. Corbett (*Drake and the Tudor Navy*, ii. p. 68, 2nd ed.). With one exception, none of the Queen's ships was paid off by the Navy Treasurer, which is an argument against the official character of the expedition; in all the ventures in which the Queen took a share, but the Crown no diplomatic responsibility, the money required was paid, as seems to have been done in this case, direct from the Exchequer. The one exception, strangely enough, was the Golden Lion, whose mutinous crew were paid their wages by Hawkyns. I am unable to explain this.

[14] Drake's commission bore date 15th March, 1587. Three days later he entered into an agreement with the owners of the London ships (*Lansd. MSS.* 56, f. 175) to take command of them and share any prizes. The form of this agreement certainly implies, as we know also from Flicke's account, that the London squadron had been prepared independently, and that Drake took command, not by the authority of the Crown, but as the result of an amicable arrangement. However, the summary of Flicke's services says that Drake 'was commanded to take the said captain to attend upon him,' but the command was probably subject to a satisfactory agreement in pecuniary matters.

[15] *I.e.* to prevent the concentration of ships, men, provisions, and stores at Lisbon.

Those were the original orders, together with a particular and important injunction 'to distress the ships within the havens themselves,'[16] but while Drake was at Plymouth Elizabeth thought she saw signs of peace in a proposal from Parma, and sent off orders to the Admiral that he was not to enter into any Spanish port, not to injure any shipping in those ports, and was not to land. He was permitted to cruise after the Flota—which had not sailed, although that fact was not known in England—but was to play the Spanish game by allowing Philip to prepare his Armada in peace. Fortunately the despatch did not arrive at Plymouth until Drake had sailed on Sunday, 2nd April, and although a pinnace was sent to sea with it, her captain was unable or unwilling to find the fleet. He seems to have found a rich prize instead.

[3] According to Monson, therefore, Drake left England without any intention of going to Cadiz. It is in the highest degree unlikely that he sailed with an open mind, trusting to some happy accident to give him an opportunity, but there is no direct evidence as to his intentions and only one indirect statement bearing on the point. Borough,[17] in his protest addressed to Drake, wrote that it was the Queen's order, 'by the advice of her Majesty's Council, that you, with these ships now under your charge, should come hither to this Cape,[18] and upon this coast, and seek by all the best means you can to impeach their purpose and stop their meeting at Lisbon, if it might be; whereof the manner how is referred to your discretion.' No one but Monson, who is only copying the Hakluyt account, mentions these Dutch merchantmen, although the information obtained from them, changing, as it was said, the destination of the fleet, was surely important enough to merit notice. Leng is silent; Drake, in writing to Walsyngham,[19] to Wolley,[20] and to John Foxe,[21] concisely gives intermediate dates and says 'we arrived' at Cadiz, as though it had been the destination from the first. The preparations at Cadiz were well known in England, and especially well known to Drake,[22] who assuredly was not the man to await the pleasure of the Spaniards passively at St. Vincent. Everything points to a premeditated decision to go straight to Cadiz, which

[16] This letter was communicated to Philip by Mendoza, on 20th May, of course far too late to be of any service.

[17] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cc. 57. As Vice-Admiral of the fleet he should be a good authority.

[18] St. Vincent.

[19] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cc. 46.

[20] *Ibid.* 47.

[21] *Harl. MSS.* 167, f. 104.

[22] Stafford told Mendoza 'they had let out a few words to Drake about Cadiz being a good port to burn the shipping in' (*Simancas Papers*, 19th April, 1587).

came within the 'discretion' of his orders, although he may also have obtained confirmatory information at sea which he did not think of any particular importance.

[4] Leaving Plymouth on 2nd April, Finisterre was sighted on the 5th; a gale then separated the fleet, which was again collected by the 16th, was off St. Vincent on the 17th, and before Cadiz on the 19th. Being off the port and seen by Spanish fishing boats Drake decided to go in that evening, much to the horror of his formal Vice-Admiral, Borough, who would have had him wait for the stragglers of the fleet, hold councils of war, draw up orders, arrange formations, and, in short, work through all the punctilious ceremonial of sixteenth century warfare.[23] Like all great leaders Drake, at this time of his life, took risks, and was fortunately seconded by that Spanish unreadiness which left the port practically undefended, since only two small and weak batteries overlooked, without commanding, the harbour. Although there were a number of victualling and store ships at Cadiz, there was only one fighting ship, a galleon belonging to the Marquis of Santa Cruz; in fact there were many men at Cadiz but no ships, and many ships at Lisbon but no men. The maritime defence, therefore, devolved on fourteen galleys under the orders of Don Pedro de Acuña, while Don Juan de Vega was in chief command of the defence. The whole district was under the orders, as captain-general of Andalusia, of that Duke of Medina Sidonia who was to gain a sorry immortality the following year, but who now showed promptness and sagacity, not only in raising the local levies, but in at once sending off advices to the Canaries and to the West Indies to stop the sailing of the treasure fleets.[24] The fighting value of the sailing ship against the galley, especially in confined waters, was still undecided, and as Drake stood towards the harbour, first two galleys and then ten others came out to try conclusions. After a very short conflict they were driven back, unable to bear the English broadside fire, two of them in a sinking condition. In the meantime those of the ships in harbour that could get away ran for refuge to Port Royal and St. Mary Port on the north side of Cadiz Bay; some escaped, but most of those in the outer harbour were boarded by

[23] Borough had to admit that 'things happened reasonable well,' but thought that if 'a man of government and judgment,' who would have acted according to rule, had been in command, the town, and galleys, and the rest of the shipping might have been taken.

[24] Labores y March, *Hist. de la Marina Real Española*, ii. p. 461 (also Cabrera de Cordoba, *op. cit.*). The West Indian fleet was therefore kept back and did not arrive until October. It brought thirteen 'millions of gold' (G. de Malynes, *Lex Mercatoria*, Lond. 1622, p. 266), or about three and a half millions sterling in Elizabethan values, of which one-eighth belonged to Philip.

the English ships of the London squadron, the crews jumping overboard. All that night the work of destruction went on in firing and sinking the prizes.[24a] Early in the morning of the 20th, the Bonaventure and some of the merchantmen went into the inner harbour beyond Puntales,[25] and took and burnt the galleon belonging to Santa Cruz, there being practically no resistance, although 'the galleys made divers bravadoes.' All that day and night the destruction of ships and stores continued until about thirty had been taken, sunk, or burnt, out of the eighty to one hundred originally in the bay.[26] The Spaniards were now bethinking themselves of attack, and kept up a continuous cannonade from the shore and the galleys, besides sending down fire-ships on the tide which 'not a little troubled' the fleet. As the English 'found little ease'[27] there, and there was nothing more to do if the town, into which upwards of 3,000 militia had come, or the ports in the bay, were not to be attacked, Drake left the harbour at 2 A.M. of 21st April, but the wind dying down gave the galleys another opportunity; ten of them came out and exchanged shots for some time in a half-hearted manner, but finally allowed the fleet to anchor, contenting themselves with an attitude of interested observation until the final departure.[28]

[24a] Usually most of the ships in a Spanish port wore every flag but that of Spain. There were to be found Genoese, Venetian, Ragusan, Levantine, Dutch, Scotch, French, Hansa, and others among the vessels hired or embargoed for transport or fighting purposes. Here, only seven of those destroyed and taken are described by Don C. Fernandez Duro as Spanish or Portuguese (*La Armada Invencible*, i. p. 334).

[25] See the plan of Cadiz Bay given for the 1596 expedition in this volume.

[26] Hakluyt (*Voyages*, vii. p. 9, ed. 1886). Drake, writing to Walsyngham (*State Papers Dom.* cc. 46), says that he sank or burnt thirty-three ships and carried away four others; Leng (*op. cit.*) says thirty vessels destroyed of about 7,000 tons, 2,000 tuns of wine, 900 tons of bread and wheat, besides other stores; Fernandez Duro (*La Armada Invencible*, i. p. 334), twenty burnt and sunk, and four carried off, altogether valued, with their cargoes, at 172,000 ducats, or about 300,000*l.* now; another estimate is that of Labores y March (*op. cit.*) of twenty-six ships.

[27] Hakluyt, *Brief Relation*.

[28] Herrera says that Drake did attempt a landing at Puntal the night before he sailed. One minor result of this voyage was to prick the bubble reputation of galleys as fighting instruments against sailing ships. The Mediterranean races pinned their faith to them, and many of the English thought that to trust to sails alone against the oar was a very dangerous experiment. Hence the jubilant tone of the writer of the *Brief Relation*: 'We now have had experience of galley fight, wherein I can assure you that only these four of her

A good deal of material damage had been done, although as yet nothing likely to cause more than annoyance, expense, and delay. But the moral effect on the minds of those who still believed in the maritime might of Spain, and held that the appearance of an English fleet on the Spanish coast would have a very different ending to a surprise raid across the Atlantic, was stupefying. In April 1586, Walsyngham wrote that Drake had laid open to view Spanish weakness, because Philip was now unable to negotiate a loan of 500,000 ducats in Florence, and that the Genoese bankers had also closed their purses. Walsyngham was an enemy, but the Venetian ambassador represented a friendly State, and, outside normal national rivalries, all his political and religious sympathies were Spanish. On 6th May, when the news of the events at Cadiz had arrived, he wrote to the Seignory that 'these injuries inflicted by Drake will raise many considerations in the minds of other princes, and also of the King's own subjects.' It is not difficult to see in these words the dawning doubt of Spanish power, hitherto accepted as incontrovertible, and the suspicion whether Catholic Europe had not, in words rendered current coin by a descendant of Burghley, 'put its money on the wrong horse.' Whether or no it was due to the warnings of the ambassador, it is certain that the Venetian bankers did not become nearly so deeply involved in upholding Spanish finance as those of Genoa.

[5] By all he saw and heard at Cadiz, Drake seems to have been deeply impressed at the extent of the Armada preparations,[29] and having obtained more definite knowledge of the distribution of the Spanish forces, had at once decided to prevent the concentration of ships and men at Lisbon. There was a weak squadron under Martinez de Recalde cruising off Cape St. Vincent, and the Admiral is said to have intercepted despatches ordering the Spaniard back to Lisbon,[30] and to have made a dash in the hope of attacking him, although in none of Drake's three letters of 27th April, nor in the Leng or Hakluyt accounts is there any mention of Martinez or the attempt; nor did the capture of the

Majesty's ships will make no account of twenty galleys if they may be alone, and not busied to guard others.' In the South a belief in them lingered until 1684, when thirty-five Spanish galleys caught a French man-of-war becalmed near Elba. After a five hours' fight the Frenchman sailed away, and the ridiculous experience was the end of the galley for anything more than show or coastguard work.

[29] 'I assure your honour the like preparation was never heard of nor known. . . . I dare not almost write unto your honour of the great forces' (to Walsyngham, 27th April); 'there was never heard of so great a preparation as the King of Spain hath, and doth continually prepare' (to Wolley, 27th April).

[30] Corbett, *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, ii. p. 86.

despatch, if the original was captured at this time,[31] prevent him making good his retreat. In any case Drake replaced him, and between 27th April and 17th May he was occupied in taking and destroying coasters carrying supplies, including 1,700 tons of hoops and pipe staves, in taking forts and in ruining the fisheries. On 4th May a force of 1,000 men was landed, and marched on Lagos, but finding the town strongly fortified returned without loss. On the 5th the castle of Cape Sagres, three miles from the companion Cape of St. Vincent, a position which should have defied everything but starvation, but which was only defended by a Portuguese garrison, was taken easily, and two other small forts in the neighbourhood followed.[31a] On the 10th and 11th he appeared at Cascaes in the Tagus in defiance of Santa Cruz, who could not or would not attack,[32] and after sending inquiries and attempting to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, Drake, finding himself too weak to enter the river, ran back on the 12th to St. Vincent. In the meantime Philip, bewildered by the rapid appearances and disappearances of his enemy, was issuing orders for the desired reinforcement of Santa Cruz with ships and men by plans which had to be altered on the arrival of each courier from Portugal. At this date our dispassionate observer, the Venetian ambassador, after describing Philip's efforts to get a force to sea, wrote, 'Meantime the English are masters of the sea, and hold it at their discretion; Lisbon and the whole coast is as it were blockaded.'[33] The ambassador only perceived the general result, but did not see that as regarded the Armada the possession of St. Vincent was equivalent to a blockade of all the ports whose lines of communication it commanded. To Fenner Cape Sagres was 'a great blessing . . . we lie between home and them . . . and they cannot come together'; and no doubt every man in the fleet who was capable of appreciating Drake's brilliant strategy was determined with him to remain there, 'as long as it shall please God to give us provisions to eat and drink, and that our ships, and wind and weather, will permit us.'[34]

[31] *Lansd. MSS.* 53, f. 21, a translation.

[31a] The drawing of the attack on the castle of Sagres, reproduced here, should be examined in the light of Thos. Fenner's letter to Walsyngham (*The Spanish War*, Navy Records Soc. p. 134). Fenner may have drawn it, or it may be part of 'the plat of the coast and those places where we have landed' that Wm. Borough sent to the Lord Admiral (*ibid.* p. 143).

[32] There was an impression among both Spaniards and foreign observers that Santa Cruz was not anxious to hazard the reputation won at the Azores by meeting Drake.

[33] *State Papers Venetian*, $\frac{1}{11}$ May, 1587.

[34] Drake to Walsyngham, 17th May, 1587. Drake also wrote that with reinforcements and supplies he could prevent any concentration

concluded that a dash for prize money was the next best course, especially as there seems to have been a good deal of sickness on board the fleet.[36]

[7] Monson's version of Drake's difficulty in persuading his men to go to the Azores is not borne out by any of the original authorities, and it may be repeated that where he was not present himself Monson was only a compiler, or retailer of ward-room gossip. Provisions were scarce on board the Golden Lion, and that that should have been the case is, as has been noticed,[37] indicative of one of Drake's weak points as a commander-in-chief, but there does not seem to have been any general scarcity. Within twenty-four hours after leaving St. Vincent they ran into a gale which lasted three days and scattered the fleet; on 26th May ten ships remained together, and on that day one of them, the Golden Lion, her crew mutinous and on short commons, with the Vice-Admiral, Borough, a prisoner on board, seized the opportunity of a chase to stand away for England.[38] On 8th June,

[36] *Simancas Papers*, 30th June, 1587.

[37] *Ante*, p. 126. See also Monson's remark in Book III. that Drake, though an 'old captain,' was but a 'young general' in such matters.

[38] It is curious that Monson does not refer to the quarrel between Drake and his Vice-Admiral, which must have caused considerable comment at the time. Borough, a man fifty years of age, and a seaman of much experience, but one who had never held any important command at sea, although he had been a member of the Navy Board, as Clerk of the Ships, from 1580, was sent, like Frobiser, in 1585, as a check on the Admiral. Drake may have become more impatient since the previous year, or Borough may have been less tactful than Frobiser, but relations speedily became strained between them. Borough complained that Drake not only did not take his advice, but did not consult him or anyone else; Drake, although he said nothing at the time, afterwards accused Borough of cowardice and disobedience at Cadiz. On 30th April Borough sent his chief a formal letter of protest (*State Papers Dom.* cc. 57), intended to be respectfully expressed but, in substance, partly a demand for co-ordinate authority and partly offensive criticism. Before leaving Plymouth Drake had coupled him with Fenner and Bellingham, as 'very discreet, honest, and most sufficient'; and Borough was unfortunate in having too good a conceit of himself, in the undefined relations existing in the sixteenth century between an admiral and his immediate subordinates, and in trying conclusions with the wrong man. On 2nd May Borough sent an apology (*State Papers Dom.* ccii. 144), but on the same day was superseded and sent to his cabin as a prisoner (*ibid.* ccii. 14). He professed to fear the fate of Doughty, and if he did not incite the crew of the Golden Lion to mutiny, which was believed, but which is improbable, made no great effort to bring them back to duty when they deserted the fleet. The Golden Lion arrived in the river on 5th June, and most of the men were at once sent to prison (*Simancas*

near St. Michael, a ship was sighted, which was closed with on the 9th, and proved to be a Portuguese carrack, the San Felipe, which struck after a weak resistance, her ordnance lying so high that the shot flew harmlessly over the English ships, and most of the crew seeking safety below. Crew, passengers, and 400 negro slaves were put into a prize and given their freedom, while Drake laid his course for Plymouth, where he arrived on 26th June. The prize eventually proved worth 114,000*l.* with cargo, jewels, ordnance, &c., which yielded the Queen and the London venturers some 40,000*l.* each and Drake 17,000*l.*[39] The papers found on board her are said to have been the incentive to the formation of the East India Company, but the real incentive to that enterprise was the closure of the Portuguese markets by the succession of Philip to the crown of Portugal in 1580. As long as Lisbon was open to the English merchants it was cheaper to buy there than to take the risk and expense of working a new trade, necessitating thousands of miles of navigation, and for long years the East India Company made smaller profits than had the middlemen who previously bought at Lisbon.[40]

[8] The Spaniards must have felt rather relieved when the San Felipe was found to be the principal sacrifice, for the Venetian ambassador wrote, 'They are expecting other bad news, for it is thought possible that Drake may seize the ships from Brazil, St. Thomé, Cape Verde, Guinea, and other places.' As usual the Spanish fleet was ready when the English one was paying off, and Santa Cruz sailed for the Azores on $\frac{1}{11}$ July with thirty-five to forty sail, carrying 6,000 soldiers and 3,000 seamen.[41] He was driven back by bad weather, and soon found that his anxiety was now groundless. From Stafford, Philip learnt that it was in con-

Papers, 30th June, 1587). After the desertion Drake held a court-martial, and summarily sentenced Borough and everyone else to death, the chief witness being Captain Marchant, who had succeeded Borough and had been sent back to Drake by the mutineers. The controversy raged long after the return of the fleet; accusations and answers were bandied to and fro with no material result, perhaps because Borough, who was not displaced and in 1589 became Comptroller of the Navy, seems to have had the support of Burghley. He never again, however, held any important command at sea. All the documents relating to this affair have been printed or referred to in Corbett, *The Spanish War*, 1585–87, Navy Records Society; Laughton, *Armada Papers*, Navy Records Society; and Oppenheim, *Administration of the Royal Navy*, i. App. B. See also *post*, ii. p. 64, note.

[39] There was a gratuity given to every man present at the capture of the carrack. But see *ante*, p. 138, note.

[40] Malynes, *Center of the Circle of Commerce*, London, 1623, p. 108.

[41] *Simancas Papers*, Philip to Bernardino de Mendoza, 28th July 1587.

templation to send Drake to sea again to look for the treasure fleet, that the Lord Admiral, Walsyngham, Hunsdon, and Cobham were in favour of that course, but that Burghley opposed it on the ground that he would certainly meet Santa Cruz and there would be risk of losing ships.[42] That risk was sufficient to decide Elizabeth, although Drake was bragging publicly that he would like nothing better than to go. However, Stafford, whose informant was doubtless Walsyngham, reported that, discussing the matter with the Council, he was not so eager, pointing out that it was late for the Azores but professing readiness to go if ordered.[43] In August two pinnaces were sent down to the Peninsular coast for purposes of observation, and a weak squadron was kept in commission during the last three months of the year, but no further active measures were undertaken.

So ended the campaign of 1587. 'With reason,' writes Captain C. Fernández Duro, 'do historians maintain that there is not in the annals of England an expedition comparable to it.'[44]

[42] *Simancas Papers*, Philip to Bernardino de Mendoza, 25th July, 1587.
[43] *Ibid.* 12th August, 1587.
[44] *Armada Española*, iii. p. 15.

The first Action undertaken by the Spaniards against us was in 1588, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, General, encountered by our Fleet, the Lord Admiral being at Sea himself in person.

THE ENGLISH FLEET. [1]

Ships.	Commanders.
The Ark-Royal . .	The Lord-Admiral.
The Revenge . .	Sir Francis Drake (Vice-Admiral).
The Victory . .	Sir John Hawkyns (Rear-Admiral).
The Lion . . .	The Lord Thomas Howard.
The Bear . . .	The Lord Sheffield.
The Elizabeth Jonas .	Sir Robert Southwell.
The Triumph . .	Sir Martin Frobiser.
The Hope. . .	Captain Crosse.
The Bonaventure .	Captain Raymond.
The Dreadnought .	Captain George Beeston.
The Nonpareil . .	Captain Thomas Fenner.
The Swiftsure . .	Captain William Fenner.
The Rainbow . .	The Lord Henry Seymour.
The Vanguard . .	Sir William Wynter.
The Mary-Rose. .	Captain Fenton.
The Antelope . .	Sir Henry Palmer.
The Foresight . .	Captain Barker.
The Aid . . .	Captain Fenner.
The Swallow . .	Captain Hawkyns.
The Tiger. . .	Captain Bostocke.
The Scout. . .	Captain Ashley.
The Bull.	
The Tramontana.	
The Achates.	
The Charles pinnace .	Captain Roberts.
The Moon. . .	Captain Clifford.
The Spy . . .	Captain Bradbury.
The Hoy.	

NOTWITHSTANDING the great spoil and hurt Sir Francis Drake did the year past in Cadiz road, by

intercepting some part of the provisions intended for his great navy, the King of Spain strived by all endeavours to revenge himself this year, lest in taking longer time his designs might be prevented as before, and arrested all ships, men, and necessaries wanting for his fleet, and compelled them perforce to serve in this action. [2]

He appointed for General the Duke of Medina Sidonia, a man employed rather for his birth than experience; for so many dukes, marquesses, and earls, voluntarily going, would have repined to have been commanded by a man of less quality than themselves. [3] They departed from Lisbon the 19th day of May, 1588, with the greatest pride and glory, and least doubt of victory, that ever any nation did. But, as it appeared, God, being angry with their insolence, disposed of them contrary to their expectation.

The directions from the King of Spain to the General were to repair, as wind and weather would give leave, to the road of Calais, in Picardy, there to abide the coming of the Prince of Parma and his army; and upon their meeting, to have opened a letter directed to them both, with further instructions.

He was especially commanded to sail along the coasts of Brittany and Normandy, for giving danger of discovery to us; and if he met with the English fleet, not to offer to fight, but only seek to defend themselves. [4] But when he came athwart the North Cape, he was taken with a contrary wind and foul weather, and forced into the harbour of Coruña, where part of his fleet lay attending his coming. As he was ready to depart from thence, there came intelligence, by an English fisherman whom they took, of our fleets late being at sea, and putting back again, not expecting their coming that year, insomuch that

most part of the men belonging to our ships were discharged. [5]

This intelligence made the duke alter his directions given him by the King, but this was not done without some difficulty, for the council was divided in their opinions:* some held it good not to break the King's command, others not to lose the opportunity offered to surprise our fleet unawares, with a purpose to burn and destroy them. Diego Flores de Valdes, who had the command of the Castile squadron and on whom the duke most relied because of his experience and judgment, was the only man that persuaded the attempt of our ships in harbour, and with that resolution they directed their course for England.† [6]

The first land they fell in with was the Lizard, the southernmost part of Cornwall, which they mistook and thought to be the Rame Head athwart Plymouth. And the night being at hand they tacked off to sea, making account in the morning to attempt our ships in Plymouth.

But whilst they were thus deceived in the land they were in the meantime discovered by Captain Flemyng, a pirate, who had been at sea pilfering; and upon view of them, knowing them to be the Spanish fleet, repaired with all speed to Plymouth, and gave warning and notice to our fleet, then riding at anchor in the Sound. [7] Whereupon my Lord Admiral hastened with all possible expedition to get out the ships; and before the Spaniards could draw

* R, and B, read 'into two opinions'; D, 'into three opinions.'

† B, and R, read . . . 'judgment although his misfortunes have been often tried in sundry actions at sea; and especially that in 1582 when he was sent to the fortifying of the Straits of Magellan after Sir Francis Drake had passed it, and in the same year Mr. Fenton and Ward had an intent to pass it but failed. It was this Valdes that only persuaded,' &c.

near Plymouth, they were welcomed at sea by my Lord and his navy, who continued fight with them, till he brought them to an anchor at Calais. The particulars of the fight, and the success thereof, being things so well known, I purposely omit.

Thus much I have thought good to show the intention of the Spanish invasion in 1588. Now shall ensue her Majesty's preparations to prevent all his designs, who by her wisdom and care had intelligence of his purposes from time to time. And because she knew his intent was to invade her at sea with a mighty and huge fleet from his own coast, she furnished out her royal navy, under the charge of the Lord High Admiral of England, and sent him to Plymouth as the likeliest place to attend their coming, as you have heard.

Then knowing that it was not the fleet alone that could endanger her safety, for that they were of small power to annoy her by land without the assistance of the Prince of Parma and his army in Flanders, therefore she appointed thirty sail of Holland ships to lie at an anchor before the town of Dunkirk, where the prince was to embark in flat-bottomed boats, made purposely for the expedition of England. [8] Thus had the prince, by the Queen's providence, been prevented if he had attempted to put out of harbour with his boats. But in truth neither his vessels nor his army were in readiness, which caused the King ever after to be jealous of him, and, as it is supposed by some, to hasten his end. [9]

Her Majesty, notwithstanding this her vigilant care to foresee and prevent all danger that might happen at sea, would not hold herself too secure of her enemy, and therefore prepared a royal army to welcome him upon his landing. But it so fell out

that it was not the will of God that he should set foot on English ground, but made the Queen a victorious princess over him, with little hazard or bloodshed of her subjects. [10]

Having showed the design of the Spaniards, and the prevention of her Majesty, I will now collect the errors committed as well by the one as by the other, as I have promised in the beginning of my discourse, being one of the principal causes for which it was written.

As it was of most likelihood and reason after the duke had gotten intelligence of the state of our navy to surprise them in harbour at unawares, knowing, that if he had taken away our strength by sea he might have landed both when and where he listed, which is the chiefest advantage in an invader; yet though it had taken the effect he desired, I see not how he was to be commended in breaking the instructions given him by the King. Then contrariwise what blame did he deserve so evil event following upon it, for if we compare it with former times and accidents of the same nature we shall read that Epaminondas, captain-general of the Thebans, slew his own son for fighting without order although he overcame his enemies. [11]

It was not the want of experience in the duke, or his laying the fault upon Valdes, that excused him at his return; but he had smarted bitterly for it, had it not been for his wife, who obtained the King's pardon and favour for him. [12]

Before the arrival of the ships that escaped in this voyage, it was known in Spain that Diego Flores de Valdes was the only persuader to break the King's articles; whereupon the King gave commandment in all his ports, where the said Diego Flores de Valdes might arrive, to apprehend him; which was accordingly executed, and he carried to

the castle of Santander, where he was never seen or heard of after.* [13]

If the King's directions had been really followed, then had his fleet kept the coast of France, and arrived in the road of Calais, before they had been discovered by us, which might have endangered her Majesty and the realm, our ships being so far off as Plymouth, whereby they could have stood us in no stead, and though the Prince of Parma had not been presently † ready, yet he had gained time sufficient, by the absence of our fleet, to make himself ready. And, moreover, whereas the prince was kept in by the thirty sail of Hollanders, so many of the duke's fleet would have been able to have put the Hollanders from the road of Dunkirk, and possess it themselves, and so have secured the army and fleet's meeting together. And then how easy a thing had it been after their joining, to have transported themselves for England? And what would have ensued upon their landing here may be well imagined.

But it was the will of Him that directs all men and their actions that the fleets should meet, and the enemy be beaten as they were, put from their anchorage by fire-ships in Calais Road, the Prince of Parma beleaguered at sea, and their navy enforced about Scotland and Ireland with great hazard and loss. Which shows how God did marvellously and almost miraculously defend us against their dangerous designs.

* All the MSS. read as in the text, but the Churchill version runs, '. . . Santander, where he was not permitted to plead his excuse, but remained there, without being ever seen or heard of after, by report of his page, with whom I spoke afterwards, we being both prisoners together in the castle of Lisbon.' It would appear, therefore, that the Churchill editor had some MS. differing from those used for the present edition and perhaps of late date. † Immediately.

And here was another opportunity offered us to have followed the victory upon them; for after they were beaten from the road at Calais, and all their hopes and designs frustrated, if we had once more offered them fight, the General, by persuasion of his confessor, was determined to yield; whose example, it is very likely, would have made the rest to have done the like. [14] But this escape cannot be imputed to the negligence or backwardness of the Lord Admiral, but merely to the want of providence in those that had the charge and managing of the fleet; for at this time of most advantage, when they came to examine their provisions, they found a general scarcity of powder and shot, for want whereof they were forced to return home.* [15] Another opportunity was lost, not much inferior to the other, by not sending part of our fleet to the West of Ireland, where the Spaniards of necessity were to pass, after so many dangers and disasters which they could not but be forced into. If we had been so happy as to have followed this course, as it was both thought and discoursed of, we had been most victorious over this great and vaunting navy; for they were brought to that necessity, that they would willingly have yielded, as divers of them confessed that were cast away in Ireland.

Herein is to be noted how weak and feeble the designs of men are, in respect of the Creator of man, and how indifferently He dealt betwixt the two nations, sometimes giving one, sometimes the other, the advantage; and yet so that He only ordered the battle.

* Churchill reads, '. . . home; besides that, the dreadful storms which destroyed the Spanish fleet made it impossible to pursue the remains of them.' In view of the next sentence this is evidently an eighteenth century editorial addition.

[1] The following is the list of men-of-war employed.[1] There were also ninety-eight armed merchantmen and tenders paid by the Navy Treasurer. Professor Laughton (*Armada Papers*, vol. ii., Navy Records Society) gives a full list of 163 merchant ships employed in various capacities.

Ships.	Commanders and Period of Commission.
Ark Royal	Lord Thos. Howard, 22nd December, 1587–15th February, 1588; Lord Admiral, 16th February–25th August; Sir William Wynter, 26th August–15th September.
Victory	Lord Edmund Sheffield, 22nd December, 1587–15th February, 1588; Sir John Hawkyns, 21st April–15th September.
Triumph	Lord Hen. Seymour, 22nd December, 1587–15th February, 1588; Sir Martin Frobiser, 21st April–15th September.
Elizabeth	Sir Robert Southwell, 22nd December, 1587–15th February, 1588; 21st April–15th September.
White Bear	Lord Admiral, 22nd December, 1587–15th February, 1588; Lord Edmund Sheffield, 21st April–15th September.
Golden Lion	Wm. Borough, 22nd December, 1587–15th February, 1588; Lord Thomas Howard, 16th February–25th August. Under a master—no captain, 26th August–15th September.
Bonaventure	Sir John Hawkyns, 22nd December, 1587–15th February, 1588; Lord Henry Seymour, 15th February–13th May; George Raymond, 14th May–15th September.
Rainbow	Sir Hen. Palmer, 1st January–13th May; Lord Henry Seymour, 14th May–25th August; Thomas Gray, 26th August–14th October.
Mary Rose	Edward Fenton, 22nd December, 1587–15th September, 1588.
Dreadnought	George Beeston, 22nd December, 1587–15th September, 1588.
Swallow	Benj. Gonson, 22nd December, 1587–27th May, 1588; Richard Hawkyns, 28th May–15th September.
Foresight	Christopher Baker, 1st January–5th October.

[1] *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2225.

Ships.	Commanders and Period of Commission
Vanguard . .	Sir William Wynter, 22nd December, 1587–25th August, 1588; Sir H. Palmer, 26th August–30th September; Sir Martin Frobiser, 1st October–31st December.
Antelope . .	Sir Martin Frobiser, 14th February–13th May; Sir H. Palmer, 14th May–25th August; J. Wynter, 28th November–31st December.
Bull . . .	Jeremy Turner, 1st January–15th September.
Tiger . . .	John Bostocke, 5th March–23rd September; J. Wynter, 12th October–27th November; J. Bostocke, 28th November–31st December.
Hope . . .	Robert Crosse, 1st January–25th August; John Sampson, master, 26th August–15th September.
Swiftsure . .	Ed. Fenner, 19th January–15th September.
Aid . . .	William Fenner, 19th January–25th August. Under a master—no captain, 26th August–30th September.
Nonpareil . .	Thomas Fenner.
Revenge . .	Sir Francis Drake, 19th January–25th August; John Gray, master (no captain), 26th August–15th September.
Advice . .	Ambrose Mannington, 1st January–23rd April; John Harris, 24th April–25th August. Under a master—no captain, 26th August–15th September.
Charles . .	John Robartes, 29th December, 1587–15th September, 1588; Robert Pettiman, 1st October–31st December.
Moon . . .	Alexander Clifford, 14th December, 1587–31st December, 1588.
Scout . . .	Henry Ashley, 18th December, 1587–25th September, 1588.
Tramontana .	Luke Warde, 14th December, 1587–24th December, 1588.
Achates . .	George Rigges, 25th December, 1587–25th September, 1588.
Spy . . .	Ambrose Warde, 14th May–29th August; Thomas Scott, 1st October–31st December.
Sun . . .	Richard Buckley, 22nd December, 1587–31st December, 1588.
Merlin . .	Walter Gower, 4th December, 1587–15th September, 1588.

Ships.	Commanders and Period of Commission.
Cygnet . .	John Sheriff, master, 22nd December, 1587–14th September, 1588.
Brigandyne . .	Thomas Scott, 12th May–16th September.
Galley Bonavolia .	William Borough, 12th May–16th September.

[2] Philip did not realize either the backwardness of his preparations, even if Drake had not appeared on the coast, or the amount of injury caused by the Englishman in dislocation, delay, and destruction of ships and stores. He still intended the English expedition to sail in 1587, and on 4th September wrote to Parma, that as soon as Santa Cruz returned he would go to Lisbon, take command of the entire fleet and make straight for the Channel.[2] The purpose was known in England,[3] and two pinnaces were sent to the Portuguese coast to reconnoitre; one went up the Tagus, lay between the two castles of Belem and St. Julian[4] during a night, and seized and brought home the master of a fishing boat, who must have been considerably surprised to have found himself on his way to England when he had gone out for a night's fishing under the protection of the guns of one of the most strongly defended ports in the world. In its outline the episode suggests a piece of work as daring in conception and neat in execution as anything recorded in the annals of the navy.[5]

In August Sluys had surrendered to Parma, who now had that harbour, as well as Nieuport and Dunkirk, for the light craft which were to carry over his troops. But Elizabeth, perhaps well informed as to the condition of the Armada, and still hoping that peace could be obtained, saw, as yet, no reason for preparation, and while Philip was reorganizing with whatever of feverish eagerness lies in Spanish character, she nominated commissioners to treat with Parma, and hinted to that prince that he would do well to seize the provinces for himself with the title of Duke of Burgundy. Therefore Frobiser was watching Dunkirk with a few ships, and Sir H. Palmer was in command in the Channel during November and December, with, at first, seven vessels, of which only his flagship the Rainbow was suitable for anything more than

[2] *Simancas Papers.*
[3] *Ibid.* 17th October, 1587.
[4] See plan of Tagus given in the 1589 voyage.
[5] The two vessels were the Spy, commanded by Charles Howard, and the Makeshift, by John Tippett (*Pipe Office Accounts*, 2224). There is nothing to indicate which one went up the Tagus. Howard commanded the White Lion of the Lord Admiral's in 1588, and was probably a son or more distant relative of that nobleman (Laughton, *Armada Papers*, ii. p. 340). Of Tippett nothing is known, and his name does not occur among commanding officers during the remainder of the reign. A reward of a month's pay was given to the crews of the Spy and Makeshift.

ordinary cruising; in December the Tiger, Swiftsure, and Aid, larger vessels, were added to the squadron.

Santa Cruz returned to Lisbon in October and speedily informed Philip that the condition of the ships and the want of stores would not permit the Armada to sail. Notwithstanding constant pressure from the King and the explanations of Santa Cruz, who was compelled to send experts to Madrid to make clear the difficulties he had to overcome, it was long before Philip resigned himself to the necessity of deferring the expedition until 1588. It is unprofitable to inquire what might have happened if Santa Cruz had been able to sail in October,[6] but we see from the preceding list that in December Elizabeth was preparing for eventualities by commissioning men-of-war, and the document from which those particulars are taken shows that eighteen armed merchantmen were also equipped during the same month. It should be remarked that the preparations of November and December were made when, in appearance, Elizabeth seemed most confident about the prospects of peace. Of course the ceaseless activity in Portugal and Flanders was well known in England, nor, probably, was the correspondence between Philip and Parma entirely a sealed book to Walsyngham. According to the *Relation of Proceedings*, supposed to be inspired by Howard and official, the order to mobilize had been given about 1st November, and the fleet was ready about 20th December,[7] and, although during January, Elizabeth, preparing to trust to the commissioners going over to Parma, discharged from half to two-thirds of the crews, and the largest ships were paid off in February, the Spanish general recognized that 'the state of affairs is now so different that it is meet your Majesty should be aware of it in order that you may instruct the Marquis of Santa Cruz to come in great force.'[8] The whole of the ships in the river were to be ready by 15th March, but whether with their full crews is uncertain, and Howard unavailingly protested against the folly of leaving the ships helpless.[9] However, on 21st February

[6] Parma thought that there would have been no difficulty in crossing, 'neither the English, the Hollanders, nor the Zealanders, being then in a position to offer resistance to your Majesty's fleet' (*Simancas Papers*, 31st January, 1588, Parma to Philip). See also Introduction, *ante*, pp. 46, 47.

[7] Laughton, *Armada Papers*, i. p. 3. Howard's commission as commander-in-chief is dated 21st December. On 9th October an embargo was laid on English and foreign shipping other than coast traders (*Admiralty Court Libels*, lxi. 128).

[8] *Simancas Papers*, *ubi sup.*

[9] 'I pray God we have them when we shall need . . . . if the forces of Spain do come before the midst of April there will be as much ado to have men to furnish us as ever was.'—Howard to Walsyngham, 28th January, 1588.

the Lord Admiral was at sea with eight ships and six pinnaces. In the meantime Drake was also equipping a fleet at Plymouth, apparently intended to act on the Spanish coast, but after much delay and vacillation his orders, whatever they may have been, were finally countermanded when the commissioners went over to Parma towards the end of February.[10] Then followed the new strategical plan evolved by the wisdom of the Council, Drake's protest of 30th March, and the statement of his own views of 13th April, all previously discussed in the Introduction to this Book. The Council imbecilities, we know, fell through, and about 10th April [11] Howard was ordered to join Drake at Plymouth, leaving a sufficient force under Lord Henry Seymour to watch Parma. Drake's insistence with the Queen to be allowed to attack the Spaniards in their own waters led to his being summoned to Court early in May, and, presumably, to the resolutions of 10th May, giving Howard a comparatively free hand.[12] Howard arrived at Plymouth on 23rd May [13] with the intention that the fleet should sail to attack the Armada as soon as possible,[14] but

[10] Burghley wrote to Stafford that he would do his best to prevent Drake going, seeing that his voyages were only profitable to himself and injurious to the Queen (*Simancas Papers*, Mendoza to Philip, 25th February, 1588). Of less authority, but so closely in agreement with the foregoing as to be likely to be true, is an account in an *Advices from London* of a quarrel between Leycester, supporting Drake, and Elizabeth. 'The Queen replied that Drake had never fought yet, and she did not see that he had done much damage to the enemy except to scandalize him at considerable loss to her' (*ibid.* 9th January, 1588). The English plans were perfectly well known, doubtless through the traitor supposed to be Stafford, and all through January Mendoza was informing Philip that Drake was coming down to the Spanish coast. For fuller details, from the English side, of Drake's proposed cruise, see Corbett, *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, ii. p. 119 *et seq.*

[11] *Armada Papers*, i. p. 159. This affords another striking illustration of the excellence of the Spanish intelligence system. 'It was agreed two days ago that the admiral should join Drake at Plymouth' (*Simancas Papers*, 'Advices from London,' ¼ April, 1588).

[12] *Ante*, pp. 61, 62.

[13] There is no explanation to be found of Howard's long delay. He had not started on 29th April (*Armada Papers*, i. p. 167).

[14] Mr. Corbett (*op. cit.* i. p. 156), quoting Ubaldino's second narration, which he ascribes to Drake's direct information, thinks that the resolution was only arrived at after two days of debate. Howard had an advisory council, of which the members sworn to secrecy were nominated by himself, but he does not speak of them until 19th June, and then as if only just appointed (*Armada Papers*, i. p. 210). The council was composed of Drake, Hawkyns, Frobiser, Thomas Fenner, Lord Thomas Howard, Lord Sheffield, and Sir Roger Williams. Williams was shortly afterwards withdrawn to join Leycester's staff at Tilbury. The deliberation, therefore, if it occurred, must have been

want of provisions and contrary winds kept him in port until 29th May. At sea, contrary winds became heavy westerly gales which drove him back to Plymouth on 6th June; there he received orders, dated 9th June, not to go down to the Spanish coast but to take up the ideal position that should protect England, Scotland, and Ireland.[15] Hard westerly weather and lack of victuals kept Howard in harbour until 19th June, when he put to sea, only to be forced back again on the 21st. On the 22nd he received the Council orders of the 17th, again permitting him to act according to his discretion, and on the 24th, having obtained some stores, he was again at sea. While at Plymouth Howard had received intelligence that a Spanish squadron had been seen off Scilly, and he had been working night and day to get into condition to go out and intercept it. Seen and reported more than once it was magnified into a large fleet, although but a weak detachment of the Armada, which, ignorant of Medina Sidonia's necessity to put into Coruña, had kept on for the original rendezvous at Scilly. Again checked by unfavourable winds Howard was too late, the Spaniards having been recalled by Medina Sidonia. From the 24th June until 4th July Howard lay with the main body of the fleet in the Channel, with wings under Drake towards Ushant, and under Hawkyns towards Scilly; on the 5th he pushed out to a position midway between Ushant and Scilly, with scouting pinnaces away on either side; and on the 7th, 'at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, it was concluded to go for Spain,' the last two movements having been discussed and decided on in council.[16] The fleet ran before a northerly wind for two days, but on 9th July it changed to south-west, and Howard bore up for England intending

that of an ordinary council of war constituted from a larger number of officers, which would explain its hesitation. However, Ubaldino's statement is completely contradicted by Howard's letter to Burghley, of 23rd May (*Armada Papers*, i. p. 179), announcing his arrival and his intention 'to stay there two days to water our fleet, and afterwards, God willing, to take the opportunity of the first wind serving for the coast of Spain.' Therefore, Howard sailed into Plymouth Sound with his plan already determined, and, as it was in agreement with Drake's often expressed opinion, he evidently did not intend to reopen the matter before a council of war. The point is of some importance as bearing on the amount of credit to be accorded to Ubaldino's second version, whether or no it was inspired by Drake, as to the events happening before 6th June (Corbett, ii. p. 158). See also *post*, p. 167. Although the purpose was fixed, the method seems to have been 'deeply debated' by Howard, Drake, Hawkyns, Frobiser, and Fenner (Howard to Walsyngham, 15th June).

[15] See *ante*, p. 62.

[16] *Armada Papers*, 'Memorandum by Drake,' 4th July, and 'Considerations by Fenner,' 14th July.

to return after revictualling.[17] However, he was not to go out again on a Spanish cruise. Occupied from the 12th July, the date of his return, in the many details of administration, and especially in remanning his ships,[18] he also made every effort by sending out pinnaces and other vessels to obtain information. From first to last, in view of the persistent endeavours made in that respect, he had been strangely unsuccessful,[19] and when on 19th July the fateful intelligence was brought to him that the Armada was at last on the coast, it came, even after the long expectation, as a surprise.

When Howard sailed westward he left his nephew, Lord Henry Seymour, in command of the fleet, ultimately of some forty sail, watching Parma's ports. Acting with Seymour, and nominally under his command, was a squadron of thirty Dutch ships under Justin of Nassau, a natural son of the Prince of Orange. The States had also another squadron in commission guarding the coasts of the United Provinces.

[3] All through the winter Philip and Santa Cruz were devoting themselves to the completion of the gigantic task they had before them, but the fact that Spain was dependent, not merely for naval stores but even for corn, on foreign importation rendered progress slow. Moreover, it was not of good omen that, notwithstanding the concentration of such a fleet, the Spanish coast still swarmed with English privateers; that the possibility of Drake again

[17] Mr. Corbett (*op. cit.* ii. p. 170) reads Fenner's 'Considerations' as meaning that the English fleet was within ten leagues of the Spanish coast and within forty leagues of Coruña when it had to turn back.

[18] 'We must now man ourselves again, for we have cast many overboard, and a number in great extremity which we discharged' (Howard to Burghley, 13th July). There may be some difference of opinion about Howard's skill as a strategist and tactician, but, reading between the lines, it would be difficult to do more than justice to his fine temper and feeling in influencing his men. 'We think it should be marvelled at how we keep our men from running away, for the worst men in the fleet knoweth for how long they are victualled; but I thank God as yet we are not troubled with any mutinies, nor I hope shall not; for I see men kindly handled will bear want and run through the fire and water' (Howard to Walsyngham, 13th June). If the very ships' boys knew the condition of the casks we may better understand the sympathetic nature and natural nobility of disposition which enabled him to 'kindly handle' them, and induced them to 'run through fire and water' for him. See also the Cadiz voyage, *post*, for further illustration of his manner with the seamen.

[19] 'Both before my coming, by Sir Francis Drake, and since my coming there hath been no day but there hath been pinnaces, Spanish caravels, flyboats, and of all sorts, sent out to discover there' (on the Spanish coast).—Howard to Walsyngham, 13th July.

appearing in force had to be borne in mind; that the mortality from disease among the soldiers and sailors was continuous through the winter; and that, far from having aid from Parma for the sea passage, the Dutch were in December 1587 blockading Antwerp with sixty ships which he was quite unable to attack. As time wore on the strain on the Marquis of Santa Cruz, suffering from Philip's suspicions and importunities on the one hand, and the ceaseless difficulties of organization on the other, became overwhelming; the final blow was given, according to two contemporary historians, by Don Alonso de Leyva,[20] who stood high in Philip's favour, and who wrote to him placing the blame for the delay on the marquis. Philip, quite ready to believe that the fault lay with a single man rather than with a system, sent to Lisbon to investigate, and Santa Cruz died on 9th February, 1588 (N.S.), of a fever, brought on, it was supposed, by mortification at the treatment to which he had been subjected.[21]

His successor was the Duke of Medina Sidonia,[22] one of the greatest nobles of Spain, chosen, some consider, because expected to be more docile than a professional seaman was like to be, but more probably for the reason given by Monson. Perhaps he had declined the charge in 1586; at any rate, the lapse of time and the knowledge of the difficulties Santa Cruz had contended with had not increased his willingness, and at first he flatly refused the command.[23] The duke, whose supreme fault of loyalty in

[20] Strada and Cabrera de Cordoba. Leyva was practically second in command at Lisbon, and when the Armada sailed carried a secret commission to succeed Medina Sidonia in case of accident.

[21] According to one of his biographers, quoted by Fernandez Duro (*La Conquista de las Azores en* 1583, p. 164), his trophies included the capture of two islands, two cities, 25 towns, 36 castles, 4,753 French soldiers and sailors, 780 English, 6,460 Portuguese, 6,243 Turks and Moors, 202 galleys and ships, and 1,814 guns. He liberated 1,654 Spanish captives. As has been noticed, there was a very general impression that he was not eager to hazard his laurels by meeting Drake.

[22] Medina Sidonia seems to have been spoken of even two years earlier for the command, therefore the appointment could hardly have caused astonishment: 'Those who know think he is to be of the Council of State and General of the Spaniards should the expedition take place' (*State Papers Ven.* 22nd March, 1586).

[23] 'The force is so great and the undertaking so important that it would not be right for a person like myself, possessing no experience of seafaring or of war, to take charge of it. . . . I possess neither aptitude, ability, health, nor fortune for the expedition.' He goes on to beg that the King 'will not entrust to me a task of which certainly I should not give a good account, for I do not understand it, know nothing about it, and have no health for the sea' (Fernandez Duro, *La Armada Invencible*, i. p. 414).

sacrificing himself to the will of his sovereign has made him a useful and gratifying subject for the wit of epigrammatic historians for three centuries, finally allowed himself to be persuaded, simply telling Philip that he would try to deserve the confidence placed in him. When the new commander-in-chief reached Lisbon he found that, since the death of Santa Cruz, progress had not only ceased but things had been moving backwards. Victuals were short, and such as were in hand were becoming unfit for use, powder and shot were wanting, and boatswains' and carpenters' stores were deficient; men were still dying from disease, and those in health were deserting at every opportunity. At the same time Parma wrote to Philip that the mortality among his troops in Flanders was 'lamentable and astonishing,' that there were only 17,000 effectives left out of 28,000 or 30,000 men, and that unless money was sent mutiny would be added to his other difficulties. In melancholy presage he adds, 'It may be that God desires to punish us for our sins by some heavy disaster.'[24] As well as these difficulties in his widely separated forces, the King had to consider and guard against the possible attack of the English fleet on his unprepared Armada, a possibility he was continually warned to expect.[25] With much effort and with much correspondence the equipment went slowly forward until, about the middle of May, the duke was only delayed by contrary winds,[26] and on $\frac{19}{29}$ May the Armada began to leave the Tagus. Headwinds, against which the leewardly Spanish and Mediterranean built ships always struggled unsuccessfully, still delayed the fleet, which, a fortnight later, after having been driven south, was again only in the latitude of Lisbon. The experience at sea had brought into relief the terrible deficiencies in the putrid and stinking provisions, which it would only be possible to describe in superlatives. At last, on

[24] *Simancas Papers*, Parma to Philip, 20th March, 1588.

[25] 'The Treasurer told Julio' (*i.e.* supposed to be Sir Ed. Stafford) 'that if he had remained two days longer weeping for his mother, who had died, the rest of the Council would have despatched Drake, who would now delay until 24th April' (*Simancas Papers*, Mendoza to Philip, $\frac{24th\ April}{8th\ May}$, 1588). Burghley's mother died on 10th March. As Stafford had this direct from Burghley it seems further evidence that Howard sailed into Plymouth Sound on 23rd May, with the full intention of at once starting for Spanish waters, and, moreover, suggests that the order (or a conditional one) to do so was given him when he received his instructions, about 10th April, to join Drake. See *ante*, p. 164.

[26] By Philip's forethought the Armada was well supplied with pilots having knowledge of the English Channel (Fernandez Duro, *op. cit.* ii. p. 201), Parma having sent some to Spain, and there are said to have been some Englishmen amongst them. One pilot was a maternal ancestor of Jean Bart (Faulconnier, *Hist. de Dunquerque*).

$\frac{1}{11}$ June, the wind changed to south-west, and the duke could proceed on his course; on $\frac{13}{23}$th he was off Finisterre, but with hundreds of men down with dysentery from the foul drinking water, and his council urging him to put into a port for supplies. Before he decided a gale came on, which on $\frac{19}{29}$ June drove him, and eventually most of the fleet, into Coruña; a few vessels kept on to the original rendezvous at Scilly, and it was these that were reported to Howard and that he put to sea to attack on 24th June.[27] At Coruña the Armada officials occupied themselves in the repair of the ships, already battered, and in sweeping the country around for the scanty supplies of victuals available. Shortly after his arrival Medina Sidonia wrote a serious warning to the King, in which, after premising that the enterprise had been represented to Philip from the first as more easy than it was known to be by honest servants, that ships were missing and unseaworthy, and that at most a two months' supply of bad victuals remained, he went on to criticize his subordinates: 'I am bound to confess that I see very few, or hardly any of those in the Armada with any knowledge or ability to perform the duties entrusted to them. I have tested and watched this point very carefully.' Seeing that the duke made no exception of his flag officers—such men as Recalde, Oquendo, Bertendona, Diego and Pedro Flores de Valdes, and others—that there is no indication in his letters of any inordinate self-esteem, and that, at any rate to the present writer, he does not seem to have been an extraordinary fool, such a passage is not easily explicable unless it be that he had found his council always at odds, and always wrong, and despised them all equally. He went on to tell Philip that in the opinion of good judges an equal force would be insufficient for the task, but that now he and Parma united would be weaker than the English, and too weak for the attack on 'so great a country as England.' The tone of this letter, and sometimes the words, are strikingly similar to the one written by Santa Cruz on 5th November, 1587, and at least Medina Sidonia did not fall into he first blunder of incapable generals, that of underrating his oe. Then he begged the King to consider the matter well; the op portunity of the delay might be taken to make terms, for if the Armada were lost the kingdom would be left defenceless.[28] More hung upon the letter than either writer or recipient was aware of, more than the fate of the Armada—the future of Spain. Of course it was fruitless, and evoked only cheery encouragement and orders to proceed from Philip, but it is remarkable as coming from the man whose stupidity has served as a butt for the gibes of

[27] *Ante*, p. 164.

[28] Fernandez Duro, *La Armada Invencible*, ii. p. 134 (Medina Sidonia to Philip II., $\frac{14}{24}$ June, 1588).

commentators, unless it be easily explained on the principle that 'out of the mouths of fools wisdom speaketh.'[29]

A council of the divisional admirals held on the $\frac{1}{2}\frac{7}{7}$ June decided to wait at Coruña for the missing ships,[30] to repair damages, and renew water and other stores. On $\frac{2}{1}\frac{3}{3}$ of July a muster showed 131 ships, 7,050 seamen, 17,017 soldiers, 291 friars and hospital attendants, and about 600 other non-combatants.[31] The final departure took place on Friday, $\frac{1}{2}\frac{2}{2}$ July, before a fair wind which continued until the $\frac{1}{2}\frac{7}{7}$th, when a short westerly gale was experienced, during which some forty ships under Pedro Flores de Valdes parted company, going on ahead, four galleys had made for home or France, and a flagship, the Santa Aña, disappeared, eventually to find her way to Havre. On Friday, $\frac{1}{2}\frac{8}{8}$th, at 4 P.M. the Lizard was sighted, and at 7 P.M. the Armada was three leagues from it under shortened sail.[32]

[4] This, of course, is all wrong ; see the preceding pages and the Introduction, *ante*, p. 65.

[5] Monson, no doubt writing from memory, evidently post-dated the discharges of men in January by nearly six months Nothing is known of the 'English fisherman,' and for his most reliable intelligence, before leaving Coruña, Medina Sidonia must have been dependent on what came through Philip. The first intelligence obtained at sea was from some Falmouth fishermen taken by a pinnace on the night of $\frac{3}{3}\frac{0}{0}$-$\frac{3}{3}\frac{1}{1}$ July. From these men the Spaniards learnt that Howard and Drake had warped out of Plymouth during Friday night and Saturday morning, and that the council held on Saturday, $\frac{2}{3}\frac{9}{9}$ July, to discuss the advisability of attacking the English fleet in Plymouth was superfluous, except as an exercise in debate. However, some of the English ships had been seen on Saturday.[33]

[6] It will be observed that Monson writes under the impression that the council of the $\frac{2}{3}\frac{9}{9}$ July, of which he may have heard vaguely,

[29] Mr. Froude cavalierly explained it as timidity, although it must have required more moral courage to have written the letter than to have remained silent, as the admirals were in favour of continuing the expedition.

[30] There were then thirty-three missing (Fernandez Duro, *op. cit.* ii. p. 144).

[31] *Ibid.* pp. 199, 200. There were from 14,000 to 16,000 men in the English fleet.

[32] *Simancas Papers*, Medina Sidonia to Philip, $\frac{1}{2}\frac{8}{8}$th July, 1588. According to some accounts, while Pedro de Valdes with his squadron made the Lizard, Medina Sidonia's pilots made the Land's End, thinking that to be the Lizard, and the two fleets did not join until the 30th.

[33] *Simancas Papers*, 24th September, 1588 (Relation of Pedro Coco Calderon).

and perhaps confuses with one of the 18th which met two days before sailing, was held at Coruña. It is described by Alonso de Vanegas who was on board the flagship San Martin.[34] The admirals present seem to have been unanimous for attack; the duke objected that Plymouth was so difficult a port to enter that no advantage could be obtained from the Spanish superiority in size of ships and number of men, and that his instructions forbade him to go into any port before joining Parma. Vanegas says that the admirals came round to the duke's view. Pedro de Valdes, writing to Philip when a prisoner, says, on the contrary, that it was resolved to attack Plymouth.[35] An attempt on Plymouth had been anticipated as most probable by the Council called together in November 1587 to discuss the best methods of defence.

[7] Captain Thomas Flemyng, of the Golden Hind, whose character has long been blackened by Monson. Probably he was no better than an Elizabethan seaman is expected to be, but on this occasion he was engaged on legitimate business and sighted the squadron lying to off the Lizard under Don Pedro de Valdes. The Golden Hind belonged to Drake's division, but two accounts, although neither first-hand, call her 'a pinnace of my Lord Admiral's.'[36] Flemyng commanded the Black Dog in 1590, the Charles in 1592, and the Merlin in 1598, all Queen's ships. In 1599 he commanded first a hired merchantman, and then the galley Mercury; in 1601 another hired ship, and a man-of-war under Leveson at Kinsale, and in 1602 acted as admiral in the west for the whole year in the Merlin. With that ends his record of service in the navy, but it will be seen that he was a very respectable pirate. He also commanded the Affection in the Earl of Cumberland's voyage to Puerto Rico in 1598.

[8] The exact details of the transport prepared by Parma are uncertain, but he had sufficient in readiness if the way had been cleared for him. In March he obtained 200 Hansa seamen and pressed labourers to dig canals between Sluys and Nieuport, so that light vessels might come from Ghent and Bruges to either place unharmed by the blockaders. He is said to have had more than 100 sea-going ships[37] at Sluys, and altogether 170 vessels, some

[34] Fernandez Duro, *La Armada Invencible*, ii. p. 374.

[35] *Armada Papers*, ii. p. 133.

[36] *Simancas Papers*, 7th September, 1588. 'Relation of the Voyage of the Spanish Armada' (an English account); and *Rutland MSS.* (Hist. MSS. Com., App. 12th Report, part iv.), 'On Sunday at one in the morning the Armada was discovered by a little pinnace of my Lord Admiral's to be at Falworth' (Robert Cecyll to — Manners, 25th July, 1588).

[37] 'De alto bordo' (*Col. de Doc. Inéd. para la Hist. de España*, lxxiii. p. 333).

being of 200 tons burthen.[38] However, a much larger number would have been necessary for the troops with their artillery, baggage, horses, and transport equipment, and the figures given in these accounts probably refer only to such as were big enough to protect themselves to a certain extent.

[9] Like that of Don John of Austria and others, the death of Parma was ascribed to Philip in popular opinion.[39] The belief as to Parma's unreadiness rests solely on the reports of the officers sent by Medina Sidonia to ask assistance, and to beg him to come out. Parma always asserted that he was perfectly ready, and that Medina Sidonia's messengers were deceived by appearances.[40] On $\frac{31\text{st July}}{10\text{th Aug.}}$ he wrote to Philip that two days previously 16,000 troops embarked at Nieuport, and that the embarkation at Dunkirk had proceeded satisfactorily;[41] Parma left little to chance, and, like Napoleon at Boulogne, had made his troops previously practise embarking and disembarking. Whatever Philip may have thought he showed no open dissatisfaction, but Parma had to defend himself, if not directly to Philip, indirectly to his confidants, for some time afterwards. As late as December 1588, he wrote to Juan de Idiaquez, the Secretary of State, that since he (Idiaquez) desired 'to know the real truth as to the date when this army could have been ready to sail if weather had permitted and the Armada had performed its task,' Parma could assure him that, notwithstanding all that had been said, there were 16,000 foot on board on $\frac{26\text{th July}}{7\text{th Aug.}}$ at Nieuport, and that the embarkation commenced at Dunkirk the next day; that everything was going on without a hitch, but that the work was suspended 'in consequence of the intelligence received of the Armada.'[42] Seeing that Parma was one of the great generals, if not the greatest, of his age, and that leaders of such quality do not wantonly imperil campaigns even if they doubt the wisdom of the plan laid down; remembering also that all the evidence goes to show continuous and provident preparation on his side, there can be little doubt that he wrote the simple truth when he said that he was ready. The point of separation between him and his critics lay in the fact that he was not ready to send out his troops to be shot or drowned helplessly by the unbeaten Dutch or English, nor had he ever professed to be ready to do that.

[10] To the great majority of Elizabethans the strength of

[38] Fernandez Duro, *op. cit.* i. p. 35.

[39] Motley thinks that he was 'doomed to disgrace and, perhaps, to death,' by Philip (*United Netherlands*, cap. xxviii.), when disease carried him off.

[40] *Simancas Papers*, Parma to Medina Sidonia, $\frac{20\text{th July}}{\text{8th Aug.}}$, 1588.

[41] *Ibid.* 10th August.

[42] *Ibid.* Parma to Juan de Idiaquez, 30th December, 1588.

England lay in the army, and it was thought that if the country did really come to a death-grip with Spain the vital struggle would be on English ground. From 1583 onwards preparations in the way of mustering and training the militia were continuous, and the land fortifications were also attended to;[43] returns of the drilled horsemen and foot were frequently called for by the Government, and arrangements were made for training, 'the said chief trainers shall carry the title of corporal.' Therefore, although doubtless inferior in many ways to Parma's veterans, it is not quite fair to describe, as some writers have done, the English army of 1588 as an undisciplined rabble. The experience of the Flanders wars was reflected in home organization, which had united companies into regiments, the company being composed of one-fifth archers, two-fifths pikemen and two-fifths musketeers;[44] on the other hand artillery, drill, commissariat, transport, and weapons were very defective, and there was a lamentable deficiency in trained officers. The returns of 1577 showed upwards of 320,000 men available,[45] but the army of 1588 was composed of 86,000 foot and 13,000 cavalry, and these only on paper. Of these 48,000 were set down as trained, and Leycester was in command at Tilbury—Leycester was to measure himself with Parma—of a force uncertain in strength, but undoubtedly not exceeding 10,000 men[46] on Saturday $\frac{27\text{th July}}{6\text{th Aug.}}$, the day the Armada reached Calais, and whatever was the number of men they found hardly sufficient victuals in the camp for a single meal. Behind Leycester were the levies of the midland and the northern counties, but, had things gone well with the Armada, Parma would have crossed on the Monday and Tuesday at latest, and the whole stress of defence would have fallen on Leycester's force and the London train-bands,[47] for the troops from the north were as yet practically non-existent. We may conclude that on land, as at sea, the nation did its part well, and that on land, as at sea, Elizabeth failed in

[43] *Foljambe MSS. passim* (App. to 15th Report, part v.; Hist. MSS. Commission). In 1586 Portsmouth was completely re-fortified.

[44] Or 35 pikemen, 15 billmen or halberdmen, 30 musketeers, and 20 calivermen (Barwick, *A Brief Discourse concerning . . . all Manual Weapons of Fire*, London, 1594). The caliver was a heavy harquebus.

[45] *Foljambe MSS.* p. 9.

[46] On 24th July he had, according to his own account, only 4,000 men. Also, incidentally, he was on the worst of terms with Norreys, his second in command, and Williams, his general of horse, both of whom had experienced him in the Low Countries.

[47] There were 20,000 men in London returned for service. Only 10,000 were armed, and of these only 6,000 were trained; the 6,000 were mustered into four regiments (*Harl. MSS.* 168, f. 171).

the foresight of preparation for the critical moment.[48] When, on $\frac{8}{18}$ August, Elizabeth was declaiming gallery heroics at Tilbury[49] instead of attending to the commonplace duty of supplying the wants of her hungry soldiers and her more than hungry—sick and starving—seamen, Parma was helpless and the Armada was flying northwards, 'so as they could recover neither England nor Scotland'—and she knew it.

But to assume, as is usually done, that the destruction of Leycester's force and the occupation of London would have been the end of the war, is to ignore English character and the experience of warfare on English ground. Parma would have found it only the beginning of his campaign, and his political and military difficulties would soon have become overwhelming, even allowing him the help of a Catholic rising.

[11] Not Epaminondas. Titus Manlius Torquatus was put to death during the campaign against Latium, B.C. 340, for accepting the challenge of an enemy to single combat, contrary to the orders of the consuls, of whom his father was one.

[12] Scandal said that the Duchess of Medina Sidonia was a daughter of Philip II. and the Princess of Eboli, wife of his favourite Ruy Gomez. If the Princess of Eboli was the mistress of Philip II.,[50] there is no doubt that she afterwards transferred her affections to his bitterest enemy, Antonio Perez, and subsequently gave Philip much trouble, not allowing threats and imprisonment to silence her tongue and pen.

Mr. Froude ends his *Spanish Story of the Armada* with the sentence, 'History does not record the reception which he[51] met with from his wife when he reached his palace.' History, however, can very well imagine, since the duchess was a termagant than whom her husband had no more merciless critic. The San Martin made Santander[52] on $\frac{12}{22}$ September, where the duke landed, having been ill for twenty-five days with fever and dysentery, and grey-headed from anxiety.[53] He wrote to Philip,

[48] A council to consider the proper measures for land defence met in November 1587 (see *post*, ii. p. 267 *et seq.*), but there is no indication that its deliberations had any immediate practical results.

[49] *Armada Papers*, ii. pp. 68, 83. On $\frac{1}{11}$ August the march of reinforcements coming up from the country was stopped, and the men ordered to return to their counties; on $\frac{14}{24}$ August Leycester was directed to commence the disbandment of the troops at Tilbury (*Foljambe MSS.* pp. 58, 60).

[50] See Forneron, *Hist. de Philippe II.* ii. p. 55; and Weil, *La Princesse d'Eboli*, p. 225 *et seq.*

[51] The Duke of Medina Sidonia.

[52] They thought they were near Coruña, when it proved to be Santander (*Simancas Papers*, 23rd September, 1588; Medina Sidonia to Philip II.).

[53] In Spain they charitably assumed it to be 'a sign of much fear' (*Col. de Doc. Inéd. para la Hist. de España*, lxxxi. p. 222).

'The troubles and miseries we have suffered cannot be described to your Majesty; they have been greater than have ever been seen in any voyage before. In the flagship 180 men died of sickness . . . and all the rest of the people on board the ship are ill, many of typhus and other contagious maladies.'[84] His next letters conveyed the information that he was in bed, too ill to attend to anything, that there were no administration and no officials at Santander to help them, and he only prayed to be allowed to go home; that he had maintained before that he was not fitted for the post into which he had been thrust, and that under no circumstances and in no way would he have anything more to do with naval matters, even if the refusal cost him his head. Philip was a gentleman, if one with intellectual and moral limitations. Unlike Elizabeth, who left the victors to starve of hunger and die of disease the need for them past, the King hurried down relief of all kinds to Santander and the other ports for the defeated, and wrote to the duke assuring him of his affection, and giving him the desired permission to go home. Medina Sidonia's passage across Spain was not a triumphal one. His want of success against Drake at Cadiz in 1587 had evoked a shower of satires and epigrams of which he was the subject, and the contempt and hatred now felt for him took more material forms. Wherever he stopped he was pelted and yelled at, and at Valladolid, where he slept one night, the street under his windows was crowded with loafers, who jeered at him through the night, shouting, among other things, 'Here comes Drake! Here's Drake!'[85] Then he went on to meet his wife.

[13] This is a mistake. Diego Flores de Valdes was arrested at Santander and sent to the castle of Burgos, where he remained until January 1590, being then liberated by the influence of his cousin, Flores de Avilés.[86] In saying that he was never seen again Monson has confused him with Diego Menendez Valdes.[87]

[14] 'The duke was counselled that if he would escape with life he should come to terms with the enemy because he found himself in seven fathoms,[88] with the wind setting on the coast of

[84] *Simancas Papers*, 23rd September, 1588. On $\frac{11}{21}$ August there were 3,000 sick in the Armada, besides the wounded (Fernandez Duro, *op. cit.* ii. p. 227).

[85] *Col. de Doc. Inéd.* lxxxi. p. 219. The scoffers must have had Cadiz or general reputation in mind, as nothing of Drake's doings in the Channel could possibly have been known then in Spain. The unfortunate duke found little good will; 'the friends and servants of the duke defend him strongly with their pens, but in private they talk very differently to that which they write' (*ibid.* p. 208).

[86] *Col. de Doc. Inéd.* lxxxi. p. 233.

[87] Fernandez Duro, *La Armada Invencible*, i. p. 214.

[88] The Spanish fathom is a little less than $5\frac{1}{2}$ feet.

Zealand, and that it would be impossible to save himself in any other way. The duke answered that he put his faith in our Lord and His Glorious Mother to bring him out of danger, and that if His will was otherwise, it should not be said of him that he was unworthy of his ancestors ; and, although it was put to him as a case of conscience not to risk the loss of so many lives, he would not give ear to them, and ordered that nothing more on the subject should be said to him.'[59]

[15] Except Professor Laughton and Vice-Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, every writer who has studied Elizabethan history at first hand holds the Queen responsible for the deficiencies in victuals and ammunition which saved the Armada from destruction after the defeat of Gravelines.[60] Monson's view that the subordinates did not do their duty does not cover the case ; they could only act on the orders of the Privy Council, and while the Council was willingly allowed to remain passive it could only take active measures with the direct sanction of the Queen, and the Queen was warned and appealed to again and again, directly and indirectly. The want of powder is similarly explained, unless, like some of the victualling ships, the powder hoys were blundering about vainly trying to find the fleet.[61] But, as in the case of the victuals, Elizabeth had plenty of warning, for as early as February the Privy Council was told that there was little or no powder available in London for drill and training.[62] On 12th April, 1588, there were 112,000 lbs. of saltpetre and 12,000 lbs. of sulphur in the Tower ;[63] as the ingredients of gunpowder for great ordnance were used in the proportion of four-sixths of

[59] Relation of Captain Vanegas (Fernandez Duro, *La Armada Invencible*, ii. p. 393) Vanegas, throughout his account, defends the duke.

[60] Laughton, *Armada Papers*, Preface ; Bridge, *Nineteenth Century and After*, Nov. 1901 ; Corbett, *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, vol. ii. caps. iv.-viii. ; Laird Clowes, *Hist. of the Royal Navy*, vol. i., The Armada Campaign; Clarke and Thursfield, *The Navy and the Nation*, The Armada ; Oppenheim, *Hist. of the Administration of the Royal Navy*, Elizabeth ; Froude, *Hist. of England*, vol. xii. ; Motley, *United Netherlands*, caps. xviii., xix. ; Fortescue (Hon. J. W.), *A History of British Army*, cap. iv., and other writers.

[61] It might be thought that the English fleet was a sufficiently large object in the Channel, even before the appearance of the Armada, to be found without exhaustive search, but the victualling accounts for 1588 show that much food was useless, because the supply ships were looking for the fleet for weeks together, if the official statement is to be accepted (*Pipe Office Accounts*, 2386), but it may be that the contrary winds in June are meant.

[62] *State Papers Dom.*, 28th February, 1588 ; Ed. Stanley to the Privy Council.

[63] *Acts of the Privy Council.*

saltpetre to one-sixth each of sulphur and charcoal,[64] there was only enough sulphur in hand then for some 70,000 lbs. of powder, but this refers only to the Tower stores. On 24th July five lasts of powder were ordered for Portsmouth, five for Brentwood in Essex, and five for Gravesend, and on the 25th the Lieutenant of the Ordnance was directed to send ten *more* lasts to Downs, being apparently in addition to a previous order,[65] perhaps one of the 23rd July instructing him to send shot and powder to the Lord Admiral and four lasts of powder to Seymour. Of the two, probably the greater need was for shot; thirty years afterwards William Gorges wrote that in 1588, 'the Spaniards brought our store of powder and shot so low as that we were fain at last, after many fights, to use plough chains instead of bullets, and sent to the shore to fetch that provision to supply the other want.'[66]

[64] Tartaglia, *Three Bookes of Colloquies* . . . London, 1588, App. p. 15.

[65] *Acts of the Privy Council.* The last of powder was 24 barrels of 2,400 lbs.

[66] *Observations and Overtures for a Seafight upon our own Coast* . . . 1618.

The Expedition to Portugal, Anno 1589 [1]

Ships.	Commanders by Sea.	Commanders by Land.
The Revenge .	Sir Francis Drake	Sir John Norreys
The Dreadnought	Captain Thomas Fenner	Sir Edward Norreys
The Aid . .	Captain William Fenner	Sir Henry Norreys
The Nonpareil .	Captain Sackville	Sir Roger Williams
The Foresight .	Captain William Winter	Captain Wilson, sergeant-major
The Swiftsure .	Captain Goring	Earl of Essex, volunteer

THE last overthrow of 1588 given to the invincible fleet, as they termed themselves, did so encourage every man to the war, that happy was he who could put himself into the service against the Spaniards, as it appeared by the volunteers that went in this voyage; which the Queen, considering the great loss the King of Spain received the year past, whereby it was to be imagined how weakly he was provided at home, was willing to countenance, though she undertook it not wholly herself, to which is to be imputed the overthrow of it. [2] For whosoever he be of a subject, that thinks to undertake so great an enterprise without a prince's purse, shall be deceived. And therefore these two Generals, in my opinion, never overshot themselves more than in undertaking so great a charge with so little means, which is by some conceived to be the only cause for the ill success of it. For where victuals and arms are wanting to the number of men, what hope is there of prevailing?

The project of this voyage was to restore a distressed king to his kingdom, usurped as he pre-

tended; and though the means for the setting forth of this voyage was not so great as was expedient, yet, in the opinion of all men of judgment, if they had directed their course whither they intended it without landing at Coruña, they had performed the service they went for, restored Don Antonio to the crown of Portugal, dissevered it from Spain, and united it in league with England, which would have answered the present charge, and have settled a continual trade for us to the East Indies and the rest of the dominions of Portugal; for so we might easily have conditioned

But, as I have said, the landing at Coruña was but a lingering of the other design, a consuming of victuals, a weakening of the army by the immoderate drinking of the soldiers, which brought a lamentable sickness amongst them, a warning to the Spaniards to strengthen Portugal, and, as great as all this, a discouragement to proceed further, being repulsed in the first attempt. [3]

But notwithstanding the ill success at Coruña, they departed from thence towards Portugal, and arrived at Peniche, a maritime town twelve leagues from Lisbon, where with small resistance they took the castle, after the captain understood Don Antonio was in the army. [4] Thence General Norreys marched with his land forces to Lisbon, and Sir Francis Drake with his fleet sailed to Cascaes, promising from thence to pass with his ships up the river to Lisbon, to meet with Sir John Norreys, which yet he did not perform, and therefore was much blamed by the common consent of all men, the overthrow of the action being imputed to him. [5]

I will not altogether excuse Sir Francis Drake for breach of his promise, though I would utterly have accused and condemned him of want of dis-

cretion, if he had put the fleet to so great an adventure to so little purpose. For his being in the harbour of Lisbon signified nothing to the taking of the castle, which was two miles from thence in circumference of height; and had the castle been taken the town must by consequence yield. Besides, the ships could not furnish the army with more men or victuals than they had done, wherefore I understand not in what respect his going up was necessary; and yet the fleet was to endure many hazards to this little purpose. For betwixt Cascaes and Lisbon there are three castles—St. Julian, St. Francis and Belem. The first of the three I hold one of the most impregnable forts to seaward in Europe; and the fleet was to pass within caliver-shot of this fort, though I confess the passing in by it was not the greatest danger, for with a reasonable gale of wind any fort is to be passed with small adventure.

But at this time there was a general want of victuals in the fleet; * and being once entered the harbour, their coming forth again was uncertain, the place being subject to contrary winds. In which space the better part of the victuals would have been consumed, and they would have remained there in so desperate an estate, that they would have been forced to have fired one half of the fleet to bring home the rest. For as it was when the army embarked for England many died for hunger in their way home, and more would have done if the wind had taken them short; or, if by the death of some of them, the rest who survived had not been the better relieved.

Besides all these casualties and dangers, the

* Sl. 1 is the only MS. which adds 'in the fleet'; the others resemble the Churchill text in omitting it.

Adelantado* was then in Lisbon with the galleys of Spain. And how easily he might have annoyed our fleet by towing fire-ships amongst us, we may suppose by the hurt we did the Spaniards the year before in Cadiz Road; and greater we might have done had we had the help of galleys. [6]

It was a world to observe every man's opinion of this voyage, as well those that were actors in it, as others that stayed at home; some imputing the overthrow of it to the landing at Coruña; others to the Portuguese failing us of those helps and assistances promised by Don Antonio; and some to Sir Francis Drake's not coming up the river with his fleet.

Though any of these three reasons may seem probable enough to many men that shall but hear them, and the landing at Coruña the chiefest of the three, yet, if we weigh truly the defect and where it was, it will appear that the action was overthrown before their setting out from home, they being weakly provided of all things necessary for so great an expedition. For when this voyage was first treated of the number of ships was not concluded on according to the number of men: wherefore they were forced to make stay of divers Easterlings they met with in our Channel, and compelled them to serve in this action for the transportation of our soldiers. And though these ships were an ease to our men, who would have been otherwise pestered,† yet their

* Originally the *Adelantado* was the governor of a province, but the nearest English equivalent in Elizabethan times would have been a lord-lieutenant with high judicial and military functions. In Spain there were seven Adelantadoships, of which that of Castile, held by Don Martin de Padilla, was the greatest; the system had been extended to America by Ferdinand and Isabella, but soon died out there as incompatible with the Audiencias, in which resided the supreme authority.

† By overcrowding understood, and inserted by the Churchill editor.

victuals were nothing augmented; but they were put aboard the ships, like banished men, to seek their fortunes at sea, for by confession of some divers of the ships had not four days' victuals when they departed from Plymouth.

Another impediment to the good success of this voyage was the want of field-pieces, the want whereof was the loss of taking Lisbon, for their strength consisting in the castle, and we, having only an army to countenance us but no means for battery, were the loss of the victory ourselves. For it was apparent, by intelligence we received, that if we had presented them with battery they were resolved to parley, and by consequence to yield; and this was the main and chief reason of the Portuguese excuse in not joining with us. [7]

There is another reason to be alleged on the Portuguese behalf and their love and favour to our proceedings, for though they showed themselves not forward upon this occasion to aid us, yet they opposed us not as enemies; for if they had pursued us in our retreat from Lisbon to Cascaes, our men being weak, sickly, without powder and shot, and other arms, they had in all probability put us to a greater loss and disgrace than we received. And if ever England have the like occasion to set up a competitor in Portugal, we shall questionless find that our carriage and good entreatment of the people of that country have gained us a great reputation amongst them. For the General most advisedly forbade the rifling of their houses in the country and the suburbs of Lisbon which he possessed, and commanded royal payment for everything they took, without compulsion or rigorous usage, which hath made those that stood but indifferently affected before now ready upon the like occasion to assist us.

[1] The following is the fleet list :— [1]

Ships.	Tons.	Commanders.	Masters.	Admiral.
		First Squadron.		
Queen's Ships:				
Revenge* .	500	Thomas Drake	Thomas West	Sir Francis Drake
Advice* . . .	50	Sam. Foxcroft*	—	
Merchantmen:				
Tiger* . . .	200	J. Young*	—	
Bark Reynolds . .	—	Reg. Goldingham	—	
Prudence, of Portsmouth*	120	Riddlesdale	—	
Vineyard* . . .	160	J. Dale*	—	
Gift, of Harwich . .	—	Troughton	—	
Daniel, of Yarmouth* .	160	Ch. Piggott*	—	
Centurion* . . .	250	J. Fisher*	—	
Thomas, of Plymouth .	—	Martin	—	
Gift, of Dover . .	—	Neale	—	
Primrose, of Portsmouth	—	J. Weynold*	—	
Emanuel, of Dartmouth	—	Wilson	—	
Mayflower, of Brightlingsea*	150	—	—	
Diana, of Southampton	—	Nich. Webb	—	
Greyhound, of Plymouth	—	Crookham	—	
Susan, of Aldburgh* .	40	Clifford	—	

[1] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxiii. 76 (9th April, 1589). An asterisk indicates that the ship or commander thus noted served in the Armada campaign; the tonnage is from Professor Laughton's list (*Armada Papers*, ii. p. 326 *et seq.*). The identification of several of these vessels presents some difficulties, but it is evident that the whole strength of the kingdom in shipping had by no means been called up in 1588. In November 1587, Burghley said 'the ships of her subjects are also at this day both in number and strength, in able captains and mariners, stronger than they ever were in the memory of any man,' and no doubt if stores had been available there might have been a larger number of ships employed in the Armada year. Drake would doubtless have preferred captains who had also served that year, but he could have had little or no influence in appointing them. At that date, and for a century afterwards, owners took advantage of any urgency in the demand for armed merchantmen to insist upon nominating their own officers, with the object of keeping their ships out of any serious mischief.

Ships.	Tons.	Commanders.	Masters.	Vice-Admiral.
Second Squadron.				
Queen's Ship:				
Nonpareil* . . .	500	Sackville [2]	Robert Wignoll	
Merchantmen:				
Samaritan, of London .	—	Lilley	—	
Roger and Katherine, of Newcastle	—	Fowler	—	
James, of Ipswich .	—	Birden	—	
William, of Ipswich* .	140	Boyer	—	
Mayflower, of Yarmouth	—	Robt. Bringborne*	—	
Golden Noble* . .	250	Adam Seager*	—	
Fortune, of Plymouth .	—	—	—	
Mary German, of Lynn	—	Wm. Bailey	—	
Godspeed, of Southampton	—	Cotton	—	
Gift, of Southampton .	—	Richman	—	
William, of Lynn . .	—	Bathridge	—	
Golden Hind* . .	50	Adams*	—	
Phœnix, of Dartmouth*	70	Champernoun	—	
Red Lion, of Ipswich* .	—	West	—	
Gregory, of London .	—	A. Manningtón*	—	
Bark Taylor. . .	—	—	—	
Third Squadron.				
Queen's Ship:				
Dreadnought* . .	400	Thos. Fenner*	John Bennett	Thos. Fenner
Merchantmen:				
Edward Bonaventure* .	300	Barker	—	
Tobie, of Harwich .	—	John Cardinal*	—	
Tiger, of Plymouth .	—	Wm. Hawkyns*	—	
Pelican, of Aldburgh .	—	Appleton	—	
William, of Wells. .	—	Madely	—	
Crescent, of Dartmouth*	140	Gifford	—	

[2] Qy. Hen. Saville.

Ships.	Tons.	Commanders.	Masters.	—
Solomon, of London* .	200	Jas. Lancaster*	—	
Susan, of Blakeney .	—	Whitehand	—	
Bartholomew, of Exmouth*	130	Rainsford	—	
William and Joan, of Lynn	—	Kelley	—	
Antelope, of Plymouth .	—	Grenville Haulse*	—	
Nightingale, of Plymouth*	160	Triggs	—	
White Lion* . .	140	Herwell	—	
Relief, of Portsmouth .	—	—	—	
Tiger, of Leigh . .	—	Jobson	—	
Fourth Squadron.				
Queen's Ship:				
Swiftsure* . . .	400	Goring [3]	Robert Hart	
Merchantmen:				
Tobie, of London* .	250	Osborne	—	
Hopewell* . . .	200	Wyld	—	
Gift, of Dartmouth .	—	A. Gifford	—	
Greyhound, of Aldburgh*	160	Pullison	—	
Charity, of Newcastle .	—	Ant. Potts*	—	
Minion, of Fowey. .	—	Atkins	—	
Valentine, of Blakeney.	—	Endick	—	
Bark Sellinger* [4] . .	160	J. Sellinger	—	
Antelope, of Lynn .	130	Burwood	—	
John Truelove . .	—	Geo. Drake	—	
George Bonaventure, of Blakeney*	200	Barker	—	
Handmaid, of Bristol* .	80	Laughton	—	
Edward, of Chicester .	—	Edward Fenner*	—	
Grace of God, of London	—	—	—	
Fifth Squadron.				
Queen's Ship:				
Foresight* . . .	300	Wm. Wynter*	Roger Talent	

[3] Qy. Walter Gore. Gore and Saville commanded men-of-war in other years, while the names Sackville and Goring do not appear in the pay lists.

[4] St. Leger.

Ships.	Tons.	Commanders.	Masters.	—
Merchantmen:				
Merchant Royal*. .	400	Robt. Flicke*	—	
Elizabeth, of Yarmouth	—	Musgrave*	—	
Minion, of Plymouth* .	200	Crisp	—	
Mayflower, of Lynn* .	150	Alex. Musgrave*	—	
Seraphine, of Dartmouth	—	Norwood	—	
Bark Bonner, of Plymouth*	120	Vaughan	—	
Reuben, of Dover .	—	—	—	
Unicorn, of Bristol* .	130	Robt. Johnson*	—	
Francis, of Fowey* .	140	Dyer	—	
William, of Plymouth*.	120	Cross	—	
Bark Hawkyns* . .	120	Josias	—	
Bark Parnell, of Brightlingsea	—	—	—	
Hart Anne, of Chatham*	60	Heron	—	
John, of Newhaven .	—	—	—	
William, of Ipswich* .	140	Forth	—	
Unity, of London* .	—	—	—	

There was also 'The Aid of her Majesty's,' Wm. Fenner, captain and Rear-Admiral. Richard Burnet, master, 'being appointed rear-admiral is left out of the squadrons in that it doth appertain to the captain, Wm. Fenner's office to see every squadron observe their prescribed orders.' To each squadron was attached a certain number of the sixty Dutch flyboats seized by Drake in March,[5] so that the fleet contained about eighty-three English and sixty Dutch ships.

The organization into squadrons seemed, perhaps, an improvement on the unwieldy fleets of 1588. themselves but little advance on the fleet division into 'battle,' or centre, and 'wings,' or vanguard and rearguard of the preceding centuries.[6] Each squadron had its colonel and staff on the model of an army regiment, or modern brigade, although, as three of the squadrons were under

[5] *Post*, p. 192.

[6] Howard's fleet had been divided into four divisions under himself, Drake, Frobiser, and Hawkyns, in the course of the fight up Channel the preceding year. Professor Laughton informs me that the allied fleet at Lepanto in 1571 was divided into squadrons with distinguishing colours.

the command of army officers, it is not clear what was to happen when, as would certainly be the case, land and sea officers found themselves in opposition. Who was the originator of this curious scheme is not manifest, but it was fortunate that 'the squadroning of the fleet set down by the two Generals at Plymouth . . . in the whole process of the service no more put in any use from the first day of our setting sail . . . than if never there had been any such matter thought of.'[7] It smacks more of the formal Low Countries' wars and of Spanish circumlocution than of the sea, but Drake must have agreed to, and perhaps approved of, it since a book, 'fair written,' containing the full details of the squadrons, and the officers and the duties allotted to them, was sent up to the Privy Council by the two Generals. The last muster taken before sailing, on 8th April, showed a total of 17,390 troops, 1,500 volunteers and their servants, 290 pioneers, 3,200 English, and 900 Dutch seamen.[8] Mr. Corbett[9] thinks that these numbers were purposely exaggerated by the Generals, who were pressing the Queen for victuals and money, and prefers Captain Antony Wingfield's estimate of 11,000 troops and 2,500 seamen.[10] Wingfield, however, was obviously a partisan of Drake and Norreys, and endeavoured to magnify their successes and minimize their losses; and it is to be considered that any attempt, which would certainly have become known afterwards, to influence the action of the Queen and Council by knowingly sending false returns would have had very unpleasant results eventually for the Generals.[11] The staff was highly organized in accordance with, or perhaps in advance of, the latest continental models, and was formed of Captain Thos. Wilson as sergeant-major; Captain Peter Crispe, provost-marshal; Marmaduke Darell, surveyor-general of victuals; Captain Dethick, quartermaster-general; Ralph Lane, muster-master; Captains York, Edward Cromwell, and James

[7] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxv. 42. The writer, Ralph Lane, muster-master of the fleet, apparently regretted that the scheme was still-born.

[8] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxiii. 74.

[9] *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, ii. p. 300.

[10] Hakluyt, *Selection of Curious . . . . Voyages*, ed. 1812, p. 779. The tract was ascribed by the late Dr. Grosart, who edited a reprint of it, to a certain Robert Pricket, a follower of the Earl of Essex, but it is certainly by Wingfield (*State Papers Eliz.* ccxxix. 16).

[11] William Fenner says 21,000 men (Birch, *Bacon Papers*, i. p. 58); Captain William Bailey, of the Mary German, supposed that there were 20,000 soldiers on 7th April (Lodge, *Illustrations of British History*, ii. p. 355). If a later paper (*State Papers*, ccxxx. 12, 18th January, 1589-90) may be accepted, there were 12,412 officers and men mustered at Plymouth, of whom 1,100 'lost and strayed' at that place, and 1,900 returned to France and England in the ships which deserted the fleet (*post*, p. 200).

Spencer, as lieutenants of horse, foot, and ordnance respectively; Sir James Halls, treasurer; and Anthony Ashley as the Queen's secretary at war with the army. The divisional commanders were Walter Devereux, general of horse, Sir Roger Williams, colonel-general of foot, and Sir Edward Norreys, general of artillery.[12] The naval arm also had its staff, conforming to its squadronal arrangement, of captains, lieutenants, and corporals of the watch, treasurer, surveyor, and master of ordnance of the navy, &c.,[13] but these offices, like the division into squadrons, were, there is little doubt, only nominal.

A Spanish historian says that the proportion of musketeers among the troops was larger than had been usual, and that the pikemen were furnished with longer pikes than had hitherto been supplied.[14] If this statement be correct, and although there is no English information on the subject there seems no reason to doubt it, we may see here the influence of the Low Country officers, the first Englishmen trained in scientific warfare since the Hundred Years' War.

[2] On 22nd October, 1588, the Venetian ambassador at Madrid wrote home that 'no small trouble would arise now if Drake should take the sea and sail to meet the Peruvian fleet, or make a descent on the shores of Spain, where he would find no obstacle to his depredations, and might even burn a part of the ships that have come back.' Apparently the ambassador had no particular knowledge, and was relying only on the shrewdness that makes his forecasts and criticisms so valuable to the historian. But Philip had already been warned from London that an expedition to Portugal under Drake and Don Antonio was in the air.[15] Although the extent of the blow to the power and prestige

[12] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxiii. 74. [13] *Ibid.* 55.

[14] Herrera, *Historia General*, iii. p. 170.

[15] *Simancas Papers*, 25th September (O.S.), 1588. In 1578 Don Sebastian, King of Portugal, disappeared from human knowledge at the battle of Alcazarquivir, and was succeeded by his uncle the Cardinal Henry, who died childless in 1580. Besides Philip II. there were two native claimants, both descended from Don Manoel, grandfather of Sebastian: one, the Duchess of Braganza, daughter of Don Manoel's elder son, the other Don Antonio, prior of Ocrato, whose father was reputed to be Don Luis, Manoel's second son, but who was generally supposed to be the offspring of one Hermand Alvarez, a Lisbon merchant (*Col. de Doc. Inéd.* lxxxi. p. 247). Fortune was on the side of the strongest battalions, and Alva by land and Santa Cruz by sea soon reduced Portugal to subjection, although all that was patriotic in the kingdom rallied round Don Antonio. Lisbon was taken on 28th July, 1580, and after months of struggle and proscription Antonio gave up the contest and fled first to France, and then, in July 1581, to England. Here he was welcomed and made much of, not merely because he had brought many of the crown jewels of Portugal with him,

of Spain was not yet realized, it was only natural, and was obviously politic, to follow up the defeat by an attack on Spanish territory which would prevent any immediate recovery, and might, if completely successful, altogether disorganize the empire. For such a purpose no more valuable instrument existed than the Portuguese pretender if, as was currently believed, all classes of his countrymen were devoted to him and ready to rise in his support. To tear Portugal from Philip would not merely place a ceaseless and vigilant enemy on his flank, but would deprive his treasury of the profits of the Portuguese East India trade and his navy of the Portuguese carracks, the very mainstay of such sea-power as he possessed. An immediate consequence of the reconquest of Portuguese independence would have been the fall of the Azores, the ocean crossing commanding the East

but as a valuable card in the game against Philip. However he got little practical help, and found his jewels disappearing under the dexterous manipulation of accounts practised by Elizabeth, Walsyngham, and Leycester, although in August a squadron under Drake and Hawkyns was actually ready for sea to go with him to the Azores, where his authority was still recognized. The sailing was stopped at the last moment because Elizabeth could not obtain the active co-operation of France, and feared 'to be left alone' by her prospective mother-in-law, Catherine de Medici, when irretrievably committed to war with Spain. Don Antonio went back to France, where Catherine de Medici was good enough to resign her own claim to the crown of Portugal in his favour, and helped him to fit out expeditions in 1582 and 1583 to strengthen his hold on the Azores, of which Terceira still held out for him, but both fleets were annihilated by Santa Cruz. He drifted back to England, and in 1583 and 1584 was negotiating with the Porte for assistance; in 1585–6 there was some talk of letting Drake sail under his flag, and he was living under Drake's patronage at the Admiral's Devonshire home, and in 1587 his name was again in men's mouths as the purpose or excuse of an expedition. In 1588 only one of his jewels remained to him, the greatest of all, now known in the Russian Imperial crown as the Sancy diamond, from the name of the person to whom he pledged it, and with the money thus obtained Don Antonio came to England to purchase Elizabeth's help (Hume, *The Year after the Armada*, p. 17). But there is no trace of any of Don Antonio's money having been applied to the avowed purpose of the expedition, however much may have gone in bribes, and it was more probably his fortune that occasion and political interest coincided. Don Antonio is described as 'under the middle height, with a thin face and very dark, the hair and beard being somewhat grey and the eyes green' (*Simancas Papers*, 26th June, 1581). Nothing in the Pretender's career gives the impression that he would have been equal to an opportunity, however favourable, and he never discovered that his closest confidants were in Philip's pay, and the source of some of the King's most trustworthy information. Philip frequently negotiated his decease, but Don Antonio nearly succeeded in outliving his clumsy opponent, dying in Paris in August 1595.

and West Indian trade routes, from the Spanish Crown; and there can be little doubt that the entire success of the 1589 expedition would have meant a very early termination of the war. So far, then, both purpose and time were happily chosen, for it is clear that to have attempted to transport a large landing force before 1588, in face of the undefeated Spanish navy, would have been committing in an exaggerated form the blunder of which modern critics accuse Philip.[16] For the time being the command of the sea had been obtained; it was necessary to use it in such a way as would convert a possibly temporary advantage into a permanent supremacy.

Unfortunately a plan, which required for its successful execution that it should be carried out with all the resources of the Crown, was turned over for accomplishment to the handling of a joint-stock company in which Drake and Sir John Norreys were the principals, as they were to be the leaders in the field. It is uncertain which of them formulated the scheme,[17] and the reasons inducing them to carry out, with insufficient resources and at their own risks, that which should have been a national undertaking are equally doubtful.[18] It is, perhaps, correct to assume that Elizabeth refused to incur the expense necessary to perform completely a design, the full importance of which she was incapable of understanding, and thought that the object she had chiefly in view—the destruction of the remains of the Armada—could quite well be effected on the limited liability principle with the off-chance that Don Antonio might be restored, and the Azores seized, for the same money. If that is so it is easy to understand why Drake, eager again on any terms to maul the Spaniards, and fearing that a large royal fleet, and royal troops, would mean courtiers in command, should fall in with the private adventure system, although he must have known that the real fighting force of ships allowed him was absolutely inadequate, and that the pecuniary resources available were unequal to the proper equipment and provisioning of his troops, since, landing

[16] On 14th June, 1588 (Laughton, *Armada Papers*), Howard wrote to Walsyngham, that the Spanish wiles in spinning out the peace negotiations might be answered by supporting Don Antonio in Portugal, and thus finding Philip occupation at home, 'which we might easily do.' Howard's conception of the use and limits of sea-power was not always well informed, and it was even less excusable in him than the similar proposal of the Privy Council (*ante*, p. 58).

[17] Mr. Corbett thinks it was Drake; Major Hume that it was Norreys. Norreys precedes Drake in their joint commission.

[18] Mr. Corbett thinks that the motive moving Drake was the desire to escape 'a high-born commander over him and the Council's apron-strings' (*op. cit.* ii. p. 295). But neither Drake nor anyone else would escape Elizabeth and the Council so long as they knew where to address despatches to him.

in what was supposed to be a friendly country although held by an enemy, he was debarred from making war support war.

Elizabeth subscribed 20,000*l.*, provided seven men-of-war, and undertook various other obligations in the shape of supplies of victuals, arms, and siege guns, some of which she did not properly fulfil; Drake and Norreys, by themselves and their friends, engaged to find 20,000*l.* each. At first subscriptions came in freely, but as the enthusiasm wore off and preparations lagged many of the subscribers withdrew,[19] and reports of intrigues at Court to the injury of the expedition did not improve its prospects. Years afterwards Essex claimed that it was due to his influence that the enterprise was finally carried out: 'I engaged my means, kinsfolk, friends and followers, else neither the adventure had been made up nor the journey performed.'[20] The Generals were permitted to recruit freely in England for their army, and in January were assisted by an order from the Council that no person holding their certificate was to be arrested, but the ragged condition and debauched character of their volunteers came into unpleasant prominence.[21] The backbone of the military force was intended to be 600 English cavalry, and thirteen companies of English infantry, from the Low Countries, besides ten companies of Walloons;[22] but either because the States objected to their armies being so far weakened, or from similar fears on the part of the English Government, no cavalry came over, and only six English and six Walloon companies of foot. As usual, Philip was well advised of English proceedings, and in a despatch of $\frac{26\text{th Oct.}}{5\text{th Nov.}}$, he carefully underlines a warning to be careful of the ships in Spanish ports, 'especially Coruña, as they are determined to send and burn them.'[23] All through December and January he was receiving similar intelligence, and early in February Mendoza wrote that the fleet would be ready by the middle of the month—which, in fact, was the date originally intended—and that it was common talk that the destination was Portugal.[24]

[19] Wingfield says to the amount of 10,000*l.* Camden (*Annals*) says that there were not so many shares taken as was expected. Several influential subscribers seceded.

[20] *Apology of the Earl of Essex.*

[21] *Acts of the Privy Council*, 28th January, 1588. 'Base, disordered persons,' Wingfield calls them, and many of them 'the scum and dregs of their country.'

[22] Men belonging to South Brabant, Hainault, Western Luxembourg, and the adjoining districts.

[23] *Simancas Papers*, 5th November. 1588.

[24] *Ibid.* $\frac{26\text{th Jan.}}{5\text{th Feb.}}$, 1589. One explanation of the way the intentions leaked out may no doubt be found in the news sent by another informant that not three members of the Council were in accord with one another, 'Amongst others there is a great quarrel between the

Again, in March, he was told that the principal object was the Spanish fleet, and this time the King writes a marginal note: 'It will be well to give notice of this to Coruña and Santander. I see that this is what they are most likely to attempt.'[25] Although, eventually, both Coruña and Lisbon, especially the latter, were insufficiently defended, it will be seen that the attacks were no surprise, and that Philip's weakness was due to the lack of armed strength in Spain itself and the inherent feebleness of the administrative system. A still more precise piece of information was forwarded from London in March, by one Manuel de Andrada, to whom Don Antonio gave his closest confidence, that the English army would land—where afterwards it actually did land—at Peniche, and the same informant also gave the details of the agreement entered into by the pretender with Drake and Norreys on behalf of the English Government.[26] According to this man Don Antonio undertook to pay 400,000 crowns within three months, and also to pay the soldiers within the same time; to do this he was willing to seize the merchandize and church plate of his future kingdom. In the English records[27] is an agreement by which Don Antonio promised to reimburse the whole cost of the expedition to the adventurers, and to give each officer and soldier three months' pay within ten days of landing; if the troops remained in Portugal longer than three months they were to be paid month by month in advance. There is still another version of the compact by which the would-be king made Portugal practically an English province.[28] Not only did he engage to pay Elizabeth 5,000,000 ducats within two months, but also 300,000 ducats a year for ever, free trade for the English

Earl of Essex and Walter Ralegh, and between the Lord Admiral and Drake' (*ibid.* ¾ February). It was quite true; in fact, Essex challenged Ralegh in December 1588, an incident to be borne in mind in reading the 1596 and 1597 voyages. An onlooker wrote to Anth. Bacon at this time that 'there was never in the Court such emulation, such envy, such backbiting, as is now' (*Add. MSS.* 4109, f. 354; Birch transcripts).

[25] *Simancas Papers*, $\frac{\text{20th Feb.}}{\text{2nd Mar.}}$, 1589.

[26] *Ibid.* March 1589, vol. iv. No. 516. Manuel de Andrada writes that he was present at Drake's house when the contract was translated.

[27] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxii. 99.

[28] From the diary of a Spanish resident in Lisbon; quoted by Major Martin Hume (*The Year after the Armada*, pp. 11, 18 *et seq.*). See also Corbett (*op. cit.* ii. p. 308), who considers this agreement 'a transparent trick to prejudice the Portuguese against the pretender.' The Venetian ambassador also sent the Seignory a similar account of the conditions, obtained, he said, from an English gentleman who deserted the army at the end of the expedition. Herrera (*Hist. General*) also quotes the articles, but hints that he has doubts about them.

to the East Indies, all the Portuguese fortresses to be occupied by English garrisons maintained at the charge of the Portuguese Crown, English fleets to fit out in Portuguese ports, and all Portuguese bishoprics and archbishoprics to be filled by English Roman Catholics, together with various other privileges, such as a twelve days' sack at Lisbon for the English army. No doubt Don Antonio, like most aspirants to a crown, was willing to promise much, but it is difficult to believe that he submitted to conditions which would have destroyed any possibility of a permanent restoration. However it is quite likely that there were some secret clauses added to his agreement, and the Spanish diarist may well have magnified or perverted them into the version he gives.

Even Drake's energy was unsuccessful in overcoming the delays he met with from his own Government, the States, and his commercial associates, and it was not until 16th March, 1589, that he sailed westward from Dover for the final preparations at Plymouth. His action on that day shows that he must have been in difficulties for transports for his troops, since on leaving Dover roads he pounced upon a fleet of sixty Dutch flyboats,[29] sailing, unluckily for themselves, through the Straits of Dover, and bound, mostly in ballast, to Brouage for salt. But for this fortunate meeting it is difficult to see how the expedition could have proceeded with the limited pecuniary and other resources Drake had at command.[30] He did not trouble himself about the international aspect of the matter, but wrote to Walsyngham that there was no better fleet to be found in all Europe as transport.[31] About the 20th March the Generals thought themselves ready, although, as they were using the ships' stores of victuals, the country round being denuded of supplies, and lacked surgeons,[32] field transport, and the twelve siege guns promised, their ideal of equipment was not extraordinarily high. On 3rd April

[29] The Dutch Government afterwards claimed 5,019*l.* as due to the masters and crews of 44 ships seized (*Acts of the Privy Council*, 16th April, 1590), but there may have been others whose dues had been paid.

[30] Between 11th October, 1588, and 6th April, 1589, 45,135*l.* 16*s.* had been disbursed in preparations. Only 28,760*l.* 18*s.* had been received from the subscribers (*State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxiii. 64).

[31] *S. P. Dom. Eliz.* ccxxiii. 24. Drake appears to have expected this fleet to pass, and made the confession of some of the masters, that a few were bound for Spain, the excuse for seizing them (The Portugal Voyage, by J. Evesham, *Harl. MSS.* 167).

[32] Wingfield says the want of surgeons was the fault of the captains, whose duty it was to provide them for their companies. Except as having a depressing mental effect on the wounded, the lack of sixteenth century surgical skill was not a misfortune for them.

they wrote to the Council that contrary winds had detained them for a fortnight, that they only had provisions in the fleet to serve until 10th May, and begged that if they failed from want of victuals the fault was not to be imputed to them.[33] Yet they were quite satisfied, 'there was never army in better order than this,' and they lightheartedly anticipated supplying themselves—without cavalry—from the harvest in Spain and Portugal.[34] Elizabeth had undertaken to victual the fleet while it was detained by contrary winds, but in their letters Norreys and Drake seem to press this claim but lightly until 8th April, when Norreys, after nearly three weeks of delay, wrote to Walsyngham that if the Queen did not perform her part of the contract 'the voyage will assuredly fail.'[35] Not the least of the Generals' troubles was one connected with Elizabeth's sentimental weakness for Essex. On Sunday, 6th April, Sir Francis Knollys came spurring down with news that the earl had suddenly left the Court to join the fleet, and Elizabeth was much more interested in recovering the victim of her elderly charms than in the needs of the army. Sir Francis Knollys was followed by the Earl of Huntingdon, but the Swiftsure, with Essex on board, had put to sea from Falmouth the night Knollys arrived, and took care to keep at sea. If the two Generals were only possibly sincere in begging the Queen to believe they had no knowledge of the escapade, they were doubtless earnestly truthful in assuring her that Essex would be of more use to them at Court than at sea. On 7th April the wind came fair, and the fleet streamed out, but only to be forced to return again by renewed unfavourable weather. The masters of the Dutch ships took advantage of the respite to enter a formal protest; they were in enough misery, they said, at Plymouth from want of provisions, 'how much more if we were at sea'; if they were not released they would all leave their ships, and the Generals would have 'to answer it to God, the world and our owners.' Five days later they descend to a petition which, *inter alia*, throws a suggestive light on the character and discipline of the troops. After pointing out that their detention was contrary to the *Intercursus Magnus* of 1495, they complained that their ships were full of soldiers, 'and no victuals to sustain them for such a voyage . . . disorders and injuries which be daily done and offered unto us and companies, not in a manner as if we were friends but mere enemies.'[36] They begged that if the ships

[33] *S. P. Dom. Eliz.* ccxxiii. 59.

[34] *Ibid.* 60. Weapons also seem to have been short; they had arms for 16,000 men (*ibid.*).

[35] *Ibid.* 73.

[36] Evesham (*Harl. MSS.* 167, f. 113) says that discipline was very strict at Plymouth, the men being drilled every day, and a court of guard kept in the market-place for the administration of martial law,

were retained, the men, at least, might be allowed to go, as they would rather lose their ships than 'go to sea without victuals or hope of provision, and so famish there.'[37] The outlook must have been very dark if these Dutch skippers were willing to sacrifice everything to escape, not fighting, but merely acting as transports for troops. At last, on 18th April, the fleet was able to leave Plymouth, and on the same day, in compliance with repeated prayers, the Council gave the Plymouth civic authorities orders to prepare a month's victuals. The Generals left directions that the supplies were to be sent after them, but on 25th April the Mayor of Plymouth and his coadjutors wrote to Burghley that provisions were scarce and could not be obtained at the prices allowed.[38] On 24th April the fleet appeared at Coruña, where, according to the Venetian ambassador, Drake's arrival took the Spaniards after all by surprise: 'The Governor of Galicia, who resides at Coruña, was attending to private matters. . . . The soldiers, as happens in time of peace, had left their quarters and their arms, and were scattered all over the country.'[39] Yet even before Drake sailed Philip must have received advices from England, dated $\frac{8}{18}$ April, repeating that the first object of the expedition was to destroy the remains of the Armada, the second to land in Portugal, and the third, if the second was found impracticable, an attack on commerce. It was the last warning.

[3] With the departure of the fleet commences the consideration of the obscure points of the conduct of the expedition, over which opinion was divided during Drake's lifetime, and about which discussion still continues. The two chief subjects of debate are the attack on Coruña, and Drake's failure to go up the Tagus in support of the land force marching on Lisbon. We may all agree with Monson that the waste of fifteen days at Coruña was a disastrous blunder—seeing that if the object of the enterprise was the destruction of the remains of the Armada, there was only one Armada ship in that port, and that if its purpose was to reinstate Don Antonio, time and strength were

'which kept the people in good obedience.' Evesham was on board the Gregory, probably as a volunteer, and was no doubt the John Evesham who was privateering for Ralegh in 1586, and voyaged to Egypt in 1587 (Hakluyt, vii. p. 5; xi. p. 44). Ralegh's venture in 1586 consisted of two pinnaces of 35 and 50 tons. Among the Azores they fell in with a Spanish fleet of twenty-four large ships, including two carracks of 1,000 and 1,200 tons, but the two pinnaces engaged the whole fleet and, far from fearing any unfortunate result, Evesham complains, with an evident feeling of injury, that 'we could not take any one of them' because the powder gave out.

[37] *S. P. Dom. Eliz.* ccxxiii. 79, 87; 9th and 14th April.

[38] *Ibid.* 91, 95, 100.

[39] *State Papers Ven.* $\frac{8}{18}$ May, 1589.

being squandered on the reduction of a town of no strategical value for that purpose; but it is less easy to apportion the blame and decide whether Drake went to Coruña in obedience to orders, against orders, or, being granted a free hand, in the exercise of his discretion and deceived by false information.

Unhappily the documentary evidence is both incomplete and contradictory; the Instructions, on which we should mainly rely, is a draft with many erasures and interlineations, and both from its date and character does not necessarily or even probably represent the ultimate orders;[40] the letters, documents, replies, exculpations, &c., will be found to be almost hopelessly inconsistent. The Instructions are dated 23rd February, 1589, and, even if the corrected draft shows the intentions of the Queen and Council on that day, if no alteration was made in them between that date and 18th April the fact may be taken as unique in the preparation for an Elizabethan campaign; but representing, as they do, the general purpose and sequence of events of the voyage, they are usually accepted as showing the final intentions of the Government, and, in default of any later paper, must be assumed to do so. They recite that Norreys and Drake are to keep two principal objects in view—firstly, 'to distress' the King of Spain's ships, and, secondly, to get possession of some of the Azores:

> We would have you direct the whole course of your proceedings in such sort as may best serve to accomplish and perform the said two ends and purposes. And first for your distressing of his ships we would have you carefully inquire in your way towards the coast of Spain what ships there are of importance in any of the ports, either of Guipuzcoa, of Biscay, or Galicia, which our pleasure is you shall do your best endeavour either to take or destroy.

As it is understood that there is much shipping in the Tagus, they are to do their 'best endeavour to intercept and destroy the same.' Then the Instructions pass to Don Antonio. As he presses for assistance, asserting that the Portuguese bear much goodwill to him and hate the Spaniards:

> We would have you very carefully and substantially to inform yourselves before you proceed to attempt anything to the purpose, whether the people stand so affected towards him as he pretendeth, as also what forces the King of Spain hath drawn down to that kingdom . . . and in case upon inquiry you shall find that neither the love borne unto him is so great as he pretendeth, and that the forces of the King of Spain are such as nothing can be attempted without very

[40] *S. P. Dom. Eliz.* ccxxii. 89. Not only are there many corrections and alterations, but the last two pages are in a different handwriting, and on paper of a different watermark from the first part. It is almost certain that it is made up from two drafts of distinct dates.

great hazard, our pleasure is that you shall then forbear to attempt anything towards Lisbon, for any enterprise to be there attempted, other than the destruction of the ships there. But in case you shall find upon good ground that the party Don Antonio hath there is great, and that they stand so well-affected towards him as he pretendeth, and that there will be a party of the Portugal nation that will be ready to aid the king, and join with his forces against the Spaniards . . . you may proceed to make a descent there without any great hazard.

After replacing Don Antonio they were to arrange for the defence of the land frontier of Portugal and to leave an officer to superintend the fortifications; they were then to turn their attention to the Azores, obtaining the pretender's assistance with the assurance that an island would only be retained until the end of the war. Then the Instructions return to what Elizabeth had most dearly at heart:

But before you attempt anything either in Portugal or the said Islands, our express pleasure and commandment is you shall first distress the ships of war in Guipuzcoa, Biscay, and Galicia, and in any other places that appertain either to the King of Spain or his subjects, to the end that they may not impeach you in such enterprises as you are to execute upon his dominions, as also the said ships remaining entire and undistressed, they may not (seeing such a number of ships and mariners employed under you out of the realm upon that coast) take encouragement in the time of your absence to attempt somewhat against this our realm, or our realm of Ireland.

If the Spaniards should be found to be too well prepared it is left 'to your own good judgments and discretions to attempt any other things.' They are to seize contraband of war in neutrals, and an advisory council is nominated, composed of Sir Roger Williams, Sir Edward Norreys, Richard Hurleston, Thomas Fenner, and William Fenner, but these names are deleted in the draft. Of the same date is a secret appointment to Sir Roger Williams and Thomas Fenner to replace Norreys and Drake in case of accident.[41]

There are probably no other instructions to a commander-in-chief, in the whole course of English history, which show such an entire ignorance of the conditions and of the object to be aimed at; nor which so cavalierly thrust upon those in command all the duties and responsibilities appertaining to a home government. Long before Drake sailed the havoc wrought upon the Armada by battle and storm was well known in England, and to calculate any possibility of the appearance of a Spanish fleet was a mere matter of arithmetic and of collation of the reports from Spain. How little Elizabeth understood the situation is shown by her

[41] *S. P. Dom. Eliz.* ccxxii. 90.

thinking it possible that Philip could or would make a counter attack upon Ireland, seeing that he could not send a ship to sea and had to save his own dominions. Yet if Elizabeth was set upon the destruction of the remains of the Armada it was a good, although not the best, form of attack on Spain; but to tell the Generals to inquire, on their way from Plymouth to Spain, where the Spanish ships were lying, is such a startling delegation of those duties of preparation belonging to a government as defies comment. If such a clause was not childish it was malicious, and as the *State Papers* show clearly that the Government had full information as to the whereabouts of the Spanish ships, the palpable purpose was to be able to throw the blame upon the Generals if the Government intelligence happened to be wrong.[42] In an equally strange fashion the care of obtaining information as to the chance of Don Antonio—information surely the duty of a government carefully to collect before fitting out a landing force needlessly large for any other purpose—is thrown upon the commanders, who are enjoined to conquer a kingdom 'without any very great hazard.' Apparently Norreys and Drake were to sail from port to port and make genial inquiries at each as to the pretender's prospects, or land their troops not as soldiers but as private inquiry agents. Here again the orders are so worded that the slightest error of judgment would form good ground for a court-martial.

Drake went straight to Coruña, although there was only one Armada ship there, while there were forty at Santander.[43] Why he did so is still one of the obscure points of his career, and the documentary evidence darkens rather than enlightens. In view of the fact that the Instructions only exist in the form of a draft of an early date, and Elizabeth's anger in May, when she knew of the attack on Coruña,[44] we might suppose (assuming another point in dispute—that the wind permitted the fleet to go to Santander) that specific directions had been given later to attack this last mentioned port. But we are confronted with the difficulty that on 6th April the Generals wrote from Plymouth that they were

[42] That Elizabeth knew quite well that the bulk of the Spanish fleet was at Santander, is clear from a conversation she had with Thomas Windebank some time before 17th May (*State Papers*, ccxxiv. 50).

[43] *State Papers Venetian*, $\frac{13}{23}$ May, 1589.

[44] The Queen said 'they had not performed that which they promised to have done before they went, which was that they had left two places where they should have done greater service in taking and burning the ships, for' (said she) 'they had eight days' fair wind to have gone to those two places before they had come to the Groyne.' After further conversation she remarked 'that they went to places more for profit than for service' (*S. P. Dom. Eliz.* ccxxiv. 50; Thomas Windebank to Walsyngham).

'credibly informed that 200 sail of divers nations have recently arrived at the Groyne (Coruña) and other ports of Galicia and Portugal . . . therefore we resolve, with all the speed we may if the wind will not suffer us to bear with Biscay and those parts, to attempt the destroying of the shipping in the foresaid coasts of Galicia and Portugal.'[45] At that date, therefore, no peremptory orders had been issued about Santander, and the Queen and Council knew that it was just as likely that the fleet would make for Coruña, nor is there any reply from them commenting on this despatch. Yet it is evident that when they sailed Elizabeth expected them to go to Santander,[46] and under such circumstances it is remarkable that Drake, in writing home, not only makes no reference to his failure to go there, but describes a direct course for Coruña as something coveted and obtained:—

> Desiring to satisfy her Majesty and your Honours in our fervent desire to accomplish our duties by all means possible, we departed from Cansan[47] Bay on Friday, 17th April,[48] hoping that if the wind were contrary it would come fair ere long, and that lying in the main sea, out of the harbour, we might be in more readiness to take the next prosperous wind, which it pleased God to send us on Sunday following about 8 o'clock in the morning, and so continued a very great gale until Wednesday, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at which time we made the first land with the Cape of Ortegal.[49]

In the same letter they add that they are going 'the next fair wind to bear towards the coast of Portugal,' and afterwards they 'purpose to return to Santander,' so that this place still stood last in their intentions. It was not until his return home, when Drake was called upon to draw up formal answers to the articles exhibited against him, that we hear of an adverse wind preventing a passage to Santander, a wind of which neither he himself nor anyone on board the fleet speaks during the voyage.[50] In the

[45] *S. P. Dom.* ccxxiii. 62.

[46] Cf. note 44, and also her despatch of 20th May, where she again accuses the Generals of passing the two ports in which the Spanish ships were collected and going to Coruña, 'being of little importance and very dangerous.'

[47] Cawsand.

[48] Friday was 18th April.

[49] Norreys and Drake to the Privy Council, 7th May. This is evidently the first despatch since leaving England.

[50] Don Antonio wrote to one of his followers that they went direct to Coruña by order of the Queen and Council (*Simancas Papers*, iv. p. 553). That was wrong, but there is no mention of any foul wind, and as Don Antonio must have been an important personage in the fleet, a curious question arises as to who told him this, and with what object. Sir Roger Williams and Anthony Ashley lament, in their letters, the delay at Coruña, but make no allusion to

passage quoted he refers only to the one 'prosperous wind' which wafted him direct to Coruña, but in his defence we get entirely different details, to the effect that when clear of the Channel he hove to in order to collect his fleet, and that it was 5 P.M. of Monday, 21st April, before they were all together. The wind was then N.N.E., but by the next morning it had gone to 'far easterly,' and Santander was not possible.[81] The Government charge was 'that having the wind at north-east, as was testified by sundry masters, they omitted the opportunity to have borne up from Ushant along the coast of France more easterly into the Bay.'[82] Apparently the Privy Council had evidence; Drake offers none, and it will be noticed that the dates and times mentioned in his despatch of 7th May are entirely at variance with the statements in his defence.

The obscurity in which the whole question is involved extends even to Drake's own view of his proceedings, about which he might be expected to form a definite judgment. On 8th May he wrote to Burghley from Coruña, 'My opinion is that great happiness is fallen to our Queen and country by our coming hither.'[83] On 2nd June he wrote again to Burghley, 'We are all of opinion that if we had come first for Lisbon the city had been ours.'[84] It

the attack on that port having been an alternative to some other predetermined plan. In his defence Drake said that the intention to go to Santander was kept secret for obvious reasons, but it can hardly have been concealed from the second in command of the army and the Queen's treasurer. Ralph Lane, the muster-master, wrote that 'for lack of a council we overshot Santander' (*S. P. Dom.* ccxxxviii. 45), which may be read in conjunction with his description of the Generals in another letter as 'two so overweening spirits contemning to be advised and disdaining to ask advice' (*ibid.* ccxxv. 42). From these passages it is clear that Lane knew of the order to go to Santander; that, to his mind, it was not any change of wind, but the will of the Generals which altered the destination; and that he thought an advisory council, such as had been nominated at first, would have overruled them.

[81] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxvii. 35.

[82] *Ibid.* Evesham says that the wind 'came fair at N. East,' having been west-south-west when they left Cawsand Bay. 'We stayed half a day to get the fleet together,' and then, being thirty sail short, 'we set our course towards Galicia.' Evesham's N.E. and Drake's 'far easterly' from N.N.E. may correspond. Rear-Admiral Sir William Wharton, K.C.B. (Hydrographer of the Admiralty), informs me that as variation then was a N.E. wind by compass would be N.E. by E. true, and that such a wind would be a point abaft the beam for Santander from a position outside Ushant, giving a good course.

[83] *Ibid.* ccxxiv. 24.

[84] Strype, *Annals of Church and State*, Oxford, 1824, iv. p. 11. On the same day he wrote to Walsyngham (*State Papers*, ccii. 7), 'if we had not been commanded to the contrary but had first landed at

may be that both beliefs were sincere at the different dates, for on 2nd June the army, beaten in the field and decimated by disease, was again at Cascaes; but if he was so enthusiastic about Coruña on 8th May it is evidence, not only that he may have sailed with the deliberate purpose of going there, but that he failed to recognize the mortal blow either Santander or Coruña dealt to the main design until taught by the stern sequence of events. Apparently all that Monson anticipated from success was the severance of Portugal from Spain, a payment of expenses, and a trade with the East Indies (*ante*, p. 178). He did not see the tremendous political consequences involved. Drake's vision was even more curiously limited. In the letter previously quoted [55] he begins, 'The best I can write is that I presently believe the enemy will not trouble England suddenly; for, first, we have destroyed very much of his provisions at Groyne . . . which the King had caused to be provided for some new army.' At that moment Philip was not considering a new invasion, but how to save his empire from disruption.

[4] Almost before the fleet was clear of the Channel Drake was short of some twenty-five ships, carrying from two to three thousand men, who returned, alleging want of victuals, lack of pilots, or ignorance of any rendezvous.[56] On 24th April the fleet was before Coruña, which was divided into two parts—a high town and low town. Both portions were situated on a peninsula,

Lisbon all would have been as we would have desired it, but God thought it not meet.' This letter is dated 1587, on which see *post*, p. 222. It does not throw any light on the difficulty about Coruña, because Lisbon may have been given as second to Santander, and we know that Drake was explicitly ordered to destroy the shipping in the Tagus, but he seems to imply that Coruña was the only alternative to Santander. See also note 70, *post*, p. 205.

[55] *State Papers*, ccii. 7.

[56] Probably many of them were Dutch. The Dutch seamen were said 'to have carried themselves very frowardly,' which was not surprising. The Privy Council sent orders to Plymouth and elsewhere that 'Her Highness in regard the dangerous consequence this example may be drawn unto that the captains of ships and other chief officers should in such sort leave an army . . . thinketh it for sundry considerations meet that such captains and principal officers should be severely punished' (*Acts of the Privy Council*, 28th May, 1589). This seems to be almost the first example of official notice of such elementary indiscipline, but it was also its first occurrence on such a large scale. Articles of War and Regulations do not precede but follow offences, and there was, at the time, no easy legal method of dealing with such delinquencies. It was common in nearly every Elizabethan voyage for a ship or two to return home if captain and crew saw fit, and before the desertion of the Golden Lion in 1587, it does not appear even to have caused comment.

the high town being separated from the lower one by fortifications, and this last being also defended by a rampart and ditch on the neck joining the peninsula with the mainland; there was also a fort—which does not, however, appear to have played any important part in the defence—on an island at the mouth of the harbour, and there were four ships and two galleys in the harbour, one of the former being the San Juan, which had been the flagship of Martinez de Recalde in the division of Portugal in the Armada. The upper town was a strong position, but the lower town was open to both a land and boat attack, and the garrison consisted of 1,500 men, mostly local levies,[57] under the command of Don Juan de Luna—Don Juan de Padilla, Marquis of Cerralba, Governor of Galicia, and one of Alva's veterans, being in supreme authority.[58] The Generals anchored at 3 P.M. of Thursday, 24th April, and within three hours landed 7,000 men,[59] which sounds incredibly smart work, seeing that there could have been no previous boat drill and that the troops were new to each other and the operation. The roads leading to the town were seized, but the bad weather prevented any assault that night; the next day guns were landed to answer the fire of the ships, which had been using their guns all night upon the troops,[60] and it was decided to storm the lower town from three points. Therefore the following night (25–26th April) 1,200 soldiers under Colonel Huntly and Thomas Fenner attacked the harbour face of the town, landing from boats, while two other parties were to carry by escalade the wall facing the mainland. Only one of the attacking forces met with any stubborn resistance, and the place was soon in English hands; a few prisoners—among them Juan de Luna—worth ransom, were taken, but Wingfield conjectures that 500 persons were killed in cold blood.[61] The place was full

[57] Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, iii. p. 43.

[58] Don Juan de Luna appears to have commanded in the lower, the marquis in the upper, town.

[59] Drake and Norreys to the Council, 7th May (*Talbot Papers*).

[60] It is not obvious why some of the English fleet did not attack the Spanish ships, nor why the latter seem to have been quite unable to interfere with the landing.

[61] The army gave sufficient proof of its loose coherence and want of discipline, but this massacre may have been a deliberate, and, as human passions work, not unjustifiable vengeance. Putting aside the classical examples of Spanish murderousness in the Netherlands, in the Indies, and everywhere else during their temporary supremacy, which some might seek to excuse as the savagery of troops out of control, it will be well to bring together the opinions of kings and statesmen, from which it will be seen that Spanish soldiers and sailors only materialized the ideas of their rulers, illustrating what Linschoten calls 'the bloody mind of the Spaniards when they have men under their subjection.' The decision to resort to systematic

of wine and all kinds of provisions—beef, wheat, salt, oil, beans and peas—and the soldiers in the town were soon helplessly drunk. On the morning of the 26th, the two galleys having escaped up the Betanzos river, the Spaniards set fire to the ships [62] and withdrew into the upper town.

murder had not even the excuse, such as it is, of religious passion, but was the primitive form of protection used in the Spanish West Indian trade. In the reign of Charles V. recourse was had to the simple method of throwing overboard every man found on board ships interloping in American waters (*Simancas Papers*, iii. p. 67), and an order of 31st December, 1557, emphasized and repeated these injunctions by decreeing that crews of vessels taken in the Indies were to be sent to the galleys, and the captain and officers hanged or drowned (Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, ii. p. 462). In 1580, when Drake returned from his voyage round the world, Mendoza represented to Philip that it would 'be desirable' to give strict orders that no foreign ship found in the East or West Indies should be spared, 'but that every one should be sent to the bottom and not a soul on board of them allowed to live.' When Santa Cruz went to sea in 1587 he had orders to kill every man found on board English ships (*S. P. Venetian*, 25th August, 1587); such precepts from the Government had their natural consequences in the conduct of subordinates, and when in 1596 the inhabitants of Faro cut off the noses, ears, and arms of three Englishmen, and sent them thus mutilated to Essex, the Venetian ambassador writes that the English 'never approached anywhere near such cruel conduct towards the Spanish.' For an instance during this present voyage, see *post*, p. 215. In 1604 Antonio de Oquendo, son of the Armada admiral of that name, threw overboard Dutch seamen taken in fight (Labores y March, *Marina Real Española*, ii. p. 594); and in 1606 'Don Luis Fajardo has written that he has taken, at Punta de Araya, in the West Indies, seventeen Dutch flyboats lying there to load salt, and has hanged more than four hundred of the crews' (Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*, p. 272). Peace, under such a king as James I., did not interfere with Spanish customs; Ralegh wrote in 1618, 'all that have traded to the Indies since his Majesty's time know it that the Spaniards have flayed alive those poor men which they have taken' (Edwards, *Life of Ralegh*, ii. p. 354), and elsewhere he alludes to thirty-six Englishmen 'out of Master Hall's ship of London and mine tied back to back and their throats cut after they had traded with them a whole month' (*Discovery of Guiana*). English historians are ludicrously apologetic about the massacres of Smerwick and Connaught; if there was to be recrimination the Elizabethan Englishman might say with Sainte-Beuve, when it was proposed to abolish capital punishment, 'Que Messieurs les assassins commencent!'

[62] Drake and Norreys wrote (despatch of 7th May), that the Spaniards burnt the San Juan but that the English took the other ships. The Governor of Galicia reported that they were all burnt. Sixteen guns were saved from the San Juan (Wingfield), and those of the San Bernardo being ashore, fell at once into English possession (Fernandez Duro); altogether 150 brass guns and a 'shipload' (Drake)

The wind was favourable for leaving the harbour as late as the night of the 25–26th, and perhaps longer, but the opportunity was neglected and then it came foul.[62*]. The Generals determined to utilize the enforced delay to attack the upper town and lay waste the surrounding country. A siege battery of two demi-cannon and two culverins was got into position on the 29th, and eventually opened a small breach after four days' fire. Near this breach a tower had been mined, and, after one unsuccessful attempt and more mining, the train was fired; part of the tower came down, and an assault was delivered at both breaches. A portion of the tower, left tottering, came down on the stormers, and the men 'forsook their commanders'—*Anglicé* ran away. The assault on the battery breach also failed, although the stormers came to push of pike with the defenders, the wall being found to be but half battered [63] when the supporting rubbish fell away under the rush of the storming party.[64] These assaults were delivered on 4th May, and the next day a prisoner was brought in from whom the Generals learnt that a strong Spanish force [65] under the Counts of Andrada and Altamira was collecting at Puente de Burgos, five or six miles away. On 29th April some 2,000 raw local levies had come down to the town, but had been easily routed; since then English detachments, 300 or 400 strong, had ravaged the country-side nearly every day, and now it was determined to attack this new army. On 6th May Norreys, with nine regiments of 7,000 men (leaving Drake in charge of the siege works with the remaining five), reached, about 10 A.M., the enemy's position, which consisted of a village in front of a bridge leading to their entrenched camp. Norreys divided his vanguard of 2,000 men into a centre and two wings, seeming to have intended flank attacks while he held the centre ready, but nothing is told of the right wing, and the centre and left fell together delivering a frontal

of small arms were taken at Coruña. The ships must have been riddled by the English fire: an eye-witness (Evesham) says, 'We might stand upon the land and see through the ships as through glass windows, we did so tear them with our pieces.'

[62*] Ashley, in Flicke's summary.

[63] Wingfield says in one place that they had four of the siege guns promised, but elsewhere implies that they had none, and the Generals and everyone else say the same. A scientific Spanish artillerist of that time defines battering cannon as pieces carrying an iron ball of from 35 to 70 lbs., using a powder charge of two-thirds of the weight of the shot.

[64] According to a Spanish writer the failure here was due to the courage of a Spanish woman, Maria Fernandez Pita, who cheered on the men. Philip gave her the rank and pay of an alférez, or ensign (Labores y March, *op. cit.* ii. p. 478).

[65] Wingfield says 8,000, Drake and Norreys 15,000 men.

attack. The result of the fighting was that the Spaniards were first driven out of the village, then driven across the bridge, and then driven out of their camp, and finally pursued for three miles. The English main body does not appear to have come into action at all, and the routed Spaniards dividing into four bodies, 'how many 2,000 men . . . might kill in pursuit of four sundry parties, so many you may imagine fell before us that day.' Colonel Van Meetkirke was detached three miles further to burn a monastery, where he found 200 fugitives, who were put to the sword; the main body went in another direction, 'so as you might have seen the country more than three miles compass on fire,' and, returning from the chase, the English killed all those they found hidden in the vineyards and hedges.[66] The cost of this victory was, according to the Generals, one officer and two men killed; according to Wingfield one officer and one man; figures which support the contention of the Spanish historians that their force was made up of undrilled and unarmed peasants who could neither shoot nor fight, but who should certainly have known better how to run. While Norreys was away the seamen landed on the island of San Antonio at the mouth of the harbour, which can hardly have been defended, as they 'burnt and spoiled all they found.'

On 7th and 8th May the guns and troops were re-embarked,[67] and the lower town reduced to ashes. When the troops were on board a council was held on the question of running back to Santander, to which Thomas West, master of the Revenge, Robert Wignoll, master of the Nonpareil, Captain Sackfield (or Saville), and Thomas Drake were called to assist as the most expert seamen. These men unanimously decided that 'it was a thing unfit and most dangerous in respect there was no safe harbour on that coast where such a fleet might ride in safety before the army should be landed. The wind being west, thought meet to leave the intended enterprise of Santander, the masters withal, and especially West and Wignoll, refusing utterly to undertake the conduction of the navy thither.'[68] On the same day Norreys

[66] The Generals (despatch 7th May) estimate the Spanish loss at 1,000, Wm. Fenner at 1,200 or 1,300 men. Evesham reckons the Spanish loss at 200 men, and the English at six or seven killed and wounded.

[67] Although the wind was still unfavourable (*S. P. Dom.* ccxxiv. 24; 8th May). The wind was westerly, and it can now never be decided whether it was less unfavourable when they left than during the period of their stay at Coruña.

[68] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxvii. 35. Answer of the Generals to the second article brought against them, that after leaving Coruña the wind was west and west-south-west, and they might still have gone to Santander. The argument of the masters applies just as much to going to Santander from Plymouth as from Coruña.

wrote to Burghley, 'Our purpose now is to go towards Portugal, for that we find by experience it is very hard to distress any shipping that is guarded by the ordnance of a town except we were able to take the town. The want of the artillery we demanded from her Majesty is the cause that we have not taken this town, and the like want we shall feel of it in every place where we come, to the extreme hindrance of the service, but we feel the smart that her Majesty was not pleased to believe us that had the charge of the voyage but other partial humours.'[69] It is clear that Norreys was against Santander, and doubtless both he and Drake had made up their minds, and only called the council to endorse a decision already made.

The fleet left Coruña on 9th May and made its way slowly southwards against adverse winds, but many of the ships were already merely floating hospitals. Sir Roger Williams ascribed the sickness 'partly by the hot winds, but chiefly by the old clothes and baggage of those which returned with the Duke of Medina out of England.' To these causes may be added the excesses in wine, the exposure to weather, and the hardships incidental to campaigning. On the 13th the Swiftsure, with Essex, his brother Walter Devereux, the general of horse, Sir Roger Williams, and others on board, and six other ships joined the fleet, having been as far south as Cadiz in ignorance of any rendezvous.[70] On the 15th they were in sight of Cape Roca,

[69] *State Papers*, ccxxiv. 22.

[70] It will be remembered that Essex, with Williams and others, left the Court suddenly, reached Falmouth on 6th April, and put to sea the same night. Williams as second in command, and Norreys' possible successor, should surely have known the destination of the fleet; Essex must have known all that Williams knew, and was possibly still deeper in the confidence of Elizabeth and of those who sought Elizabeth's favour through him, yet the Swiftsure was knocking aimlessly and ignorantly about the coast of Portugal for nearly six weeks. They could not have been unaware of the proposal to attack the Spanish shipping, but their action suggests that when they left England it was in contemplation to carry out a direct attack on Lisbon. Either that, or, which is unlikely, they were indifferent to anything that occurred before the descent on Portugal. Williams distinctly implies that on 6th April the destination was Lisbon, 'had our army not touched at the Groyne and sailed straight to Lisbon as the Earl of Essex did . . . the town had been ours' (*A Brief Discourse of War*, Lond. 1590). Robert Flicke, too, who must have been in a position to obtain authoritative information, writes that he subscribed 1,000*l.* and furnished twenty musketeers 'upon foundation only of a direct course and voyage to Lisbon or the Islands . . . supposing there should no attempt have been in the way upon the coast of Galicia' (*Ad. Misc. Bks.* 983, No. 167). This certificate of Flicke's services is attested, among others, by Drake and Norreys, who did not question his statement. Altogether the evidence points to the conclusion that

and a council was held,[71] at which it was determined to put back and land the troops for the march on Lisbon in Consolation Bay, just south of Cape Carvoeiro, on which stands the town and fort of Peniche. The next day the fleet stood into the Bay, and ignoring a harmless fire on its flank from the fort, the boats dashed for the broad expanse of beach opposite, considered impracticable by the Spaniards from the heavy surf beating upon it. Many men were drowned in landing, but before a small Spanish force could reach the spot an English force of overpowering strength was ashore; there was some little fighting, but the combined Spanish and Portuguese troops retreated inland. The English entered Peniche the same night, and on the 17th the fort surrendered, the governor, Captain Aranjo, being a secret adherent of Don Antonio, and only stipulating that it was to be yielded to him and not to the Generals.

The third Article of Accusation afterwards brought against the Generals was that they landed in Portugal without any assurance that a Portuguese rising would follow. They answered that they had been especially instructed to destroy the ships in the

Lisbon was the destination when Essex left the Court; that, at some later date, Santander was preferred; but to go further, and fix the responsibility for Coruña, appears to be hopeless.

Even at Plymouth it had been common talk that Essex's escapade had cost the expedition the Queen's favour (Lodge, ii. p. 354; Captain Bailey to the Earl of Shrewsbury), and the first despatch the Generals received from her (*State Papers*, ccxxiv. 10) was a long and hysterical document dealing, not with the wisdom or unwisdom of their proceedings or their good or ill success, but with the heinousness of the offence committed by Sir Roger Williams in encouraging the earl, and directing that, if they had not already executed Williams, he was to be put under arrest and Essex sent back. It is true that the paper is only a draft, but, whether or no it was sent, it is so remarkable in the circumstances that, considered in connection with some other facts, it raises a question interesting to the gynæcologist but unsuitable for discussion here. The Generals received that or some such despatch, because on 5th June they answered, notwithstanding Elizabeth's warning that they were not 'to seek evasions as the customs of lawyers is,' that they had done their 'endeavours for his lordship's present return,' but because the wind was 'east and northerly' they had not been able to spare the Swiftsure, which is a brilliant *non sequitur*. However, the despatch had immediate effect in causing Essex, perhaps nothing loth as the attack on Lisbon had then failed, to be sent home at once; as for Williams, who cared nothing for Elizabeth or anyone else, he was not executed and not put under arrest.

[71] William Fenner in Birch (*Bacon Papers*, i. p. 59). Cape Carvoeiro was sometimes called 'the young Rock' to distinguish it from Cape Roca, or 'the Rock of Lisbon.' But nothing indicates that Fenner meant the first-named.

Tagus, that it was impossible to do this without attacking from the land,[72] and that they had said this to the Privy Council before sailing. And, naturally, they added that they could only find out by landing whether there was any party ready to support Don Antonio. Wingfield writes, 'The Generals there fully resolved that the army should march overland to Lisbon,' but the resolution must have been come to at the council mentioned by Fenner, or there would have been no object in landing.

On the 18th the army, leaving Captain George Bertie with 200 men to garrison the fort of Peniche, and six companies of foot on board the fleet, set forward on its forty-five mile march to Lisbon, without victuals, without cavalry,[73] without artillery,[74] and without transport, officers and men believing that Drake would support them by an attack on the river front from the Tagus. Not the least of the obscure questions inwrought in the story of this voyage is why the army was landed at Peniche, thus exposing it to all the risks inherent to an unnecessarily long line of advance. The Venetian ambassador says that Drake went to Peniche Roads because he had heard that there was an Indiaman there; but even if that were so, and the Indiaman gone, there was no quality of cause and effect between the ship, present or absent, and landing an army, an operation not usually undertaken in such a haphazard fashion. On the other hand, William Fenner—who, however, was not the Rear-Admiral of that name and was not present—is explicit that, at the council, the landing 'was at last determined to be at Penecha'; and Sir Edward Norreys gives the only intelligible reason, obviously wrong as it is both in theory and fact. He writes: 'It was thought fit because we understood that the King had placed strong garrisons in every landing place near Lisbon to land at a place called Peniche.'[75] In

[72] 'They found it not performable unless they might have their forces as well at land as at sea' (*State Papers Dom. Elis.* ccxxvii. 35).

[73] There was 'the Generals' company of horses,' about fifty.

[74] Possibly we get very near the real explanation of Norreys' apparent recklessness in going forward without artillery in a passage in the *Avis de la Victoire . . . contre l'Anglois en Espagne*, a pamphlet based on Spanish official information. That says, 'Don Antonio had given the English to understand that it would not be necessary to land the artillery because the inhabitants of Lisbon would at once acknowledge him as king.' There were no siege guns to land, but if the Generals expected merely a sharp attack supporting a rising in the city, the want of artillery may not have appeared of the vital importance to them that it does to us.

[75] Sir Edward Norreys to Hatton (Lodge, *Illustrations of English History*, ii. p. 379). The reader will remember the curious circumstance that Manuel de Andrada, who was present when Drake and Don Antonio were settling the terms of assistance, and when the plans

reality the only other suitable landing place nearer Lisbon in which there was a garrison was Cascaes, and Cascaes did not possess a tithe of the natural strength of Coruña, which the Generals had not hesitated to attack, nor was it nearly so strongly defended. Moreover the Generals, and especially Norreys, whose particular business it was to be acquainted with such precedents, had a classical illustration before them of a successful attack on Lisbon in Alva's campaign of 1580,[76] in which that general refused to move from Setubal until Alvaro de Bazan came from Cadiz with his ships and galleys to give him the command of the sea. Then he transported his troops to Cascaes, took the castle there, and then those of St. Julian and Belem; this was followed by the battle of the bridge of Alcantara, which gave him possession of the city, all these actions having been fought along the right bank of the Tagus.[77] In the harbour were forty-four Portuguese ships and galleys, which seem to have been a negligible quantity so far as fighting went, but Bazan did not come in and assail them until the city had fallen, although he covered the march of the army.[78]

[5] The limited number of Italian and Spanish troops available had compelled Philip to concentrate his preparations for defence on the effort to preserve Lisbon. He had a very able representative there in his nephew, the Cardinal Archduke Albert of Austria, a son of the flighty Emperor Maximilian.[79] The Archduke had but a small body of Spaniards either as a garrison

of the proposed expedition must have been discussed, warned Philip long before the fleet sailed that the landing place was to be Peniche (*ante*, p. 191).

[76] Altolaguirre y Duvale, *Don Alvaro de Bazan*, Madrid, 1888.

[77] See plan of Lisbon.

[78] A plan of river attack, attributed to Drake, is noticed, *post*, p. 219, but it did not comprise any landing force at Cascaes.

[79] At this date he was Viceroy of Portugal; in 1596 he became Governor of the Netherlands, and in 1598—the dispensation of the Church having been obtained—married Philip's daughter, the Infanta Isabel, Philip dowering them with the sovereignty of the Netherlands, obedient and disobedient, in equal authority. He and his wife, who was by no means a passive partner, appear prominently in the political history of the early seventeenth century, as 'the Archdukes.' The Archduke Albert was a skilful politician of that hard, intellectual, but essentially inferior, type which is either unable to understand the value of sentiment in politics or unable to utilize it. He is said to have considered that his true *métier* was that of arms, and Henry IV. once remarked that there were three things that the world would not believe, but which were all true—that the Archduke was a good general, that he himself was a good Catholic, and that Elizabeth was 'a throned vestal.' Motley comments that probably all three statements were equally true.


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done. The army reached Cascaes on the night of the 29th, the fleet having been there since the 23rd;[82] on his arrival Drake had occupied the town without resistance, but the fort held out until 6th June, when the governor yielded either to force or the persuasions of some of Don Antonio's followers.[83] The beginning of June was signalized by a piece of good fortune. On 18th May the Privy Council wrote to the Generals to inform them that a Hanseatic fleet of sixty ships, laden with supplies for Philip, was going north-about round Scotland for Portugal. Before the warning reached them, the fleet laden with corn, masts, cables, &c., sailed comfortably into Drake's hands, and his ships had nothing to do, day after day, but to pick up the helpless Easterlings as they straggled into the mouth of the Tagus. The army also was cheered by the prospect of a fight with 6,000 or 7,000 Spaniards under the Count of Fuentes, who advanced nearly to Cascaes on 1st June, but who either shirked the combat at the last moment, or was forced to return hurriedly by signs of insurrection in Lisbon denuded of troops.[84]

The Generals themselves could hardly have found much consolation for their disappointments in the despatches from Elizabeth now arriving. On 4th May the Council wrote that a month's victuals would be sent on, but that as the Queen had spent much more than the original 20,000*l.* she would expect them

[82] *State Papers Dom.* ccxxiv. 27. Evesham says that the fleet arrived on the 20th May.

[83] The Archduke's opinion is indicated by the fact that the governor, Cardenas, a soldier of the Flanders wars, was seized at Setubal and beheaded. But as the garrison was Spanish, treachery seems unlikely. According to Evesham there were only seven pieces of artillery in the fort. A pamphlet published in Paris, and supposed to be by Antonio Perez (*Traicté Paraenetique . . . auquel se montre . . . le Droit Chemin et vrais moyens de Resister à l'effort du Castillan . . . par un Pelerin Espagnol*, 1598), says that a council was held at noon of the day on which the fort of Cascaes surrendered, at which it was decided that fleet and army should return to Lisbon; that Drake went in the Revenge the same afternoon to explore the south channel; but that the desire to secure the Easterlings caused the relinquishment of the intention. Any statement made by Antonio Perez requires corroboration in order to obtain implicit credit, but there is nothing inherently improbable in an accusation that Drake found prizes an overwhelming temptation.

[84] The field state of the army on 2nd June was 5,735 men serviceable, and 2,791 sick (*State Papers*, ccxxiv. 78, 1). The *Avis de la Victoire* says that the Count of Fuentes found the English too strongly entrenched to be attacked with any prospect of success. Don C. Fernandez Duro says that the reason he refused battle was that he had only four companies of Spaniards among 4,000 Portuguese (*Arm. Española*, iii. p. 47).

to pay for this supply. About this time must have come a furious letter, dated 20th May, in which Elizabeth said that she found their request for heavy guns and ammunition 'very strange,' that before they sailed they repeated 'that the first and principal action should be to take and distress the King of Spain's navy and ships in ports where they lay, which if you did not you affirmed you were content to be reputed as traitors.' That they had passed by the two chief places where the Spanish ships were lying, and gone to Coruña, 'being of little importance and very dangerous,' and that she expected them still to destroy the Spanish fleet, restore Don Antonio, and proceed to the Azores.[85] Putting aside any questions as to whether her instructions had been exact, or whether the two leaders had really promised the precise version she gave, we see here again Elizabeth's inability to seize the strategic object of the expedition. As the greater includes the less, so the restoration of Portuguese independence would have included the disintegration of Spanish maritime power, and such a by-issue as the destruction of some Spanish ships was but risking the success of the main purpose. If Elizabeth insisted, against the opinion of her naval advisers, that the Spanish ports should be attacked, she is solely responsible, but it appears more probable that even Drake did not recognise the mistake until it was too late.[86]

On 2nd June the Generals wrote home giving an account of their proceedings, and said that they were thinking of a second attempt on Lisbon if supplies arrived, but that otherwise they were in doubt what to do.[87] They, or Don Antonio, seem before this to have opened negotiations with the Shereef of Morocco, and there was some idea of sailing to Barbary to revictual and perhaps obtain assistance for an attempt on Cadiz. However, on 5th June they had decided, after deliberation, and having no hope of supplies from England, to go for the Azores.[88] The departure

[85] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxiv. 53. Elizabeth would have her opinions still further confirmed and embittered by the reports of Ashley, her official representative with the expedition: 'The landing at the Groyne is judged to have been the special hindrance of good success here, the enemy, upon knowledge thereof, having in the meanwhile assembled great strength for the defence of the city.' Spanish opinion agreed with Ashley, 'It is thought that Lisbon, and by consequence all Portugal, owed its salvation to the days wasted in the attempt on Coruña' (*State Papers Ven.* $\frac{2}{12}$ June, 1589).

[86] *Ante*, pp. 199, 200.

[87] *State Papers Dom.* ccxxiv. 78. When the troops were re-embarked the Spaniards thought it was preparatory to an attempt by way of the river (Cabrera de Cordoba).

[88] Norreys and Drake to the Council (*State Papers Dom.* ccxxiv. 85). There were several councils held (Strype, *Annals*, iv. p. 11; Drake to Burghley).

took place on 8th June, but not without some loss from the galleys which had been lying under the command of Alonso de Bazan in the harbour, and recently reinforced by a squadron from Cadiz under Don Martin de Padilla, the Adelantado of Castile, who took the supreme command.[89] The fleet being becalmed, the galleys came out and sank or captured three or four vessels. On 6th June the Generals had been joined by two small vessels with provisions which brought news of more being at sea, and on the 9th they met the main body. This must have been the convoy under Captain Robert Crosse,[90] advised by the Council on

[89] Wingfield says that nine galleys under Bazan were joined by twelve from Cadiz, but the numbers are very uncertain, the Spanish writers differing considerably. The Venetian ambassador doubtless gives us the key to Bazan's previous inaction. He was the brother of Santa Cruz, but 'though he is highly esteemed and very well versed in business matters, yet not being titled he lacks the rank which would induce noblemen to submit to his orders.' We know that perhaps the principal motive for the nomination of Medina Sidonia to the command in 1588 was the knowledge that the other seaman admirals would give but little obedience to that one of their equals selected for the command-in-chief. Linschoten tells us of a Portuguese fleet, that 'some captains did not follow the admiral because they were quarrelling about precedence; others would not obey the vice-admiral, saying that he was no gentleman, and that they were his betters; upon these and such like points most of the Portugals enterprises do stand' (fail). The feeling was more pronounced in Spain and Portugal, and lingered later in the Peninsula, but of course it existed for long in England and other countries, and, in the cognate belief that a noble is a born leader, is not yet extinct in army promotion.

[90] As Robert Crosse was an Elizabethan seaman of some importance in his day, and as he has not been considered worthy of a place in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, it may be useful to notice here some of the salient points of his career. He was a son of William Crosse, of Charlinch, near Bridgewater, Co. Somerset, and does not appear to have gone to sea early in life, but first comes into prominence with Drake in the 1585–6 voyage. He commanded the Hope in 1588, and in 1589 was selected to bring out the convoy of supplies Norreys and Drake so eagerly expected (see next note). In 1591 he was with Lord Thomas Howard at the Azores, in command of the Bonaventure, and in 1592 had the Foresight at the capture of the carrack Madre de Dios (see *post*). The same year he was in legal difficulties about the seizure of a Bayonne ship, decided by the Admiralty Court to be an unlawful prize, and taken by a privateer belonging to him called the Exchange of Southampton, under his brother, John Crosse. In 1595 he was 'Captain and Admiral' in the Swiftsure, from 11th May to 2nd December, having been at sea on the Spanish coast with the Crane for part of the time. He did not go with Drake and Hawkyns to the West Indies, but was part owner with Ralegh of the Little Exchange, which appears to have accompanied the fleet independently, and was taken in the West Indies, the

4th May, and 'whose provision,' says Wingfield, 'little answered our expectation.'[91] Some vessels were sent to Peniche to take off the garrison of the fort, but the officer in command according to one account[92] was too closely pressed by the Spaniards to save

captain, John Crosse, eventually finding his way to Cadiz and the mercies of the Inquisition three days after his brother, who commanded the Swiftsure under Essex in 1596, left that port with the rest of the fleet. At Cadiz, Crosse with Monson and many others was knighted. After his return from the Cadiz voyage he petitioned Burghley for some reward, and gives some facts which throw light on his early career. His first service appears to have been at Newhaven (Havre) in 1563, and afterwards in Scotland and Ireland. He had found that, like most of Elizabeth's fighting men, he had 'never had a groat from her Majesty in gift—only bare pay'; his command in 1595 had cost him 400*l.* and produced no profits, a statement which, if true, shows that the incidental expenses contingent to a man-of-war appointment must have been considerable, seeing that his pay was ten shillings a day, equivalent to at least 3*l.* now. The Cadiz voyage also cost him 400*l.*, but, he says, these losses did not worry him as much as the thought that he had incurred Burghley's displeasure: 'I erred in not telling you of the chest and trunk I carried to my lodgings, for which I crave pardon'—referring to some unlicensed spoil from Cadiz. Crosse was not employed in the Islands Voyage of 1597, but was recommended by Essex as 'very fit' to take charge of a convoy of supplies for the fleet if Sir Fulke Greville did not come. In 1598 he was in command in the Narrow Seas from January to March, and in 1599 was nominally in charge of the Nonpareil during the mobilization of August and September, but was entrusted by Lord Thomas Howard with the superintendence of the preparation of the hired ships in the Thames. This was his last navy service. He was so far implicated in the Essex rising that a Captain Thomas Lea, or Leigh, came to him at his house at Ivybridge, in the Strand, to propose seizing the Queen, and although he gave information at once and Lea was hanged, the Government may not have been altogether satisfied why he was chosen as a confidant. In 1605 he asked Cecyll for a seat in Parliament, 'if you have any spare places to bestow,' having no other friend to appeal to (*Cecil MSS.* 24th October). Subsequently Sir Robert Crosse appears to have fallen upon evil times; in 1610 he petitioned the King for relief, and in another petition addressed to Salisbury in 1611, he urged his former services and begged permission, if not befriended, to leave the country and hide his poverty abroad. I have not been able to ascertain the year of Crosse's death, but he is said to have left no issue.

[91] On 19th May Crosse wrote to Burghley that he expected to be ready to sail on the 22nd, but Mendoza was informed by one of his agents, who was at Plymouth at the time, that the convoy, consisting of twenty flyboats, sailed on $\frac{31\text{st May}}{10\text{th June}}$ (*Simancas Papers*, 8th July). William Fenner, who was the second in command, says seventeen or nineteen, his syntax leaving room for doubt.

[92] Wingfield.

all his men; according to another[93] basely escaped in a French ship, leaving his men, who were mercilessly put to the sword. The Generals' orders were that with a northerly wind the fleet was to make for the Azores, with a southerly for the Bayona Islands outside Vigo Bay.[94] Contrary winds and heavy weather delayed and separated the fleet, but on 19th June it was reunited in Vigo Bay.[95] Here 2,000 men, all that remained of the army that was fit for service, were landed, Vigo and the neighbouring villages burnt, and the country wasted for miles round. The English accounts record all this as done without loss, and without resistance from the Spaniards. On the 21st Norreys and Drake decided to man and victual twenty of the best ships for Drake to take to the Azores, while Norreys was to go home with the rest. For this purpose it was resolved that the fleet should fall down again to the Bayona Islands outside the Bay to shift men and stores, but Drake, for some unexplained reason, 'never strooke at the Islands, but put straight to sea.'[96] Thirty-three of the vessels farthest up the river were forced by wind and tide to anchor and thus escaped the worst storm of the voyage, which came on the following night and day. Norreys called a council, which of course advised an immediate return home, and he arrived at Plymouth on 28th June,[97] where he found Drake already in port.

Drake remained silent; Norreys commenced writing letters. To Walsyngham he wrote that he feared 'her Majesty will mislike the event of our journey; it is true that by reason of the extremity of the sickness it is not succeeded as otherwise we had hoped it should—especially for our profits; but for her Majesty's honour and the reputation of our country I trust there shall justly no fault be found in our actions.' On 13th July he wrote to his brother, Sir Edward Norreys, that the Privy Council wanted his and

[93] Fenner in Birch (*Bacon Papers*). The occupation of Peniche may be noticed as an egregious minor blunder, for there was no intention of using it as the base, which was transferred to Cascaes. If Lisbon fell, Peniche, if reoccupied by the Spaniards, would also fall; if the expedition failed, the men were needlessly sacrificed if they were not got away in time, and in any case their services were lost.

[94] But from Evesham's account it appears that many captains were ignorant of any rendezvous.

[95] Crosse and Fenner with seven of their supply ships were driven down to Puerto Santo in the Madeiras, where they 'refreshed themselves for two days,' and ransomed the town for '100 fat sheep, 1,120 hens and chickens, 10 fat oxen,' and many other odd articles. seems curious that when the fleet was separated by hard weather, the ships of this particular squadron should have been able to hang together and arrive—quite as if by appointment—at Puerto Santo.

[96] Wingfield.

[97] *State Papers Dom.* ccxxv. 5. Wingfield says 2nd July.

Drake's opinion 'what present[98] service may be done either for the Islands or for Santander. . . . We must be better used before I enter into any new service.'[99] There was little in the way of plunder brought back beyond the guns taken at Coruña and the Hansa fleet seized at Cascaes. The Hansas, ships and goods, were valued at about 100,000*l.*, and Norreys desired permission to sell the cargoes to pay the men, but by the certificate of Anthony Ashley, the Queen's treasurer, sent in years later, there was not much to be had from this source. Ashley reported that two-thirds of the cargoes was stolen or spoilt at sea by the seamen and soldiers, and that half of the remaining third disappeared at Plymouth, so that only that which was too heavy to steal remained on board.[100] Wingfield says that the men were liberally paid, although he has to admit that they were not satisfied; a month or two later there were riots in London, their active protests against insufficiency or delay, and if we may trust a Spanish correspondent, four of them were hanged, and one of these 'said to the people that the gallows was the pay they gave them for going to the wars.'[101] The number of deaths from wounds and disease is very uncertain. Ralegh put the loss at 8,000 men,[102] and he must have been in a position to know, but, as an enemy of Essex and an opponent of the expedition, was not likely to minimize it. One of Philip's correspondents wrote that not 2,000 men returned in health, and that is likely to be a truthful statement. In only one case are we told the actual loss on board a ship of the fleet; one of the Fenners wrote to Walsyngham, from Plymouth, that of 300 men on board, only three escaped sickness, that there were 114 dead, and that when he returned he had only eighteen able to work.[103]

Seeing what Elizabeth had previously written to Norreys and Drake, and the steps subsequently taken by the Privy Council with her sanction, not the least singular document relating to the

[98] *I.e.* Immediate.

[99] *State Papers*, ccxxv. 26. In this letter he implies that the Lord Admiral, Howard, is the person 'of crossing humour' he and Drake have previously referred to.

[100] *State Papers*, ccxlvii. 65.

[101] *Simancas Papers*, 18th September, 1589. In August, in consequence of the numerous complaints, a commission was appointed to examine the accounts of the voyage and inquire what was due to the men. About this time they had collected into bands and were robbing along the high roads (*Acts of the Privy Council*, 17th, 22nd August, 1589).

[102] *Works*, viii. p. 480.

[103] *State Papers Dom.* ccxxv. 27. Wingfield reduces the loss to about 3,500 men. The highest estimate was 11,000 men (Fenner). On board Evesham's ship, the Gregory, there were only eight men fit for deck work when they decided to go home.

voyage is one of 7th July, within a week of their return. Its tenour is to 'assure you for both your comforts that we do most thankfully accept of your service, and do acknowledge that there hath been as much performed by you as true valour and good conduction could yield.' The Queen's thanks were also to be conveyed to the officers and men.[104] This is only a draft and was probably never sent, but as a sign of mental temperament it is valuable. It could not have been possible satisfactorily to serve, and only by persistent make-believe could it have been possible to pretend to respect, a woman who whirled from furious bullying to fulsome gratitude, presently to return to a court-martial or its equivalent. Considering this paper in connection with the proposal mentioned by Norreys, that they should start again at once for the Azores, we may infer here the influence of Essex, just as in the Articles of Accusation, deferred until October, we may see a momentary triumph of his enemies. Whatever their merits, or demerits, Norreys and Drake were not judged on them, but were merely the counters with which courtiers played their miserable game.

[6] The question whether Drake should or should not have gone up the Tagus to Lisbon was the one most bitterly debated at the time, and the one on which he was most generally condemned. It will be observed that Monson bases his opinion that it would have been useless to go up the river on the supposition that if Drake had appeared before the city he could have done little or nothing to assist in its capture. That alone is a very questionable argument, seeing that Drake had guns, seamen, and troops on board his fleet; but we know certainly now, what was already guessed at the time, that his appearance before Lisbon would have caused its immediate fall, and the dangers Monson dwells upon were known to the Admiral and all the experienced seamen in the fleet before he gave his promise to enter the river. Warfare is the art of taking risks successfully, and the mere fact that he had to incur the hazards enumerated (some incorrectly) by Monson would not excuse him had not his own defence been stronger than that put forward by his contemporary.[105] Whether his own defence is sufficiently strong to clear him is a matter on which opinion is still divided.

Drake, himself, did not deny that his promise to meet Norreys

[104] *State Papers Dom.* ccxxv. 15.

[105] Monson appears to have altered his opinion later when he wrote: 'I confess if our actions in 1589 had been well carried we had spoiled and ruined the city of Lisbon where they had been surprised before we had been suspected.'—Book II.; Section *The Author's Opinion of that Expedition* (Cadiz, 1625). The suggestion here is that the fleet should have sailed direct to the Tagus and entered the river.

before Lisbon was unconditional subject to favourable winds, and the official charge against him was that he did not enter the Tagus, 'although the wind served well at his first arrival.' His answer is :—[106]

To the fourth Sir Francis Drake answereth that before his going up the river towards Lisbon he thought it meet to understand in what state our army stood, which he attained unto by setting certain Portugals ashore at Cascaes ; where himself also thought fit to land as required thereunto by the inhabitants of the town, thereby to find the inclination of the people and what party might be found for Don Antonio according to the Instructions. Which done, he called a council of the captains and masters to advise and resolve for the manner of his going up to Lisbon. And albeit he found by their several reports, testified under their hands, to be showed that the sickness and weakness of the mariners and soldiers was so extreme as they were not able to handle the tackle of their ships ; and that the sea captains and masters were all of opinion, as appeareth under their hands likewise, that it was most dangerous for sundry good reasons to have passed up with the fleet. Yet, nevertheless, the said Sir Francis, desirous to have performed as much as in him lay, gave order that two-third parts of the best ships of the navy, and best manned, should bring themselves into the further channel ready to take the first good wind, which came the very next day, being the 27th, at south-west ; and the other third part to stay behind at Cascaes for guard of the town and the flyboats, which had accordingly proceeded had not Sir John Norreys returned to Cascaes with the army.

It may be observed on this that Drake does not deny that the wind was fair for a rush up the river on his arrival at Cascaes. Instead of redeeming his pledged word by doing this, he called a council and landed natives to find 'the inclination of the people,' although once the army was launched on its adventure, the time had obviously passed for preliminary measures of the kind, if they had ever been possible, and both his honour and military necessity called upon him to support the army with his utmost strength, unless prevented by overwhelming obstacles.[107] Such an obstacle would be the extreme sickness among the men described in his defence ; but it is to be noticed that no such extreme sickness existed at Peniche on the 18th, when he undertook to support Norreys, and that for the condition he depicts to have suddenly arisen within five days,[108] the men must have fallen down by scores and hundreds of which there is no hint in his despatches or in

[106] *State Papers Dom.* ccxxvii. 35.

[107] 'When we arrived, had our navy entered we would have entered the town.'—Sir Roger Williams (*Brief Discourse of War*, Lond. 1590, p. 9). Evidently Williams knew of nothing that need have prevented it.

[108] Mr. Corbett makes the arrival at Cascaes on 22nd May, which would be four days ; Evesham on the 20th, which is only two days.

any account of the voyage.[109] Moreover, if the sickness was so terrible on the 23rd as practically to disable the fleet, it is difficult to understand how, on the 27th, there should have been sufficient men available to man two-thirds of it, for we know that matters grew steadily worse with every day of the voyage. The plan Drake finally decided upon was the best since the army had been landed at Peniche instead of Cascaes, and since he had failed to act at the moment of his arrival, and, to modern ideas, he might have urged one further reason for his hesitation had he not debarred himself from using it by accepting the instruments placed in his hands. Large as was the total of the fleet, it was composed mainly of transports and store ships; of the men-of-war there were only five fit, to use a later phrase, 'to lie in the line,' and on these all the real stress of the fighting must have fallen. How much, if any, fighting there would have been in the Tagus must be pure hypothesis, but the experience of all these Elizabethan expeditions, and those of later reigns, went to prove that, as Wynter said in 1588, the merchantmen were only 'fit to make a show. Not only were they usually insufficiently armed for close action, but with no prospect of compensation for the loss of the ship, and attracted chiefly by the expectation of plunder, it was clearly to the interest of officers and men to keep as far as possible out of harm's way. But Drake had deprived himself of this line of defence by originally accepting the fleet as sufficient, and by the agreement at Peniche.

There is another plan attributed to Drake on the authority of a Spanish resident in Lisbon whose MS. account of the expedition, as seen from the Spanish side, is now in the National Library at Madrid, and of which a transcript has been used by Major Martin Hume.[110] According to this, Norreys and Don Antonio desired to land, but Drake desired to keep the army on board the ships, and—spoiling the aim of the gunners at St. Julian by letting four smoke ships drive down upon the fort—dash through with the fleet and land the troops in Lisbon itself. The MS. was written in 1589, and there is the *prima facie* improbability that the Spanish resident, writing within a few weeks or months of the events, should have known so much of disagreements among the English leaders when neither they nor their subordinates give any hint of such dissensions having existed.[111] Neither the official

[109] In fact, in their despatch of 2nd June, the Generals specifically refer to the amount of sickness in the *army*, making no mention of the navy.

[110] *The Year after the Armada*, pp. 11, 45.

[111] Antonio Perez, if he was the author of the *Traicté Paraenetique*, is the only writer who speaks plainly of disagreements between Norreys and Drake. 'Drake being appointed and sent by the merchants (who were those principally concerned in this voyage) laid

objection that if things had gone wrong the fleet might have had to remain in a desperate plight waiting for a wind, displays a curious ignorance of the navigation of the Tagus, seeing that he had had opportunities for observation as a prisoner in Lisbon. The difficulties connected with the port of Lisbon relate not to leaving but to entering it, for, off the city, the ebb tide runs at six or seven miles an hour, and 'in the South Channel the current sets directly through and over the bar, on the flood three miles an hour, and on the ebb, four miles an hour,'[114] so that tide and current alone would take a ship out against a moderate wind. His objection as to the castle is pertinent to the want of siege guns, but has nothing to do with the question whether Drake could, or should, have kept a promise made with a full knowledge of the disabilities that he and Norreys seem to have agreed from the first to ignore.[115]

In considering whether Drake was unequal to his opportunity and his reputation, we have to take into account what may be termed the personal equation on both sides. Had Monson, with his exaggerated and ignorant respect for Spanish power, been in command, we should have accepted all such or worse reasons as natural to the man and his normal line of thought. But Drake was very far from feeling respect for Spanish power, and hitherto in his career had never refused to take such risks as were inherent in his plans. There is no greater injustice in historical work than to judge a man on *ex post facto* knowledge; we know now, and have long known, that it is sufficiently safe in a maritime war with Spain to take any hazard, but Monson and many of his contemporaries did not know that, and it would be unfair to condemn them because they acted and reasoned within the limits of their mental survey. But Drake did know it, and the essence of his theory and his practice had been to put his knowledge in force. To explain the faltering at Cascaes we must assume either extraordinary difficulties in the enterprise or some cause subjective to the man himself.

If we reflect on Drake's indecision in this and other matters, there seem to be signs that, for the first time in his career, he was losing his nerve. As the days passed by, the conclusion he put on paper on 2nd June that Coruña had been a disastrous mistake, intensified by a delay he had possibly never anticipated there, must have pressed on his mind with greater and greater weight

[114] *Sailing Directions for the Coast of Portugal.*

[115] However, no Englishman with the expedition ever mentions Lisbon Castle as a factor to be considered, nor do the Spanish writers refer to it. It seems to have been assumed that if the city had been entered the castle would have fallen at once. Ships lying in mid-river would have been out of the effective range of its guns.

When Essex joined him there was not only his responsibility, activè or passive, for an escapade which he knew then Elizabeth regarded so seriously that it might do more to mar his fortunes than any mere disaster at sea, but Essex and his following, although without any official position, must have been able to exercise a disturbing social influence. Essex could hardly be ignored or repulsed; Norreys had to be persuaded. In his previous voyages he had either been subordinate or in sole command, and his previous attacks on ports had always been in the nature of surprises with an overwhelming superiority of force. Now he had to reckon with men of equal professional authority, and of greater Court influence; and Lisbon, besides being more strongly defended than any port he had yet attacked, would not be taken unawares. By influence or chance the advisory council at first nominated to control the Generals had been abolished, and the conduct of the expedition was in their hands without appeal, yet a council was called to discuss the advisability of landing at Peniche or elsewhere, although Drake's self-confident nature had hitherto despised councils and discussions. Essex, although holding no formal position, was certainly a disturbing element,[116] but when Essex and Norreys had both gone, yet another council was held at Cascaes, although the position was essentially one in which, in former years, Drake would have acted decisively on his own judgment without calling on others. It looks as though he feared that failure might become disaster, and could no longer coolly take responsibility in his old fashion. Again, at Vigo, after deciding to man and victual the best ships for a run to the Azores, he went straight to sea without waiting at the place appointed to prepare the ships, and made the best of his way home. He had promised to anchor at the mouth of Vigo Bay, and there is no explanation of his failure to do so, but the inconsequent and sudden processes of an overwrought and harassed brain. Perhaps the first signs of that condition are to be seen in, and explain, his hesitation at Cascaes; afterwards every day that went by must have increased the mental tension, for every purpose of the voyage had failed, and he must have known Elizabeth well enough to be aware that no former services would count against a present disappointment.[117]

[116] Essex admits his intention to exercise influence, 'But though I had no charge I made my brother general of the horse, and my faithful friend, Sir Roger Williams, colonel general of the infantry, seven or eight of my fast friends colonels, and twenty at the least of my domestics captains, so as I might have authority and party enough when I would.'—*Apology*.

[117] Drake has dated the letter of 2nd June previously quoted (*ante*, p. 200) 1587 instead of 1589. From internal evidence there is no doubt that it belongs to this year. We have all experienced the

The question discussed in this note may be subdivided into (1) Could Drake have gone up to Lisbon? (2) Should he have done so? To the first the answer is that the evidence goes to show that at his first coming he could have entered the river. To the second that, having assented to the plan adopted, having agreed to support the army, and having sent it on its march in the expectation of his assistance, he was no longer at liberty to discuss but only to act. Being unable to recall the troops, he was in the position of a subordinate acting under orders, and his failure to carry out, at all hazards, his part of the design was, if he was in physical health, an inexcusable breach of duty.[118]

[7] Monson's conclusion that 'the action was overthrown before their setting out from home' is undoubtedly the correct one, but we must go a step farther back and inquire whose was the fault that its weak equipment foredoomed it to failure. The reply must be that, whatever the mistakes of Norreys and Drake, they shrink into insignificance beside the initial blunders of Elizabeth. Incapable of appreciating the true purport of the attempt to restore Don Antonio, an attempt which would have been as momentous in its consequences if successful as would have been Philip's in the preceding year, she handed over an undertaking which deserved, and should have obtained, the support of national resources to the agency of a joint-stock combination, whose means were inadequate from the first. She did not even carry out her

momentary forgetfulness which leads us to use the old date in the January of a new year, but this error, going back two years, is of a different character and is an indication of mental strain. Possibly those most closely associated with him could have told us of others. He was in ill-health in January 15$\frac{8}{8}$ (*Add. MSS.* 12507) and writes of it to Sir Julius Cæsar as though the complaint from which he was suffering was something of long standing. To the present writer it is clear that the Drake of 1589 and 1595 was a very different man to the daring, resolute, and resourceful leader who had made his name terrible to the Spaniards.

[118] Ralegh, writing many years later, seems, from the number of guns specified, which was about the armament of St. Julian, to have had this voyage in mind: 'In this age a valiant and judicious man-of-war will not fear to pass by the best appointed fort in Europe with the help of a good tide and a leading gale of wind; no! though forty pieces of great artillery open their mouths against him and threaten to tear him in pieces' (*Hist. of the World*, Book V. cap. 1, sect. 10). Tactically the mission of a fleet is not to engage forts and batteries, but to assist and protect the operations of the troops landed for that purpose, but here the harbour face of the city was undefended, and Drake was not asked to engage St. Julian but to pass it. In July 1831 the French Admiral Roussin went up to Lisbon with six line-of-battle ships notwithstanding that the entrance was then protected by an almost continuous chain of batteries, which did him little harm.

own part of the agreement, for besides her liability to supply victuals in port, which she evaded, she failed to provide the siege guns which might have saved the expedition even after the mistakes of Coruña and Peniche. While the Generals were writing piteous appeals from Plymouth for assistance she was trembling, not for the fate of her seamen and soldiers, but for Essex, and sending down courtiers to threaten and search for him. If it be said that equal blame rests with Norreys and Drake for consenting to proceed when they saw that their means were insufficient, and that Elizabeth was not performing what she had promised, it must be remembered that Drake at least was full of a justifiable contempt for Spanish seamanship and leadership, and Spanish power generally, and having brought Elizabeth so far he might well hesitate to relinquish an enterprise which, if successful, would be the crowning honour of his career and the decisive blow of the war. In Elizabethan expeditions bad equipment was merely a matter of degree; neither on land nor sea, not in the Low Countries, not in Ireland, not in the fleets, had any previous fighting force been properly fitted out, and the Generals had either to calculate the amount of deficiency that might be risked, or abandon their command. Here the one fatal want appears to have been the siege guns.

It is less easy to acquit the Generals of lack of administrative capacity in the control and victualling of their men. Much of the epidemic disease, whatever it may have been, which scourged the force, was, if not caused, certainly intensified by the drunkenness permitted at Coruña and Peniche. Of course, experience shows it to be difficult or impossible to preserve discipline in a place taken by storm, but it should not have been impossible to restore it and restrain the drunkenness described as general and continuous. Still less excuse is there for the semi-starvation which characterized the whole course of the voyage in view of the enormous quantity of provisions of all sorts taken, and finally destroyed, at Coruña. The best that the Generals' defender, Wingfield, can find to say is that 'whosoever made not very large provisions for himself and his company at the Groyne was very improvident . . . and no man of place prohibited to lay in the same into their ships.' It seems hardly necessary to remark that the greatest generals and admirals have not thought it beneath their attention—in fact it has been one of their first considerations, as it is one of their first duties—to give the most careful personal regard to food supplies. Such leaders do not merely give permission to their subordinates to supply themselves; they take steps to see that orders of such vital importance are properly executed, and do not augustly despise details, for often enough the possibility of carrying out great strategical conceptions hinges on such details. It has been pointed out (*ante*, p. 126) that Drake

was uniformly wanting in the administrative quality which shows itself in a personal anxiety that men should have everything needful, even if for no higher motive than that they cease to be efficient fighting instruments when neglected. Norreys was as much, or more, blameworthy ; it was plainly his duty to ascertain whether sufficient stores for his troops were being taken on board the fleet.

Comparing what was done with what might and should have been done, the verdict of William Fenner that the voyage was 'a miserable action,' must be endorsed by later inquiry. It has been compared as a disaster to that experienced by the Spaniards in 1588, but there were circumstances which differentiated it widely from the Armada. There may not have been much difference in the loss of life in the two fleets, but in 1589 there was but trifling material loss of ships, and, although the expedition was unsuccessful, it was a failure and not a defeat, with the added fact that the failure was due not to Spanish skill or prowess but to English faults and deficiencies. While the English fleet was ranging the coast of Portugal Philip had been unable to oppose a single ship to it, nor had he been able to make any effective military opposition on land. There was nothing humiliating to English pride in a retreat enforced by want of victuals and munitions of war, even after repulses at Coruña and Lisbon, which could be validly attributed to the same causes. Englishmen might reasonably believe that they had been foiled in England rather than in Portugal. But if England had no cause to grieve over loss of prestige or material, and could boast of having answered the Armada by carrying on war in Philip's dominions, on the other hand it had failed miserably in inflicting a crushing blow ; and the failure was to bear fruit, as Spain apparently recovered strength, in long years of unnecessarily protracted war and in repeated alarms of, and preparations to resist, invasion that Spain should never have been able even to threaten.

A Voyage undertaken by the Earl of Cumberland, with one Ship Royal of her Majesty's, and six of his own and other Adventurers. A.D. 1589. [1]

Ships.	Commanders.
The Victory (Queen's ship) .	The Earl of Cumberland.
The Margaret . . .	Captain Christopher Lister.
And five others . . .	Captain Monson, afterwards Sir William Monson, Vice-Admiral.

As the fleets of Sir John Norreys and Sir Francis Drake returned from the voyage of Portugal, my Lord of Cumberland proceeded upon his towards that coast; and meeting with divers of that fleet, relieved them with victuals, who otherwise had perished.

This voyage was undertaken at his and his friends' charge, excepting the Victory, a ship royal of the Queen's, which she adventured.

This voyage is amply and largely writ by that famous mathematician Mr. Wright, who was an actor in it himself; what is here set down is but a brief collection out of his discourse.*

The services performed at sea in this journey and the number of ships taken by my Lord were these as follow: three French ships of the League in our Channel before we quitted the English coast; and from thence directing his course for the Spanish coast, upon his arrival he encountered with thirteen

* See also Book V., Section *Stratagems*, for more of Monson's own recollections of his voyage.

hulks who made some resistance upon Captain Monson fetching them up, but my Lord coming to his rescue he forced them in little space to yield. Out of which hulks he took 7,000*l.* or 8,000*l.* in spices belonging to Portugal, as themselves confessed. [2]

From thence he crossed over to the Terceira Islands, and coming to St. Michael, the first and greatest of the islands, with his boats he fetched out from under the castle * two ships that arrived there the same night from Spain.

In his course from thence to the island of Flores, the westermost of the Terceiras, he took a Spanish ship laden with sugars, wines, and sweetmeats that came from the island of Madeira. [3]

Being come to Flores, where he refreshed himself with water, he received intelligence, by an English man-of-war, of divers Spanish ships which were in the road of Fayal ready to take the first opportunity of a wind to carry them to Spain, whereupon he made a sudden return to that island to expect the truth of this advertisement. As he drew near the island he could view the roaders and their number as reported, where Captain Lister and Captain Monson gave a desperate attempt upon them in the manner following: my Lord at his arrival near Fayal in the evening was not able by reason of the calm to fetch into the road where the ships were by three leagues, which Captain Lister and Captain Monson seeing, betook themselves with eight choice shot, besides the coxswain's gang, who they armed with pikes, and put off in the skiff to descry and behold in what manner the ships rid, thinking to take advantage of them the next day; but rowing until the dashing of their oars was heard

* The Churchill edition reads, 'castle, which fired upon him.' None of the MSS. gives this addition.

by the Spanish Admiral she shot at us, and missing us, did so much embolden us that we ran desperately on board her. Our force being not able to prevail against her, we were compelled to put off and retire towards our ships who might behold the passage of the fight betwixt us. In our way, as we rowed, we met another boat bigger than our own sent to rescue us, to whom we made relation in what manner we had left the ship for want of help, and encouraged them to join with us and once more return into the road and assail them, which they willingly consented unto, and agreed upon this resolution—the one to board in the quarter, the other in the hawse to cut her cables, and upon a word given every one to enter her. Which was accordingly acted and the ship gained, being moored to the castle and so nigh it that the Spaniards being beaten were forced to leap on shore, the captain and one more excepted, who were taken prisoners in her. Thus having possession of her we hastened to tow her out, the calm continuing, and after we had brought her clear of the shot of the castle, which ceased not continually to play upon us, we took all our men out of her, the helmsman and one more excepted, and once more returned with our boats into the road, where we enjoyed all the rest of the ships, which were seven in number. The Admiral was of nigh 300 tons; she and one more came out of the Indies, having sixteen pieces of ordnance and sixty men in her; two of them came out of Guinea and one laden with woad, which that island affords in great plenty; the other we cast off, being of small value. Putting from thence to sea and coming to the island of Graciosa, where we hoped to find some succour of victuals, after two days' resistance (for wheresoever we offered to land they repulsed us to our loss) in the end we forced

them to yield to a composition of some refreshing. Whilst we lay thereabouts we had the chase of a French ship of 200 tons that came from Canada,* and of the League, which we made prize of.

Afterwards, sailing to the eastward of the road of Terceira, in the evening we beheld eighteen tall ships of the Indies entering into the said road, one whereof we after took in her course to the coast of Spain. She was laden with hides, silver, and cochineal; but coming for England, she was cast away upon Mount's Bay in Cornwall, being valued at 100,000*l.* Two other prizes of sugar we took in our said course to the coast of Spain, esteemed each ship at 7,000*l.* and one from under the castle of the island of St. Mary to the same value.

There was no road about those islands that could defend their ships from our attempts. Yet in the last assault we gave, which was upon a ship of sugars, under St. Mary, for we were there, we found ill success, being sharply resisted, and two parts of our men suddenly slain and hurt by the occasion of Captain Lister, who would not be persuaded, but would needs land in the face of their fortifications.

The service performed by land was the taking of the island of Fayal some months† after the surprising of those ships you have formerly heard of. The castle yielded us forty-five pieces of ordnance, great and small; we sacked and spoiled the town, and after ransomed it, and so departed. [4]

These summer services and ships of sugar proved not so sweet and pleasant, as the winter was afterwards sharp and painful; for in our return for England we found the calamity of famine, the hazard of shipwreck, and the death of our men so

* A, C, D, and Sl. 1 read 'Newfoundland.' † *Sic.*

great, that the like befel not any ship during the time of the war. All which disasters must be imputed to Captain Lister's rashness, upon whom my Lord of Cumberland chiefly relied, having no experience himself.

He was the man that advised the sending the ships of wine for England, otherwise we had not tasted the want of drink. He was as earnest in persuading our landing in the face of the fortifications of St. Mary against all reason and sense. As he was rash, so was he valiant, but paid dearly for his unadvised counsel; for he was one of the first hurt, and that cruelly, in the attempt of St. Mary, and afterwards drowned in the rich ship cast away at Mount's Bay.*

* All the MSS. examined end this voyage here. The Churchill text goes on: 'After our quitting St. Mary, as you have heard, we repaired to the island of St. George, as you may read in the sixth book, where there happened a strange accident to me, and indeed I may say the strangest escape that ever befel me in my life. I refer you to that book, thinking it fitter to be inserted there than in this.' The reference in the sixth book sends the reader back to the fifth, where the incident will be found in the section on *Stratagems to be used at Sea.*

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[1] Purchas and Wright[1] give only four ships:—

Ships.	Tons.	Commanders.
Victory . .	800	Earl of Cumberland, Admiral. Captain Lister.
Meg . . .	60	Captain William Monson, Vice-Admiral.
Margaret . .	60	Captain Edward Wright, *alias* Careless, Rear-Admiral.
Carvel[2] . .	40	Captain Pigeon.

[1] In Hakluyt, *Voyages*, vii. p. 63, ed. 1888.

[2] *Carvel* is usually considered the anglicized form of the Portuguese *Caravella*, a four-masted vessel, seldom exceeding 120 tons, built on finer lines than the square-rigged ship, and native to the Mediterranean. The foremast usually had two square sails; the other three masts each carried one great lateen sail, and their build and rig rendered the caravels much faster and more windwardly than the ordinary round ship. But Jal (*Glossaire Nautique*) seems to doubt whether the

but they were joined by some others at the Azores, perhaps from Drake's fleet or sailing on their own account; and among them was a ship commanded by Captain John Davis, the famous navigator. There were about 400 volunteers, soldiers, and sailors, 'all at his lordship's own expense.' George Clifford, third Earl of Cumberland, expended a great fortune in ostentatious living and privateering expeditions. It was as common in the time of Elizabeth to take shares in a privateering venture as it is now, in trade and society, to speculate on the Stock Exchange. But the earl differed from his compeers in that some of his fleets were fitted out on almost a royal scale, and in sometimes venturing his own person at sea; he found that a single ship was more likely than a fleet to make a profit, but wisdom was bought too late to save his great estates. He is accredited with having conducted, or fitted out, eleven voyages, of which this was nominally the third. The second, so-called, was under a commission bearing date 4th October, 1588, for which the Queen lent him the Golden Lion, but he was only a very short time at sea, having been disabled by bad weather, and driven back with only one prize.

[2] The squadron sailed from Plymouth on 18th June, 1589, and on the 21st met three French ships laden with fish from Newfoundland and bound for Havre and St. Malo. These, being owned by Catholic adherents of the League, were seized under letters of marque from Henry IV. with which Cumberland was evidently furnished.[3] Two were sent to England, and with them went the Margaret,[4] which was found to be unsuitable for the service. In the run across the Bay several vessels of the Portugal voyage were met returning and their necessities, in the way of provisions, relieved. On 13th July, in 39° N., they encountered the eleven Hansa ships Monson refers to, and took out of them all goods belonging to Philip's subjects, but, according to Wright, the value of the spices was about 450*l.*, instead of Monson's 7,000*l.* or 8,000*l.*

[3] They sighted St. Michael on 1st August and sailed along the coast that day under Spanish colours; at dusk they were off the anchorage of Ponta Delgada, and seeing some vessels at

English, French, and Flemish *Carvel* was not a 10 or 20 ton fishing boat or tender of indigenous development. In support of his view the existence of the Carvel of Eu, belonging to the navy of Edward IV., may be adduced as evidently of French type and origin, and the term 'carvel-built' is found in English use before any reference to, or apparent knowledge of, caravels.

[3] Henry received one-fifth of the proceeds of such prizes, and the assent of the French ambassador was requisite to each condemnation (R. G. Marsden, *The High Court of Admiralty*).

[4] They were afterwards joined by another Margaret, if this statement (Purchas) be correct.

anchor decided to send in the boats at ten or eleven o'clock to cut their cables to let them drive out to sea. The largest was found to be a London ship sailing with Scotch papers[5] and a large crew, but three other small vessels were towed out, the Spaniards jumping overboard. On the 14th August they were off Flores, where, by professing friendship for Don Antonio, they obtained water and fresh victuals in exchange for oil, wine, and pepper. Here an English vessel brought news that the carracks were at Angra, upon which they resolved to return there, but took Fayal on the way, and, on 27th August, made some prizes under circumstances detailed by Monson more fully than by Wright.

[4] Monson's account differs in some respects from Wright's, who says nothing about the attempt on Graciosa at this time. On 31st August they were in sight of Terceira, and obtained information from some escaped English prisoners, who boarded them at sea, that the carracks they were after had left Angra for Lisbon a week previously.[6] Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, the Dutch traveller, was a passenger on board one of these carracks, and his facts correspond with those of Wright, but his dates are quite incompatible with any English account, although, if we read August for July throughout his story, the events fall into place fairly well. He says that Cumberland passed them, but out of sight, when they were making for Angra; if so it must have been near Terceira, when the English were running from St. Michael to Flores. Having no hope of the carracks, they determined to return to Fayal Island to sack Horta, the principal town, consisting of some 300 houses built of stone. Calms and contrary winds delayed them until 10th September, when they stood into Horta Bay, which was defended by a battery having twenty-three guns mounted. An invitation to surrender having been refused, the ships engaged the fort while a landing party was put ashore a mile and a half from the town. The defenders made a brave show at first, but ran away from both town and fort as soon as Cumberland and his men approached. Linschoten says that the weak resistance was 'by reason of some controversy among them,' and, as they were all Portuguese, we may guess the 'controversy' was really disaffection to Philip. The town was plundered notwithstanding Cumberland's prohibition, but guards were placed over the

[5] A more or less continuous trade with the Azores was carried on by English merchants, under false papers, all through the war. Probably most of the Portuguese officials were not over eager to detect the artifice. In this case, 'the Scots likewise discharged three great pieces into the air to make the Spaniards think they were their friends and our enemies, and shortly after the Scottish master and some other with him, came aboard to my lord, doing their duty and offering their service.'

[6] Wright.

churches and convents, which were thus saved; and the townspeople ransomed them and their houses for 2,000 ducats, paid mostly in church plate. The battery was destroyed and fifty-eight pieces of iron ordnance, mounted and unmounted, removed on board the ships. Matters being thus satisfactorily arranged, the governor and some of the chief people were solemnly invited to dinner on board the Victory, on Sunday, in orthodox English fashion, those who came being saluted at their departure 'with sound of drum and trumpet and a peal of ordnance.' Two more days were spent in watering, and on 16th September they put to sea, but were driven back by foul weather on the 23rd, much to the terror of the inhabitants, who were pleasantly surprised to find that, this time, the English paid for all they took. On the 25th they were driven to sea by heavy weather and were beating about until 2nd October, when they were off Graciosa. It must have been after Cumberland left Fayal for the second time that what Linschoten describes as the hard fortune of the Englishmen in missing six West Indian ships occurred. He says they came into Fayal three or four days after Cumberland left, with treasure worth 4,000,000 ducats on board. They must have been a part of the New Spain fleet of that year, under Juan Aribe,[7] who, when he heard of his danger, got to sea again as soon as possible and arrived safely at San Lucar, Cumberland passing Fayal again within less than forty-eight hours of his departure.

Cumberland wanted water badly, and at first thought he would have no difficulty in getting it by force at Graciosa. But the islanders made a stout resistance, the anchorage was bad, and there was no easy landing place, so he took to writing letters made up of persuasion and threats, and again invoking the name of Don Antonio. The people of the island had very little fresh water for themselves, and professed that they would rather give two tuns of wine than one of water, but finally agreed to provide some if the English refrained from landing. In the meantime a Weymouth privateer had joined them with a 16,000*l.* prize, from which news was obtained that the West Indian fleet was momentarily expected. Leaving three vessels to take in the water, the Victory put to sea, and on the 4th October took the Newfoundland ship laden with fish, Monson speaks of, which was sent off to England. The weather was bad and the squadron, reunited, remained beating about for some days, but on 9th October, being off Angra, just saw fifteen vessels from the West Indies going into the port. They were a portion of a fleet of fifty, of which eleven had been lost in the Florida Channel and the rest separated by weather. The English lingered longingly off the harbour, which

[7] 'Juan Dorives' in Linschoten.

was too strongly defended for a direct attack, hoping that the Spaniards would resume their voyage, and after waiting some days sent in to sound, thinking that there might be an anchorage out of range of the batteries from which the Spanish ships might be cannonaded.[8] This failed, and as a last resource the squadron put to sea, leaving a pinnace, but also out of sight of land, to watch the port, trusting that the Spaniards might be tempted to come out. Five days later the pinnace rejoined with the information that the Spaniards had struck their topmasts and unbent their sails, and, as Cumberland's supplies were always from hand to mouth, it was evidently impossible to continue his watch for an indefinite period.[9]

On 20th October the earl stood over to St. Michael and found some Scots ships in Ponta Delgada roads and at Villa Franca. From them some fresh water and a few butts of wine were obtained, but nothing sufficient, and on the 21st a boat's crew tried to land at Villa Franca to fill the casks, but were repulsed. Hearing that the island of St. Mary was less well defended, they resolved to go there for water and then stand away for the coast of Spain. On the 24th sixty or seventy men under Captains Lister, John Davis, and Amyas Preston were sent away in the boats, but on approaching the roadstead of the town of St. Mary two ships were seen to be at anchor, and all thought of watering vanished at the prospect of prizes. They were boarded, the crews having fled ashore, but with a loss of two killed and sixteen wounded from the fire of the town;[10] one was aground and had to be left, the other, laden with sugar, was towed out.

[8] Linschoten describes an action the next day (10th October) between an English ship and a lagging Spaniard making for the harbour. The Englishman sank her, nothing being saved of her cargo and the 200,000 ducats in treasure she carried, and only about thirty of her passengers and crew, who were set ashore. Linschoten says that the English would not rescue the friars and women who were drowning. As to the friars the statement can be understood, but as to the women it seems to require some further elucidation. None of the English accounts mentions an action of any kind as occurring.

[9] Linschoten writes that these Spanish ships sailed again on 27th October, and that all but two of them were taken on the coast of Spain. If so the performance of striking topmasts and unbending sails must have been gone through for the especial benefit of the crew of the pinnace, which was doubtless watched, and the Spanish commander took the first opportunity, after Cumberland left, to slip to sea.

[10] Monson, it will be noticed, says: 'two parts of our men' were killed and wounded. The Purchas relation says that eighty were killed and wounded, Cumberland being among the latter, in trying to bring off the grounded prize. Monson describes this incident more fully in Book V., where he says the attack was made by 200 men.

The next day, the 25th, the object of their quest came again into prominence, the excitement of the capture having worn off, and another attempt was made to get water; but this failing, they went the same night for the island of St. George, where they came on the 27th. Here Cumberland sent Monson and Preston ashore with a letter promising to do no harm if they were allowed to fill their casks, but no resistance was attempted. However, many of the men were tired of the voyage, and wanted to go home instead of to the coast of Spain, as the earl intended, and brought off only six tuns for the Victory, saying they could get no more, thinking thus to compel Cumberland to go back to England, the Victory having only twelve tuns of water and wine on board. The plan was simple, but did not persuade the Admiral, who purposed sending them back the next day, but, 'through roughness of the seas and wind and unwillingness of his men it was not done,' which last phrase seems to suggest something approaching mutiny.[11] In the result it was put to the vote whether they should stop at the Azores, or go for England, *viâ* the coast of Spain on half allowance of drink, the latter alternative being eagerly agreed to. Some sick and wounded were sent home direct in the Margaret, with the prize taken at St. Mary, and Monson left the Meg for the Victory.[12]

The return voyage commenced on 31st October; on 4th November a Portuguese vessel of 110 tons from Pernambuco, with sugar and brazil-wood, was chased and taken. From its people they had information of another ship ahead which they went after, and that or a second Brazilman was taken on 6th November. While examining this prize a sail was made out from the maintop of the Victory, which was chased and taken the same afternoon. This proved to be one of the Flota ships from Angra, which Cumberland had had to leave, a vessel of 300 or 400 tons, with hides, cochineal, and sugar, besides bullion. Some resistance was expected, they 'having hanged the sides of the ship so thick with hides . . . that musket shot could not have pierced them,'[13] but she struck to the second shot. They were now about forty-five leagues west of Cape Roca, and as the Victory was found to sail faster than any of the prizes Captain Lister was put into the one last taken and directed to follow with the others to Portsmouth, while the flagship made the best of her

[11] 'In a tumultuous manner,' says Monson (Book V.).

[12] It may be that it was now that the Margaret first left the fleet, and not as stated in Purchas (*ante*, p. 231), who says that the Meg was now sent home with the prize which, as Wright says Monson was taken out of her, seems more likely.

[13] This form of defence, of Mediterranean origin, was of unknown antiquity.

way home. In the twenty-four hours (7–8th November) after parting company they ran 140 miles, and were looking forward to all the pleasures of Christmas in England, when the wind came easterly and remained so, driving the ship off to leeward and out into the Atlantic. It will be remembered that there was only sufficient drink on board to provide half allowance for the run home by way of the Spanish coast, and as, day after day, and week after week, the wind steadily blew from the east, the miseries endured by the tortured men are described, sadly enough, by Wright in what is a piece of classical Elizabethan prose, but too long to quote here.[14] It must suffice to say that more men died from thirst during those weeks than had perished by disease, shot, or sword during the whole voyage, until, on 1st December, they spoke an English ship, which gave them some beer. But for occasional rain probably not one man would have survived. On 2nd December they made Ventry Bay, and remained there until the 20th; on the 30th the voyage ended at Falmouth. In all, thirteen prizes had been taken,[15] but the Flota one, worth all the rest, was wrecked on the Cornish coast and all on board—but five or six—drowned.

Monson found this voyage interesting because he took part in it, and otherwise apparently would not have considered it worth remark. But it is deserving of notice in some detail as illustrating fully the besetting weakness of Elizabethan royal and private expeditions—the want of supplies, which rendered the execution of any systematic strategical plan impossible. Here, after his first mistake, Cumberland could only look for Spaniards in the intervals of his flights from island to island in search of water and other necessaries. How large his squadron was we do not know, and it probably altered in composition almost day by day, as he was joined or abandoned by independent ships. But whatever its size it held by default the complete command of the sea among the Western Islands, there being no Spanish force capable of trying conclusions with it. That being so, the object of the Admiral should have been to obtain a success which would have been a heavy blow to Philip and would have filled his own and his men's pockets, an object not to be attained by the sack of any number of wretched little island towns. The West Indian fleet being expected daily, Cumberland must have known that his proper station was west of Flores, his ships spreading north and south within signalling distance of each other, that being the landfall the Flotas always sought. Instead of pushing on to his

[14] See also Monson (Book V.), 'For sixteen days together we never tasted drop of drink, either beer, wine, or water.'

[15] Purchas.


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26

the homeward Flota ships as should escape Cumberland. His squadron consisted of the Golden Lion, Bonaventure, Advice and Repentance,[24] and, sailing in September, made straight for Cape Sagres, where he cut out a Biscayan ship from under the fire of the fort. Shortly afterwards he met the West Indiamen which, evading Cumberland, left Angra on 27th October,[25] and, Linschoten says, took twelve out of the fourteen forming the fleet, but as Frobiser only accounted for four prizes this must be a mistake. Two of them were wrecked and the remaining two were valued at 15,000*l.* He returned in November, the cost of his voyage having been 11,320*l.*[26]

[24] *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2226. The Repentance, better known afterwards as the Dainty, belonged to Sir John Hawkyns.

[25] *Ante*, p. 234.

[26] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxxiv. 75.

Sir John Hawkyns and Sir Martin Frobiser, their Voyage to the Coast of Spain and Islands, A.D. 1590. [1]

Ships.	Commanders.
The Revenge . .	Sir Martin Frobiser.
The Mary Rose . .	Sir John Hawkyns.
The Lion . . .	Sir Edward Yorke.
The Bonaventure . .	Captain Fenner.
The Rainbow . .	Sir George Beeston.
The Hope . . .	Captain Bostocke.
The Crane . . .	Captain Hawkyns.
The Quittance . .	Captain Burnell.
The Foresight.	
The Swiftsure.	

FROM the year 1585 until this present year 1590, there was the greatest possibility of enriching our nation by actions at sea, had they been well advised and followed. The King of Spain was grown so weak in shipping by the overthrow he had in 1588, that he neither could nor did defend the trade of his subjects.

Her Majesty now beginning to find how necessary it was for her to maintain a fleet upon the Spanish coast, as well to hinder the preparations he might make against her to repair the disgrace he received in 1588. as also out of a hope she had to intercept his trade from the Indies, by which he grew great and mighty, and therefore of the better ability to offend her, she sent this year, 1590, twelve ships of her own in two squadrons, the one to be commanded by Sir John Hawkyns, the other by

Sir Martin Frobiser, two gentlemen of tried experience and known valour. [2]

The King of Spain, understanding of this preparation of hers, sent forth twenty sail of ships under the command of Don Alonso de Bazan, brother to the late famous Marquis of Santa Cruz, who had not long before subdued the Terceira Islands, and overthrown the navy of France wherein Monsieur La Strozzi was chief commander. [3] Don Alonso was charged to secure the coming home of the Indies fleet and carracks at that time of the year expected.

But he being put to sea with the directions aforesaid, it seemed the King of Spain was better advised than to adventure twenty of his ships to twelve of ours, and sent for Don Alonso back, and so frustrated the expectation of our fleet.

He likewise made a despatch to the Indies, commanding the fleets to winter there rather than to run the hazard of coming home that summer for fear of us. But this proved so great a hindrance and loss to the merchants of Spain, to be so long without return of their goods, that many broke in Seville and other places. Besides, it was so great a weakening to their ships to winter in the Indies as it was many years before they could recover their losses, as by the years following it appeared.

Our fleet, being thus prevented, spent seven months in vain upon the coasts of Spain and the Islands, but in that space could not possess themselves of one ship of the Spaniards. And the carracks, upon which part of their chief hopes depended, came home without sight of the Islands, and arrived safe at Lisbon.

This voyage was a bare action at sea, though they attempted landing at Fayal, which, as you have heard, the Earl of Cumberland the year before had taken. But the castle being refortified they

prevailed not in their enterprise, and from this time thenceforwards the King of Spain endeavoured to strengthen his coasts, and to increase in shipping, than in any way to encounter us at sea, as may appear by the next ensuing year. [4]

[1] The fleet consisted of :—[1]

Ships.	Tons.	Commanders and Period of Commission.	Masters.
Mary Rose .	600	Sir John Hawkyns,[2] 25th May–8th November.	Thos. Thompson.
Revenge .	500	Sir Martin Frobiser,[2] 25th May–16th October.	Thos. Grove.
Golden Lion .	500	Sir Geo. Beeston,[3] 25th May–15th October.	—
Hope . .	600	George Fenner,[2] 25th May–10th November.	Wm. Broadbent.
Nonpareil .	500	Rich. Hawkyns,[4] 25th May–8th November.	John Hampton.
Rainbow .	500	Ed. Fenner, 25th May–8th November.	Ed. Taylor.
Swiftsure .	400	Ed. Wilkinson, 25th May–8th November.	Wm. Mace.
Foresight .	300	Wm. Wynter, 25th May–8th November.	Simon Fernandez.[5]
Bonaventure .	600	Ed. Yorke, 25th May–24th October.	—
Dreadnought .	400	Martin Frobiser, junr., 25th May–17th October.	—
Crane . .	250	John Bostocke, 25th May–17th October.	—
Quittance .	270	Francis Burnell, 25th May–6th October.	—
Advice . .	50	Wm. King, 25th May–7th October.	—

[1] *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2227.

[2] Thirty shillings a day.

[3] Fifteen shillings a day. In 1590 Beeston was upwards of seventy-nine years of age (*Cecil MSS.* 20th June, 1596).

[4] Rich. Hawkyns and the following captains, two-and-sixpence a day.

[5] Fernandez was one of several Portuguese in the English service, and was considered of sufficient importance to receive especial notice from Mendoza, who, in writing to Philip about Fenton's attempted voyage to the East Indies in 1582, says : 'The pilot of the principal ship is a Terceira Portuguese, a heretic called Simon Fernandez, who

[2] The year 1589 marks the close of the first era of military expeditions, and the commencement of the phase of so-called commerce destruction advocated by Walsyngham and so many others, discussed in the Introduction. There were other reasons, beside the failure of the Portugal voyage, moving Elizabeth to a change of system. The area of active operations against Philip was now to be extended to France. Henry III. had been murdered by Jacques Clement on 31st July, 1589, and Henry of Navarre now became King of France, gathering to himself, it is true, all that was sanest in the national life, but uniting against himself fanaticism and the personal ambition of the feudal nobles, backed by the power of Spain. Moreover there were signs of the movement Philip subsequently made to obtain a footing in Brittany, and it was becoming plainer that the support given to the League was but the first step in a scheme to obtain the crown of France for himself or a dependant. The assassination of Henry III. so far cleared the situation as to make it obvious that if France was not to become a stepping-stone towards the conquest of England, Henry IV. would have to be supported, and the natural method to that end appeared to be by way of auxiliary troops and subsidies adopted in assisting the Dutch. But as Elizabeth was venturing on a new path, to an unknown destination, she may naturally have resolved, even if no other causes had been at work, no longer to expend English lives and treasure in expeditions which appeared to her fruitless. In consequence of events following the death of Henry III., Henry of Navarre was compelled to raise the siege of Paris and fall back into Normandy. He had sent representatives to lay the state of affairs before Elizabeth and the consequent action was exceedingly prompt for her, for in September 4,000 men under Lord Willoughby were passing over into France. Their movements in France do not concern us here, but difficulties arose with Henry about their pay and support, and they were recalled towards the end of the year.

This military aid given to Henry no doubt caused the postponement of a cruising fleet intended to sail early in 1590 under Hawkyns and Frobiser, who were now to be given an opportunity

has lived here for some years, and is considered one of the best pilots in the country' (*Simancas Papers*, 20th April, 1582). There are several seamen of his name, and possibly of his family, known in maritime history; two were granted licences to explore in 1501, by Ferdinand and Isabella, another was one of Magellan's pilots, and a fourth fled from punishment in Portugal for conducting French ships to the East Indies (Harrisse, *Travaux Nautiques des Portugais*, Paris, 1898). In the Cottonian collection is a chart of the North Eastern coast of America, which Simon Fernandez lent to Dr. John Dee in 1580. He was with Amadas in 1584, and was master of the Tiger, under Sir Richard Greynvile, in 1585.

to put into practice the line of action they had long advocated against the Flotas.[6] But besides Elizabeth's new entanglement in France there was the nervous dread of a fresh Spanish invasion, which was a source of constant alarm to her and made her loth to send any considerable fleet out of the Channel. To us, now, it seems inexplicable that the Government, knowing, as it must have done, the straits to which Spain was reduced, and knowing, as it should have done, the value of Philip's grandiloquent but slow and confused preparations, could have taken him so seriously in the years immediately following 1588; but one of the periodical fits of panic seized the Government in the beginning of 1590, and all preparation for a foreign voyage was stopped. Estimates for a fleet had been drawn up in the preceding December, but in February and March 1590 an embargo was laid on shipping, the victualler, Quarles, was ordered to prepare provisions for 10,000 men for three months, and the vice-admirals and deputy-lieutenants of the maritime counties to register for service all seamen, fishermen, and gunners between sixteen and sixty years of age.[7] On the 23rd February the Privy Council decided that all ships in readiness for sea were to be concentrated at Portsmouth, that the States were to be applied to for the twenty-five ships they were bound by treaty to provide, and that it was 'unmeet' to allow Hawkyns to go.[8] Philip was informed that there was great alarm in England at the prospect of another attempt at invasion, and, in April, that there were twenty-six Queen's ships and seventy merchantmen ready. The alarm was ludicrously mutual, for while Elizabeth was dislocating her scheme of offence, and announcing imminent danger, the Lisbonese were removing their property far inland in fear of the expected English fleet.[9] There was, however, far less excuse for the English tremors, for Philip was only now taking steps to replace the material losses of 1588. In 1589 he contracted for twelve ships, the twelve apostles Monson writes about later, but probably only on the disastrous subsidy system;[10] in 1590 twelve Ragusan ships were contracted for;[11] a Spaniard undertook to maintain a fleet of forty-two sail at sea to keep open communications with Brittany

[6] See Introduction, *ante*, pp. 39, 75.

[7] *Acts of the Privy Council.* On 23rd April, Drake was ordered to Plymouth to advise about its defence (*ibid.*).

[8] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxx. 80, 94.

[9] *Ibid.* ccxxii. 17. Also 'Ferrol is in a panic, and they have run a chain across the mouth of the harbour' (*State Papers Ven.* 14th February, 1590).

[10] See Book III., *post.*

[11] Pedro Ivella engaged to keep twelve galleons in commission for twelve years, at a fixed rate. He did not arrive at Cadiz with them until July 1595, and then only three or four were found to be of service.

in view of the proposed force to be sent there, and Alonso de Bazan designed some new fast vessels—galleyzabras—to carry the treasure home from the West Indies.[12] As these last were meant rather to run than to fight they were a confession of weakness. The *personnel* was to be replaced by sweeping into the navy all the vagabond youths to be found in Spain.[13]

Whatever success was to be anticipated from these measures, they required time to come into effect, and, while they were an added reason for Elizabeth to strike again and again while she had the upper hand, need not have disturbed her plans. But not only was she alarmed by the futile fear of invasion, but she was equally disquieted by the weak threat of an expeditionary force to Brittany which Philip was known to be preparing.[14] In January he had obtained a report from Diego Maldonado, that there were only three ports suitable to receive and fit out a Spanish fleet, that there were no useful local ships, and that although the Breton seamen were Catholic, they were not to be trusted.[15] He also knew, probably, that the Duc de Mercœur, the Governor of Brittany, proposed to use Spanish assistance to his own profit and not to that of Philip.[16] The apparent necessity of watching Philip's movements towards Brittany was probably the immediate cause of the decision of the Council on 23rd February, but Hawkyns was bitterly disappointed, and on 1st March wrote to Burghley that 'now being out of hope that ever I shall perform any royal thing, I do put on a mean mind.' Philip attempted to send a force of 4,500 troops to Brittany in May, but the fleet was twice driven back,[17] and as

[12] Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, iii. p. 184; *Disq. Nauticas*, v. p. 24. The galleyzabra was built 'after the zabra fashion, but the keel long, galley-wise . . . made on purpose for swift sailing with oars.' Probably the sides did not 'tumble home' as in the ordinary ocean-going vessel. See also *post*, ii. p. 319.

[13] *Armada Española*, iii. p. 193.

[14] See Introduction, p. 70, *ante*.

[15] *Simancas Papers*, 31st January, 1590.

[16] Philip Emanuel de Lorraine, Duc de Mercœur and Penthièvre, the 'Duke Mercury' of Monson and Camden, claimed the sovereignty of Brittany in right of his wife, Marie de Luxembourg. Legally, Brittany was not a part of the kingdom of France, but belonged to the reigning family, just as the American possessions were not a part of the kingdom of Spain but possessions of the Crown. In the circumstances, Henry III., who had married Mercœur's sister, would hardly have made him Governor of Brittany had he respected his mental capacity, which does not seem to have been great.

[17] Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, iii. p. 69. E. de Mariategui (*El Capitan Cristobal de Rojas*, Madrid, 1880, p. 25) says that the Spaniards were twice compelled to put back by reason of an English fleet

that danger appeared to have passed for the time, the Hawkyns-Frobiser voyage was again taken up. Either for tactical reasons, or because friction was anticipated between the two Admirals if they sailed in company, the fleet was practically divided into two independent commands: Hawkyns had the Mary Rose, Hope, Nonpareil, Rainbow, Swiftsure and Foresight, with 1,340 men; Frobiser the Revenge, Lion, Bonaventure, Dreadnought, Crane, Quittance and Advice, with 1,190 men. On 11th June[18] the Council wrote to the Admirals that whereas their Instructions ordered them not to leave the English coast before the 20th, intelligence had been received from Spain that the Spanish fleet would soon put to sea and, as the English Channel must not be left unguarded, they were to remain about Plymouth until the end of the month. They were to send some pinnaces down to the Spanish coast, and if any attempt on Brittany appeared likely, they were then to follow their Instructions. We do not know the nature of the Instructions, but it seems probable that the first object now was to prevent the passage of Spanish troops to Brittany, and that the search for the treasure fleets had taken the second place. At this moment Philip was more concerned about the safety of the 1590 Flota from the Indies than about putting in an appearance in the Channel. That of 1589, carrying 5,000,000 ducats in silver, had been got home safely in March, escaping by a chance twenty English ships lying off Cape St. Vincent on the watch,[19] and possibly had Hawkyns and Frobiser been at sea as early in the year as was at first intended, it may not have been so fortunate. The date of departure of the fleet is unknown, but it seems to have sailed and put back at least once. On 4th July Hawkyns was at Plymouth attending to the unloading of a Dutch and two Easterling ships from Portugal brought in by the Swiftsure, it having been found from 'divers letters and notes that they did relieve her Majesty's enemies and had the same intent to do the like again.'[20] Hawkyns must have sailed finally shortly afterwards; the first indication of Frobiser's whereabouts is from the report of some townsmen of Lyme Regis who, coming from the Azores, met him about 25th July with ten ships within thirty leagues of St. Michael, where, Frobiser told them, possibly for publication, he meant to land.[21] They were also told that the

lying at Belle Isle. I cannot find any reference in English papers to the fact, but it is quite possible that part of the Channel squadron went there.

[18] *Acts of the Privy Council.*

[19] Linschoten. They must have been privateers, and the number is probably exaggerated.

[20] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxxiii. 4. They were stopped by the Swiftsure on 27th June, so that it may have occurred well into the Bay.

[21] *Ibid.* 39.

new ships Sir Martin had with him 'did sail passing well.' The ships in question were the Mary Rose, rebuilt in 1589, and the Crane and Quittance just launched.

[3] When Don Antonio found, in his first visit to England, that he could get no assistance, he removed to France in January 1582, where Catherine de Medici and Henry III. allowed a fleet of privateers to be collected at Belle Isle, hired from Rochelle, Dieppe, and St. Malo. The command was given to Catherine's cousin and favourite, Philip Strozzi, and, as usual, Don Antonio's confidential agent was in the pay of Philip, and not only betrayed his plans but did his best to disorganize the expedition. Philip was uneasy, for in 1581 a force under Pedro Flores de Valdes, which had been sent to subdue the Azores, had been repulsed with a loss of 700 men, and he now fitted out a powerful fleet under Alvaro de Bazan, Marquis of Santa Cruz.[22] Unless some leader capable of bewildering tactical surprises had arisen, the French fleet of fifty-five vessels, ill-manned, ill-found, and undisciplined, was set a hopeless task against the as yet unshaken maritime prestige of Spain. The French sailed in June 1582, the fleet being under the command of M. de Sainte-Soulaine, and the troops, thirty-seven companies of foot and 400 volunteers, under the orders of Strozzi and Charles de Brissac. In July they were at St. Michael and, disdaining the undefeated Spanish fleet at sea, landed 1,500 men at Ponta Delgada to take the fort. Within a week, on 22nd July, Santa Cruz appeared, his fleet having upwards of 7,000 soldiers on board. From the 22nd to the 26th the two fleets remained in face of each other without coming to action, Strozzi waiting for the English auxiliaries he hoped for, the Spaniard for reinforcements which would have still further increased his fleet. Santa Cruz could afford to be patient, for the French, having attempted a landing expedition in contempt of an unbeaten enemy's fleet, could now neither fly nor carry on their design without first fighting him. During the night of 25–26th Don Antonio lost courage and fled, with several ships. On the 26th Strozzi lost patience and attacked, and did not fear to come to close quarters with the Spaniards, although the only chance for the lighter and more weakly manned Frenchmen would have been an action at cannon range. The battle lasted five hours, and then many of the French ships escaped. Strozzi and some other leaders were killed, and 1,200 Frenchmen were killed and wounded, the Spaniards losing upwards of 500 men. Eighty gentlemen and 313 soldiers and

[22] There were only three King's ships in Bazan's fleet of seventy ships, and one of them was the San Martin, Medina Sidonia's flagship in 1588. (Fernandez Duro, *La Conquista de las Azores en* 1583, p. 36.)

sailors, taken prisoners, were beheaded and strangled in cold blood by order of Santa Cruz, five days after the fight.[23]

There was a very general belief in Spain that with the French had been a strong English squadron which had been the first to run, and there was thus one more impression leading Philip to despise the English as maritime antagonists. It is certain that the French chiefs expected a squadron of thirty or forty English vessels, and it is equally certain that the traitor, Miguel Vaez, boasted of having persuaded Strozzi to depart before they joined, and of having induced Don Antonio to send back such as came after the defeat at St. Michael.[24] But if there were any at the battle they could only have been a few of the half-trader, half-pirate class, always hovering about the Azores in search of legitimate or illegitimate profit, who would have had nothing to gain by fighting seriously for Don Antonio.

[4] Linschoten tells us that in 1589 out of 100 ships in the Tierra-firme fleet, all but one were wrecked in the Florida Channel, and that of 220 ships sailing that year for Spain and Portugal from the various possessions of the Spanish Crown, only fourteen or fifteen arrived in safety. For what passed under his eyes at the Azores Linschoten is a trustworthy witness, but he had come from the East Indies, and knew nothing whatever of the West Indian trade, and there is no doubt that the figures he gives are grossly incorrect, the products of ship and tavern gossip and multiplication. A combined fleet from Tierra-firme and New Spain rarely contained 80 or 100 ships when trade was at its best, and was usually much smaller; it was quite impossible that the Tierra-firme fleet alone should have consisted of 100 vessels. In his enumeration of the settlements from which ships sailing that year had been lost, he omits the East Indies because he had just arrived thence himself, and knew that no vessels had been wrecked; in the other cases he was detailing report.[25]

It has been noticed that the possibility of seizing a rich silver convoy in March had been missed by the delay in sending the admirals to sea. On 7th August Frobiser, with twenty ships, having doubtless picked up some privateers on his passage, was

[23] It is fair to say that many of the Spanish officers protested against the act. It 'weighed on their souls,' says one of them. Santa Cruz asked his prisoners whether they could show any commission from the King of France; failing a commission he was technically entitled to treat them as pirates. Lord Grey slaughtered the Italians taken at Smerwick in 1580 on the same grounds.

[24] Forneron, *Hist. de Philippe II.* iii. pp. 155, 160.

[25] Don C. Fernandez Duro (*Naufragios de la Armada Española*, Madrid, 1867) does not mention 1589 as a particularly unfortunate year, but he gives fourteen vessels as wrecked at San Juan de Ulua in 1590, in a Norther.

off Terceira, and, although he did not know it, had again missed an opportunity, for Pedro Menendez Marquez, with some of the new galleyzabras laden with silver had got home to Viana in the beginning of August.[26] From Terceira Frobiser went on to Fayal, where the fort had been rebuilt, and where there was now a Spanish garrison. Linschoten relates that Frobiser sent ashore for victuals, offering money and 'good friendship' in exchange, and that the messenger was killed, upon which Frobiser sailed away with threats of coming back and wreaking vengeance. In weighing the probability of a story, the character, previous career, and general line of action of the central character must always be taken into consideration, and in this case the reputation of one of the roughest and fiercest of the Elizabethan seamen renders it likely that the story was a Spanish rhodomontade repeated by Linschoten in good faith. If, indeed, the incident happened and Frobiser left suddenly after the murder of the bearer of a flag of truce, we may be certain that it was for good reason, such as the receipt of intelligence upon which he thought it necessary to act at once. About the end of August or beginning of September Frobiser was off Corvo, where he took several prizes, but the carracks from the East Indies, having somehow obtained information of his presence, avoided the Azores, and also escaping Hawkyns, arrived safely at Lisbon, having probably gone north-about. It happens that during 1590 there were many intercepted Spanish letters, which paint vividly the fear inspired by the English throughout the Spanish dominions. Officials writing from Puerto Rico and the Havana complain that the English come and brave them at the mouth of their harbours; even at far Panama one writer says that the sight of a strange sail put the whole country in a turmoil lest it should be one of the dreaded corsairs.[27] At the Azores the English, in the eyes of Linschoten, 'are become lords and masters of the sea, and need care for no man,' and the Spaniards themselves 'cursed those that had been the cause to provoke the Englishmen to fight.' Frobiser's squadron was doing nothing heroic to catch the attention of the world, but it was once more exemplifying the silent but widespread effect of naval operations on a nation depending on maritime communication for its power of action, by dislocating the processes of commerce and warfare, and thus affecting millions of people who did not know, and would never hear, of its existence. So far the purely Flota warfare recommended by so many English observers was justifying itself. Frobiser was back at Plymouth on 29th September, having been obliged to return for lack of provisions. Hawkyns had remained nearer the coast of Spain, although

[26] Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, ii. p. 485.
[27] Hakluyt, *Voyages*, xv. p. 313 *et seq.*, ed. 1888.

towards the end of August he also was half-way over towards the Azores. He did not come back until the end of October, when he wrote to Burghley in a melancholy frame of mind from Plymouth :—

I did refrain to write to your Lordship, for that I ever hoped upon some notable thing to come into our hands, but it hath pleased God to deal with us that we met with nothing whereby I should have occasion to advertise your Lordship as I desired; and thus God's infallible word is performed, in that the Holy Ghost said Paul doth plant, Apollo doth water, but God giveth the increase. So I may boldly say unto your Lordship I was very well provided, both of shipping, victual, furniture, and a quiet and sufficient company, but since this hath been the good pleasure of God, I do content myself and hold it all to come for the best.[28]

Hawkyns was very well satisfied with his crews and equipment. A Thomas Davyes, who sailed with the expedition, it is not quite clear whether with Hawkyns or Frobiser, but probably with the former, held a different opinion and drew up a report for the authorities, charging knavery and incompetence all round, from the highest to the lowest. It is not necessary to attempt an analysis of the truth of his accusations, but the paper has been printed as an appendix to Book III. as throwing some light on the internal economy of Elizabethan men-of-war. Both the Admirals provided heavy work for the Admiralty Court, for they both seem to have seized neutral ships on the principle that every vessel was guilty until proved innocent. The proceedings lingered on in the approved fashion, and in some cases at least the owners obtained a verdict, but did not find themselves any nearer the restoration of their ships and goods. The cost of the two squadrons was 17,275*l.*,[29] and it is fairly certain that, so far as direct returns went, they did not pay their expenses.[30]

Sixtus V., who was always one of Philip's candid friends, remarked of his preparations that they never became effective until the moment for action had passed. So far as maritime

[28] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxxiii. 118, 31st October, 1590. When Elizabeth heard the letter read, she exclaimed: 'God's death! This fool went out a soldier, and is come home a divine!'

[29] *Ibid.* ccxxxiv. 75.

[30] Linschoten says that in November 1590, two ships carrying in money and spices alone, without other cargo, 670,000 ducats—upwards of 200,000*l.*—were captured. It need hardly be said that such captures, far exceeding in value the San Felipe, the Madre de Dios, and the St. Valentine, the three great prizes of the war, would have set all England aflame with exultation, and would certainly be recorded in the *State Papers* and elsewhere. For what Linschoten saw himself he is trustworthy; for what he heard he is nearly valueless unless corroborated.

measures were concerned, this slowness was quite as much a matter of inability as inefficient administration. In February the Venetian ambassador noticed that the Spanish ships were lying in port unmanned and unarmed, and in April that there were still no signs of anything beyond the ordinary routine. Philip was quite well informed of English intentions and movements, and the ambassador supplies the explanation of his inactivity elsewhere, when he dilates on the want of seamen; those of the northern provinces had been used up, he says, and those from the south were nearly useless. It was not until the end of September that Don Alonso de Bazan was able to put to sea with forty ships, only to be driven back by bad weather within ten leagues of the Azores. Frobiser must have reached Plymouth within a few days of Bazan's departure from Spain, and the approach of winter would, in the usual course of events, be clearing the Azores of privateers so that his presence was needless; but it is said, although the evidence is not conclusive, that Philip, recognizing the narrowness of his resources, had previously decided to accept all the political and commercial disasters consequent to the non-arrival of the treasure fleets and had sent orders that their return from the West Indies should be deferred. The success of Hawkyns and Frobiser was not obvious to those who measured the fortune of a cruise by the amount of plunder brought back, but the effects were seen in starving and mutinous soldiery, and in the paralysis of Spanish military operations in France and in the Netherlands,[31] for whether or no such orders were sent, no treasure arrived between August 1590, which was part of the silver of 1589 delayed at the Azores, and the spring of 1591.[32]

Probably the principal reason why Hawkyns was kept on the coast of the Peninsula was to watch for any expedition to Brittany, but to do that successfully he should not have been south of Finisterre. When Bazan sailed, a fleet under Sancho Pardo Osorio also left at about the same time with 3,000 troops for a Breton port, and with instructions to crush any English fleet they met, a meeting Philip thought probable in view of the long notice Elizabeth had of his intentions.[33] The soldiers were under the command of Don Juan de Aguila, and as he landed

[31] The cost of Philip's armies in France and the Low Countries was about 110,000*l.* a month (Motley, *United Netherlands*, cap. xxv.), or at least 750,000*l.* now. This was exclusive of the large payments in pensions, bribes, and for political services.

[32] *Armada Española*, ii. pp. 485. 6.

[33] *Ibid.* iii. p. 69. Don C. Fernandez Duro says that they sailed in October, the Venetian ambassador wrote that they landed 15th October; but Forneron (*Philippe II.* iv. p. 83) says they disembarked at Quiberon 28th September. The last-named may be considered the best authority.

with 700 sick, and the Spanish equipment left much to be desired, it is to be regretted that the King's expectations were not fulfilled. Sir Richard Hawkyns, writing many years later, refers in his *Observations* to this cruise of his father's, and says that some Spanish ships for Brittany were encountered, and that the opportunity of engaging with effect was lost by the remissness of the second in command. As he specifies that they were only eight ships and laden with stores 'for the supply of the soldiers in Brittany,' they were probably a reinforcement known to have been sent a month after the transport of the main body.[34] Don Juan de Aguila moved on to and fortified the strong position of Blavet, now a ruin near another famous naval port, L'Orient, whose glories have departed. He was soon on bad terms with the natives, who did not want to be rescued by the Spaniards, and with the Duc de Mercœur, who did not find Don Juan the submissive instrument hoped for.

Don Alonso de Bazan returned from his attempt to reach the Azores about the end of October,[35] and if Philip was in earnest in desiring that his fleets should try conclusions with the English, might have been sent out again after Hawkyns, who could hardly have left the coast. If he did go to sea again, he furnished no material for history. On 25th October the Privy Council directed that a pinnace should be sent with orders to Hawkyns to come home, in consequence of the presence of the Spaniards on the coast of Brittany,[36] but as he wrote from Plymouth on 31st October, he must been on his way back before he received the despatch. It may have been intended that he should go to sea again, as he wrote to Burghley from Plymouth on 10th November that he could not be ready very quickly as it was necessary to lay his ships aground the next spring tide, but if there was any such purpose it was not carried out.[37]

[34] Forneron, *op. cit.* iv. p. 84. Davyes, in the paper previously referred to, seems, in one of his accusations, to allude to the same occurrence, but places it between Lisbon and Coruña. Sir Richard Hawkyns says that it occurred north of Finisterre.

[35] *State Papers Ven.* 10th November, 1590.

[36] *Acts of the Privy Council.*

[37] Hist. Man. Com., 12th Report, *Coke MSS.* i. p. 14.

Two Fleets at sea; the one by us under the Lord Thomas Howard, the other Spanish, commanded by Don Alonso de Bazan, A.D. 1591. [I]

Ships.	Commanders.
The Defiance . .	The Lord Thos. Howard.
The Revenge . .	Sir Richard Greynvile,* Vice-Admiral.
The Nonpareil . .	Sir Ed. Denny.
The Bonaventure .	Captain Crosse.
The Lion . . .	Captain Fenner.
The Foresight . .	Captain Vavasour.
The Crane . . .	Captain Duffield.

HER MAJESTY understanding of the Indian fleet's wintering in the Havana, and that necessity would compel them home this year 1591, she sent a fleet to the Islands under the charge of the Lord Thomas Howard.

The King of Spain perceiving her drift, and being sensible how much the safety of that fleet concerned him, caused them to disembogue so late in the year that it endangered the shipwreck of them all. And thus you may see how he was willing rather to hazard the perishing of ships, men, and goods, than their falling into our hands.

He had two designs in bringing home this fleet so late. One was, he thought the Lord Thomas would have consumed his victuals, and have been forced home: the other, that he might in the mean

* In literature and history Greynvile is known as Grenville, but he always signed his name as printed here, and the form is adopted in accordance with the regulations of the Council of the Society.

time furnish out the great fleet he was preparing, little inferior to that of 1588. In the first he found himself deceived, for my Lord was supplied both with ships and victuals out of England: and in the second he was as much prevented, for the Earl of Cumberland, who then lay upon the coast of Spain, had intelligence of the Spaniards putting out to sea, and advertised my Lord Thomas thereof with all expedition the very night before they arrived at Flores, where my Lord lay. [2]

The day after this intelligence was received from my Lord of Cumberland the Spanish fleet was discovered by my Lord Thomas, being then at an anchor, which he knew by their number and greatness to be the ships of which he had warning; and by that means escaped the danger that Sir Richard Greynvile, his Vice-Admiral, rashly ran into. Upon view of the Spaniards, which were fifty-five sail, the Lord Thomas, like a wary and discreet general, weighed anchor, and made signs to the rest of his fleet to do the like, with a purpose to get the wind of them, and so doing he was secured from them whatever they were. But Sir Richard Greynvile being a stern man,* and imagining this fleet to come from the Indies, and not to be the Armada of which they were informed, would by no means be persuaded by his master or company to cut his cable to follow his Admiral, as all discipline of war did teach him, nay, so headstrong, rash, and unadvised he was that he offered violence to all those that counselled him to the contrary.

But the old saying, 'That a wilful man never wanteth woe,' or is the cause of his own woe, could not be more truly verified than in him. For when the Spanish ships approached nigh unto him and he

* A, B, and R read 'being astern and imagining,' &c. The Churchill text says 'a stubborn man.'

beheld the greatness of them, he began to see and repent him of his error and folly, and would gladly have acquitted himself of them, which then to the best of his power he endeavoured, but too late, for he was left a prey to the enemy, every ship accounting herself happiest that could board him speediest. [3]

This wilful rashness of Sir Richard made the Spaniards much triumph in the victory, being the first ship that ever they took of her Majesty's, and commended to them by some English fugitives serving them to be the best she had. But their joy continued not long, for they possessed her but five days before she was cast away, with many Spaniards in her, upon the Terceira Islands. [4]

Commonly one misfortune is accompanied with another: for the Indian fleet, which my Lord had waited for the whole summer, the day after this mishap fell into the company of this Spanish Armada, whereas if they had come but two days sooner we had possessed both them and many millions of treasure, which the sea afterwards devoured, and many ships and men wrecked; for from the time they met with the Armada and before they could recover home, nigh a hundred of them suffered shipwreck besides the Ascension of Seville, and the double flyboat * that were sunk by the side of the Revenge. All which was occasioned by their wintering in the Indies, and their late disemboguing from thence; for the seas upon that coast engender a worm which doth both weaken and consume their ships.

Notwithstanding the cross and perverse fortune, which Sir Richard Greynvile unadvisedly brought †

* A hundred years later a double flyboat would have meant one that was sheathed (Fr. *doubler*, *doublage*). Perhaps it had the same meaning in Monson's time. † A reads 'wilfully brought.'

upon his fleet, the Lord Thomas would not be dismayed or discouraged; but kept the sea as long as he had victuals; and by such ships as himself and the rest of the fleet took, defrayed the better part of the charge of the whole action. [5]

[1] The ships and captains were :—[1]

Ships.	Tons.	Commanders and Period of Commission.
Defiance .	550	Lord Thos. Howard, 'captain and admiral,'[2] 16th March–13th December.
Bonaventure .	600	Robert Crosse, 16th March–16th October.
Nonpareil .	500	Sir Ed. Denny, 1st April–20th August.
Crane . .	250	————[3] 1st March–5th October.
Moon . .	60	— Jonas, 1st March–4th August.
Charles . .	70	Mathew Bradgate, 1st April–8th August.
Golden Lion .	500	Geo. Fenner, 'captain and vice-admiral,'[4] 6th June–16th October.
Foresight .	300	Thos. Vavasour, 6th June–27th October.

The Defiance was victualled by Lord Thos. Howard; the Revenge and Crane by Ralegh; the Bonaventure, Charles, and Moon by the Lord Admiral.[5] The Moon was sent home on 10th July to hasten the supplies to be sent out; the Nonpareil on 23rd July on account of 'the great infection of the ship'; the Charles is known to have been cruising in the Channel in September. On 31st August Howard appears to have had fourteen ships with him, of which only the Defiance, Revenge, Bonaventure, Lion, and Foresight were men-of-war.[6] Howard was in 'consortship' with independent privateers at various times, but they seem to have come and departed at their own will.

[2] As yet nothing had happened to teach Elizabeth that her cruising squadrons were too weak if Spain made any real attempt to regain the command of its trade routes. During 1589 and 1590 it had been unable to do this and, theoretically,

[1] *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2228. Of course the Revenge does not appear in this list, but a gratuity of six months' pay was given 'to divers widows whose husbands perished' in her.

[2] Forty shillings a day. [3] Blank in pay roll.

[4] Ten shillings a day. [5] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxl. 101.

[6] *Ibid.* and *Lansd. MSS.* lxx. f. 99.

it was good policy to have a squadron at the Azores, on the lines of communication, and another in Spanish waters, 'thereby to amuse the Spanish fleet and hold them on their own coast.' But, as has been remarked, they could only be held on their own coast if the containing squadron was strong enough to keep them in port, or fight them if they came out of port, and this essential qualification was missed, so that if attacked by any greatly superior force the separated squadrons would be compelled to fly or be crushed in detail. After two years of effort Philip was at last able to send a fleet of respectable strength to sea, and his first aim was to clear his trade lines of the enemy clogging communication in a way which bid fair to reduce his armies to impotence for lack of the treasures of the New World. For the invasion, with groundless fears of which Elizabeth was continually fretting the country, he had neither men, ships, nor money, nor could Parma again co-operate in such a scheme, since France had taken an active part in the war. Even for the important end in view, and after long endeavour, Philip's solitary fleet was not ready until the summer was far advanced, and there was so little strength to spare that communication with Brittany, where men and stores were badly wanted, could only be kept up by a squadron of fast-sailing pinnaces trusting to evasion tactics.[7] Monson's statement that Philip was waiting until want of provisions forced Howard off the station cannot be accepted, for not only were the means so humble while the stake was so great, but the dates and facts contradict it.[8]

In England there had been no hesitation about continuing the policy of the preceding two years; the only doubts had been about the methods and the men. The first plan was for twenty ships and pinnaces to be placed under the command of Lord Thomas Howard and Ralegh, and the West Indies were to be included within the area of their operations.[9] This was in

[7] Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, iii. p. 73. In the beginning of 1591 the Spanish force had fallen to less than 2,000 men (Forneron).

[8] The Flota sailed for Spain on 27th July in pursuance of orders sent out long before, the treasure being brought 'by lighter vessels,' Fazan's galleyzabras, 'which, keeping a different latitude, are wont to come more safely to Spain' (*State Papers Ven.* 19th October, 1591, Hakluyt, *Voyages*, vii. p. 106). Philip only delayed the sailing of the Flota until he knew that he would be able to send an escort to meet it.

[9] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxxviii. 18; ccxliii. 105. The responsibilities for this fleet were complicated. The Defiance was to be victualled by Lord Thomas and the wages paid by the Queen; the Revenge to be victualled and paid by the Lord Admiral and Lord Thomas, or, as an alternative, to be victualled by the Queen, and two months' wages to be paid by Ralegh and the subsequent wages by the

January, but in March, if we may trust a newsletter,[10] a larger scheme was contemplated; the Lord Admiral was to go to sea with a powerful fleet, Lord Thomas was to go to the Azores, and Cumberland, acting for Ralegh, Drake, and others, to the coast of Spain. This could only have been belated gossip at best, for we learn by a letter of 10th March that 'My Lord Thomas Howard hath kissed her Majesty's hand, and is gone down to his ships . . . my Lord of Cumberland is not yet ready.'[11] The voyage in its final shape was therefore then settled so far as Lord Thomas Howard was concerned, who was to sail with the Defiance, Revenge, Bonaventure, Nonpareil, Crane, Charles, and Moon, but subsidiary proceedings were for some time under consideration, since in May Burghley notes four ships as to be prepared for a voyage to Newfoundland, presumably to attack the Spanish and French fisheries.[12] Howard's Instructions were dated 15th May,[13] and informed him that there was a Spanish 'fleet' lying between Ushant and Scilly picking up merchantmen. This was probably a distorted report of the proceedings of the squadron of pinnaces keeping up communications with Brittany, and untrue, since there is no other reference to its presence; if it was true it reflected disgrace on the Government which had allowed it to remain there. Lord Thomas was to keep his ships together, and, if he took any prizes, to detain them with him until he came home.[14] He was warned that there was a Spanish fleet between 'St. Mary's Cape and the South Cape,'[15] and it was

Lord Admiral. Others were to be victualled by Ralegh. These minutiæ show that Elizabeth must have haggled considerably over the terms.

[10] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* Add. xxxii. 7, 12th March, 1591.

[11] Lodge, *Illustrations of British History*, ii. p. 437.

[12] *State Papers*, ccxxxviii. 150. Two of these ships were the Lion and Foresight, afterwards sent to reinforce Howard. The Government was always chary of having many ships at sea simultaneously, but Elizabeth had been frequently urged to destroy the Newfoundland fishing fleets. Walsyngham had proposed it in 1585 (*ibid.* clxxvii. 58).

[13] *Ibid.* ccxxxviii. 152. A draft.

[14] This order was probably due to a complaint made by some foreign owners in 1590. Two ships were taken off the Tagus; the crews were transferred to one, the most valuable portion of the two cargoes to the other, which was sent down to Barbary to be sold. This, they said, 'begins to be a daily practice of men-of-war,' doubtless meaning privateers, but a practice the true men-of-war would soon copy. One of Ralegh's ships, the Roebuck, was credited with originating the trick, which evaded awkward questions in the Admiralty Court and the payment of customs. Perhaps it was of Ralegh's own contrivance.

[15] The 'South Cape' is St. Vincent; Cape St. Mary is on the south coast of Portugal, east of Cape St. Vincent.

left 'to my Lord Thomas's judgment by such intelligence as he shall learn whether it be surer lying at the Islands[16] for the Indian fleet, or at St. Mary's Cape, but it is thought by men of good judgment and experience that the Cape is the surer.' Finally he was promised that victuals for two months should be sent after him. The date of these Instructions—15th May—is puzzling because Howard was certainly at sea early in April; they may be a copy of those first given, or later ones modifying the original orders.

The fleet left Plymouth in the beginning of April,[17] but bad weather drove it back to Falmouth, the Revenge alone riding out the gale in the mouth of the Channel, during which time she sprang some of her masts. Fishing and woolding them at sea, Greynvile continued his voyage without waiting for his Admiral, visiting four Easterlings, and taking a Leaguer off Finisterre. On 18th April, off the Berlingas,[18] they sighted seven or eight sail which proved to be part of Howard's fleet chasing a Lübecker, the Eagle, laden with naval stores for Philip. She struck to the Revenge, which continued her passage down to Cape St. Vincent, where Howard, who could not have been delayed long at Falmouth, was met about 22nd April.[19] From St. Vincent the reunited squadron ran to the Azores, and, on the way, took a caravel going there, with 'a bushel of letters' on

[16] *I.e.* the Azores.

[17] On 3rd April Howard took up four of Alderman John Wattes' ships at Plymouth and signed articles of consortship, so far as the coast of Portugal was concerned, undertaking not to interfere with their subsequent voyage to the West Indies (*Ad. Ct. Interrogatories*, 4). The agreement eventually gave rise to a lawsuit, Howard denying his signature. The sentence of the Admiralty Court was in favour of Wattes.

[18] Usually called the Burlings in Elizabethan papers: 'The Berlingas . . . would seem to have been a station of the Northmen, apparently presenting a widely diffused patronymic which is found on the Baltic coast, in Friesland, and in England' (Taylor, *Words and Places*).

[19] Hist. MSS. Com., Appendix to 7th Report, p. 521; *Gawdy MSS.* These details are taken from the letters of Philip Gawdy, probably a volunteer, who was on board the Revenge. At St. Vincent he changed to the Defiance, at Howard's invitation, but at some later period went back to the Revenge, and is likely to have been in the famous fight, since the next letter to these written at sea is, though undated, written as a prisoner from Lisbon. From the freshness with which he records his impressions it must have been his first ocean voyage, and he particularly mentions the 'good usage' he received from Greynvile and Captain Laborne. Laborne must have been the captain of the soldiers on board the Revenge, seen afterwards, when a prisoner at Angra, by Linschoten.

board, to meet the Flota. As yet, notwithstanding the Lübecker, valued at 10,000*l.*, the cruise had not been very productive, and Gawdy tells us that he and his companions were feeling 'like lions that have been almost famished for want of prey.' Presumably Howard reached the Azores early in May, although we know nothing of his proceedings, there being no record of the capture of anything but one small prize. However on 18th May the Privy Council wrote to him embodying the Instructions of the 15th inst., with some additions. They remarked that they had only heard from him once since he left England, and confessed that they were still unable to give him any reliable information as to the arrival of the Flota, opinion being divided between September and October or earlier. He would be victualled until the end of October, and, if he missed the Flota, was to consider whether he would go to the Newfoundland fisheries.[20] Whether the sickness which afterwards struck down nearly half the crews of Howard's squadron had already broken out we do not know, but evidently the Council had heard nothing of it. On 13th June Sir Robert Sidney, the Governor of Flushing, and Bodley, Elizabeth's representative with the States, were instructed to use every endeavour to get a Dutch squadron sent to the Azores by the end of July, holding out golden promises about the amount of plunder to be shared, of which the members of the English Government certainly had no precise knowledge themselves.[21]

On 21st June Burghley and the Lord Admiral wrote to Lord Thomas that two months' victuals had been sent out, and that the Queen, having information that the Flota would be convoyed by upwards of twenty men-of-war, besides the fleet going out from Spain to meet it, had thought it advisable to reinforce him with the Lion and Foresight and six armed merchantmen. As the Spaniards knew that he was at the Islands, and might change their course, they recommended him to send a pinnace to the Havana to watch the route they took.[22] All the details of Howard's fleet were known in Spain;[23] it would appear from this letter that the English authorities were ignorant of the strength of the fleet preparing under Bazan. The Lion and Foresight must have sailed about the end of June or beginning of July and joined Howard

[20] *Acts of the Privy Council.*

[21] *Ibid.* On 6th July Drake was ordered to come from Plymouth to the court at Greenwich, 'so as his abode and stay were but for a few days' (*ibid.*). There is no indication of the purpose of his visit.

[22] *State Papers*, ccxxxix. 52. The merchantmen, from the Thames, were powerful ships of their class: Susan, 350 tons; Centurion, 300; Mayflower, 320; Cherubim, 320; Margaret and John, 200; and Corslet, 200 (misprinted Costely in Hakluyt), *ibid.* 102.

[23] *Ibid.* ccxlii. 57.

without delay. The merchantmen left the river some days before 21st July, but did not leave Plymouth until 17th August, having been kept back by contrary winds. Howard had given a rendezvous sixty leagues west of Fayal, 'spreading North and South betwixt 37½ or 38½ degrees.'[24] If he was not found there the officer in command, Robert Flicke, was to run up to Flores or Corvo where, if Howard had gone, a pinnace would be left to meet him until 31st August, after which date the place of meeting would be the coast of Portugal, twenty or thirty leagues west of Cape Roca. There being so little time to spare, Flicke, to be more sure, went down to Cape Roca, and, on 29th August, was off Peniche and bore away westwards for the Azores. On 31st August, when the presence of his homogeneous little squadron with Howard might have altered the history of the cruise and, sequentially, Elizabeth's naval policy, he was only two days out into the Atlantic.

[3] On 31st August Howard was at anchor off Flores, watering and refreshing with the Queen's ships, the six victuallers that had brought out the fresh provisions, the bark Ralegh and two or three pinnaces.[25] Disease of some sort was raging in the fleet, 'one half part of the men of every ship sick and utterly unservicable; for in the Revenge there were ninety diseased; in the Bonaventure not so many in health as could handle her mainsail . . . the rest, for the most part, were in little better state.'[26] It was no doubt in consequence of the sickness that new ballast was being obtained from the shore, the ships being therefore very light, and many of the men not employed in this work were foraging on their own account for fresh provisions. Alonso de Bazan had left Ferrol with fifty-five ships and 7,200 men[27] and on

[24] *I.e.* in the longitude of Flores, but south of it. The league was an extremely elastic measure of distance as used by the English seamen of the sixteenth century, and indeed for two centuries later. Sometimes it meant merely English miles; it is unlikely that Howard intended to be much west of Flores.

[25] Observations extending over a series of years (*North Atlantic Pilot*) show that winds from N.E. and N.W. obtain in the Azores during an average of twenty days in August and eighteen days in September. The anchorage and watering place during such winds would be on the east side of the island, a little south of the town of Sta. Cruz.

[26] Ralegh, in Hakluyt, *Voyages*, vii. p. 92, ed. 1888. Howard had sent home one ship full of sick men (*Acts of the Privy Council*, 28th February, 1591). This seems to have been in addition to the Nonpareil sent back in July.

[27] Duro, *Arm. Española*, iii. p. 79. According to Labores y March (*Hist. de la Marina Real Española*, ii. p. 479, fifty galleons, four galleasses, and six galleys, divided into five squadrons. Santa Cruz had twelve galleys with him in 1582 at the Azores, said to have been the

15th August was at Terceira. Howard was quite ignorant of Bazan's movements, but he had been seen after leaving Ferrol by some of Cumberland's squadron, and the earl had detached Captain Wm. Middleton,[28] in the Moonshine, to keep him company and warn Howard. Bazan, who appears to have been well informed of the position of the English, had intended to surprise them at anchor, and had calculated his rate of sailing to reach the anchorage at daybreak, but was delayed by accidents to several of his ships and did not appear until five o'clock in the afternoon of 31st August, leaving Middleton just time to deliver his message.[29] Signalling, except for a few recognized and simple purposes, was non-existent, and Howard could only inform his subordinates of the danger, and communicate his orders to recover the men ashore and weigh, by boat messages to each ship. It would appear that before that could be done the Spaniards were in sight and several of the English ships had to slip their cables to get away, but eventually all got clear and to windward of the Spaniards except the Revenge.

This is Ralegh's account, but it will be observed that Monson says that Howard was warned twenty-four hours before the Spaniards appeared, and perhaps, under the charm of 'Ralegh's matchless prose,' sufficient weight has not been allowed to Monson's version of the early events. The Moonshine was sent on her mission as an especially fast sailer, and once the Spaniards were seen to be laying a course for the Azores it would not be necessary to dog them, nor would Middleton be likely to wait while Bazan was at Angra, however short a time he may have stopped there.[30] Again, if, as Ralegh says, Middleton 'had no sooner delivered the news but the fleet was in sight,' there could not have been time to send round to the ships, to send from the ships to the shore, to collect the scattered men and bring them on board, seeing that the Spaniards were coming down with the wind.[31] Monson fulfils the requirements of a trustworthy witness :

first time they had been used in ocean fleets. Whatever the number of Bazan's fleet (Linschoten says thirty), probably not more than half were fighting ships.

[28] Middleton was a brother of Sir Hugh Middleton, of New River renown.

[29] Fernandez Duro, *op. cit.* p. 80.

[30] Ralegh's statement that Middleton 'had kept them company three days before' probably means that he left them three days before finding Howard.

[31] If Ralegh's time be correct, the sick could not have been ashore at all, or it would have been quite impossible to remove them. Linschoten implies that the English were not taken by surprise. Herrera says that Bazan planned his approach 'in such a manner that the English might imagine them, when they were discovered, to

he was conversant with the business under discussion, for he must have talked it over with men who had been with Howard, and perhaps with survivors from the Revenge; he is not known to have had any personal prejudice against Howard and Greynvile or any prepossessions in their favour; and he was of good repute in respect to truthfulness when his own interests were not concerned. Ralegh, by far Monson's superior intellectually, was writing primarily in defence of the memory of a cousin and close friend, secondarily in defence of a member of his own political faction and of English reputation generally, and could lie like a politician on occasion. Ralegh and Monson both had the same sources of information, and when they differ on an important question of fact, such as the length of warning given to Howard, the point of motive as affecting credibility comes under consideration. The only argument of any weight against Monson is that he was writing from memory—so far as we know—thirty years after the event. The rest of Monson's narration is not so consistent with probabilities, perhaps for want of the fuller details he could have given. He implies that Greynvile would not cut his cable because, taking the enemy for the Flota, he thought he had time to weigh leisurely; but a few lines above he tells us that Lord Thomas weighed, in which case there should have been time for Greynvile to do so as well, and we can hardly suppose that an old seaman like Monson uses 'weighing anchor' as equivalent to the urgent procedure of cutting or slipping a cable. And if Greynvile recognized the true conditions, even though it was not until the Spaniards were within range, there seems no reason, unless the Revenge was closer inshore than the rest of the English fleet, and to windward of some headland, that she could not weather in time, why, having the heels of any Spanish ship, he should not have run down to leeward and got clear.

On the whole we may take it that Greynvile did not disobey the order to weigh or slip,[32] but being delayed for some reason, or being in a worse position than the others, could not do so in time to disengage himself with the rest of the fleet, and then refused,

be the Flota, thus hoping to take them unprepared. Don Alonso de Bazan succeeded in his design . . . seeing that he came from the direction in which the Flota was expected, and that by an *aviso* taken a few days previously the English knew that the two Flotas would come together and very shortly' (*Hist. General*, iii. p. 294). No English writer mentions the capture of the despatch boat, but it is exactly the kind of detail of which a Spanish writer would have knowledge. Herrera's version fits in with Monson's, for while Greynvile may have insisted that it was the expected Flota, Howard's more skilful advisers recognized a Spanish fighting fleet.

[32] If Greynvile took the approaching Spaniards to be the Flota he would equally be anxious to get under sail.

on the point of honour, to run to leeward of the Spaniards.[33] Such an interpretation of his conduct explains if it does not excuse, but it was condemned even by those of his own generation who should best have appreciated it. To Monson it was headstrong folly, 'unadvised negligence and wilful obstinacy'; Sir Richard Hawkyns acquits him, but only on the erroneous supposition that he had to wait to take off those ashore, and qualifies his admiration by adding, 'some do say, and I consent with them, that the best valour is to obey and follow the head, seem that good or bad which is commanded,' a passage in which breathes the naval spirit of to-day. Even Ralegh, forgetting for the moment the purpose of his pamphlet, writes 'the other course,' running to leeward, 'had been the better.'[34] Sir Arthur Gorges comments, 'the best he could hope for was after exchanging some great shot with them, to have come off again if he could.'[35] The action of the Revenge has afforded material for much fine writing, but the history of the English navy would have been but a sorry one if its inspiration had been personal honour, as understood by each individual officer, rather than the honour of the country and the Service. Any captain can make a dramatic ending—at the expense of his men—if by insubordination or want of skill

[33] In the etiquette of the sea the leeward position has always been the place of the inferior.

[34] Mr. David Hannay (*New Review*, May 1897) has discussed Greynvile's family and personal history, his hereditary predisposition, character, and previous life as leading up to, and explaining, a Berserk end to his career. As 'his ambition had not been satisfied, for he was not among the great men about the Queen . . . with such a man ambition might direct itself towards making a splendid end.' The entire absence of any reference to his presence at Court (Arber, *Last Fight of the Revenge*, 'Notes respecting Sir R. Grenville') between 1571 and 1591 militates against ambition of this kind having moved him, and he seems to have been quite satisfied when on shore in performing the duties of an influential country gentleman. The ambition which would direct itself deliberately to such an end, regardless of a captain's duty to the men under him and to his country, is, stripped of fine phrasing, only vanity run to seed and verging on insanity. Such excellent fighting men as Greynvile are not introspective enough for weaknesses associated with a type of intellect finer and more delicately balanced than he can have possessed. However, there is no reason to suppose that he was in any way a disappointed man; he was frequently entrusted with official business, and on 7th March of this year was granted some forfeited Irish estates (*Cecil MSS.*).

[35] Compare also Blaise de Montluc (*Commentaries*, Bordeaux, 1592): 'A man is no less worthy of blame for wilfully losing himself when he may retire, seeing himself at the last extremity, than he who shamefully runs away at the first encounter.' This was not written with any reference to the affair of the Revenge, for Blaise de Montluc died in 1577.

he chooses or is forced into an untenable position. Fortunately English officers were even then relearning from classical history, and their experience of European war, that the subjection of individual pride and ambition to co-ordinated effort afforded a higher ideal than the showy exploits of the shallow egotism which characterized feudalism, of which Greynvile's conduct was a late example.

The 'Last Fight of the Revenge' has been so often described that it is unnecessary to relate it again in detail here. It will suffice to say that after fifteen hours of fight, after having borne the attack of fifteen Spanish ships, of which two sank at her side, and two more were afterwards abandoned,[36] with forty men killed and most of the survivors wounded,[37] with all the powder spent and six feet of water in her hold, the crew surrendered on terms to Bazan against Greynvile's orders, who wished to blow up the ship, but who, mortally wounded and with failing authority, was overborne by his men. Howard, it is said, desired to engage in close action to save Greynvile, but yielded to the protests of his officers; he did, however, hold the attention of some of the Spaniards at long range until nightfall, the Foresight narrowly escaping the fate of the Revenge. Howard was a young admiral, but, unless we knew the exact conditions and possibilities of wind and position, it is difficult to see that a Drake, a Hawke, or a Nelson could have done more. Greynvile died, two or three days later, on board the Spanish flagship, after, we are told, delivering a final set speech, which is probably as authentic as most other historical speeches handed down by report.[38]

[36] Linschoten says that the Spaniards only lost two ships; his report would be as unfavourable to them as was consistent with the truth as he knew it.

[37] She went into action with 100 fighting men and ninety sick (Ralegh); her normal complement was 250 men. According to Labores y March the Spaniards lost twenty men, Linschoten says 400, Ralegh 1,000.

[38] Through how many persons the speech came before it was conveyed to Linschoten must be surmise, but he did not write his travels until four or five years later. In the original, Greynvile, after praising himself in finished periods, added 'But the others of my company have done as traitors and dogs, for which they shall be reproached all their lives, and leave a shameful name for ever.' This was omitted by the English translators of 1598, and only recovered this century by Southey, who went to the Dutch edition of Linschoten's book. It is difficult to believe that Greynvile sullied his last moments by cowardly abuse of the men his wilfulness had led to destruction, or of his chief and fellow officers, and, indeed, the whole speech is more characteristic of the self-conscious southern nature than of the silent English temperament. Moreover it has not been noticed that Linschoten adds: When he had finished these, *or such other like words*, he gave up

[4] The Revenge was not the first man-of-war captured by the Spaniards during the Elizabethan war; she was the second and last. The first was the Jesus of Lübeck, lost by Sir John Hawkyns at San Juan de Ulua in 1568, although, at the time, the Jesus was not sailing under the Queen's commission. After his victory Bazan remained at anchor off Corvo until the end of September (New Style) waiting for the expected Flota, which came in singly and by squadrons until he had 140 sail under his flag. Then a cyclone of unprecedented violence swept over the Azores,[39] ascribed by the Spaniards to Greynvile's influence in raising the devils in hell to revenge his death. Thousands of men were drowned, and seventeen vessels, including the Revenge, were cast away on the island of Terceira alone.[40] A paper in Hakluyt, which is a summary of the examination of some Spanish prisoners, says that seventy-seven sail left the Havana on $\frac{17}{27}$ July and that twenty-nine of these were lost before reaching the Azores,[41] but others, of which these prisoners were apparently in ignorance, joined Bazan. At a moderate computation not half the Flota and convoy reached Spain; an extreme view is that not more than twenty-five came home.[42] Linschoten says that thirty-two or thirty-three reached port, and Philip must have congratulated himself that the Flota was not carrying any treasure, that having been left at the Havana to be brought on by the fast frigates assigned to that purpose, and delayed until mid-winter when the sea would be free from English cruisers.[43]

[5] When Alonso de Bazan returned to Spain he was much blamed for not following and destroying Howard's fleet. Even if he knew where Howard had gone, he must have thought it his duty to remain where the West Indian merchantmen would expect to find him, while if he did not meet the English admiral he would be answerable for any mischief that might happen to the defenceless Flota. Then came the great storm which occupied him sufficiently with the disasters it caused. What course Howard

the ghost.' Evidently there must have been several versions of his last words to choose from, and it is significant that not one of the contemporary Englishmen who wrote about him had heard of them. Gervase Markham, in his poem *The Tragedy of Sir Richard Grinvile*, says twice over, that Greynvile never spoke after his removal to the flagship, and this would be most consonant with the character of the stern and sullen Englishman.

[39] Linschoten says that it lasted seven or eight days.

[40] Fernandez Duro and Linschoten. Ralegh says the island of St. Michael.

[41] *Voyages*, vii. p. 105, ed. 1888. The prisoners were taken by one of the London ships the Cherubim (*Cecil MSS.* 1st November, 1591).

[42] Hakluyt, vii. p.

[43] *Cecil MSS.* 1st Nove... , 1591.

took when he drew off from Flores at nightfall of 31st August is unknown, but from the condition of his crews, the probability is that he went straight home, although the date on which his ships were reported to have returned is against this view, unless he had experienced a succession of contrary winds. Possibly he went to the coast of Portugal as he had intended to do after 31st August.[44] We left Robert Flicke on 31st August on his way to the Azores with his squadron of merchantmen, having met one of Cumberland's ships the day before which warned him that Bazan had gone the same route, information that it was fortunate he obtained or he might, in his turn, have experienced a misfortune like Howard's. On 4th September he sighted Terceira, and then for four days stood off and on round all the islands without being able to get any news of Howard or the Flota. He then went on to the rendezvous originally given, from which he was driven by 'extreme tempests.' Flicke was probably on the outer edge of the cyclone which played havoc with the Spaniards, but must have escaped its full force. He remained about the islands, picking up several prizes, until the fourth week of September, when, perhaps uneasy at Bazan's proximity, and finding his men nearly out of control when prizes were boarded, he went for England, arriving at Plymouth on 11th October. His experience with his men testifies to the marked difference in discipline now existing in men-of-war compared with merchantmen, even when sailing as an auxiliary squadron to join a royal fleet. Out of one prize a sum of money was taken and brought aboard his ship, upon which his crew demanded that it should be shared, which Flicke refused to do, reading at the mainmast his instructions signed by Burghley and the Lord Admiral. 'Hereupon they mutinied, and at last grew into such fury as that they would have it or else break down the cabin . . . whereby I was forced to yield lest the Spaniards, which we had aboard being many, perceiving the same, might have had fit opportunity to rise against us.' Henry VIII. laid the foundation of discipline in the navy, and his teaching had been so far improved upon that these things were no longer possible in the Queen's ships.

The cost of Howard's voyage was 21,991*l.*, of which Lord Thomas, the Lord Admiral, and others adventured 4,906*l.*[45] Ralegh had done better for himself than if he had shared in the

[44] *Ante*, p. 261. The Bonaventure was back on 14th October, the Lion on 9th October, and the Foresight on 25th October (*State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxl. 102). Five prizes were taken by Howard (*Lansd. MSS.* lxvii. f. 172), on 18th April, 9th May, 10th June, 29th July, and 11th August.

[45] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxl. 55.

larger scheme at first proposed. For what he had subscribed to Howard's fleet he received 4,000*l.* in return,[46] but he had also been in partnership with Alderman John Wattes,[47] one of the largest privateer owners of the time, and during 1590 and 1591 their ships had ranged the Caribbean Sea. In a letter to Burghley he complains that he only makes 100 per cent. (gross) out of his speculation with Wattes, 'which is a small return. We might have gotten more to have sent them a fishing.'

[46] *Acts of Privy Council*, quoted by Edwards (*Life of Ralegh*).
[47] Lord Mayor in 1606.

The Earl of Cumberland to the coast of Spain, A.D. 1591. [1]

Ships.	Commanders.
The Garland, of her Majesty's.	The Earl of Cumberland. Captain under him—Captain Monson, afterwards Sir William Monson.
Seven other ships of his and his friends.	

THE Earl of Cumberland keeping the coast of Spain, as you have heard, while the Lord Thomas remained at the Islands, all to one end—that is to say, to annoy and damnify the Spaniards, though with two several fleets and commissions—the earl found fortune in a kind as much to frown upon him, as it had done upon the Lord Thomas Howard.

He departed England in May, and in his course to the Spanish coast encountered with divers ships of Holland, which came from Lisbon, wherein he found a great quantity of spices belonging to the Portuguese, as themselves confessed. Herein may appear the great abuse offered us by the people of Holland, who, though they were the first that engaged us in the war with Spain, and we bore the brunt of it eighteen years together, yet did they cunningly maintain their trade into those parts, and supplied the Spaniards with ammunition, victuals, shipping, and intelligence against us. [2]

My Lord being arrived on the Spanish coast it was his hap in the little space he stayed there to take three ships at several times, one with wine, which he unladed and divided amongst his fleet, and two with sugars, which he enjoyed not long; no

more did he the spices, which he took out of the Hollanders. For one of the ships of sugar, by means of a leak that sprung upon her, was forced to be cast off, and the men, with much difficulty, recovered the shore, and saved their lives. The other being sent for England, and tossed with contrary winds, was for want of victuals forced into Coruña, where they rendered themselves to the enemy's mercy.

The spices were determined to be sent for England, and a ship appointed for that purpose, with other ships to guard her, and on board her was sent Captain Monson to the islands of the Burlings with charge to see her despatched for England.

But the other ships not observing the directions given them, and the night falling calm, early in the morning this scattered ship was set upon by six galleys, and after a long and bloody fight, the captain and principal men being slain, both ship and spices were taken. But whether it was the respect they had to the Queen's ship, which was admiral of that fleet, or honour to my Lord that commanded it, or hope, by good usage of our men, to receive the like again, I know not; but true it is, that the ordinary men were treated with more courtesy than they had been from the beginning of the war.* [3]

My Lord of Cumberland considering the disasters that thus befel him, and knowing the Spanish fleet's readiness to put out of harbour, but especially finding his ship but evil of sail, it being the first voyage she ever went to sea, [4] he durst not any longer abide the coast of Spain, but thought it more dis-

* The Churchill text adds the following passage here which is not contained in any of the MSS. :—'I mean that of such men as were taken only Captain Monson was detained as a hostage for performance of covenants agreed upon for release of the rest, in which imprisonment he remained almost two years.'

cretion to return for England, having (as you have heard) sent a pinnace to my Lord Thomas, with the intelligence aforesaid, which proved a service of great moment to the Queen and State, in preventing the danger that might have otherwise ensued. [5]

[1] Purchas[1] gives the Garland (Queen's ship), Samson, Golden Noble, Allagarta, and Discovery as forming Cumberland's squadron. The Moonshine, Captain William Middleton, detached to convey information to Lord Thomas Howard, may also have belonged to it, or may have been an independent privateer which had joined him. The same remark applies to 'the Red Rose, sometimes called the Golden Dragon, separated from my Lord of Cumberland in a storm,' which Robert Flicke spoke on his way from Peniche to the Azores.

[2] There is very little known about this cruise of Cumberland's, its chief claim to remembrance being its connection with Howard and the fate of the Revenge. Originally he was to have joined in the projected grand venture of the Lord Admiral, Lord Thomas Howard, Ralegh, and others; then, when it was decided that Howard should sail with a squadron of Queen's ships, he was chosen to command the secondary privateering cruise on the coast of Spain. In March it was expected daily that he would have been ready to go, but it was said that want of money detained him, most of the preparations being made at his own expense.[2] Monson says that they sailed in May, but there is a note by Burghley, under date 17th May, that the earl was to be instructed 'to employ himself against the Spaniards.'[3] If he was only instructed after 17th May he can hardly have been ready to sail that month.

The Dutch ships Monson refers to were probably four, whose case afterwards came before the Privy Council. The Council ordered that three of them, which yielded without resistance, were to be restored to their owners, their cargoes being stayed pending examination in the Admiralty Court; the fourth ship, which had resisted search, was not to be restored.[4] It is evident that

[1] *Pilgrimes*, iv. p. 1,144.

[2] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxxviii. 82; 22nd March, 159$\frac{1}{2}$

[3] *Ibid.* 154.

[4] *Acts of the Privy Council*, 15th September, 1591. There is a letter from Cumberland to the Judge of the Admiralty Court about this ship, dated 14th July (*Add. MSS.* 1206, f. 233), showing incidentally that he could not have then been long at sea. 'Such hath been my fortune sithens coming to sea to meet with a hulk being bound

this proceeding was intended to encourage neutrals and others to submit to search. The commerce carried on by the Dutch with Spain, throughout the war of independence, in their own ships and in neutral bottoms, was a very tender point with English statesmen and seamen, although English merchants were doing precisely the same thing, if on a smaller scale, under the protection of Scotch or French (League) papers. Assuredly the Dutch could not have maintained the war but for the profits from trade, and Spain producing less, even of food-stuffs, year by year, was one of their best customers. Some years later the Lord Admiral, having tried to stop some Dutch merchantmen bound for Spain, wrote to Robert Cecyll, 'this is the fruit of their friendship, in such a time to betray her Majesty and themselves with serving the enemy's turns . . . for the States themselves be traders and will not forbear their gain; and so to colour all and serve their own turns will little care what becometh of us.'[5] In 1580 Mendoza told Philip that the reason the English had grown rich within the last ten years was because they had possessed the carrying trade of Spanish goods.[6] The Dutch had gained all, and more than all, that the English had lost,[7] and, at one time, Philip had struggled with the situation by confiscating all Dutch ships and cargoes that came into his ports, however colourable the pretence adopted. His own and his subjects' necessities soon caused this system to break down. In 1597 he negotiated directly with the Hansa League, trying to induce them to stop the Dutch Baltic trade and import naval stores straight to the Spanish ports. He made use of the strained relations existing between Elizabeth and the Hansa as an argument, and promised the protection of his ships and men.[8] The Hansa answer was evasive; perhaps they were hardly convinced of the efficacy of Philip's protection against the English and Dutch navies.

By their trade with Spain and Portugal the Hansa ships were

for Lisbon, which presumed in manner of defiance to carry forth her flag in the sight of H.M. ship, as also to fight with her and other ships consorted with me, until such time as the master of the said hulk and other of his company lost their lives.' For their insolence and because there was corn in her he has sent her home.

[5] *Cecil MSS.* 10th February, 159$\frac{8}{9}$.

[6] *Simancas Papers*, 20th February, Mendoza to Philip.

[7] 'Whereas the Spanish merchants' (*i.e.* English merchants trading to Spain) 'in ancient times past, as long before the troubles with Spain, did commonly employ 100 sail, giving them 3*l.* 10*s.* a ton to San Lucar, and Cadiz, and so likewise since the peace they did give the same freight for a year or two after,' now shipowners have been completely cut out by the lower freights of the Dutch (Report of Trinity House, 1609; *Lansd. MSS.* 142, f. 306).

[8] *Cecil MSS.* 1st and 25th June, 1597.

instrumental in causing the first definite pronouncement of modern English international law on the subject of contraband. Of course the Hansa had always been viewed by the English mercantile classes, who thought themselves injured by its privileges, with enmity and jealousy, but these feelings had induced no serious results until the commercial activity of the second half of the sixteenth century rendered the opinions and actions of English merchants more important in the eyes of the Government. By Edward VI. and by Mary the privileges of the League were curtailed or abolished, nor did the accession of Elizabeth relieve the tension existing, which found expression in continual quarrels and protests. The war, and the seizure, by Drake, of scores of Hansa ships off the mouth of the Tagus in 1589,[9] still further embittered matters, and was the cause of the first authoritative English declaration on contraband[10] of war. The Council of the Hansa protested that the seizure was illegal as a violation of their privileges, but the only answer vouchsafed them was an Order in Council[11] which recited that 'whereas, in November last, upon certain knowledge given to her Majesty that the late great navy of the King of Spain which was set forth and brought to the coast of England for the invasion of this realm, the depriving her Highness of her crown, and the overthrow of the Gospel and the professors of the same, could not have been prepared and furnished fit for such an exploit with ships, munition and victual unless they had been supplied, as they certainly were, of the greatest part of their provisions, yea, very many great warlike ships furnished with men and ordnance, by certain Easterlings, members of the Hanse towns,' it was then decided that the Council should send for the Alderman of the Steelyard and tell him how 'unkindly' Elizabeth took it that the Hansa, which had always professed friendship, should aid an enemy who had no just cause 'but in regard of her possession of the Gospel.' The Alderman had then been required to warn the Hanse towns to forbear sending to Spain or Portugal 'any kind of provision fit for the maintenance of the King of Spain for his wars against this realm upon pain of confiscation of the said goods and ships.' That, although their correspondence proved that they had received this warning, they had continued to send ships and goods to Spain, some of which were taken off Lisbon; but, although such ships

[9] *Ante*, p. 211.

[10] The word *contraband* is not found until the treaty of 1625, between Charles I. and the United Provinces. It is supposed to be derived from *contrabannum*, the equivalent of the Italian *contrabbando*, 'used in relation to a trade prohibited by the sovereign power of a state to its citizens in time of peace' (Travers Twiss, *The Law of Nations*).

[11] *Acts of the Privy Council*, 27th July, 1589.

and goods were forfeited by international law and their charters, the Queen would not insist on her full rights, and that only naval stores, munition, and victuals would be seized. Such ships, also, as had not served in the Armada, or had not been sent to serve in the Spanish navy, would be restored. Her Majesty, therefore, 'will confiscate such as are particularly set down at the foot of this decree.' Then follows the list—the earliest detailed one in our history—of articles held to be contraband of war: cables, masts, anchors, cordage, pitch, tar, tallow, pikestaves, calivers, muskets, armour, powder, brimstone, saltpetre, bullets, copper, lead, match, canvas for sails, ordnance not belonging to the ship, corn, bacon, wheat, beans, rye, pease, barley, meal, and 'such like.' The next, and a still longer catalogue of such prohibited things, is that of a proclamation of 4th March, 1626,[12] a catalogue no doubt based on the judgments of the Admiralty Court of the reign of Elizabeth. But as the Judge of the Admiralty Court, then and long afterwards, decided in accordance with the directions received from the Privy Council, to which he frequently referred, it was really that body which made prize law.

In a later paper Elizabeth's Government quoted examples, from 1558 onwards,[13] of the application of the right of belligerents to prevent the transport of commodities calculated to assist or strengthen an enemy. Illustrations of the principle Elizabeth upheld might have been found much farther back than 1558; in the thirteenth century it had been usual at the outbreak of war to forbid, by proclamation, the import to an enemy of provisions or munitions, and categorical precedents existed in the treaties of 1303 between England and France, and of 1370 between Edward III. and the Flemings. In 1543 an edict of Francis I. authorized the seizure of munitions of war, but in this case they were to be paid for at a valuation; and in the same year Henry VIII. had treated fish in Scotch ships bound for French ports as contraband, being covered, he held, by the words 'aid of any kind' in the treaties with Scotland.[14] There was no indisputable authority for either freeing or confiscating neutral ships if any enemy's goods were found on board, although in 1640 Sir H. Marten, the then Judge of the Admiralty Court, laid it down that it had never been the practice to condemn the neutral ships themselves. The practice had been conflicting, and it would have been more exact to have said that there were precedents both ways. In 1545 the Admiralty Court, copying the example of France, was condemning such ships, but Elizabethan law was more lenient, and in 1591 the Privy Council

[12] Rymer, *Fœdera*, xviii. p. 856.
[13] Winwood, *Memorials*, i. p. 57.
[14] Sir Ralph Sadler's *Letters and Negotiations*, p. 381.

ordered that neutral vessels, with so much of the cargo as was not enemies' goods or contraband of war, were to be restored to their owners.[15] Whether they were right or wrong in their legal interpretation of the charters under which they exercised their privileges, the policy of the Hansa was extremely unwise in that it took no account of English commercial activity and enterprise, and the new situation created when England became a predominant sea-power. Neutrals who expect to profit by obtaining the commerce of the weaker belligerent must be strong enough to protect their flag, and neither the Hansa nor the Danes occupied such a position. When Spain and France made peace in 1598 and the latter Power obtained a share of Spanish commerce Elizabeth had to submit to many infractions of what she considered her rights, for she could not adopt the same tone to France as to the Hansa and had to confine herself to remonstrances. In 1597 an imperial edict was obtained expelling the English from Germany; in 1598 this was answered by the seizure of the Steelyard, and the expulsion from England of the Hansa merchants residing there.[16]

[3] According to the account in Purchas, Cumberland wrote to the Cardinal Archduke threatening reprisals if the prisoners were not well treated. Only Monson and six others were kept; the 'common sort' were re-clothed and sent back to the earl.

[4] The Garland, built by Richard Chapman, one of the master shipwrights, had been launched in 1590. Her dimensions were: length of keel, 95 feet; beam, from outside to outside, 33 feet; depth of hold, 17 feet; rake of the stem and beakhead, 32 feet; rake of stern post, 5 feet 8 inches; tonnage, net, 532, and gross, 666 tons. In 1603 the armament of the Garland consisted of 16 culverins, 14 demi-culverins, 4 sakers, 2 fowlers, and 2 portpieces, carried on a gun deck and upper deck.[17]

[5] Cumberland must have left the coast immediately after sending off the Moonshine to warn Howard, about the end of the third week in August. Perhaps his return was not unconnected with the appearance of a squadron under Marcos de Aramburu which, the Spanish historians boast, cleared the coast of corsairs this year, although the time of its cruise is not stated.[18] The

[15] R. G. Marsden, *Nautical Magazine*, June 1898.

[16] For some years subsequently the Steelyard, with its wharf, was used for the safe keeping of naval stores. Later, it was given back to the representatives of the Hansa, and Cannon Street Station now stands on part of the site.

[17] See Book III. for details concerning sixteenth century ordnance.

[18] As Marcos de Aramburu commanded one of the squadrons under Bazan to the Azores, he must have ranged the coast just before the main fleet left Ferrol if his presence at sea affected Cumberland.

earl was far too weak to deal with anything but defenceless merchantmen.

In 1591 'no one thought more took up the Queen's mind than her care for Bretaigne in France,'[19] and although, for the reasons indicated in the Introduction, Philip's movements there were not of the supreme importance they appeared to Elizabeth, they compelled her to military proceedings which are directly connected with the naval history of the reign. Such progress as Philip had made in Brittany was due rather to bribery than to force of arms; 'even Philip II., in all his long experience, had never found patriotism on sale so cheap.'[20] However, Hennebon was taken in January 1591, but in September, after the arrival of reinforcements, the Spanish army did not number more than 4,000 men. In January, when Elizabeth was still fearing invasion, Blavet was the only port the Spaniards held, and there were only 330 soldiers, 280 seamen, and as many galley slaves available there.[21] Philip had instructed his officers to seize the ports, not with any view to immediate maritime action against England, but to satisfy the more pressing need for money by imposing customs duties. In Brittany, as elsewhere, the want of money was continually causing Philip's combinations to fail, and shortly led to one of the mutinies which so often reduced his arms to impotence. Elizabeth continually impressed on Henry IV. the danger of allowing the maritime places of Brittany and Normandy to fall into the power of Philip, but Henry, knowing that the Queen for her own sake was bound to take active measures to prevent such evils, contented himself with minor operations in Brittany, while his serious efforts were directed to objects in which his interests were more urgent.[22]

In January 1591 Buzanval, Henry's envoy at the Hague, obtained a loan of 100,000 florins from the States and the promise that some men-of-war should be sent to co-operate with the English Channel guard. At the same time Sir John Norreys was sent over to arrange for the withdrawal of 3,000 English troops from the Low Countries to serve in France.[23] Shortly afterwards Sir Roger Williams occupied Dieppe, and Norreys, with about 1,500 men, went to Brittany, where, in May, Henry had a small force under the Prince de Dombes.[24] The position in Brittany

[19] Camden, *Annals*. In 1590, shortly after the Spanish landing, Drake had been sent over to Brittany to report on the situation.

[20] Forneron. [21] *Ibid. op. cit.* iv. p. 85.

[22] When Elizabeth asked for a port to which her troops might be sent, and which might be held as a base, Henry politely suggested Blavet.

[23] *Acts of the Privy Council*, 17th January, 1591.

[24] Guingamp had been taken in May, although 600 men of Norreys' force had been diverted to Normandy (Birch, *Bacon Papers*, i. p. 65).

was nearly a stalemate throughout the year, the centre of interest being Normandy and the siege of Rouen, undertaken by Henry with the aid of an English contingent under Essex, but the campaign has only a very indirect connection with naval history.

Sir John Norreys landed at Paimpol early in May, and on his way took the Isle of Bréhat, where he is said to have killed his Spanish prisoners by hanging them to the sails of windmills.

A Voyage undertaken by Sir Walter Ralegh, but he returning left the charge of it to Sir Martin Frobiser, Anno 1592. [1]

Ships.	Commanders.	Commander by Land.
Garland .	Sir Walter Ralegh	Sir John Burgh *
Foresight .	Captain Crosse and others	—
	Sir Walter went not, but Sir Martin Frobiser	

SIR WALTER RALEGH, who had tasted abundantly of the Queen's favour and love and found it now begin to decline, out of discontent put himself upon a voyage at sea, and drew to adventure with him divers friends of great quality, and others, thinking to have attempted some place in the West Indies that should afford him wealth. And with this resolution he put out of harbour, but spending two or three days in foul weather at sea, her Majesty was pleased to command his return and to commit the charge of the ships to Sir Martin Frobiser, who was sent down for that purpose; but with an express order, not to follow the design of the West Indies.

This sudden alteration, being made known to the rest of the captains, for the present made some

* Burgh invariably signed his name as above, but is also invariably called Borough, Burroughs, or Burrowes by his contemporaries.

confusion, as commonly it happens in all voluntary actions. Their General leaving them, they thought themselves free in point of reputation, and as free in election, to take what course they pleased. Few of them therefore submitted themselves to the command of Sir Martin Frobiser, but chose rather each to take his particular fortune and adventure at sea.

Sir Martin, with two or three ships, repaired to the coast of Spain, where he took a Spaniard laden with iron, and a Portuguese with sugar. He remained there not without some danger, his ship being ill of sail and the enemy having a fleet at sea. [2]

Sir John Burgh, Captain Crosse, and another, stood to the Islands, where they met with certain ships of my Lord of Cumberland's, with whom they consorted. After some time spent thereabouts they had sight of a carrack, which they chased, but she recovered the island of Flores before they could approach her. But the carrack, seeing the island could not defend her from the strength and force of the English, chose rather, after the men were got on shore, to fire herself, than we the enemy should reap benefit by her. The purser of her was taken, and, by threats, compelled to tell of another of their company behind that had orders to fall in with that island; and indeed gave such particular advertisement, that she fell into their hands.

In the meantime Don Alonso de Bazan was at Lisbon, setting out twenty-three galleons, which the year before he had when he took the Revenge. He was directed with those ships to go immediately to Flores, to expect the coming of the carracks, who had order to fall with that island, there to put on shore divers ordnance for strengthening the town and castle. Sir William Monson, being then

released out of prison, sailed in a Hamburg ship with this fleet. Don Alonso, breaking his instructions, very unadvisedly repaired first to St. Michael, and there delivered his ordnance before he arrived at Flores. And in the mean time, through his negligence and loss of time, one of the carracks was burnt, and another taken, as you have heard.

This he held to be such a disreputation to him, and especially for that it happened through his own error and default, that he was much perplexed, and pursued the English a hundred leagues, but in vain, they being so far ahead.

The King of Spain being advertised of his two carracks' mishap, and the negligence of Don Alonso, though he had much favoured him before, on account of divers actions he had been in with his brother the Marquis of Santa Cruz, and for what he had lately performed, by taking the Revenge and other good services, yet the King held it such a blemish to his honour not to have his instructions obeyed and observed, that he did not only take from Don Alonso his command, but he lived and died in disgrace, which, in my opinion, he worthily deserved. [3]

The Queen's adventure in this voyage was only two ships; one of which, and the least of them too, was at the taking of the carrack. By which title she assumed to herself out of her regal authority a power of interest therein, and made most of the adventurers submit themselves to her pleasure; with whom she dealt but indifferently. [4]

[1] On 29th April, 1592, a week before the fleet sailed, Captain Robert Crosse, writing to Sir Robert Cecyll from Fal mouth, sent up the following list of the ships:—[1]

[1] Murdin, *Burghley Papers*, p. 653. This is followed by another list in Ralegh's writing, undated, but probably subsequent to the return of the expedition and relating to the division of the plunder.

Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Commanders.
Queen's ships :—			
Garland . .	660	300	[Sir Walter Ralegh] Sir Martin Frobiser.
Foresight . .	300	180	Robt. Crosse, Vice-Admiral.
Merchantmen :—			
Alcedo . . .	400	180	Captain and Rear-Admiral, Geo. Gifford.
Roebuck . .	250	160	Captain and Lt.-Gen. for the land, Sir John Burgh.
Great Susan . .	350	180	— Acton.
Susan Bonaventure	250	160	— Thynn.
Galleon Ralegh .	250	160	— Middleton.
Dainty . . .	200	100	[Thos. Thompson]
Lion's Whelp[2] .	100	50	— Manswell.[3]
Sun . . .	120	60	— Leye.
Black Dog . .	120	60	— Fleyne.
Margaret and John	200	120	— Grenville.
Pinnaces :—			
Lark . . .	40	20	—
Darling . .	—	16	—
Adrian . . .	—	16	—
Wren . . .	—	10	—

Cumberland's squadron, which sailed independently of Ralegh's and did not enter into consortship until later, consisted of the Tiger, 600 tons, Captain Norton; the Samson, Captain Cocke; the Golden Noble, Captain Cave; and two smaller ships, the Phœnix, 70, and the Discovery, 25 tons.[4] In Crosse's

[2] 'Of my Lord Admiral.' The Alcedo and Susan Bonaventure belonged to Alderman John Wattes, the Galleon Ralegh to Carew Ralegh. The Great Susan returned home early in the cruise.

[3] Qy. Robert Mansell.

[4] *Lansd. MSS.* 73, f. 38, and Purchas, *Pilgrimes*, iv. p. 1,144. This last says that the earl had decided to hire no more ships from the Queen because she strictly interdicted boarding with any of her ships. If so the earl altered his mind by 1593, when he took the Lion and Bonaventure. It is generally assumed now that Elizabeth was averse to staking so much as is done when ships are grappled alongside each other, but the truth seems to be that it was rather her admirals and captains who hesitated. Howard and his coadjutors played the game at long range in 1588, but the Council, of course with the knowledge and permission of the Queen, fully expected boarding tactics to be employed. On 26th July they wrote that hearing that the Spanish ships were so full of men that they could not be boarded, the Queen

list he, like Monson, calls Burgh lieutenant-general for the land. It will be seen that he had been destined from the first for the command, with Frobiser to dry-nurse him; but Crosse had

had ordered that her vessels should be double manned; and on the same day Howard was informed that picked musketeers from the London train-bands were to be sent down to him (*Acts of the Privy Council*). Ralegh's remarks show that the advantages of off-fighting were not generally realized: 'To clap ships together without consideration belongs rather to a madman than to a man-of-war. . . . The Lord Charles Howard, Admiral of England, had been lost in the year 1588 if he had not been better advised than a great many malignant fools were that found fault with his demeanour . . . had he entangled himself with those great and powerful vessels he had greatly endangered the kingdom of England . . . but our Admiral knew his advantage and held it, which had he not done he had not been worthy to have held his head' (*Hist. of the World*, Book V. cap. i. sect. vi.). Sir Richard Hawkyns, 'the complete seaman,' who represented the scientific knowledge and skilled seamanship of his time, derides the suggestion that there was any fixed rule about not boarding: 'We leave not to board with them on occasion when otherwise we cannot force them to surrender,' but, he says, it would be foolish to board when ships can be taken otherwise. He instances 400 and 500 ton Spaniards boarded by English vessels of 80 or 100 tons. The legend about English ships not boarding grew, he thinks, from the answers of English prisoners when, to cover their own cowardice, they told the Spaniards that the Queen forbade it. Never, he affirms, was there an 'imagination so vain and void of ground'; in fact, it was left entirely to the discretion of the captains (*Observations*, p. 292, Hakluyt Society). Elsewhere (p. 222) he praises Howard for withstanding in 1588 the persuasions of 'many courageous and noble captains' to board, which may mean that opinion was divided on the subject even among the higher officers. So far from prohibition was Elizabeth in 1588 that on 31st July she desired an explicit statement from Howard of the causes 'why the Spanish navy hath not been boarded by the Queen's ships' (*Armada Papers*, i. p. 355). By 1599, however, there may have been some foundation for the answers of English prisoners, for in that year Lord Thomas Howard's Instructions particularly forbade him to board an enemy. But there was nothing original or peculiar to the English navy in the admirals' system of fighting at long range, although Elizabeth did not understand it. As early as 1500 Philippe de Clèves, the leading naval strategist of his generation, had laid it down, as taught by experience, that ships were then more frequently taken by artillery fire without boarding (De la Roncière, *Hist. de la Marine Française*, ii. p. 497). When this was understood it followed that the weight of metal in a broadside should be steadily increased and that ships should be chary of a too close approach, but we see that even at the end of the sixteenth century seamen were not unanimous. The Spaniards seem to have ignored as far as possible the tactical changes brought about by heavy guns on shipboard and paid the penalty. An examination of English fleet and frigate actions will show that the English seaman has been by

doubtless been kept in ignorance. Sir John Burgh, or Borough,[5] was a younger son of the fourth Lord Burgh, of Gainsborough. He had served since 1585 in the Low Country wars; but this seems to have been his first sea-service, and he is supposed to have been killed in 1594, in a duel arising out of recriminations about the plunder of the Madre de Dios.[6]

[2] Monson's opinion that Ralegh prepared this expedition, and intended to command it personally because he was declining in favour, is not accurate. Nothing was known of the secret marriage with Elizabeth Throckmorton which threw him into disgrace with the Queen until long after the voyage was designed and the fleet at sea. In reality the enterprise grew out of the cruise of the London squadron under Robert Flicke, who, although he did not find Lord Thomas Howard, was so successful in the matter of prizes that the adventurers readily agreed to fit out another fleet. It is probable that the original intention was a winter cruise for the treasure frigates, and on 29th December, 1591, Burghley notes that Ralegh required, besides 6,000*l.* from the merchants, another of the Queen's ships as well as the Foresight, and 2,000*l.* advanced on prize money and pensions due to him.[7] On 6th January, 159½, the Queen addressed a letter to the Lord Mayor to the effect that the seven prizes taken by Flicke were of such value that 6,000*l.* could be paid on account as they were willing to employ the money in fitting out other ships; the Lord Mayor was to remit it to Ralegh, 'a special charge of service having to be performed by him this year with some of her ships and others of her subjects under him.'[8] This was followed by articles of agreement[9] in the same month with the Lord Mayor and Commonalty of the City of London, in which they protected their interests by covenanting that the victualling and fitting was to be done under the supervision of their agents; that there should be a registrar in every ship, appointed jointly by the Queen and themselves, to keep account of prizes; that they should be empowered to nominate commissioners to act with the Queen's commissioners to deal with prize goods; and that they should not be called upon for more than the 6,000*l.* unless they obtained more from the 1591 prizes. Then the preparations

no means so fond of boarding as is usually supposed. Of course, before artillery became effective, it was the only practical form of fighting; later, it seems to have been more prevalent between 1650 and (roughly) 1750 than before or after.

[5] See *ante*, p. 278, note.

[6] *Dict. of Nat. Biog.* But see *post*, ii. p. 230, note.

[7] *Lansd. MSS.* 69, f. 55. He had a pension on the customs besides other grants.

[8] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxli. 9.

[9] *Lansd. MSS.* 69, f. 54.

seem to have slackened off, since Ralegh's commission was not signed until 28th February.[10] It was very wide in scope, giving him power to levy 2,000 men, and apply martial law and punishment of death; he was authorized to act by sea or land, on continents or islands, and was permitted to take up at sea all ships he found necessary. He was allowed to join in partnership with others and to enjoy all plunder, after the payment of customs, if before distribution 'allowance be made to us of all parts due to us according to the tonnage of our own ships,' a stipulation that Elizabeth afterwards sought to evade.

On 10th March Ralegh wrote to Sir Robert Cecyll on several subjects, and incidentally remarks that 'I have laid all that I am worth, and must do, ere I depart on this voyage. If it fall not out well I can but lose all, and if nothing be remaining wherewith shall I pay the wages?' Elizabeth was endeavouring to make him responsible for the wages, although she had promised to pay her share; but the fact, if it be one, that he had staked his whole fortune on the venture shows the contempt felt by those best able to measure it for Spanish maritime power, notwithstanding the loss of the Revenge. He goes on: 'I have promised her Majesty that if I can persuade the companies to follow Sir Martin Frobiser, I will without fail return, and bring them but into the sea some fifty or three score leagues, for which purpose my Lord Admiral hath lent me the Disdain; which to do, her Majesty many times with great grace bid me remember, and sent me the same message by Will. Killigrew, which, God willing, if I can persuade the companies I mean to perform, though I dare not be known thereof to any creature.'[11] Whatever may have been the original design, the purpose now appears to have been a long cruise, wintering in the West Indies. On 23rd May Burghley and the Lord Admiral acknowledge a letter of his, in which he brought forward reasons for now doubting the advisability of that plan, and thought it would be more profitable to try for the East India carracks due in July and August. The Queen, they wrote, permitted the alteration and left to Frobiser the choice of station to be taken up.[12] Perhaps, notwithstanding his promise to the Queen, and the 'many times' Elizabeth had reminded him of it, Ralegh had intended to go to the West Indies himself until the delay caused by contrary winds and the natural hesitation to

[10] *Harl. MSS.* 168, f. 57.

[11] Murdin, *Burghley Papers*, p. 663.

[12] *Cecil MSS.* 23rd May, 1592. Camden (*Annals*) says that Ralegh intended to attack Panama, but a much stronger force would have been necessary for that. Camden is not a high authority; he says that the fleet was delayed three months by contrary winds, which it certainly was not. The dates show that at the most it can only have been delayed some weeks.

entrust his fortunes, so far from aid or interference, to another man, induced him to change his intention in favour of the always possible carracks and treasure ships. Frobiser was too strict a disciplinarian to be liked by officers or men, and had it been known that he was to have command, it would have been difficult to get either to join the expedition. On the other hand, Ralegh was a favourite with them,[13] although he never pretended to like the sea.[14]

We know that the English fleets were continuously sent to sea too weak for the proper execution of the work they were set to perform; yet, if the English statesmen had been minutely informed of the conditions in Spain, they could have pointed to them as an apparently effective answer to the charge. For the time Philip's resources appeared to be exhausted by the effort in setting forth the fleet under Alonso de Bazan in 1591, and although in January 1592 he was sent for to the court to give advice as to the best course to adopt to clear the sea of privateers, the resulting measures were purely local. There was no question of an English invasion; it was difficult enough to keep up communications with Brittany, and the most Philip proposed to do was to send an escort to meet the carracks and the Flota in August and September. The Venetian ambassador explains the steps taken as the consequence of acknowledged weakness: 'This method of concentrating all the defences at home and leaving the sea open to the English is held to be, if not the most useful, still the most necessary, for it is impossible to raise an armament in these kingdoms which would be strong enough to make head against the enemy.'[15] During the winter months privateers were infesting the Portuguese coast, but the only remedy the King could provide was to forbid merchantmen to go to sea.[16] Ralegh's intention for the West Indies was well known to Philip, and he could never have found much difficulty in obtaining knowledge of the English plans, not only by means of his well-organized spy service, but by the carelessness of the English leaders themselves.[17]

Ralegh sailed on 6th May and, in pursuance of the arrange-

[13] See *post*, p. 294.

[14] 'I am not so much in love with these long voyages' (*Discovery of Guiana*). Elsewhere he speaks contemptuously of the miseries of seafaring life.

[15] *State Papers Venetian*, 23rd March, 1592.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Richard Butler, who was subsequently in the Spanish service, remarked that the English ministers were very unsuspicious in their methods. About this very time Burghley sent an open letter to Ralegh by Butler, containing the latest information about the Flotas and where it was advisable to wait for them (*Simancas Papers*, iv. p. 600).

ment made, the Disdain with Frobiser on board joined the next day to relieve him. But Ralegh's presence was found to be necessary for some time to soothe jealousies and establish Frobiser in command, although he eventually found it necessary to divide the fleet either because he failed or for other reasons. On 13th May, when forty leagues from Finisterre, he met thirteen Flemish and French ships, with which there was a difficulty about striking to the Queen's ship. On board one of these vessels was an Englishman escaped from Spain, who told him that Philip had ordered that no Flota should sail from the West Indies that year. The knowledge possessed by a prisoner just escaped could not have been very reliable,[18] but it may have been a factor in inducing Ralegh to divide the fleet before he quitted it; Frobiser, with the Garland, Alcedo, Susan Bonaventure, Margaret and John, Dainty, and others, was to remain off Cape St. Vincent; Burgh, with the Roebuck, Foresight, and the rest, was to go to the Azores.[19] Ralegh himself was in London again on 8th June as he then dates a letter from Durham House. The two divisions kept company for some time, and the immediate result of their presence was a report from the Venetian ambassador that Lisbon was blockaded, and that instead of there being two West Indian fleets this year, there would hardly be one.[20] Philip, however, was preparing a fleet, and, if the writer of the Hakluyt account is to be trusted, intended it to follow Ralegh and bring him to action if he went to the West Indies, or to meet and escort the East Indian carracks if he went to the Azores. But as we know from Monson's letter of 12th July [21] that Bazan was not ready for sea until the middle of that month, Ralegh would have had a long start if the original design had been followed. Before they separated Burgh and Frobiser took a Biscayan ship with goods valued at 6,000*l.* or 7,000*l.*, and Burgh, in the Roebuck, having parted company in chase, had a narrow escape from some Spaniards, probably a part of Bazan's force. After that Burgh stood away

[18] In the early months of the year Philip certainly intended that the fleets should come home (*Cecil MSS.* May 1592; Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, ii. p. 486), but it happened that the information was correct, or an alteration of Philip's intentions subsequently made it so.

[19] This is the version in *A true Report of the honourable service at sea performed by Sir John Borough*, &c. (Hakluyt, *Voyages*, xii. p. 34), but that account is not completely reliable in this or other matters. Months later Frobiser wrote to Burghley that Crosse, in the Foresight, had 'left me disorderly on the coast of Spain,' a complaint which would have been baseless had Crosse been ordered to the Azores (*Lansd. MSS.* 70, p. 68), although it may only apply to the actual manner of his departure.

[20] *State Papers Venetian*, $\frac{8}{18}$ June.

[21] Appendix of Letters, No. 1.

for the Azores without further communication with Frobiser, and arrived at Flores on 26th July.[22] Of Frobiser's proceedings little is known. On, or shortly before, 15th July he took the Brazil prize laden with sugar mentioned by Monson, and sent the Galleon Ralegh home with her; he did not know of Burgh's good fortune, until in the Channel on his way home, and could only compare it with his bad luck in missing another carrack 'at the Burlings in a dark night, having sight of her lights the 7 of July. But I am of opinion that my stay upon the coast of Spain made the King's fleet stay so long from the Islands, as this carrack was the better come by, for I have kept every day upon the coast.'[23] This carrack must have been the one that Monson wrote to him reached Lisbon on 8th July,[24] but it does not appear that his presence on the coast had the effect he supposed, because Alonso de Bazan sailed for the Azores as soon as his fleet was ready on $\frac{14}{24}$ July. Probably much of the rest of Frobiser's time was occupied in looking for his own ships and reprimanding his own captains. Captain Thompson, of the Dainty, went off on a chase and apparently met more than his match, or, as he put it, 'having met with some bad company that had dealt friendly with me.' When he related his experiences to Frobiser, the Admiral gruffly remarked that it was a pity that some of the others did not fall into the same trouble to induce them to come back to the flag.[25] Thompson said nothing, but 'lost' Frobiser again, while sending a topmast down, and went away to join Burgh. On his way he took a caravel with 'not one real of plate or piece of gold as God help me, but sixteen reals that was found about one man.'

[3] On 25th July Captain Christopher Newport, of the Dragon, 180 tons, and Captain Hugh Merritt, of the Prudence, 100 tons, two London ships, were taking in water at Flores on their return from the West Indies, when Burgh appeared the next day. In pursuance of the power given by Ralegh's commission, Burgh demanded their services, and did so the more eagerly because he was alone, or, at most, had only a pinnace with him. On 28th July articles were entered into between Burgh and the two captains by which they agreed to enter into consortship and share prizes 'jointly and severally, in sight or out of sight, ton for ton, and man for man.'[26] The Admiral succeeded in opening

[22] *Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 223. [25] *Ibid.* f. 68.

[24] Monson's letter to Frobiser, *post*, ii. p. 376; Labores y March, *Marina Real Española*, ii. p. 480.

[23] *Lansd. MSS.* 67, f. 192. The Dainty belonged to Sir John Hawkyns; four of the others were certainly London ships, and of the remainder doubtless some belonged to private adventurers like Hawkyns.

[26] *Lansd. MSS.* 70, ff. 55, 66, 223. The Hakluyt account says that Burgh was off Flores on 21st June, but the dates in the text are

friendly relations with the inhabitants of the island, and, besides obtaining supplies, got the information that although one carrack, the one Frobiser missed, had passed, there were four more expected. In the meantime Burgh was being joined by other vessels belonging to Cumberland's squadron, the Tiger, Samson, Grace of Dover, Phœnix, and Discovery. The earl, also, had been delayed so long by contrary winds that, although he had intended to go himself cruising for the carracks and then for the West Indies, he had transferred the command in disgust to Captain Norton of the Tiger. A rich prize was taken from under the guns of Cascaes, and the Golden Noble, having been injured in action with two other ships, was sent back to England with her, the rest of the squadron making for the Azores. There they entered into consortship with Burgh by verbal agreement—so Cumberland alleged—which Elizabeth afterwards maintained was not good in law.[27]

It is to be presumed that Monson, Frobiser, the inhabitants of Flores, and the purser of the Santa Cruz, spoke with knowledge when they described five carracks as homeward bound, but a recent historian, working from the Portuguese archives, says that there were only four expected. Five vessels, he writes, sailed from Lisbon in April 1589, and four of them started for home on 10th January, 1590;[28] of these the Bom Jesus was lost in the Mozambique Channel, the S. Bartholomeu was never more heard of, and the Santa Cruz and Madre de Dios were to come. According to the depositions of the Portuguese prisoners there was a fifth, the S. Bernardo, which, by her fast passage, passed the Azores in safety and escaped Frobiser. Burgh had arrived just in time, for it must have been during the last days of July that a carrack was sighted which proved to be the Santa Cruz. When chased by some of Cumberland's squadron she made for Angra, but being headed by the Roebuck bore up for 'Porto Lagowna,' perhaps

those of the original documents. The Dragon and Prudence belonged to John Moore, a London merchant.

[27] *Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 187. Elsewhere (f. 212) he says: 'Sir John Burrowes took such liking of the course which the said earl had directed his ships to follow as he desired to enter consort with them.'

[28] F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, ii. p. 67. The year there given, 1590, is no doubt a misprint for 1592. Vincent Fonseca, the purser of the Santa Cruz, said that they were from Cochin (on the Malabar coast); the Santa Cruz had sighted St. Helena but had touched nowhere (*Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 82). The Hakluyt *Report* says that Philip had ordered them not to put in to St. Helena, as was customary, because he had heard that English privateers lay there waiting for them. If true it is a striking testimony to the growth of English enterprise and Philip's fear of it.

Porto de Lagede, on the south-west side of Flores. A calm prevented an immediate attack upon her at her anchorage, and it was decided to board her the next morning; in the night a squall forced the English to weigh and put to sea, and on their return the following day they saw the Portuguese busily landing cargo. The reappearance of the English was the signal for the Portuguese to fire the carrack, and they made some intrenchments on the shore from which their musketeers might prevent any attempt to board and save the vessel. However a landing party of 100 Englishmen soon drove off the defenders, and recovered such goods as had not been carried away and some prisoners. From the prisoners was obtained authoritative information about the three other carracks due, and the fact that Philip had promised that an escort, which should have been already on the station, should meet them at Flores. In the meantime Captain Thompson, with the Dainty, had joined Burgh, having been guided towards his chief by wreckage with spices still adhering to the woodwork,[29] and at a council of the captains it was decided to take a station west of Flores,[30] and lie north and south, each ship being separated by at least a couple of leagues. The next day Burgh received a welcome addition to his fighting strength in the shape of the Foresight, and as soon as, or perhaps before, they had taken up the assigned positions the prey came in sight. On 3rd August the Madre de Dios was sighted, running with a south-south-west wind about twelve or fourteen leagues from Flores. At that time the Dainty, Dragon, and Roebuck were to windward, then the Tiger, Samson, and Prudence, the Foresight being the 'lymost' ship.[31] The Dainty, being the handiest ship, outstripped the others in coming up, and her crew, having prayed, 'forgave one another and went to the battle.'[32] About 11 A.M. the Dainty was within musket shot, and, forging right ahead, raked the carrack with her stern chasers, falling then alongside and engaging. About two o'clock the Dragon came up, upon which Thompson hailed Newport, 'Shall we stand thrumming here with her?' and wanted him to board, while Newport desired to wait for the others. It is not clear whether Thompson convinced Newport, but according to his own account the Dainty boarded altogether three times before Burgh came up in the Roebuck about four o'clock, and had lost three killed and fourteen

[29] *Lansd. MSS.* 67, f. 192.

[30] The Hakluyt account says six or seven leagues west of Flores; Captain Thompson, of the Dainty, says west and west by south of Flores, eighteen or twenty leagues; and John Hampton, 'general pilot of the whole fleet,' west-south-west of Flores, twelve leagues.

[31] *Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 192. Deposition of John Hampton. He was on board the Foresight.

[32] *Ibid.* 67, f. 192. Thompson's report.

wounded, had been on fire twice, and was much injured in her masts and rigging.[33] The Dainty fell off, the merchantmen, as usual, were only fit 'to make a show,'[34] and the Roebuck appears to have done little until the Foresight came up about 7 P.M. It was then agreed that the Roebuck and Foresight should board on either side, but, whether due to clumsiness or timidity about responsibility, Crosse fell alongside the Roebuck instead of alongside the Madre de Dios, and sent his men across his consort. In half an hour the Roebuck, shot betwixt wind and water, had five or six feet of water in her hold, and both ships were compelled to fall away. In the meanwhile the carrack was standing steadily east-north-east for the land, now only four or five leagues distant, and Hampton, the chief pilot, warned Crosse that if he did not lay the Foresight athwart her hawse, to give the other ships time and encouragement to act, she would yet escape. With some difficulty Hampton persuaded Crosse 'to venture her Majesty's ship in so good a service,' but the Dainty and the Roebuck had really broken the Portuguese resistance; about ten o'clock Crosse having managed to cut the carrack's fore and sprit sail sheets, fell along her lee side and remained there until the Samson and the Tiger closed in after midnight and sent their men to complete the capture.[35] For a carrack crew the Portuguese had made a quite heroic resistance, and the dead and wounded were lying about in heaps when the English got on board, nor had the loss of the victors been trifling.[36] All that night a saturnalia of plunder went on;[37] Burgh, occupied in keeping the Roebuck afloat, did not come up until the next day, and when he appeared and attempted to recover some of the stolen property, Cumberland's men defied his authority and went near to actual mutiny. In Burgh's absence Crosse was the senior officer, but he, instead of restraining his

[33] *Lansd. MSS.* 67, f. 192. Thompson's report.

[34] The Dainty was built and manned as a privateer, and intended to fight; the merchantmen were only intended to plunder. If Thompson's report be trustworthy, and no discredit was thrown upon it, the Madre de Dios would in all probability have got to the shore and been burnt like the Santa Cruz, but for the persistent way he hung on to her. In 1603 Thompson became one of the six 'principal masters of the navy,' called masters attendant in later centuries.

[35] The foregoing account, compiled from the reports of actors in the engagement, differs materially from that of the Hakluyt *Report*, which bears evident marks of having been written in the interest of Elizabeth's claim to all or most of the plunder.

[36] 'Burrowes had thirty men killed and wounded' (*Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 187). Taken literally this would mean on board the Roebuck alone.

[37] It is said that, from the amount of cargo taken out of her, she drew two feet less when brought into harbour than when captured (*Sloane MSS.* 3289, f. 74)

men, was attending to his own interests, and the Madre de Dios was on fire four or five times during the night 'by the disorder of the men with candles in their rifling.' As the wind rose, the Dainty's wounded foremast and bowsprit went overboard; many of Thompson's men had gone to the carrack, and he fired guns for assistance, but no one took any notice. After drifting about for five days, setting up jury masts, he fell in with the Roebuck again and went to see Burgh, who thanked him for his conduct in the action. Thompson suggested that as circumstances had prevented him doing himself justice on the night of the capture he hoped that Burgh had reserved something for him. Burgh replied that he had claimed all for the Queen; 'Good Lord,' said I, 'and I looked for a gold chain and pearls.' Then the other humourist consoled him by telling him that a chest had been kept for him, which, however, he would not allow him to open, and, on examination, turned out to be an ordinary seaman's chest. 'Other men,' said Thompson, 'have had their whole cabins furnished with plate, jewels, silk, apparels and other good things.'

There were 400 negroes on board the Madre de Dios who were put ashore at Flores and Corvo. The captain,[28] passengers, and crew were transferred to the Grace of Dover, to go about their business, but met Captain Aire in the Bark Bond of Weymouth, who brought them to and despoiled them to the value of 50,000 ducats, for which a warrant against him subsequently went out. If the amount be correct the original captors must have dealt very liberally with those on board the carrack. As Burgh knew that Bazan was now more than due, he was anxious to get home with his prize. The information Monson sent to Frobiser was perfectly accurate, although it reached the latter far too late to be of any use, and Bazan sailed on 16th July (old style) as expected. With a leading wind and ordinary despatch he should have been off Flores before 3rd August; he failed in the way described by Monson, to which there is nothing to be added.[29] Burgh's despatch to Burghley,

[28] The captain, Fernando de Mendoza, had been master of Medina Sidonia's flagship, the San Martin, in 1588 (*Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 163).

[29] Nothing to be added, that is to say, if Monson's account, which is in accord with that generally given by the Spanish historians, be accepted. But Herrera (*op. cit.* iii. p. 337) tells an entirely different story, to the effect that Bazan received, simultaneously, orders directing him to cruise off St. Vincent and to go to Madrid. Writing to know which order to obey he received no answer for more than a month, and was then directed to go to Lisbon with his fleet to consult with the Archduke Albert. But even Herrera says that he was ordered to sea on 18 July, so that it is not clear that the charge against him was not just. However, according to Labores y March he was delayed by calms (*op. cit.* ii. p. 480). Monson's further statement that 'he lived and died in

announcing the capture, is dated 17th August, in which he says that he expects to be home soon after the letter; as excuse for not informing him sooner, he remarks that Cumberland's pinnace, apparently the only one left, had stolen away, and he could not spare a ship, fearing every day to meet the Spaniards.[40] Frobiser also was coming home; on 4th September, off the Lizard, he wrote to Burghley that since 1st August there had been much sickness among his people which would force him to put into Plymouth, but that having met Crosse on 31st August in 47° N., and heard of the capture, he would keep between Ushant and Scilly until the carrack had passed. He gave ministers their first inkling of the amount of the rifling that had gone on. Crosse, he said, had plunder to the amount of 10,000*l.*, and had disobeyed his orders and left him in order to reach port and put it in safety, for which he hoped they would order Crosse to be arrested.[41]

[4] The Madre de Dios arrived at Dartmouth on 7th September. The news of the wealth coming home had spread far and wide, and merchants, shopkeepers, and goldsmiths were hastening down to the coast. Only Burgh, with the Roebuck, had stood by the carrack; the others made the best of their way to various ports to sell their pillage before questions were asked. The Queen sent down commissioners and issued stringent orders, but the commissioners could not be everywhere and seamen cared very little for orders in 1592. Some ships put into Plymouth, and Sir Robert Cecyll wrote to his father that, approaching Exeter, he 'could well smell them almost, such has been the spoils of amber and musk among them; . . . there never was such spoil.' The Foresight and others went to Portsmouth and the scene there was described as resembling Bartholomew Fair; the seamen, with the thoughtlessness of their kind, sold for a trifle that which they had so hardly earned, and the same articles were sometimes again bought on the same day for five times the price given to the original seller. The Queen's officers found them dangerous to interfere with, 'customers, surveyors, searchers, or who else dareth not once check these doings lest they receive a stab.'[42] Thompson, who seems to have had much of the courage, buoyant shrewd-

disgrace' is not correct. During the remainder of the reign of Philip II., Bazan only held some temporary and subordinate posts, but in 1602 he was appointed General of the Armada of the Ocean, a place formerly held by his brother, the great Marquis of Santa Cruz, and the most important maritime employment in the service of the Spanish Crown. Bazan was so far from feeling himself a disgraced suppliant that he stood out for a salary of 12,000 crowns, being double the amount formerly attached to the office (Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*, p. 156). He died in 1604.

[40] *Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 62.

[41] *Ibid.* ff. 68, 69.

[42] *Ibid.* f. 80.

ness, and humour of his master, Hawkyns, struck out a line of his own, and went round to Harwich because he knew 'no better harbour for such a ship so distressed.' No preparations had been made on the east coast, and there goods to 1,200*l.* were sold out of the Dainty without trouble, Thompson declaring that he would not interfere with the men 'because by that usage, if hereafter he had occasion to serve, he would lose their good wills.'

The purser of the Santa Cruz stated that, besides her heavy cargo, the Madre de Dios carried precious stones, amber (Qy. ambergris), and musk to the value of 400,000 crusados.[43] It was a coincidence that seemed suspicious to the Queen's advisers that the purser of the Madre de Dios had been released with the other prisoners, and the bills of lading had disappeared. In no way, and by no cross-examination, could the commissioners obtain any information about these bills of lading; Burgh and Norton confronted 'fall into arguments of taking and boarding and such-like points of honour,' but avoided the point the commissioners desired to clear up. Burgh was said to have taken 2,000*l.* from Captain Cocke, and more from other officers and men, but an examination of his possessions did not reveal much. Gossip accused Crosse of plunder to 10,000*l.*; he confessed to 2,000*l.*, and asserted that a cross of emeralds and diamonds found at his lodgings at Ivybridge in the Strand had been in his possession for seven years. When the men were examined they were all willing to name some one else who had had precious stones, but the person under examination had never touched such things. One man was said to have had 320 diamonds, another 150, another 'a packet' of diamonds and 10,000 crusados, others 'packets' of rubies and chains of pearls. A man named Broadbent, probably a well-known Elizabethan navy officer of that name, bought 1,800 diamonds and 200 or 300 rubies for 130*l.* from a seaman, while he was impressing upon Hawkyns the efforts he was making in trying to find the disappearing treasures.[44] Broadbent rapidly got rid of them for 200*l.* Whiskynges, who was later with Monson,[45] 'a sailor, and master of one of the ships that took the carrack, hath by report half a peck of pearls.' A proclamation went out threatening all the usual penalties and ordering that all chests and goods coming from the coast should be searched, but the men were very restive under these strict measures; the commissioners found it useless to put them on their oaths, 'we hold it lost labour and offence to God.' Ralegh was now a prisoner in the Tower in consequence of preferring the charms of Elizabeth Throckmorton to those of the Queen, but Hawkyns told

[43] 100,000*l.*, taking the crusado at five shillings (Malynes, *Lex Mercatoria*).

[44] *Cecil MSS.* 1st October, 1592.

[45] *Post*, ii. p. 255.

Burghley that Ralegh was 'the especial man' to send down, and Burghley convinced Elizabeth of the necessity. Drake had gone to Dartmouth as one of the commissioners, and, although he had been charged with showing the men undue favour, had not been very successful with them. To Burghley he protested that the accusation was false, and referred for corroboration to Robert Cecyll, 'who hath seen the course I have carried against the mariners. . . . I have been so far from favouring the mariners either in speech or deed that both openly and privately I have been, and am, exclaimed on to be severe in both.'[46] If Drake had not won their confidence, they appear to have regarded Ralegh with a very different mind, and on his arrival 'all the mariners came to him with such shouts and joy as I never saw a man more troubled to quiet them in my life.'[47] The Council proposed to allow the seamen twenty shillings in lieu of all pillage recovered from them, a proposal which would not commend itself to men who had obtained, for the first time in their lives, diamonds and pearls by the handful.[48]

The Purchas account of this voyage says that four-fifths of the cargo of the carrack was embezzled. That is probably an exaggeration, but if the purser of the Santa Cruz spoke with knowledge when he said that the Madre de Dios had precious stones, &c. on board to the value of 100,000*l.*, there can be little doubt that most of that escaped the commissioners. The bulky cargo—pepper, cinnamon, cochineal, ebony, silks, carpets, drugs, &c.—was eventually valued at 141,200*l.*, and this included no jewels, bullion, or plate. Then there were protracted arguments about the distribution of the proceeds. Elizabeth showed signs of an intention to claim the whole, only allowing what she pleased as a grace instead of a right. Cumberland was disposed of because the assistance of his ships 'was not more than is the duty of every subject, for which they are to be recompensed at her Majesty's good pleasure rather than to challenge any terms as due;'[49]

[46] *Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 179.

[47] Robert Cecyll to Burghley, 21st September, 1592.

[48] *Acts of the Privy Council*, 1st October, 1592. On the subject of pillage, *i.e.* plunder on the upper deck, see *post*, Book III. If the Madre de Dios was like the Santa Cruz, the men may have been peculiarly fortunate in finding the spoil ready to their hands and in a position which gave them a legal title to it, if legality would have been of any value in a contest between the Crown and a sailor. On board the latter carrack, said the prisoners, the merchants who had money and jewels kept their chests on the upper deck that they might land them secretly on arrival, and so escape the payment of dues or the possibility of a forced loan to Philip.

[49] *Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 187. Another objection to giving Cumberland anything was found in the fact that his commission did not provide for the case of his not going to sea himself.

whether Burgh really denied the verbal agreement to consort with the earl's ships we do not know, but at any rate Elizabeth did it for him. Cumberland's fleet had cost him 19,000*l.*; Ralegh and his brother adventurers had laid out 34,000*l.*, and he claimed 57,750*l.* But, according to Elizabeth, Ralegh and his partners were to have 36,000*l.*, by which he showed that his net loss altogether would only be 2,200*l.*, since the London merchants were to be more liberally treated as they were to have 6,000*l.* net profit out of the 36,000*l.* Ralegh does not seem to have quoted the clause in his commission;[50] perhaps he thought it waste of time, but Elizabeth may have been impressed by the opinion of Sir John Fortescue, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that 'it were utterly to overthrow all service if due regard were not had of my Lord of Cumberland and Sir Walter Ralegh and the rest of the adventurers who would never be induced to further venture,' nor, although Elizabeth, always afraid of the City, had taken care of the interests of the London merchants, could she be indifferent to City opinion of her conduct. On consideration Elizabeth must have reflected that, although Ralegh could be ill-treated with impunity, it was unadvisable to offend the Earl of Cumberland, and he was granted 37,000*l.*, which left him a handsome profit on his outlay. The London merchants got 12,000*l.*—that is to say, the 6,000*l.* they had subscribed from the 1591 prizes and 6,000*l.* profit; payments of 7,000*l.* or 8,000*l.* were made to Hawkyns and others, and Ralegh got his 24,000*l.*—that is, the 36,000*l.*, first proposed, less 12,000*l.* for the City of London. Elizabeth took the remainder, which may have been anything from 60,000*l.* to 90,000*l.*, her original subscription in hard cash having been 3,000*l.*, of which 1,200*l.* was devoted to fitting out the Garland and Foresight.[51] Ralegh complained loudly of the comparative generosity shown to Cumberland, but it is quite certain that, however much the latter had been mulcted, the former would have been no better off, unless, perhaps, he had divorced his wife. What little there is to be said for Elizabeth is to be found in the fact that if she robbed Ralegh she was only robbing him of what she herself had given, for it was only her bounty that had made him a capitalist. Hawkyns, whose ship had done most to secure the prize, also got much less than was his right, but he remained silent.

The Madre de Dios was, if not the largest ship afloat, the largest ever seen in England; she was 165 feet long over all,

[50] *Ante*, p. 284.

[51] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxliv. 1, 18, 35, 75; ccxlvi. 41, 42; *Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 216. *Ibid.* 73, f. 42, differs somewhat in details, but agrees in giving Elizabeth about 80,000*l.* In Book III., where Monson writes about the division of prize-money, I have printed another paper dealing with the partition of the carrack proceeds on the usual system of thirds.

from beakhead to stern, and seems to have had four full decks with three others in the forecastle and poop. Her beam was 46 feet 10 inches, her keel length being little more than twice her beam.[52] She is said never to have left Dartmouth Harbour,[53] and an offer from the Mayor and burgesses of Dartmouth, in 1594, to build a hospital for the poor in return 'for the carrack,' may relate to her.[54]

[52] The Hakluyt *Report* says that the keel was 100 feet long; in that case the fore and aft rake was more than three-fifths of the keel length.

[53] Purchas.

[54] *Harl. MSS.* 306, f. 233.

The Earl of Cumberland to the coast of Spain and Islands, A.D. 1593. [1]

Ships.	Commanders.
The Lion	The Earl of Cumberland. Captain under him, Captain Monson.
The Bonaventure, and seven other ships.	Sir Edward Yorke, Vice-Admiral.

THE Earl of Cumberland finding by proof and experience that many of his voyages miscarried through the misgovernment of those he trusted, yet, being encouraged by the good success he had the last year, obtained two of her Majesty's ships, and victualled them himself, together with seven others that accompanied them. Besides that his commission gave him power to take, destroy, and arrest all nations that were subject to the King of Spain yet at this time he had a greater hope, for all such French as did adhere or combine with the League against King Henry IV. were to be held and adjudged lawful prize. And coming upon the coast of Spain two of the first ships he encountered and took belonged to St. Malo in Brittany, a principal town of the League, and though these ships made but little show in respect of their burthen and the grossness of their lading, yet were they rich and of good value in money and did more than treble the expense of the voyage by the treasure aboard them.

My Lord being severed one day from his fleet near the islands of the Burlings, it was his hap to meet with twelve hulks, at the same place where

Captain Monson was taken the same day two years before; he required that duty from them that was due to her Majesty's ship, which they peremptorily refused, presuming upon the strength of their twelve ships against one only. But they found themselves deceived, for after two hours' fight he brought them to his mercy, and made them acknowledge their error; and not only so, but they willingly discovered and delivered up to him a great quantity of powder and ammunition which they carried for the King of Spain's service. Here I must not let pass to lay down an error committed by my Lord or especially by his master, and thus it was: my Lord, upon taking the hulks aforesaid, stood to sea with part of them, leaving the rest with Captain Monson to be examined and rummaged. His lordship towards the evening dismissed those ships under his custody, and it seems he had forgot that he had left his long boat and fifty of his men with Captain Monson, under the guard of one small ship for their defence. These hulks being thus dismissed, and coming towards Captain Monson and their consorts, he mistrusted, as indeed it fell out, that they would take advantage of my Lord's keeping his luff, to board and surprise him, his men, and boat, that were aboard another hulk. Indeed it had so fallen out if Captain Monson had not prevented it by leaping into his boat on one side as they boarded him on the other. In which leap he received a hurt in one of his legs which to this time, being the year 1640, he hath found a prejudice to his whole body.*

My Lord of Cumberland having spent some time

* The passage 'Here I must not . . . whole body' is found only in B and R of the MSS.; and in neither of those does the date, 1640, occur as in the Churchill text, which is allowed to remain. Both the MSS. read 'hurt in one of his legs, which to this day he hath found,' &c.

thereabouts, and understanding that Fernantelles de Menezes, a Portuguese, and the King's General of a fleet of twenty-four sail, was gone to the Islands, he pursued them, thinking to meet the carracks before they should join together. At his coming to Flores he met and took one of the fleet, with the death of the captain. By that ship he understood both where the fleet was and of their strength, which he followed and had view of them the day following. But he being far too weak for them, and having the advantage to sail from them, being to windward, he left them and spent some time about those islands until he understood the carracks were passed by without seeing either fleet or islands.

About this time the earl being taken so ill that his recovery was despaired of unless he could return to the English shore, or get a cow to supply him with milk, Captain Monson ventured ashore on the island of Corvo, where, what with threats, and what with promise of reward, he got a cow, which he carried aboard, and in all likelihood was the means of saving the earl's life.

However, Captain Monson valuing the earl's safety above all the profit of the voyage, hasted towards home, and lost company of the rest of the ships by so strange an accident, that it will scarce be believed, though it is a most undoubted truth; for the whole fleet being one day becalmed, the said calm lasted for several days, and in it the ships were so parted that they lost sight of one another, and never saw one another more till they met in England, about four or five weeks after. Those ships so parted from the earl took a prize laden with sugar, which was a good addition to what was taken before.* [2]

* Instead of the paragraphs 'about this time . . . taken before,' B and R read simply, 'And at this time he was taken with a most

melancholy sickness, being in despair of health or life unless the discovery of the English shore did amend him, whereupon he hastened to England and left the rest of his ships behind him, which he had lost some few days before by reason of a long calm.' The other MSS. terminate the voyage at 'fleet or islands.'

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[1] Purchas[1] gives six ships—the Lion and Bonaventure of the Queen's, the Bark Chaldon, Anthony, Pilgrim, and Discovery. The Anthony, 120 tons, Captain James Langton, pilot Antonio Martino;[2] the Pilgrim, 100 tons, Captain Francis Slingsby, pilot Diego Petrus; and the Discovery were subsequently detached at the Azores to cruise in the West Indies.

[2] The only sources of information for this voyage are Monson's account[3] and that in Purchas, of which the former is the fuller for Cumberland's own cruise. An escaped prisoner from Spain, Nevill Davies, brought home by Ralegh in 1592, wrote to the Queen that had she used her opportunities Spanish power would long since have been broken.[4] He had been twelve years a prisoner there, and his conclusion was that of Walsyngham and others, that the interruption of the West India treasure traffic would speedily force Philip to seek peace. But he warned her that the work should be done systematically, and that it was necessary that all fleets should be of sufficient strength. It was not in Elizabeth's nature to carry out any design persistently, and this year, notwithstanding the encouraging capture of the Madre de Dios, no real plan of attack, either maritime or territorial, was even talked of.[5] Certainly Walsyngham, and those who were of his opinion, never contemplated that cruises for the treasure fleets should be carried on by a force too weak to do anything but run from an enemy able to fight. This year, when Elizabeth should have redoubled her efforts, seems, indeed, to mark a pause in the action of the English Government, for only eight ships, exclusive of the Lion and Bonaventure, were commissioned during the whole year, and of these eight the Rainbow was the only one of any fighting strength.[6]

As usual Englishmen themselves were doing the work of the Crown, and although unable to bring about a striking success

[1] *Pilgrimes*, iv. p. 1,146.

[2] 'A Spaniard well acquainted with the West Indies' (*ibid.*).

[3] Here and in Book V. *Stratagems to be used at Sea.*

[4] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxlii. 57.

[5] On 25th February the Privy Council sent an urgent mandate to Frobiser to appear before them, but the motive is unknown. He was then residing on his Yorkshire property.

[6] *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2230. See *post*, p. 306.

against the Flotas, such as would have gone far to end the war, but required a strong fleet to obtain, they were carrying on individual privateering ventures with the customary success. In March the Venetian ambassador wrote that there were fifty of them in Spanish waters doing the most serious damage, and it was common talk at Madrid that an understanding between Elizabeth and the Sultan was extremely probable. As Spain could barely hold her own in the Mediterranean against the Mahommedan Powers now that the effect of Lepanto was wearing off, a real working alliance between England and the Turk would have meant unutterable disaster to Spain if both Powers put forth their strength. It was fortunate for Elizabeth that Philip was always fearing more energetic measures from her than those she actually employed; in consequence of the Ralegh-Frobiser expedition of 1592, the exaggerated reports of its strength, and the number of privateers in the Caribbean Sea, Luis Alfonso Flores, General of the outward Flota of that year, had been ordered to winter in the West Indies. Defective as were Elizabeth's preparations to intercept it, the presence of so many privateers at sea and rumours of operations on a large scale again shook Spanish financial and political equilibrium; 'there is the greatest alarm at the possibility of an English descent upon the coast of Spain,' wrote the Venetian ambassador, and it (the Flota) 'has never at any time of its history been so harried by the English and exposed to such danger of capture as at the present moment.'[7] If this could be written at a time when there were not half-a-dozen Queen's ships in commission, and no threatening fleet at sea, the question arises what would have been the result, and how long could Spain have stood the strain, if the unorganized and undirected movements of individual privateers working for profit had been backed by powerful royal fleets, used consistently and continuously on an intelligent plan, as laid down by Elizabeth's statesmen and seamen.

Philip had sent warning to Alfonso Flores to come with caution, and two squadrons were prepared to meet him at the Azores. He reached Angra and disembarked the treasure there on $\frac{1}{11}$ April, he, himself, with the cargo fleet arriving at Lisbon in June, and it is said that the Flota took a new route this year to avoid the usual dangers from the English. Cumberland sailed on 23rd June,[8] but it would appear that the Armada the earl met at the Azores was not that under Don Francisco Coloma, who was sent to bring the silver left by Alfonso Flores, and who reached Cadiz

[7] *State Papers Venetian*, 17th April, 1593.

[8] *Cecil MSS.*; Cumberland to Robert Cecyll, from aboard the Lion under sail. He excuses himself for not taking leave of Cecyll, but could not do so without coming to court, 'where I durst not be seen.'

with it on ¼¼ July.[9] The admiral's name, given by Monson, would be, in Portuguese, Fernão Tellez de Meneses, but although no such name is to be found in the works of Spanish naval historians, there was such an officer at sea this year, but not in connection with the homeward Flota. A carrack, the San Pantaleão, was blockaded at Ponta Delgada from $\frac{21st\ July}{26th\ Aug.}$[10] to $\frac{29th\ Aug.}{8th\ Sept.}$, by seven English 'galleons,' probably privateers, and was released by the appearance of Tellez de Meneses.[11] The Purchas account differs from Monson's in saying that Cumberland kept company with the Spaniards for three weeks, a highly improbable statement from every point of view, but it may be that the three weeks is a reference to the blockade of the carrack at Ponta Delgada. The treasure brought home in July included 2,102,000 ducats for the King and 5,141,000 belonging to private owners, besides jewels and other valuables.[12]

The crews of the three ships detached to the West Indies had an interesting and adventurous voyage. Making St. Lucia, they then decided for a dash on the pearl fisheries at Margarita, where they took pearls to the value of 2,000*l.* and ransomed the town for 2,000 ducats. From there they went to Cumana and Rio de la Hacha, but found the Spaniards ready for them, so they sailed for the islands and for some time cruised round Española, Jamaica, and Cuba. Off Cuba the Pilgrim left them for England, while the Anthony and Discovery stood over to the Gulf of Honduras, where, at Puerto Cabello,[13] they found seven Spanish vessels at anchor, 'the least of which was 180 tons.' After twenty-four hours' fight the Spaniards deserted their ships, which were all burnt by the English except one, which was saved and brought home. However, Don C. Fernandez Duro remarks that there is not only no report among the Spanish papers of such a serious loss but no reference to any such event, however trifling. But their success at Margarita was reported to Spain in a fashion that magnified them into a fleet of twenty ships, and in February 1594, Don Francisco Coloma was ordered to take command of a squadron and pursue them,[14] but of course they were back in England by the time he arrived in West Indian waters.

[9] Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, ii. p. 488.
[10] 'Feast of St. Lawrence.'
[11] Vaz Coutinho, *Hist. do Successo que na Ilha de S. Miguel.*
[12] *State Papers Ven.* 28th August, 1593.
[13] There is another, and better known, Puerto Cabello, in Venezuela, South America.
[14] *Armada Española*, iii. p. 488.

Sir Martin Frobiser with a Fleet to Brest in Brittany, Anno 1594. [1]

Ships.	Commanders.
The Vanguard	Sir Martin Frobiser.
The Rainbow	Captain Fenner.
The Dreadnought . . .	Captain Clifford.
The Quittance	Captain Saville.

About three years before, and in 1591, the Queen sent Sir John Norreys with 3,000 soldiers to join with the French King's party in those parts of Brittany about Brest. The King of Spain, who upheld the faction of the League, sent Don Juan de Aguila with the like forces, to join with the Duke of Mercœur, who was of that side. The Spaniards arriving first, had fortified themselves very strongly near the town of Brest, expecting new succours from Spain by sea; which the French King fearing, craved help of ships from the Queen, which her Majesty was the more willing to grant because the Spaniards had gotten the haven of Brest to entertain their shipping in, and might in time prove most dangerous neighbours. Wherefore she sent Sir Martin Frobiser thither, in this year 1594, with four of her ships to make good that harbour. Upon his arrival he conferred with Sir John Norreys, and betwixt them both resolved to give an assault on the fort the Spaniards possessed—Sir John with his land forces and Sir Martin with his seamen. And though the Spaniards defended it as bravely as men could do, the fame whereof will remain to posterity, yet in the end it

was taken with no less valour by the English, as appeareth by the deaths of divers of their captains. And Sir Martin himself being sore wounded died after his return to Plymouth. [2]

[1] Frobiser's squadron was :—[1]

Ships.	Tons.	Commanders and Period of Commission.
Vanguard .	500	Sir Martin Frobiser, 'captain and admiral,'[2] 15th July, 1594–9th January, 1595.
Rainbow. .	500	George Fenner, senior, Vice-Admiral,[3] 15th July, 1594–25th January, 1595.
Crane . .	250	Humph. Reynell (Reynolds), 15th July, 1594–9th January, 1595.
Quittance .	270	Hen. Saville, 15th July, 1594–25th January, 1595.
Charles . .	70	Nich. Franklyn, 15th July, 1594–22nd January, 1595.
Moon . .	60	John Merryweather, 15th July–31st December, 1594.
London ships :		
Ascension .	400	—
Consent . .	350	—
Susan Bonaventure	250	—
Cherubim .	320	—
Minion . .	180	—
Primrose. .	180	—
Pinnace . .	50	—

[2] No doubt it was not altogether unpleasing to English politicians to see France torn by civil war, in which Philip was becoming involved more and more deeply. Elizabeth's preoccupation was about the maritime places, and her unusual energy in 1590 was due to the prevailing belief that Parma was about to abandon his communications and march across France to seize Brittany, strategy which would have been more akin to her own feeble inspirations than to the genius of the great soldier. The Queen was continually writing to Henry about holding on

[1] *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2231 ; *Remembrancia*, p. 241. The City of London paid the expenses of the merchantmen.

[2] At 1*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* a day. [3] At 13*s.* 4*d.* a day.

recovering the ports, but the King knew that they would stand or fall by greater movements, nor, if they were to pass out of his power for the time, is it unlikely that he preferred to see them in Spanish or Leaguer hands rather than in English possession. During 1592 the skirmishes in Brittany were overshadowed by the more important encounter between Parma and Henry, which resulted in the former relieving Rouen, taking Caudebec, and finally retreating without loss in the face of a superior force. Henry's failure against Parma coincided with the defeat of the allied English and French, under Norreys and the Princes of Dombes and Conti, at Craon on $\frac{13}{23}$ May, 1592, when the English contingent was cut to pieces in the battle and afterwards, the Spaniards giving them no quarter.[4] The defeat was the plain issue of a policy which provided neither sufficient troops for land operations nor a naval force powerful enough to cut the invaders' sea communications, which only existed on sufferance. Henry implored help; Elizabeth insisted on a port—Brest—and the right to receive customs to recover her expenses.[5] Henry made promises, but in the end had to confess that he dared not give up Brest, as such an act would cost him the attachment of his adherents in Brittany.[6] When Parliament met in February 1593, the Lord Keeper's speech dwelt on the danger of Philip's designs in Brittany and Scotland, but the latter was brought forward in by far the most prominent manner. Sir Robert Cecyll, as the Government spokesman, enlarged on the same text, it being the lever whereby Parliament was to be moved to a heavy money grant. The Cecyll outbid even the Essex faction in their alarmist prognostications, although, as Major Martin Hume notices,[7] Burghley was well aware that Philip's preparations at the time were strictly defensive. Members were told that that was the object for which they were called together: 'the calling of the Parliament now is not for the making of any more new laws and statutes, for there are already a sufficient number.' Cecyll said in his speech that Philip held most of the Breton ports—which was untrue, because they were mostly held by Mercœur, by no means the same thing—'whither he still sendeth supply daily and reinforces them every four or five months.' A modern Opposition would have

[4] It is worth noticing that 800 English who escaped from the field retreated to Ambrières, where they were surprised and nearly exterminated through their neglect of simple outpost precautions.

[5] 'I urge continually the yielding of Brest.'—Unton to Burghley, $\frac{20th\ May}{3rd\ June}$, 1592.

[6] L. Grégoire, *La Ligue en Bretagne*, Paris, 1856, p. 257.

[7] *Treason and Plot*, Lond. 1901, p. 37. Major Hume thinks that the scare was 'deliberately exaggerated' by the Cecylls in order to obtain liberal supplies.

desired to know why, with a strong fleet available, Philip was permitted to supply them at his will, and there is just a suggestion of dissatisfied criticism in the speech of Sir H. Knivett, who hoped that a sufficiently strong force would be sent, and that Spain would be fought and conquered abroad.[8]

For years Philip's object had been to obtain the crown of France for himself; if not for himself, for his daughter, or, at the worst, to allow the Dukes of Mayenne, Guise, and Mercœur some provinces, keeping as much as he could for the Spanish Crown. After Parma's successful campaign and the victory of Craon he thought the time had come to cease to be merely the 'Protector of the Catholic Religion in France,' and put forward his claim unveiled by phrases. Politically the move was a mistake; not only had Guise, Mayenne, and Nemours their own hopes of the crown, but the discovery of Philip's purpose reawoke national sentiment and rallied moderate Catholics to Henry when he skilfully outwitted Philip by his conversion. It has been remarked that the Duke of Mercœur had never worked very cordially with the Spaniards, but the tension was increased after the revelation of Philip's designs, for the duke had no notion of revolting only to make Philip the owner of Brittany, and, as early as September 1592, he was secretly negotiating with Henry.[9] As the result of the strained conditions existing between Mercœur and Don Juan de Aguila the latter retired sulkily to Blavet, after Craon, and refused to help the duke, who, on his side, when Philip sent reinforcements, protested, ostensibly on the ground that supplies were insufficient for them, that there were already sufficient Spanish troops in the province. A further cause of quarrel between Mercœur and Aguila was the truce between the followers of Henry and the Leaguers, which continued during the second half of 1593, but which the Spaniards refused to recognize. Elizabeth's first decision, when she heard of Henry's conversion, was to withdraw all the English troops from France, but she subsequently permitted herself to be persuaded to continue her assistance, and towards the end of 1593 some scanty reinforcements were sent to Brittany, but so undisciplined and ill-provided that they were more terrible to the natives than to the enemy. The fleet, with which Elizabeth might have isolated Aguila, was lying unused during 1593,[10] while she allowed Philip

[8] D'Ewes, *Journals of Parliament during the reign of Elizabeth.*

[9] Grégoire, *op. cit.* p. 320.

[10] Exclusive of the Lion and Bonaventure with Cumberland, and two ships on Bordeaux convoy service between January and March, the only men-of-war commissioned during 1593 were the Rainbow, 500 tons; Tramontana, 150; Crane, 250; Quittance, 270; Moon, 60; Charles, 70; Lion's Whelp, 40; Spy, 40. Of these some must have

to prepare for a further movement and she herself was intriguing for a port. The desires of the English Government were still fixed upon Brest, although of what value it would have been except as a base for a fleet which Elizabeth seemed resolved not to use, or how it could have been held without a fleet against a combined land and sea attack, is not clear. The Queen had refused Paimpol and Bréhat, and was sending sweet messages to M. de Sourdéac, the Governor of Brest, promising to continue him in his post if Henry delivered the place as a surety for the money advanced.[11] So far from being persuaded, Sourdéac said he would resign if Henry gave it up; the States of Brittany protested against putting it into English hands; and Henry could only write smooth letters, at long intervals, to Elizabeth, while secretly assuring the States that he had no intention of yielding the port.

After Craon Philip had hesitated whether to attack Brest or Bordeaux,[12] but finally decided for the former, although he was for a long time unable to send Aguila sufficient troops, and his general could not rely on Mercœur's assistance. It was not until 1594 that the Spaniards took active steps to reduce Brest, and as they were still too weak for a formal siege, their engineers decided to erect a fort on a projecting point, still called the Pte. des Espagnols, on the southern side of the Goulet, which would completely command the entrance to the harbour. The fort, called *El Leon*, progressed but slowly, because the ground was rocky, and, partly from suspicion and partly from necessity, materials and workmen were both sent from Spain,[13] the English navy apparently regarding the transit benevolently. While the fort was slowly shaping into existence the Maréchal D'Aumont, who had replaced the Prince de Dombes, besieged Morlaix with a combined French and English force, and although Mercœur and Aguila advanced to its relief, they quarrelled during their uneasy partnership, and Aguila retired, leaving Mercœur helpless, with the result that Morlaix surrendered on 2nd September, 1594. Elizabeth immediately demanded that it should be handed over to her, but matters at Brest were becoming too urgent for the application of her favourite threat of withdrawing her assistance. The reduction of the new fort had indeed already

been employed on other service than watching the Breton coast, and it is obvious that there can have been no idea of hampering communication between Spain and Brittany.

[11] Grégoire, *op. cit.* p. 259.

[12] *Cecil MSS.* 1½ August, 1593.

[13] Mariategui, *El Capitan Cristobal de Rojas*, Madrid, 1880. Rojas was the engineer officer who planned the fort and superintended its construction. The site was afterwards covered by another fort laid out by Vauban (Grégoire, *op. cit.* p. 324).

been decided on, and Norreys with fresh troops landed at Paimpol on 1st September, and, joining D'Aumont, moved on with him to Brest, seizing Quimper on their way. They appeared before *El Leon* in the first week of October,[14] Frobiser, with the fleet, from which the Admiral landed a naval contingent under his own command, having already taken up a blockading position. The fort was protected on two sides by a sheer fall to the sea, and on its third, or land, face presented two bastions united by a curtain with a ditch in front, but walls and ditch were both unfinished, or it had defied any pressure but that of starvation.[15] The Spanish garrison consisted of 400 men under Don Tomé de Parades; the attacking force is said to have been made up of 5,000 French and English infantry and 700 horse.[16] On 23rd October, after the batteries had been at work some time, an assault was delivered which was repulsed with heavy loss to the besiegers, who then took to mining towards the eastern bastion, their work being more than once interrupted by the sallies of the Spaniards. Aguila had not been idle in collecting troops for the relief, but Mercœur now avenged himself for the quarrel before Morlaix by refusing to move a man to assist the Spaniard, and, in view of the negotiations he was still carrying on with Henry, would probably not in any case have assisted to put Brest in Spanish hands. However, on $\frac{7}{17}$ November it was known that Aguila was only four or six leagues distant, but his force was small and he had no cavalry.[17] It is said that D'Aumont desired to raise the siege but that Norreys persisted that a final attempt should be made. Norreys had his way; the mine was fired, blowing down a part of the curtain and making a comparatively easy breach for the main body of stormers, while Frobiser and his seamen attempted to scale the western bastion.[18] The struggle lasted all day, but eventually the assailants forced their way in at all points, Frobiser being shot in the hip as the bastion was entered. Quarter was neither asked nor given; all but nine of the garrison were put to the sword, and the surviving nine being sent to Aguila were promptly hanged by him. The losses of the besiegers from exposure to cold and rains in the trenches, fighting, and want of food are said to have been some 3,000 men,[19] or nearly half the force. Frobiser was well enough the next

[14] Mariategui, *op. cit.* p. 34; or on $\frac{4}{14}$ October (Levot, *Hist. de Brest*, i. p. 77).

[15] There is a map of the position among the *Cecil MSS.*, with a contemporary endorsement that it is by Frobiser, but the handwriting of the names on the map is certainly not his.

[16] Levot, *op. cit.*

[17] Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, iii. p. 88.

[18] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccl. 28.

[19] Levot, *op. cit.* p. 80.

day to write to the Council announcing the success and that Norreys was already marching towards Aguila, who retreated before him, while the fort was being destroyed by a party left for the purpose. When the news reached England Elizabeth wrote to Frobiser a letter of thanks for his services, and 'we have thought good to vouchsafe to take knowledge of it by our own handwriting.' The prevailing impression was that the Admiral's wound should not have proved dangerous, but the surgeon who extracted the ball left a piece of wadding behind, the shot having been fired at close quarters, and complications set in which caused his death on 22nd November, shortly after the return of the fleet to Plymouth. Fuller [20] remarks on his unexpected death, 'Swords or guns have not made more mortal wounds than probes in the hands of skilless chirurgeons, as it here came to pass.'

After the failure at Brest Philip took but little interest in the land war, but kept Blavet as an advanced post for possible operations against England in the future. Elizabeth did not get Brest or any other Breton port, for Henry's political and military situation was improving daily, and he could afford to use a more independent tone. It will be noticed that no maritime opposition to Frobiser's squadron was attempted by Philip, and as the squadron was not a strong one the fact is a sufficient commentary on the naval policy which had permitted the untrammelled transport of men and supplies from Spain to Brittany for a period of four years.[21] In June 1594, when the Brest expedition was being spoken of, Ralegh wrote to the Lord Admiral, 'I hope, also, that you will remember it is the Queen's honour and safety to assail and not to defend; and for aught I hear your fleet will be far too weak.' Ralegh, a born strategist, understood that for a sea power like England to fight Spanish troops on land in Brittany instead of at sea before they arrived there was a feeble form of defensive policy, equivalent to meeting invasion on English ground instead of meeting it on the Atlantic. Even he did not realize the impotence of Spanish pretension, for, weak as was the squadron, it was sufficient for its work, although, as few people in England could have known that, and as there was every reason to believe that Philip would endeavour to assist the garrison by sea, Elizabeth was not justified in taking the risk of sending a force which would have been unable to beat off a Spanish fleet of any strength.

The only attempt, on a large scale, this year against Spanish commerce was one prepared by the indefatigable Earl of Cum-

[20] *Worthies.*

[21] The cost of the military operations in Brittany between 1591 and 1594, inclusive, was 262,000*l.* (*Pipe Office Accounts*, 243); the navy could have done the work more cheaply.

berland.[22] On 6th April the Royal Exchange, George Cave, Admiral; the Mayflower, Vice-Admiral William Anthony; the Samson, Captain Nicholas Downton; and the Violet, a pinnace of 24 tons, sailed from Plymouth with sealed orders. As on 24th April the squadron was in 43° N., off the coast of Spain, spreading east and west by day and rejoining at night, we may surmise that Cumberland's directions were of the usual nature, and enjoined them firstly to try the coast of Spain, and in due course to stand over to the Azores for the carracks and Flota ships. After his squadron sailed Cumberland's self-respect had suffered a shock by the issue of an order, which he attributed to the direct interposition of the Queen, that all ships brought in for him were to be searched. He wrote to Robert Cecyll that vessels in which he was not interested were not searched, but that if an example was to be made of him he would 'content' himself, but that if the Queen could not trust him to pay the customs he had 'hazarded estate and life very vainly.'[23] No doubt Elizabeth's action was a consequence of the huge amount of illicit plunder in the Madre de Dios in 1592.

Several small prizes were taken at various times, and on 2nd June they were in sight of St. Michael, and on the 13th, six leagues south of the channel between Fayal and Pico, sighted a great carrack, Las Cinque Llagas, of about the same size as the Madre de Dios. The Mayflower engaged in the evening and by midnight all three ships had closed with her, but it was not until the next morning that the Royal Exchange and the Mayflower laid alongside to board. Anthony was killed and his ship fell out of action, taking little further part in the fight, her place being taken by the Samson. But shortly afterwards Cave was mortally, and Downton badly, wounded, and no doubt the loss of the three captains and consequent lack of authoritative direction was the reason that the issue of the fight was not more fortunate. Several attempts were made to board and might have succeeded 'if there had been any principal man to put them forward';[24] and the English were much surprised at the 'fireworks' used by the Portuguese, a form of attack which was supposed to be a favourite one in Elizabeth's rather than in Philip's ships.[25] In consequence of this the English ships were several times on fire, but the struggle continued until the afternoon, when the flame from a

[22] The two authorities for this voyage are the account in Purchas, and that by Downton in Hakluyt (*Voyages*, xi. p. 354, ed. 1888).

[23] *Cecil MSS.* 26th May, 1594.

[24] Downton appears to have been on deck but unable to move.

[25] See Instructions to Medina Sidonia 1st April, 1588 (*Simancas Papers*); and reference to the English 'artificial fires from which the Spaniards had always suffered enormous damage' (*State Papers Venetian*, 26th January, 1594). See Book III. for a note on 'fireworks.

forecastle piece of the Samson's, lying then close alongside, set a mat on the carrack's beakhead alight and the fire spread until there was no chance of saving the ship, the Samson and Royal Exchange having much ado to get clear and save themselves. The Portuguese, having to choose their death, jumped overboard, and Downton sent an officer with a boat 'to use his own discretion in saving of them'—in other words, to rescue only those who could pay ransom. The other ships sent their boats also, probably with the same directions. The carrack burned all through the night and blew up on the morning of the 15th, when the flames reached sixty barrels of powder in her hold. The Venetian ambassador wrote that she was the richest ship that had ever sailed from the East Indies and worth 2,000,000 ducats;[26] her passage had been a fortunate one until she took 400 negroes on board at Angola for sale in Spain, after which some virulent disease broke out which killed 500 persons within ten days, the disease chiefly attacking the whites, of whom there were 300 as passengers exclusive of the crew.

The disheartened privateersmen had a hope of better fortune when, on 30th June, they sighted and came up with another great carrack. Downton described the end of Las Cinque Llagas to her captain, and summoned him to yield under penalty of suffering the same fate. He replied that if they had been at the burning of Las Cinque Llagas he had been at the capture of the Revenge, and bid them do their worst. Their worst, after consultation, was to sail peacefully away by reason that so many of the superior officers were killed and wounded, 'and because of the murmuring of some disordered and cowardly companions,' some of the men being evidently demoralized by the result of the fight with the first carrack. After fruitlessly cruising for some time about Flores and Corvo, and victuals growing short, they sailed for home, arriving at Portsmouth on 28th August. Downton does not mention the presence of any Spanish fleet at the Azores, and it would seem that Philip, having ordered the Flota to winter in the West Indies, had decided to let the carracks take their chance. Apparently the only Spanish cruising fleet sent to sea this year was one under Antonio de Urquiola, which sailed in April to clear the enemy from Cape St. Vincent and the adjacent coasts; it was probably the presence of this fleet which shortened the stay of Cumberland's squadron on the coast of Portugal.

[26] 550,000*l.* or some 3,500 000*l.* now (*State Papers Venetian*, 28th July, 1594).

A Fleet to the Indies, Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkyns, Generals, wherein they ventured deeply, and died in the Voyage, A.D. 1595. [1]

Ships.	Commanders by Sea.	Commander by Land.
The Defiance .	Sir Francis Drake.	Sir Thos. Baskervile.
The Garland .	Sir John Hawkyns.	—
The Hope .	Captain Gilbert Yorke.	—
The Bonaventure	Captain Troughton.	—
The Foresight .	Captain Wynter.	—
The Adventure .	Captain Thos. Drake.	—

THESE two Generals, presuming much upon their own experience and knowledge, used many persuasions to the Queen to undertake a voyage to the West Indies, giving much assurance to perform great services, and promising to engage themselves very deeply therein with the adventure of both substance and their persons. And as all actions of this nature promise good hope until they come to be performed, so did this the more in the opinion of all men, in respect of the eminence of the two Generals and their great experience.

There were many impediments and lets to this voyage before they could clear themselves of the coast, which put them to greater charge than they expected. The chiefest cause of their lingering was a mistrust our State had of an invasion, and the danger to spare so many good ships and men out of England as they carried with them. The Spaniards

most subtly let slip no opportunity to put us into an amazement, thereby to dissolve or divert the expedition, and sent four galleys from Blavet in Brittany to seize some part of our coast, that so we might apprehend a greater force was to follow. These galleys landed at Penzance in Cornwall, where, finding the town abandoned, they sacked and burnt it; but this design of theirs took little effect, for the voyage proceeded nevertheless.

The intent of the voyage was to land at Nombre de Dios, and from thence to march to Panama, to possess the treasure that comes from Peru, and, if they saw reason for it, to inhabit and keep it. But a few days before their going from Plymouth they received letters from her Majesty of an advertisement she had out of Spain that the Indian fleet was arrived, and that one of them, with loss of her mast, was put room * to the island of Puerto Rico. Whereupon she commanded them, seeing there was so good an opportunity offered as the readiness of this her fleet and the weakness of Puerto Rico, to possess themselves of that treasure, and the rather, for that it was not much out of their way to Nombre de Dios. It is neither years nor experience that can foresee and prevent all mishaps and disasters incident to man's undertakings, which is a manifest proof that God is the guider and disposer of men's actions; for this latter design was as probable to be effected considering the ability and wisdom of the two Generals, as it was wisely directed, yet, for want of not carrying it secretly, so unfortunately prevented as it failed in execution. [2]

There were at this time five frigates sent out of Spain to fetch the treasure put on shore at Puerto Rico. In their way it was their fortune to take a

* To leeward.

pinnace of the English fleet, by whom they understood the secret design of the voyage, and to prevent the attempt of Puerto Rico they hastened thither with all speed (whilst our Generals lingered at Guadalupe to set up their boats and do other necessary works about the ships), and so strengthened the town with the soldiers brought in the frigates, that when our fleet came thither, not expecting resistance, they found themselves frustrated of their hopes, and were forced to retire with dishonour and loss of many gentlemen there slain. None was the occasion of this disaster but the Generals themselves, not having care to carry their actions with more secrecy, and this repulse, it is thought, bred so great a grief in Sir John Hawkyns that it hastened his death. This disaster was great and unexpected, yet it did not discourage Sir Francis Drake's great mind, who proceeded upon his first resolved design for Nombre de Dios, though with no better success. For the enemy, having knowledge of their coming, fortified the passage from thence to Panama and forced them to return with loss.

Sir Francis Drake, who was wont to rule fortune, now finding his error, and the difference between the present strength of the Indies and what it was when he first knew it, grew melancholy upon this defeat, and suddenly, and I hope naturally, died at Puerto Bello, not far from the place where he got his first reputation. The two Generals dying, and all other hopes being taken away by their deaths, Sir Thomas Baskervile succeeded them in their command, and began now to think upon his return for England; but coming near Cuba he met and fought with a fleet of Spain, though not long, by reason of the mortality of his men. This fleet was sent to take the advantage of ours in its return, thinking, as indeed it happened, that they should find them

both weak and in want, as indeed they had done and put them to some hazard; but our ships were too good of sail for the Spaniards, which was the great advantage we had against them in the time of the war.

It is to be observed that from the year the Revenge was taken until this present year, 1595, there was no summer but the King of Spain furnished a fleet for the guarding of his coasts, and securing of his trade. And though there was little fear of any fleet from England to impeach him besides Sir Francis Drake's in the Indies, yet because he would show his greatness, and satisfy Portugal, who were daily vexed and spoiled by our ships of reprisal, he sent the Count of Feria, a young nobleman of Portugal who desired to gain experience, with twenty ships to the Islands, for the defence of the carracks, who came home in safety though they missed the fleet and Islands, as they used to do in many other years, and arrived safe at Lisbon. The other fleet of the King of Spain in the Indies consisted of twenty-four ships, their general Don Bernardino de Avellaneda, a man, it seems, not chosen for his valour, for when he came to encounter the English fleet his cowardliness wonderfully appeared; but his defects were supplied by the valour of his Vice-Admiral, to whom our men did attribute much honour. His name was Don Juan Gutierrez de Garibay, and he it was that was afterwards General of the Indies fleet Sir William Monson met with, as you shall understand hereafter. [3]

[1] The following is the complete fleet list.[1] The first six were Queen's ships, the rest hired London merchantmen :—

[1] *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2233. It is not clear why the accounts only commence from 22nd July; the fleet was at Plymouth long before that date, but presumably there was some question of agreement or bookkeeping involved.

Ships.	Tons.	Captains and Period of Commission.
Defiance . . .	550	Jonas Bodenham,[2] 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Garland . . .	660	Humphrey Rennell (Reynolds), 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Hope . . .	600	Gilbert Yorke,[3] Thos. Drake, Sam. Thomas, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Bonaventure . .	600	J. Troughton, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Adventure . .	340	Thos. Drake, Hen. Saville, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Foresight . . .	300	Wm. Wynter, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Concord . . .	330	David Serrucoud, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Susan Bonaventure .	250	Rich. Barnard, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Amity . . .	300	Chas. Cæsar, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Solomon Bonaventure	—	Wm. Middleton, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Elizabeth Constant .	—	Wm. Morrice, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Saker . . .	—	Alex. Vaughan, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
John Bonaventure .	200	Jas. Fenton, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Jewel . . .	110	Ed. Goodwyn, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Pegasus . . .	—	Timothy Shotten, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Felix . . .	180	Barnard Drake, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Desire . . .	240	Hen. Austin, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
Help . . .	—	Anth. Lister, master, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.
John Trelawney .	150	Pierce Lemman, master, 22nd July, 1595–2nd June, 1596.

There were some others not mentioned in this list because they did not return: the Francis, 35 tons, Captain Wignoll,

[2] After Drake's death. [3] Yorke died on 6th December.

was captured on 30th October. The Richard was sunk at Guadalupe as too slow, the Pulpit was burnt, and the Exchange abandoned, on 23rd and 25th November. The Delight and another ship were sunk on 7th February, 1596, as unseaworthy, the Phœnix, frequently mentioned in the Hakluyt *Relation*, is probably the Felix of the above list. With one exception the various authorities which give the number agree that there were twenty-seven sail in all; the records of the Plymouth Corporation, however, make the total thirty-six.[4]

The financial statement[5] of the voyage shows that Elizabeth advanced 20,000*l.*, Drake and Hawkyns, 'to be at the charge above our charge of as much as shall make a third part of our portion to be employed in this service.' On 4th December, 1594—and the date shows approximately the time of the definite decision to undertake the expedition—a patent was passed to T. Middleton, Rich. Carmarthen, and Wm. Borough to keep the accounts of expenditure and receipts, a new proceeding from which may be inferred the dissatisfaction of Elizabeth with preceding methods which left the details to be made up by the admirals. According to this paper she expended 42,000*l.*, but according to another the total cost was upwards of 70,000*l.*,[6] and only 4,907*l.* for gold, silver, and pearls brought home, summed up the scanty assets. That portion of the fleet prepared by Drake was, we know, not well supplied; therefore the Canary, Muscatel, Gascony, and Spanish wines entered as purchased were presumably furnished by Hawkyns, as also 'lasting victuals, a kind of victuals for sea service devised by Mr. Hugh Platt.' There were, however, only four barrels of it, at 4*l.* 10*s.* the barrel. In 1590, Hawkyns, who was always careful of his men, had obtained 'victuals of an extraordinary price and goodness to keep men in health,' and now the provision of calico for suits of apparel was probably also due to his forethought, as also the purchase of 927 'Brasill beds,' doubtless hammocks, at 4*s.* 6*d.* each. The refinements of life were attended to by the purchase of instruments for eight musicians and nine trumpeters; and one Bible, twenty-five psalters, and two service books does not seem a large supply for the fleet.

From another paper[7] we obtain some interesting details concerning the offensive equipment of the fleet. Of brass guns for the men-of-war, there were delivered to the Generals, 4 cannon periers, 6 demi-cannon, 54 culverins, 72 demi-culverins, 30 sakers, 6 minions, 13 falcons with 26 chambers, 10 portpieces with

[4] Hist. MSS. Commission, Appendix to Ninth Report, p. 278.
[5] *Pipe Office Accounts, ubi supra.*
[6] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclix. 61.
[7] *Audit Office Accounts*, 1688, xxx.

20 chambers and 2 fowlers; of iron there were 6 demi-culverins and 2 sakers. Only one culverin and one chamber were missing when the ships returned. By a comparison with other documents[8] we obtain the following distribution for the heavy pieces :—

—	Cannon Perier.	Demi-cannon.	Culverins.	Demi-culverins.	Sakers.
Hope .	2	4	9	12	4
Bonaventure	2	2	11	14	6
Defiance .	—	—	14	14	4
Garland .	—	—	16	14	4
Foresight .	—	—	—	14	8
Adventure .	—	—	4	10	6

Shot supplied and used :—

—	Stone Shot.	Iron Round Shot.	Iron Cross-bar Shot.
Cannon perier :			
Supplied . . .	60	—	—
Used . .	24	—	—
Demi-cannon :			
Supplied . . .	—	—	50
Used	—	72	23
Culverin :			
Supplied . . .	—	1,720	340
Used	—	1,230	205
Demi-culverin :			
Supplied . . .	—	2,970	480
Used	—	1,977	289
Saker :			
Supplied . . .	—	—	260
Used	—	1,328	150
Minion :			
Supplied . . .	—	—	60
Used	—	185	17
Falcon :			
Supplied . . .	—	—	30
Used	—	420	18

These figures suggest serious engagements at sea, but, except at Puerto Rico and the action off the I. de Pinos, there was

[8] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* clxxxvi. 34 ; ccxxxiv. 69 ; *Royal MSS.* 17A, xxxi.

no occasion during the voyage when the ships were called upon for heavy artillery work. The numbers must be read with allowance for the habits of theft common to the Elizabethan official classes; it was not unusual, we are told, for gunners to sell again to the Queen the powder and shot they had stolen from her ships. Iron shot cost from 5*l.* to 10*l.* a ton; stone shot, 1*s.* 4*d.* apiece. One hundred and seventeen dozen musket arrows, a favourite missile, were carried; 'it is incredible how wonderfully one of them will pierce, and what dangerous leaks they will make, and how hard to be found and stopped. . . . I have seen trial made that one of those musket arrows hath pierced clean through a piece of timber of eleven or twelve inches thick.'[9]

As Nombre de Dios and Panama were the objective, troops were necessary for the land operations. Altogether there were 2,500 men in the fleet, but how many of them were soldiers is unknown. The troops were under the command of Sir Thomas Baskervile, who was connected by marriage with Essex, and who in reputation was hardly second to any of the Elizabethan soldiers. Parma had singled him out for especial honour at the fall of Sluys: 'There serves no prince in Europe a braver man than this Englishman,' he declared, embracing him before all those present.

[2] The cessation of direct attack on Spain during 1593 and 1594 is not easy to explain, unless Elizabeth's weakness for acting on the defensive, and merely repelling attack, be borne in mind; 'They urge necessity, she opposes, . . . and that she will not make wars but arm for defence' is the key to her hesitating action during the whole of the Spanish war. The Parliament which met in February 1593 had voted the largest money grant ever given to an English sovereign, and there may then have been some intention of resuming a maritime offensive under fear of invasion in England, Philip's action through Scotland, and assisted revolt in Ireland. No doubt Elizabeth considered that she was fighting Spain very efficiently in Flanders and France, but she was dealing with the symptoms instead of cutting short the disease. In Spain it was anticipated in 1593 that Drake was to be let loose, and in June great preparations were made along the coast of Biscay to receive him.[10] In 1594 fear of direct invasion, or of trouble through Scotland, rose high in England, and the usual defensive preparations by way of musters, and schemes for meeting attack on the maritime counties, were being made, but at the same time Alonso

[9] Wm. Gorges, *Observations and Overtures for a Sea Fight.*

[10] Birch, *Bacon Papers*, i. p. 107. In January 1592-3 a warrant was actually issued, or noted for issue, to Drake and Hawkyns for three men-of-war and twenty merchantmen, but nothing further was done (Murdin, *Burghley Papers*, p. 800).

de Bazan was equipping a small force at Coruña to protect the coast against the expected English descent. In truth Philip's hands were very full, and he was in no position to undertake another invasion if the English Government could have fairly realized his true situation. Besides his foreign wars Philip had been occupied between 1590 and 1594 with an insurrection in Aragon, where smouldering discontent had been lighted into revolt by the violation of their privileges in the pursuit and persecution of Antonio Perez. While England was prospering and once more taking its place in Europe as a great power, Spain was sinking, as much from maladministration as from external losses.[11] Population diminished by a fifth during the reign of Philip; the peasantry were ruined by legislation, and the number of sheep in the country fell from 7,000,000 at Philip's accession to 2,000,000 at the end of the century, with the consequent destruction of the woollen trade. Manufacture and commercial industry, which under Isabella and Charles V. had made striking advance, were almost extinct, and there was widespread poverty affecting nearly all classes. In 1595 the revenues from the commanderies were pledged for ten years to come to a German firm of financiers; in ten months life annuities to the value of 200,000 ducats a year had been sold, and the ordinary revenues for 1595, 1596, and part of 1597, together with the bullion expected from America for those years, were already mortgaged to their full extent.[12] It is true that a fleet of a sort, of Spanish, Portuguese, bought or hired ships, was being once more slowly brought together, but the forces which alone could make the fleet effective—the trained seamen, the professional skill, the money to prepare, and the enthusiasm to act—were all wanting.

Mr. Julian Corbett has suggested that the Cadiz expedition of 1596 was originally intended for 1595, and this is very probable, for in 1593 Antonio Perez, who had then escaped from Spain, was urging it upon the English ministers.[13] In the summer of 1594 Drake was in France and Holland attempting to arrange the withdrawal of a body of veteran English troops for service under their own flag, and it may be that the objections raised by Henry IV. and the States was the reason that the Cadiz scheme fell through for the time. In those circumstances, and moved by the ever present fear of invasion, Elizabeth consented

[11] A Spanish correspondent (Birch, *op. cit.* i. p. 202) wrote that returns from the Spanish ports showed a loss of 3,000,000 ducats (900,000*l.*), or some 6,000,000*l.* now, in the ten years ending with 1594. This direct loss can have been but a fraction compared with the indirect damage, political and material.

[12] Sempére, *Considérations sur les Causes de la Décadence de la Monarchie Espagnole*, i. p. 316.

[13] Forneron, *Hist. de Philippe II.* iv. p. 265.

to a counter attack on Drake's favourite system, the strategical aspect of which has been discussed in the Introduction, and the Letters Patent to Middleton and his colleagues indicate the time of her decision. No doubt Hawkyns was joined with Drake for the same reason that Frobiser had gone as his Vice-Admiral by Elizabeth's particular order in 1585; the principal authority for the voyage, Thomas Maynarde,[14] voiced Elizabeth's opinion, and that of many of his contemporaries, when he described Drake as 'a man of great spirit, but better able to conduct forces and discreetly to govern in conducting them to places where service was to be done than to command in the execution thereof,' and 'it may be his self-willed and peremptory command was doubted.'[15] Hawkyns was upwards of sixty years of age, and after a long life of private and official cares might have been thought desirous of a peaceful ending. His son, Richard Hawkyns, had been taken on the coast of Peru by the Spaniards in June 1594, but the date of the first warrant of January 1593 (p. 319, note) shows not only that he was willing to go to sea again, but that it had been decided from the first that Drake should have a coadjutor.[16]

The Admirals' commission was issued towards the end of January 1595, but Baskervile's, as colonel-general, not until May.[17] In August the Lord Admiral wrote to Robert Cecyll that the Admirals had 'retarded their going so long as they have done, promising they would have departed the 1st May.' Howard was a truthful man, and should have been well informed, and here he imputes the blame for the delay to lie with Drake and Hawkyns, although if Baskervile's commission was not signed until after 22nd May it is not easy to see how there can have been any expectation of an earlier departure. It is possible, however, that the commission of 22nd May replaced an earlier one, as Baskervile does not appear to have been easily satisfied in his require-

[14] *Sir Francis Drake, his Voyage* 1595, by Thomas Maynarde, Hak. Soc. 1849. Maynarde was a military officer.

[15] No one had ever accused Hawkyns of rashness, but even he lost his character for caution by association with Drake, 'those braving humours have of late years been the hindrance and the loss of many good fortunes, as well as Sir Francis Drake, his two last voyages to the Indies and Sir John Norreys in his to Lisbon by staying at the Groyne.'—Sir Arth. Gorges, *Islands Voyage*, written in 1607 (Purchas, iv. p. 1,946). Hawkyns is not specifically mentioned, but he may be presumed to be included in the censure, which is further evidence of the widespread distrust of Drake as a commander-in-chief.

[16] It has been suggested that one motive impelling Hawkyns to sea was the desire to rescue his son, but Richard Hawkyns did not sail until June 1593, six months after the warrant which shows that his father was preparing for another expedition. Sir John heard of the misfortune in June 1595, when the fleet was nearly ready for sea.

[17] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclii. 28; 22nd May, 1595, a draft.

ments. Even the conditions of the venture as between the Queen and the Admirals were not settled until June.[18] In return for her six ships, prepared for sea, Elizabeth was to have one-third of the booty; the men were to be paid either by wages or shares, and if the voyage was stopped, or the destination altered, the Queen was to reimburse all the outlay. In the meanwhile Spain was suffering the usual alarms, for Philip's information was not as complete as it was wont to be, and the objective of the fleet was as yet unknown. In April Lisbon was in a panic, the people flying inland, while to add to Philip's discomfort the position of the homeward bound West India fleet was uncertain.[19] As a matter of fact it arrived, with the much needed treasure, in the beginning of May, so that if the English fleet had sailed on 1st May it would not have been intercepted. Whatever the cause of the delay, if there was delay,[20] the preparations went on apace during June and July, and towards the middle of the latter month Sir Thomas Gorges wrote from Plymouth to Robert Cecyll that in another fortnight the fleet would be ready to sail; the ships, he said, were in good order, 'Sir John Hawkyns, I doubt not, but you know to be a man excellent in those things, and at this time one that hath a special care to see all things done in good order himself.' Then the even passage of events was disturbed by an incident which must have considerably startled Elizabeth and those who thought with her—nothing less than a Spanish attack on the English coast and the destruction of English villages by a Spanish landing force.

It has been observed that, after the failure at Brest, Philip practically renounced the attempt to conquer Brittany, and his only remaining foothold on the coast was at Blavet. The port offered a secure harbour, but as an advanced base for another *Felicissima Armada*, something more than security from weather was required—forts, magazines, storehouses, stores, arsenals, and all the thousand and one necessaries and appliances for the support and restoration of a fleet and army. Of all these it had none; the station squadron attached to it consisted of four galleys, six flyboats, and four pinnaces with 680 men,[21] a force that could have been destroyed

[18] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclii. 107; a draft.

[19] *Ibid.* 58; *State Papers Venetian*, 22nd April.

[20] Maynarde says that when they sailed (28th August) they had been two months at Plymouth, which would take the commencement of fitting out back to a period coincident with the signature of the conditions between the Queen and the Admirals. Although their commission was signed in January, it is clear from Howard's letter that they were not expected to leave before 1st May at the earliest.

[21] Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, iii. p. 92. I have translated the *Felipote* of Don C. Fernandez Duro as flyboat, but possibly incorrectly. He says that they were an invention of Philip's reign

or immobilized by a small English squadron properly handled. The two Spanish officers in charge of the communications with Brittany, Don Diego Brochero de Anaya and Don Pedro de Zubiaur, perceived the disqualifications and, apparently hopeless in their own minds of any larger operations, recommended systematic raids on the English coast. They 'proposed the organization of a combined squadron of galleys and flyboats to ravage the coasts of England, reasoning that since with so many infantry, cavalry, galleys, and coastguards in the kingdom of Naples they could not prevent the incursions of the barbarians, still less could it be done in a country where they took no precautions.'[22] It was a confession of weakness, possibly not recognized, but the invariable degradation of the weaker power unable to meet its adversary's fleets. If Elizabeth had understood its meaning she might have congratulated herself on the pitiful fall from the world-terrifying fleet of 1588 to the miserable coast raids of 1595, which were all that the Spanish admirals could hope to carry out.

Philip authorized his officers to put their suggestion to the trial, and the intention was known in Fuenterabia on $\frac{25\text{th July}}{6\text{th Aug.}}$, although the warning letter did not reach England until after the event. Four galleys left Blavet about the middle of July, and the commander, Carlos de Amérola, steered first for the coast of Normandy, where he supplied himself with victuals at the expense of the Huguenots,[23] and then crossed the Channel, making Mousehole, in Cornwall, on 23rd July. In face of 400 soldiers who were landed, the inhabitants ran away; Mousehole was burnt, and then Newlyn and Penzance shared its fate, the Spaniards holding a thanksgiving service on the Western Hill at Penzance, and vowing to build a friary there when they had conquered England.[24] When the news reached the court at Greenwich, 'it bred in these courtly breasts diversities of passions,' and the Spanish force was immediately magnified into fifty ships, four galleasses and eight galleys;[25] the emotional effect on Drake and Hawkyns we are not told, but practically they hurried off help to Sir Francis Godolphin, who was raising the county forces. The help was not needed; the foray was not meant to be anything

and named after him, light vessels of from 120 to 200 tons, and carrying eight, ten, or twelve guns (*ibid.* p. 185). He describes them as built without poops, round sterned and nearly alike at both ends, characteristics of the Easterling flyboat, a short, broad, flat-bottomed vessel, of which, probably, they were only a modification. The Spanish word for the ordinary flyboat for cargo was *Urca*, and these were perhaps smaller ones intended both for cruising and the transport of men and stores.

[22] *Armada Española*, iii. p. 92. [23] *Ibid.*

[24] *State Papers*, cclii. 33. [25] Birch, *Bacon Papers*, i. p. 269.

more than an alarm and destruction raid, and the Spaniards scuttled back to Brittany without waiting to meet the militia, or to be cut off by the ships from Plymouth Drake took round, Monson, who had just come back from sea, being with him.

Not only was Elizabeth unable to measure the true relation the attempt bore to the maritime power of Spain on the offensive, but it happened that at this time she was especially alarmed by ridiculous reports from that country. She was told that Philip had 50,000 men ready, of whom 10,000 were to go to Scotland, and he was concentrating a fleet at Lisbon; he was going to send assistance to Tyrone, in revolt in Ireland; he was going to invade England in the winter; in short, all the flying gossip sent by spies anxious to give something in return for their wages was taken seriously. Evidently the Queen was more than half inclined to stop the expedition altogether, but she would still allow it to go forward if it could be carried out in conjunction with the new measures necessary to allay her fears. She now desired the Admirals to go round by the south coast of Ireland to intercept any Spanish fleet that might be found there, and then to go to the coast of Portugal and attack any fleet in those parts.[26] It is true that Philip was preparing a fleet at Lisbon, but it was partly with the purpose of meeting Drake, and partly to meet the Flota expected home in the late autumn, therefore it was altogether defensive. Above all things they must promise to return by the end of May 1596, the Spanish invasion being expected for June or July of that year. If they found that there was no reason to delay on the coast of Portugal then they were to proceed, 'without spending your time upon any unnecessary or small attempts upon your way,' an order which was fatally disregarded. It is not clear whether Elizabeth had in mind the fleet at Lisbon, the homeward Flota, or both, as the preliminary objective;[27] if the former the idea was sound enough, but, as Drake and Hawkyns pointed out, they had an unnecessary number of men for either purpose, and if the design of the voyage was changed, the Queen, according to her agreement, must bear all the expense. The Admirals promised that if they met any Spanish fleet they would turn and follow it, but they flatly refused to wait on the Portuguese coast or to spend a month in looking for the Flota; they would be back as soon as they could. In her reply, Elizabeth fastened on this last indefinite declaration, and said that she had sent them the opinions of others which they had ignored, and that unless they promised to be back within

[26] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclii. 70, a draft; also *ibid.* 76, to nearly the same effect, which was probably the despatch actually sent.

[27] From the Admirals' reply of 13th August (*State Papers*, cliii. 79, i.), the homeward Flota was certainly understood by them as one, if not the sole, object.

six months she would stop the voyage.[28] Fortunately, or unfortunately, for the doomed Admirals, they were also writing to the Queen on 16th August information that was peculiarly tempting to her. They had learnt that the flagship of the last Flota had been forced into Puerto Rico disabled, with a vast amount of treasure on board: 'we do mind, with God's favour, to take that place with all speed; it lieth in our way and will no way impeach us'; they had told this to no one but the Queen. No doubt this news decided Elizabeth, and she made no further objections to their departure. In fact, the galleon in question was the Nuestra Señora de Begoña, the capitana, or flagship, of the last Tierra-firme fleet under Sancho Pardo de Osorio. Coming home through the Florida channel, with 3,000,000 pesos [29] on board, she had lost masts and rudder, but Spanish seamanship had been able to bring her back to Puerto Rico, where she lay awaiting the arrival of five frigates, under Don Pedro Tello de Guzman, sent out by Philip to bring home the treasure. These frigates must have left Spain after the Admirals left Plymouth, but the English delays enabled them to reach Puerto Rico first.[30] The authorities at the Canaries received warning on $\frac{8}{18}$ August that a visit from the English was possible, although Philip probably did not know that the immediate destination had been altered.

[3] The fleet sailed on 28th August, 1595, and there are signs that even at Plymouth strained relations existed between the two Admirals, and between them and their subordinates.[31] Each Admiral affected the chief command over that squadron which he had victualled, and, according to Maynarde, neither of them had done his duty in this respect. Hawkyns, however, was the better off,[32] and his superiority led to the first open quarrel. Running down the coast of Portugal councils and discussions were held to

[28] *Cecil MSS.* 16th August, 1595. Among the *State Papers* of the same date is a draft endorsed as not sent, which adds the threat that if the voyage was stayed for this reason Drake and Hawkyns would have to bear all the loss.

[29] 600,000*l.*, taking the peso at four shillings. But Maynarde values it as the ducat—five-and-sixpence.

[30] Fernandez Duro, *op. cit.* iii. p. 107; *Col. de Doc. Inéd.* lii. p. 505.

[31] 'Your lordship doth know our Generals' humours are to respect none but those whom they must perforce, and Sir Thos. Baskervile to be a true lover of himself.'—Sir Nich. Clifford to Essex (*Cecil MSS.* v. p. 357).

[32] Maynarde, after saying that neither Admiral had properly provisioned his ships, adds that Hawkyns offered to assist Drake if he would acknowledge his error. Beyond the fact that the two statements are contradictory, it is to be remembered that Hawkyns, in his previous voyages, had always been particularly careful about the equipment of his fleets.

settle their course of action; Drake complained that his squadron contained 300 men more than that of Hawkyns, but the latter refused to receive any of them 'unless he were entreated; to this Sir Francis' stout heart could never be driven.' Evidently Hawkyns was standing on his greater age and, nominally, greater experience, and displaying that touchy obstinacy of years which rejects accommodation and shows that the man is no longer fit for work. Captain Troughton says 'many unkind speeches passed, such as Sir John Hawkyns never put off till death,' and matters were not mended by Drake and Baskervile suddenly springing upon Hawkyns, in a council, their resolution to make an attack at the Canaries. Hawkyns resisted it as unnecessary for victualling and a dangerous waste of time, and it was now that he offered to augment Drake's supplies from his own ships, but coupled with the foolish condition that Drake should admit himself to have been improvident.[33] The Admirals nearly parted company on the question, but Hawkyns eventually gave way upon Baskervile's assurance that there should only be four days lost, and 'upon the confession of need' of victuals. Hawkyns was perfectly right to oppose an hour of needless delay. Not only was it contrary to their orders, and opposed to those principles which teach a commander in no case to waste time and strength on ineffectual objects, but in this instance it was particularly dangerous when time was the essential element of success. It was the policy of a privateersman rather than of an admiral. It is hard to believe that Drake's squadron was really in such urgent need,[34] but if so it is difficult to apportion the blame between the Admirals—Hawkyns for not supplying him without a stipulation calculated to hurt his pronounced self-conceit; or Drake, as the younger and abler man, for not yielding with the scorn of intellectual superiority to his tetchy colleague. It could not have made for the efficiency of the fleet that all these quarrels were common talk as the 'captains, masters and gentlemen' were called to the councils.[35]

On 26th September[36] the fleet appeared before Las Palmas,

[33] Maynarde; Troughton's Journal, *State Papers Dom.* cclvii. 48, i.

[34] On 13th August they gave their excess of provisions as one of the reasons why it would be such waste of opportunity simply to wait for the Flota.

[35] Maynarde; who also says that Hawkyns talked about their destination in the hearing of everyone. But Maynarde is favourable on the whole to Drake, with whom he seems to have had some personal friendship. As Captain Wignoll, of the Francis, possessed written instructions to rendezvous at Guadalupe and Puerto Rico, which he did not destroy before his capture, what Hawkyns said in conversation cannot have much mattered.

[36] Maynarde; Troughton. The Hakluyt *Relation* says the 27th.

the chief town of Grand Canary, at nine o'clock, and at 1 P.M. an attempt was made to land 1,400 men. Maynarde writes that 'had we landed under the fort at our first coming to anchor we had put fair to be possessors of the town,' but in the interval the Spaniards had thrown up entrenchments. Troughton is still more condemnatory, for he says that there was only slight resistance and that the landing was covered by the fire from the small ships anchored within musket shot of the shore, but that Baskervile drew off without any serious attempt. The troops were re-embarked and the fleet went round on the 27th to the west side of the island, where 'some went ashore for water and some for pleasure.'[37] Here three or four stragglers were killed and the surgeon of the Solomon Bonaventure taken prisoner, from whom the Spaniards learnt all that he knew of the objects of the voyage and within a very short period an advice boat was speeding to the West Indies with the intelligence. On 28th September, the next day, the Generals themselves left for the West Indies. Drake had obtained no provisions and had made no serious effort to procure any, for the repulse from Las Palmas did not prevent his landing elsewhere and sweeping the island,[38] a process which would have taken less time than fighting and negotiating at Las Palmas. He could not have been in need of water because he made little or no use of his opportunity on the 27th; everything points to the fact that it was plunder and not victuals that took him to Las Palmas, and that failing there he did not keep up any further pretence of necessity.

On 26th October, near Martinique, Drake and Hawkyns parted company in a storm, but the fleet had come together again by the 29th at the rendezvous on the south-east side of Guadalupe. On the 30th two lagging vessels, the Francis and the Delight, were sighted by one of the five frigates before mentioned, sent by Philip to bring home the treasure left at Puerto Rico; the Francis, disabled by the loss of her rudder, was easily captured and, from the despatches she carried, information was obtained which impelled the Spaniards to make urgent haste to Puerto Rico. As soon as the capture of the Francis was reported to Drake he was for an immediate chase to cut off the five Spanish frigates. Hawkyns refused, Maynarde says, from jealousy, lest Drake should reach Puerto Rico first, which implies that the latter was prepared, if he did not overhaul the Spaniards at sea, to make a dash on the

and *Sloane MSS.* 2177, the 29th. According to this last, five days elapsed between sighting Fuerteventura and reaching Las Palmas, the distance between them being only some two hundred miles.

[37] Troughton.

[38] 'Canary affords more anchorages than any of the other islands' (*North Atlantic Pilot*).

town of San Juan with whatever force he had available. However if we could hear Hawkyns's version we should probably learn that there was some better reason than jealousy. On the facts as they appeared to him there is no doubt that Drake was in the right, but it is doubtful whether the loss of the Francis was of any practical importance. When the report of the Governor of Puerto Rico reached Spain, six months later, it said that had the English appeared before San Juan fifteen days earlier than they did—that is, on 28th October—they would have taken the place by surprise and could have worked their will there.[39] But on 28th October the Admirals were only making Guadalupe instead of San Juan, and Tello de Guzman's frigates were yet out on the Atlantic; the inference therefore is that on that day, or within a few hours of it, a warning reached the governor,[40] and the place was being put into a posture of defence before Tello de Guzman came in. If so it was the price paid for the call at Las Palmas, and the leisurely proceedings among the islands. The anxiety and irritation caused to Hawkyns by the dispute seems to have been the exciting cause of his last illness; Troughton says that he being 'not able to bear his grief out longer sickened,' but probably there had been other matters of strife, not related, between the Admirals. Before the fleet left on 4th November, seven pinnaces were put together,[41] and on the 8th it anchored again in the midst of the Virgin Islands, a few miles from the island of Puerto Rico, in a nearly land-locked basin, between Tortola and Virgin Gorda, still called Drake's Bay. The loss of time now was not of much importance, but here four days passed in fishing and fowling, parading, and distributing the soldiers into their commands, and it was not until the 12th November that the fleet weighed, arriving the same afternoon before San Juan de Puerto Rico,[42] anchoring to the eastward of the town. Just before, or after, the arrival, Hawkyns died, as much of grief for the failure he anticipated, and of resentment at the blundering he had been powerless to remedy, which had characterized the expedition, as of disease. It has been customary to imply, if not to state directly, that Hawkyns was Drake's evil genius during this voyage and marred all his skilful plans; as a matter of fact, down to the time of

[39] *State Papers Ven.* 4th May, 1596.

[40] Philip had written to him in the spring that an English descent was to be expected in the winter.

[41] Troughton. At Plymouth they had twenty pinnaces, or material for them.

[42] Mr. Corbett holds that Drake's purpose in stopping among the Virgin Islands was to conceal his fleet, and thus lull the Spaniards into the belief that his plan was altered, and to find a new passage to Puerto Rico not watched by the Spaniards (*Drake and the Tudor Navy*, ii. p. 389).

his death it was Hawkyns who showed the skill, and on the whole proposed the wisest measures. If both Admirals displayed narrow personal jealousies and temper, one, at least, proved that he understood the strategic value of time.[43]

[43] Hawkyns made his will on 16th June, 1595, and bequeathed 100*l.* to Burghley, 500*l.* to William Cecil, Burghley's grandson, and his best diamond ring to the Lord Admiral, bequests which sufficiently indicate his political sympathies. Of the political intrigue, of which this expedition, like every other Elizabethan undertaking, was a centre, we get no hint in the official papers, but there is a suggestive allusion in a letter from Sir Thomas Lake to Sir Robert Sidney (*Sidney Papers*, Lond. 1746, i. p. 343; 22nd August, 1595): 'Some proposition was made by the active sort (you may guess whom), to convert this fleet assembled, with some enforcement, to an offensive course upon the ports of Spain; but checked from above, or crossed underhand, not without a great distemper of humours on both sides.' We may take it that Essex was one of the 'active sort,' and was advocating an alteration, to which Drake would not have objected had his outlay been repaid to him, and that the antagonism between Essex and the Cecils found expression also in the fleet. It may be that this is the key to the original disagreements between the two Admirals if Hawkyns felt himself bound to stand by the Cecils. Major Martin Hume even thinks that it was with Burghley's connivance that the plan of the expedition became known to Philip. By a codicil of 8th November, Hawkyns bequeathed 2,000*l.* to Elizabeth in expiation of all offences which he might have committed against her, 'for that she hath in her possession of mine a far greater sum which I do release unto her.' The only money that Elizabeth can have owed him must have been his surplusage—or extra payments as Navy Treasurer beyond the grants received for the time from the Exchequer—and some of his expenditure on this voyage. The meaning is far from plain, and, so far as the two possible sources of debt are concerned, Elizabeth paid both in full. In fact, when his accounts as Navy Treasurer were finally closed it was found that he owed the Queen 1,400*l.*, although she may have been in his debt when he left England (*Cecil MSS.* viii. p. 559). He left some 10,000*l.* of private estate (*ibid.*). Captain Troughton, of the Bonaventure, was one of the first to reach England towards the end of April 1596. He at once wrote to Elizabeth that 'Sir John Hawkyns upon his death-bed willed me to use the best means I could to acquaint your highness with his loyal service and good meaning towards your Majesty, even to his last breathing. And forasmuch through the perverse and cross dealings of some in that journey, who, preferring their own fancy before his skill would never yield but rather overrule him, whereby he was so discouraged, and, as himself then said, his heart even broken that he saw no other but danger of ruin likely to ensue of the whole voyage, wherein, in some sort, he had been a persuader of your Majesty to hazard as well some of your good ships as also a good quantity of treasure; in regard of the good opinion he thought to be held of his sufficiency, judgment, and experience in such actions, willing to make your Majesty the best amends his poor ability would then stretch unto, in a codicil as a piece

The town of San Juan built on a small island, has the sea to the north and west and the harbour on the south, and is joined to the larger island on the eastern side by a causeway, bridging a narrow arm of the sea which connects the ocean with the harbour and completes the insulation of the town. It had been fortified in 1590 under the superintendence of Juan Baptista Antonelli, who had planned for Philip the defences of many places in Spain, the Azores, and the West Indies. Antonelli built in that year the present Morro Castle on the cliff at the western extremity of the town, a citadel rendered impregnable to assault seawards by the heavy surf ceaselessly beating at its foot. In addition to this the governor, Pedro Juarez, had made use of the respite allowed him by throwing up batteries at important points,[44] and had closed the mouth of the harbour by sinking in the fairway the disabled galleon with other ships, and mooring a boom across it. Within the harbour were Tello de Guzman's five ships which had arrived on 3rd November.[45] On the evening of the 12th Drake left his anchorage at the eastern end of the town, and, tacking about during the night, anchored in the morning of the 13th at the mouth of the harbour. A council was held during the day at which it was decided to send in the boats to fire the five frigates;[46] the day passed in taking soundings, and at ten o'clock at night a number of boats and pinnaces dashed in close under the castle and therefore sheltered from its fire, and apparently by the side of the boom which did not extend to the shore, the Spaniards not having anticipated a boat attack, or thinking it sufficient as it stood. One frigate was set in flames, but by the light of the burning vessel the Spaniards were enabled to pour in such a deadly

of his last will and testament did bequeath to your highness 2,000*l.* if your Majesty will take it' (*Cecil MSS.* vi. p. 163). It appears from this that the 'offences' of the codicil refers simply to his share of responsibility in persuading Elizabeth to undertake the expedition, and the bitter message shows how little he thought himself accountable for the failure he foresaw. There is no evidence to indicate whether Elizabeth took the 2,000*l.*; if she did it was probably included in the payments for the voyage subsequently made by Lady Hawkyns.

[44] There were twenty-seven guns in the castle, and ten batteries, furnished with from two to nine guns each, were improvised at different points. Most of these guns were taken from the disabled treasure ship and from the five frigates, therefore if the English fleet had sailed from England direct to San Juan the castle would have been, then, the only defence to have overcome. Monson says (*Puerto Rico Voyage*) that there were 800 or 900 soldiers in the frigates, but even the smaller number is improbably high.

[45] The advice boat from the Canaries came in on 5th November.

[46] Maynarde; Troughton. See map, ii. p. 220. There seems to have been some difference of opinion, Maynarde, and presumably others, preferring to cut them out.

fire that the attack was beaten off with heavy loss.[47] On the 14th the enemy, fearing that Drake would make another attempt to enter, sank two more vessels at the boom; while they were adding to the defences the English council was deciding to accept defeat. Maynarde and some other officers were for continuing the attack, Baskervile was against it, and Drake had evidently lost hope. On the 15th the fleet still rode off the port as though loth to depart; on the evening of that day it weighed anchor, but was becalmed during the two following days. From the 18th to 24th November the fleet lay in San German Bay, on the west side of the island, taking in water and such provisions as could be obtained, and repairing damages. No opposition was encountered ashore; Drake took country rides, and Baskervile also explored inland for some ten or twelve miles.

As the commanding officers at the scene of action refused to take the responsibility of a land attack from the eastern side, their decision, with such knowledge as we possess of the conditions, must be accepted as a proper one. It may be pointed out that, with two exceptions, the circumstances of locality were very similar to the assault on Cartagena in 1586 by the tongue of land, which corresponded to the isthmus at San Juan. But Cartagena had no castle, and San Juan was much more strongly garrisoned than the South American town had been. Baskervile was a good soldier, and the leadership of, and responsibility for, land operations would have been his; on the other hand, he was accustomed to fight the veterans—most of whom, by the way, were not Spaniards—of the Spanish tercios of the Low Countries, and perhaps he paid the raw colonial levies an undue compliment of respect. The existence of Morro Castle at San Juan was a factor to be reckoned with, but although very strong on the sea face it does not, so far as the present writer observed, offer any difficulties on the land side if the condition now is that of 1595, the streets of the town rising gently to the level of the height on which it stands. The axiom that a well-defended port cannot be taken by a fleet alone without the assistance of troops was not merely implicitly understood, but had been explicitly stated by Norreys in 1589,[48] therefore there should have been good reason for the absence of any combined land and sea attack, although we are left in ignorance of what it may have been. Any success against the Spanish ships would have been inconclusive, for the treasure was ashore, and the town would still have to be taken, while the fleet could blockade the port with ease. The quiet acceptance of defeat by Drake and Baskervile, with the powerful force they had available, and after one repulse that had

[47] Fernandez Duro; Hakluyt *Relation*.

[48] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccxxiv. 22; ccxxvii. 35. Also *post*, p. 372.

not seriously strained their resources, is so strange that one is tempted to surmise something more behind that we get no hint of in the various accounts of the voyage. It may be that, as Captain Fernandez Duro holds, Drake's weak point as a leader, his reliance on surprises and impatience of regular operations, was shown again here, but that would not explain Baskerville's acquiescence. No doubt the channel east of the town was fortified, but the existence of two forts and stockade did not, three years later, prevent Cumberland, an amateur general with amateur officers and fewer troops, many of whom had been with Drake now, forcing the passage, occupying the town, and battering the castle into surrender.

On 25th November Drake stood across for the Spanish Main, but to Cape de la Vela instead of direct to Nombre de Dios, in order to plunder the coast settlements on his way to his destination. On 1st December he was before Rio de la Hacha and remained there until the 18th, being detained by pretended negotiations on the part of the governor, who, when he had gained as much time as possible to send warnings along the coast, told Drake that he had never intended to ransom the town and that the English were welcome to burn it.[49] In the interval a small force went to La Rancheria, a pearl-fishing village about twenty miles to the eastward, and there obtained some pearl plunder, probably that which appears in the financial accounts of the voyage. So far as we can tell, loss of time now would not, and did not, affect the result, the officials of Panama having had time for defence, but the waste of seventeen days at an unimportant place like Rio de la Hacha was in defiance of all the principles of warfare. We know from Baptista Antonelli's own authority that he was constructing works on the Isthmus before 5th October.[50] La Hacha and La Rancheria were both burnt, and on the 20th the fleet was off Santa Marta, which was found to be deserted and was also burnt without delay. Cartagena was left alone as too strong to be carried by a summary attack, and on the 27th the fleet anchored before Nombre de Dios. After a slight resistance from seventy Spaniards in the fort the town was occupied, the inhabitants having all fled with their possessions of value.[51] From the time that Peru had commenced to send its

[49] Fernandez Duro, *op. cit.* iii. p. 110. Troughton and the Hakluyt *Relation* say that pearl to the value of 24,000 pesos was actually tendered in ransom by the inhabitants, but refused by Drake as of indifferent quality, and that the governor then told him that it had been offered against orders and bid him do his worst.

[50] *Cecil MSS.* v. p. 402.

[51] Hakluyt. But Troughton says that much money, bullion, jewels, and merchandise were obtained there. A mulatto and two Spaniards

gold and silver to the Old World the treasure had been brought by sea to Panama, and thence across the Isthmus to Nombre de Dios to be there loaded in the galleons. From 1584, however, Nombre de Dios had ceased to be the port of shipment, which had been changed to Puerto Bello, a few miles to the westward, the former place having been forsaken on account of its unhealthiness, and because the harbour was open to the heavy ocean swell always rolling in.[82] It is not obvious, therefore, why Drake chose to strike at Panama from Nombre de Dios, seeing that the passage by the old road, almost deserted, must have been rendered additionally difficult by the growth of the luxuriant vegetation of the tropics, although as the two roads met not far from the coast he may not have regarded this objection if he considered it; the Spaniards, however, expected that the advance would be by the river Chagres, which is navigable to within five leagues of Panama and had been blocked and entrenched by them. The roads, so called, were merely bridle paths for the mule trains, running through swamps and jungle, over hills and rocks, broken by unbridged rivers, and situated in one of the deadliest climates in the world. The one point in favour of the English was that they had come in the dry season; otherwise the passage would have been impossible for them.[83]

Two days after the arrival of the fleet Baskervile, with 750 men, commenced the march to Panama. On the 31st, when crossing the Sierra de Capira, and therefore near Boqueron, he came upon a fortification held by the Spaniards, who had fallen back from Puerto Bello, and, having no scouts out, a score or more of men were killed 'before we were aware of them.' The fort was only a wooden one, doubtless a roughly improvised one of logs, held by the seventy musketeers,[84] but it was enough for

are said to have deserted to Drake here; another Spaniard, a muleteer, who knew the road to Panama was tortured in vain to make him act as a guide (Simon, *Noticias Historiales*, v. p. 136).

[82] A century later the site was a waste: 'The place where Nombre de Dios stood is . . . all overgrown with a sort of wild canes, like those used by our anglers in England. There is no sign of a town remaining; it is all so overrun with these canes' (Wafer, *Description of the Isthmus of America*, London, 1699). Puerto Bello was found to be quite as unhealthy.

[83] They did experience some rain.

[84] Richard Hawkyns (*Observations*) says that the passage was defended by Don Alonso de Sotomayor, an old soldier of the Flanders wars, who 'wrought all the inventions' against Baskervile. Don C. Fernandez Duro associates Baptista Antonelli; the latter chose the site a year before, when the expectation of Ralegh's arrival at Trinidad led to fears of attack, as a suitable position for a fort, but neither he nor Sotomayor was now present (Herrera). The entrenchment was not far

Baskervile, who heard that there were two more forts behind, and whose men were worn out by the miseries of the road and want of food.[55] On 2nd January, 1596, the survivors were back again at Nombre de Dios and the losses from privation and disease must have much exceeded those of battle: 'The march was so sore as never Englishmen marched before,' says one writer, and Maynarde adds that it 'made many swear that they will never venture to buy gold at such a price again.' During Baskervile's absence Drake had observed the customary process of burning the town of Nombre de Dios, and on 4th January a council was held to decide on the next proceedings. Maynarde, who is sometimes bitter and sometimes sympathetic in his references to Drake, first says that 'since our return from Panama he never carried mirth nor joy in his face,' although he maintained a brave assurance towards his men, and then breaks out, 'our blinded eyes began now to open, and we found that the glorious speeches of an hundred places that they knew in the Indies to make us rich was but a bait to draw her Majesty to give them honourable employment, and us to adventure our lives for their glory.' But the faith felt in the great seaman was still sufficient to maintain his ascendency, and when, in the council, he had to confess that the limit of his actual knowledge was reached and that for further progress maps would have to be relied on, there seems to have been no opposition when he vaunted the success that would follow an incursion on the cities situated on the Lake of Nicaragua.[56] But he must have felt that the game was going

from the Cerro Grande, the hill from which Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, the first European known to have looked upon the Pacific, beheld it on 25th September, 1513. The Colon-Panama Railway now runs close to the Cerro Grande. Had Baskervile been able to force his way across the Isthmus he would have found old Panama, which was four or five miles from the present city, open and defenceless. The ruins are now hidden by the dense tropical growth, only the tower of the cathedral remaining.

[55] Herrera says that three assaults were delivered, and that reinforcements from Panama came up just in time to repel the last one. There were no other forts to bar the way to Panama, but the Spaniard adds that Drake had been disappointed in not obtaining help that he had expected from the Cimaroons, that the men were worn out with fatigue, and had been badly led by the mulatto guide, Andrew. As for the Cimaroons—escaped negroes from the Spanish settlements—Drake had given himself no time to open communications with them. When Morgan sacked Panama in 1671 he advanced by the river Chagres with 1,200 picked villains inured to the climate, and even then his losses were very heavy.

[56] Troughton says that in this he followed the advice of a Spaniard. The deterioration observed in Drake as a commander in 1589 is more noticeable in this voyage, and culminates after the failure at Panama.

desperately against him, and that assaults on minor towns with the coast alive with preparation and resistance was a hopeless cast; no doubt Mr. Corbett is right in his surmise that Drake had resolved still to succeed or never to return. On 5th January he sailed for the river San Juan, but on the 10th had only reached the island of Escudo de Veragua, and there they remained until the 23rd. The island is one of the most unhealthy places in the West Indies, but none of those who described the voyage says that he remained there but from choice, cleaning ships and setting up pinnaces.[57] Many officers and men died there, and on the 15th Drake himself fell ill of dysentery; on the 23rd the fleet returned eastward,[58] and arrived at Puerto Bello on the 28th, bearing the dead body of the Admiral who had died that morning. The disease was probably an acute suppurative dysentery of a sthenic type, with high temperature and delirium towards the end.[59] Monson's gossip, given, we may suppose, in good faith, and the outcome of talk with men who had performed the voyage and had been present, perhaps, at the death scene, hints at suicide rather than the foul play with which Lope de Vega, reasoning from the customs of his country, slandered the Admiral's

A better test of generalship than success is the way that a failure is retrieved or the evil effects of a mistake neutralized. Here, after the repulse on the Isthmus, Drake may almost be said to have resigned himself to circumstances and to have yielded his volition to them. An attempt on the settlements on Lake Nicaragua, which were not cities and would have yielded no wealth, although they were popularly supposed to be roofed and paved with gold, was more hopeless than that on Panama, for they were more difficult to reach, and his men were disease-stricken and discouraged by defeat. Avowedly he knew nothing about them and could obtain no information, but he was prepared, casually, to stake fleet and army on the chance. He may have persuaded himself that it was the best course, as an overwrought brain can persuade itself of anything, but the journey was as flighty as the search for the Golden City of Manoa or the Fountain of Youth. Adventurers had gone in search of both, but not English royal fleets entrusted to Admirals for purposes of warfare. If it be asked what alternative he had, there was a very obvious one. As Baskervile knew when Drake died a fortnight later that a Spanish fleet was nearly due, the probability is that the Admiral knew it now, and if so he might have turned and fought it with perhaps far-reaching consequences. He cannot have considered himself too weak, for if so he was too weak to undertake another land attack with the possibility of the Spaniards appearing when half his men were away.

[57] Troughton condemns it, 'a place which affordeth nothing good, yet here we stayed,' &c.

[58] Herrera says with a view to another attempt on Panama by way of the Chagres.

[59] He 'died like a frantic man, as one related unto me who was then in his company' (Goodman, *Court of King James I.* i. p. 170).

followers. The suggestion of suicide seems equally untenable. In view of his confession of failure, his knowledge that Elizabeth would never forgive it, the blow to his own belief in himself and his admiration of classical examples, Drake's suicide, under that condition of abnormal nervous discharge and reaction that coroners and their juries call temporary insanity, may not have been unlikely had he been free from physical disease, or had his disease been other than dysentery. But the physical and mental conditions attending acute dysentery render it in the highest degree improbable.

Drake's best epitaph was the joy with which the news of his death was received in Spain: 'His Majesty shows the keenest delight and declares that this good news will help him to get well rapidly.'[60] The ultimate defeat of Spain did not depend on the life or death of one man, or the success or failure of one expedition, but to the Spaniards, if not to the Elizabethan English to the same extent, Drake was the embodiment of English naval power, and Philip, if he flattered himself that the different results of English and Spanish maritime warfare were merely due to the commanders, may have thought that the conditions were at last more equal.[61] But whatever Philip's private fears of the issue of a meeting, he had been compelled to prepare a force to follow Drake and Hawkyns, although, as usual, execution lagged far behind direction. The fleet was under Don Bernardino Delgadillo de Avellaneda,[62] with Juan Gutierrez de Garibay as his Vice-Admiral, both of whom had seen some service. It had been intended that they should sail in October,[63] but it was not until 23rd Dec.–2nd Jan. that the fleet got to sea, and then Philip's resources had not permitted him to equip more than twenty-one ships, but eight of which were of any strength, and these carried guns only on their upper decks.[64] They were manned with 3,000 soldiers and seamen, but many of the former were boys and untrained volunteers; nevertheless the General had orders to fight at all

[60] *State Papers Ven.* 14th May, 1596.

[61] For Monson's pen portrait of Drake, see *post*, Book IV., where also will be found an estimate from the Spanish point of view by Captain Don C. Fernandez Duro.

[62] 'Whose name for the prolixity thereof may be drawn somewhat near the length of a cable,' says an indignant Englishman, who had frequently to write it, and regarded its length as another Spanish outrage.

[63] Fernandez Duro says that it was not ordered until the English were at the Canaries; Labores y March, that preparations were begun much earlier—in August—which is more likely to be correct.

[64] Labores y March, *Hist. de la Marina Real Española*, ii. p. 351. These writers say that six of the eight ships were galeoncetes, not exceeding 300 tons each.

costs when he came up with the English.[65] If Drake had been successful, the Spaniards could not have reached the West Indies in time to save either Puerto Rico or Panama, for their fleet did not leave Cartagena in chase of the English until $\frac{\text{21st Feb.}}{\text{2nd March}}$ and Delgadillo had only spent three days in that port.[66] Moreover, his force was far too weak to inflict a crushing blow, and was much more likely to be itself destroyed. It was another object lesson on the failing vigour of Spain had the English Government understood its meaning, but they were more alive to the daily alarms of invasion than to the instruction to be gained from the strength and constitution of a Spanish fleet when Philip did get one to sea. Reports from Spain repeated that shipbuilding and other preparations were progressing, which was true, but, as the Venetian ambassador wrote, 'the first flush of preparations here in Spain usually promises much more than is eventually accomplished,' and the Spaniards did not hope to be in a condition to act until June. However there were the usual terrors on both sides; 'the Spanish preparations . . . doth breed incredible fears in the minds of most men,' although at that very time the English Government were being told that no effort was being made for any offensive movement against this country.[67] And in Spain, a little later, there was 'no small alarm' at what England was supposed to be about to do, with particular fear of another descent on Portugal, and no other subject of conversation, says a spy, than Drake's expected appearance. For five years Philip had continued his clumsy endeavours to retrieve the losses of 1588, and the actual non-existence of a Spanish navy in everything but ships—in seamanship, administration, and leadership, in everything that makes for success—was no more understood in England in 1595 than it had been in 1589. Although he could not protect his coasts from alarms and his colonies from attack, it was Philip's hobby to talk over the invasion of England with his confidants,[68] as though nothing was necessary for it but a sufficient number of ships with soldiers on board them. It will be seen that when the long-threatened stroke did fall it was on a plan which strikingly illustrated Spanish lack of generalship and material weakness.

Tello de Guzman had sailed for Spain with the treasure from Puerto Rico on board his remaining three frigates on $\frac{1}{12}$ De-

[65] Labores y March, *Hist. de la Marina Real Española*, ii. p. 351.

[66] He only stopped for water, although he was strongly urged to stay longer for repairs, his vessels being in very bad condition. But he decided to push on although the pumps had to be kept going continuously (Herrera).

[67] Collins, *Sidney Papers*, i. p. 355; *Cecil MSS.* v. p. 442.

[68] 'It is well known that his Majesty likes to discuss this subject with his commanding officers' (Ven. Ambassador to Doge).

cember, Drake having been followed across the Caribbean Sea by two Spanish pinnaces.[69] Delgadillo de Avellaneda was half-way across the Atlantic when the body of the dead Admiral was brought into Puerto Bello on 28th January, and a decision had to be come to as to the course to be held, as Baskervile seems to have known of the Spaniard's expected arrival.[70] The first step was to perform the obsequies of Drake with all due honour,[71] and a council was then held at which Baskervile produced his commission to take command. With the death of Drake and the loss of his powerful personality the captains of the merchantmen had shown an inclination to go off privateering on their own account, a proceeding always more attractive to them than acting in the disciplined combination of fleets, but Baskervile's persuasions or threats induced them to keep to the flag. It was resolved to run [illegible] Marta or to stand over to Jamaica, as the wind permitted, either course being suitable, although the first would be the quicker, for the homeward run through the Yucatan channel.[72] They sailed on 8th February, employing the interval in making ready for sea; three ships were sunk as useless, and a muster taken on 7th February showed 2,000 men, sick and well, in the fleet, so that the voyage had as yet cost 500 lives, and probably at least twenty per cent. of the survivors were on the sick list. On the 14th the fleet was off the Isle of Baru, near Cartagena, and that night, in a gale, several ships parted company, including the Foresight with Maynarde on board. On 1st March Baskervile was approaching the Isle of Pines on the south side of Cuba, and about 100 miles from its western end. The English were in want of water and the pinnaces were exploring inshore when a Spanish fleet was sighted ahead. It was Delgadillo's, who had made all the haste he could from Cartagena, knowing that if he took up his position in the Yucatan channel he would be certain there to intercept Baskervile, home-

[69] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* 25th March, 1596.

[70] Hakluyt *Relation.*

[71] It ought not to be difficult to identify the place where Drake's coffin went overboard with sufficient closeness to justify the erection of a memorial on the corresponding shore. The harbour entrance of Puerto Bello is about a mile and a quarter broad, but, in consequence of reefs, the fairway runs under the guns of the fort of St. Philip, situated on the northern shore and at the western or seaward end. Captain William Parker, who took the town in 1602, says that he then 'rode somewhat to the eastward of the castle of St. Philip, under the rock, where Sir Francis Drake his coffin was thrown overboard.' This should be either Drake's Point or Drake's Island.

[72] See Appendix B. The intention to go to Jamaica must have been for provisions. The island was regarded as the storehouse of the West Indies.

ward bound, unless the latter had passed before him. Notwithstanding the long period of preparation in Spain his ships were in a bad state, because, 'on account of the haste in getting ready the galleons could not be so well fitted as was needful,' and a man's thigh could be passed through one leak in the flagship. The action is described with all the verbose obscurity characteristic of most Elizabethan writings,[73] not even the direction of the wind being given. The indefiniteness of description is especially to be regretted in this instance, as we are told that Baskervile 'wisely and politicly had so ordered his vanguard and rearward, and as the manner of it was altogether strange to the Spaniard, so might they have been without all hope of victory if their General had been a man of any judgment in sea fights.'[74] All that can be made out with any certainty is that, by Baskervile's 'former direction,' the Queen's ships came into action in succession, reserving fire until within musket shot, and perhaps concentrating on a portion of the Spanish fleet.[75] Monson's aspersion of Delgadillo de Avellaneda's conduct is copied from Saville, and does not appear to have any basis of fact, as from the nature of the position his Vice-Admiral bore the weight of the attack. The fight ceased with dusk, and, although the fleets were in company through the night, was not renewed the next day, the Spaniards making for the Havana, when the English were seen to be well on their way for the Florida channel. Both sides claimed the victory, but practically the results of success remained with the English. Baskervile, with weather-worn ships, and sick, disheartened, and diminished crews, had no purpose of conquest, but was only anxious to retreat in safety; the Spaniard had been sent out to bring him to action and destroy him as a lesson to those who dared the might of Spain. He had brought him to action, but he had done nothing else; the English retreat was not hindered, no injury had been inflicted, and such lesson as was to be learnt was not one that tended to the glorification of the

[73] In the Hakluyt *Relation*, and by Captain Henry Saville of the Adventure. The latter afterwards wrote a pamphlet he entitled *A Libell of Spanish Lies*, controverting Delgadillo's account of the action, but he only succeeded in showing that he translated Spanish as vaguely as he wrote English.

[74] Saville. Presumably he means that, however large the Spaniard's experience, he would have been unable to hold his own against Baskervile's novel formation, or plan of attack.

[75] Mr. Corbett holds that the English were in line ahead, in two columns abreast, that nearest the Spaniards, which did all the fighting, being composed of men-of-war. Also, that having engaged the Spanish Vice-Admiral and two or three ships with him, four of the Queen's ships after forging ahead tacked in succession to come into action again.

maritime power of Spain.[76] The remainder of the voyage was slow but uneventful, the fleet reaching England at the end of April and beginning of May. The Foresight, which lost Baskerville on 14th February, never rejoined, but after staying at Jamaica for victuals left that island on 1st March for the passage through the Yucatan channel. On the 6th five Spaniards, probably some of Delgadillo's fleet, were encountered, and Maynarde was much disgusted at the conduct of the consequent fight. He could not persuade his captain to board, perhaps luckily, if the crew were as bad as he describes them. The gunnery was sinfully bad, 'most of our gunners would hardly have stricken Paul's steeple,'[76a] and, altogether, 'never ship of her Majesty's went so vilely manned out of her kingdom.' Fortunately nothing worse happened than these expressions of opinion, and the Foresight arrived home on 3rd May.

A stronger force was in commission in home waters during 1595 than in the immediately preceding years. The Antelope, Answer, Tramontana, Scout and Advice were on service throughout the year; the Dreadnought, Rainbow, Advantage, Quittance and Sun from August until December; and the Charles and Moon were on the Irish coast.[77] In addition to these, two ships, the Swiftsure, Captain Robert Crosse, and the Crane, Captain Richard Warburton, were sent down to the coast of Portugal to act in conjunction with Drake and Hawkyns had they cruised there as Elizabeth desired them to do. Crosse's instructions were drawn up by the Lord Admiral, Drake, and Hawkyns, and he attributed his failure to the non-appearance of the two latter 'according to their determined appointment . . . since, by our being together we might have extended ourselves in a greater circuit.'[78] These instructions were given before the detention of the treasure galleon at Puerto Rico, which altered the direct destination of the fleet, was known in England. Crosse's par-

[76] The Spaniards admitted one ship burnt, but claimed two prizes, a statement which Saville nailed down as another Spanish lie. Nevertheless it was quite true, although the two vessels—the Help, which lost company during the gale of 14th February, and the Exchange, belonging to Robert Crosse—may not have been captured on the day of the action, and the second one did not belong to the fleet. In June 1597 the survivors, then rotting in a Spanish prison, of fifty-five men, taken probably in the Help, petitioned the English Government for assistance. Thirty of them had been sent to the galleys, where most had been starved or beaten to death (*Cecil MSS.* 3rd June, 1597).

[76a] Maynarde's illustration is a curious one, because in 1596 St. Paul's had not possessed a steeple for upwards of thirty years. Destroyed in the fire of 1561, it had not been rebuilt with the cathedral.

[77] *Audit Office Accounts*, 1688, xxxi.

[78] *Cecil MSS.* 1st October, 1595, Crosse to Robert Cecyll.

ticular object was the capture of the expected carracks, but he returned towards the end of September empty handed, being forced home by want of provisions and sickness on board; the sickness, he said, was due to the bad quality of the victuals, and the victuallers did more harm than the enemy. The Earl of Cumberland, too, had his desires fixed on these carracks. In April 1595 he obtained a commission permitting him to raise volunteers to man six vessels; he was to be allowed to retain prize money without rendering any account on payment of 10,000*l.* for any prize bound from Portugal to the East Indies, or 20,000*l.* if she was from the Indies for Portugal.[79] No doubt Elizabeth would have walked through the agreement had he been successful. The squadron consisted of a vessel the earl had just built, the Malice Scourge, of 600 tons, which, renamed Red Dragon, was later to be the flagship in the first voyage undertaken by the newly formed East India Company in 1601;[80] the Alcedo, a ship of 400 tons belonging to Alderman John Wattes of London; the Anthony, and the Discovery. The earl had intended to go himself in command, but gave out that he had been recalled by Elizabeth. The truth was, he wrote to Cecyll, that when ready to sail, or just after sailing, he heard that one of the carracks had been met at Cape Roca, and, as he intended never to go to sea but when there was a 'certain likelihood' of good fortune, he had returned.[81] So far from the Queen having ordered him back, he would not have written but that his coming back would be misrecounted[82] to her if he did not. Monson was to have been his Vice-Admiral, but considered himself badly treated, and left the squadron when Cumberland came home after appointing Captain James Langton to take his place.[83] The earl appears to have hardly lost sight of the English coast when he put back, but the squadron went down to the Portuguese coast, where Crosse, who was looking out for it, failed to fall in with it, and then to the Azores. Three neutrals, laden with wheat and other contraband of war, formed the only spoil.

In 1594 Sir Robert Duddeley (Dudley), Leycester's son, falling in with the prevailing fashion, proposed to undertake a voyage

[79] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* ccli. 125.

[80] Purchas says 900, Monson 800 tons; when bought by the East India Company in 1600 she was rated at 600 tons. Monson writes that Cumberland 'began discreetly to consider the obligation he had to the Queen for the loan of her ships from time to time, and withal weighed what fear of danger he brought himself into if, unluckily, any of those ships should miscarry.' See *post* (*Puerto Rico Voyage*), and *ante*, p. 281.

[81] *Cecil MSS.* 30th June, 1595.

[82] 'Miscontered.'

[83] See General Introduction, and *post*, Book V. section *Strata*

to the South Sea. He was forbidden to go, probably because he was thought too young and inexperienced for such a dangerous venture, and he converted it to a journey to the West Indies, of which he says 'so common is it indeed to many as it is not worth the registering.' He sailed in November 1594 for Trinidad and the Orinoco, with two ships and two pinnaces, and returned in May 1595, having explored some of the branches of the Orinoco, marched where he pleased with fifty men across Trinidad, for his 'experience and pleasure,' in despite of the Spaniards, and taken, sunk, and burnt, nine ships during his voyage. On his way home in his flagship of 200 tons, he fell in with a Spaniard of 600 tons, and fought her for two days until all his powder was gone. Having only a crew of fifty men he could not board, and finally left her 'in such distress, without sails and masts, and hull so often shot through with my great ordnance between wind and water, that, being 300 leagues from land, I daresay it was impossible for her to escape sinking.'

The chief interest of Duddeley's voyage is that it covered the same ground as Ralegh's first Guiana voyage, and was intended either to assist or to forestall Ralegh. The latter was still unforgiven for his marriage with Elizabeth Throckmorton, and he thought his best way to recover the Queen's favour was to find some gold mines for her while exploring, with a view to founding an English settlement, a proceeding always more attractive to him when national, rather than his own personal interests were concerned, than the transitory possession of gold. His attention seems to have been long fixed on the vast region east of Peru known as El Dorado, which was fabled to contain the golden city of Manoa and all sorts of wealth, to which that already discovered was infinitesimal; and there are signs that he had eagerly read and examined every scrap of evidence he could find on the subject, so that the voyage must have been for some time in his mind. In 1594 he had sent Captain Jacob Whiddon, one of the privateersmen he employed, on a preliminary voyage of observation; and possibly Duddeley was also acting in agreement with him, as he seems to regret not being able to await Ralegh's arrival. Ralegh was not indifferent to gold, but he saw further than most of his fellow speculators, and had visions of a great tributary empire, to be obtained by organizing and supporting the natives against the Spaniards. But seeing that a score of Spanish expeditions, working from Peru and from the Atlantic during the previous half century, had failed to open up the unknown territory, he must have been very optimistic to suppose that the 200 or 300 men he took with him could effect anything material. Probably he intended but to clear the ground, and hoped to show Elizabeth sufficient profit to induce her to commit herself to a modified territorial attack, in spite of the certain Spanish reprisal.

Ralegh sailed on 6th February, 1595, and although the Drake-Hawkyns fleet was then preparing, there was no suggestion of any co-operation between them, but it may have been supposed that the greater expedition would draw off the Spaniards from interference with the lesser one. Trinidad was reached on 22nd March, and as Ralegh thought he would have 'savoured very much of the ass' to have left his ships and gone on a boat voyage, leaving a Spanish garrison behind him, the chief town, San Joseph, was burnt, most of the soldiers killed, and Don Antonio de Berreo, the governor of the island, taken prisoner. This Berreo had invented a new torture for the Indians, that of dropping melted bacon on their naked bodies, and Ralegh was careful all through the voyage to illustrate Elizabeth's beneficent intentions by a comparison of the kindly and sympathetic treatment he used to the natives. To the Englishman, however, Berreo appeared to be 'very valiant and liberal, and a gentleman of great assuredness and of a great heart.'

With five large and small boats, carrying 100 men, Ralegh then started to explore the Orinoco, inquiring cautiously for gold, and making friends and allies of the Indian chiefs. He claims to have examined 400 miles of river and collected specimens of quartz, which assayed richly enough in England. His proceedings were intentionally tentative in accordance with 'my first resolution that her Majesty should either accept or refuse the enterprise, ere anything should be done that might in any sort hinder the same.' When the expedition returned in August there was little hesitation on the part of the Queen and others in refusing to take any step to materialize the golden dream. As far as Elizabeth was concerned, any measure towards the conquest of Guiana would have stultified all her previous declarations and policy, a policy which led her to refrain from all territorial acquisitions. In the ordinary investor Raleigh did not inspire confidence, and he had many personal enemies. Discredit was thrown upon his story; he was said to have been hiding in Cornwall and not to have sailed at all, and to have obtained in Africa the ore he brought home. Essex was, if not hostile, at least unsympathetic, and Ralegh saw his hopes fading; he knew that Berreo was taking a force over the ground he had traversed to undo his work; he had neither capital nor influence for another expedition, and the minds of Elizabeth and the English leaders were fixed on the Cadiz expedition to take effect in 1596 rather than on any recommendation of his. With the assistance of the Lord Admiral and Sir Robert Cecyll, Captain Kemys, with two small ships, was sent out in January 1596, but he found the Spaniards already established where Ralegh had been, and had to return without doing anything.

The Earl of Essex, and the Lord Admiral of England, Generals, equally, both by Sea and Land, A.D. 1596. [1]

Ships.	Commanders.
The Repulse . . .	The Earl of Essex. Captain under him, Captain Monson.
The Ark-Royal. . .	The Lord Admiral. Captain under him, Sir Amyas Preston.
The Merhonour . .	The Lord Thomas Howard.
The Warspite . . .	Sir Walter Ralegh.
The Lion	Sir Robert Southwell.
The Rainbow . . .	Sir Francis Vere.
The Nonpareil . . .	Sir Robert Duddeley.
The Vanguard . . .	Sir John Wingfield.
The Mary Rose . .	Sir George Carew.
The Dreadnought . .	Sir Alexander Clifford.
The Swiftsure . . .	Sir Robert Crosse.
The Quittance . . .	Sir George Gifford.
The Tramontana . .	Captain King.
The Crane, and others.	

THE 1st of June, 1596, we departed from Plymouth; and our departure was the more speedy, by reason of the great pains, care, and industry of the two Generals, who, in their own persons, laboured the night before to get out some of their ships riding at Catwater, which otherwise had not been easily effected. The 3rd we set sail from Cawsand Bay, the wind, which when we weighed was at west and by south, instantly cast up to the north-east,* and so continued till it brought us up as high as the North Cape of Spain. And this fortunate beginning,

* A, B, and R read 'north-west.'

with the like that after happened, put us in great hopes of a lucky success to ensue.

We being now come upon our enemy's coast, it behoved the Generals to be vigilant in keeping them from intelligence of us, who therefore appointed the Lioness, the Truelove, and the Lion's Whelp (the three choice sailers of our fleet) to run ahead, suspecting the Spaniards had some carvels of advice out, which they did usually send to discover at sea, upon any rumour of a less fleet than this made ready in England.

No ship or carvel escaped us, which I hold a second happiness to our voyage. For you shall understand hereafter the inconvenience that might have happened upon our discovery.

The 10th of June the said three ships took three flyboats of Holland that came from Cadiz fourteen days before, by whom we understood the state of the town and ships, which afterwards we found true; they reported our coming was nothing suspected, which we held a third observation of good towards us.

The 12th of June the Swan, a ship of London, being commanded, as the other three, to keep a good breadth off the fleet to prevent discovery, met with a flyboat of Holland which made resistance, and escaped her. This flyboat came from the Straits,* bound home; who discovering our fleet, and thinking to gain reputation and reward from the Spaniards, shaped her course for Lisbon, but she was luckily prevented by the John and Francis, another ship of London, commanded by Sir Marmaduke Darell, who took her within a league of the shore; and this we may account a fourth happiness to our voyage. The first (as hath

* The Mediterranean.

been said) was for the wind to take us so suddenly, and to continue so long: for our soldiers being shipped, and in harbour, would have consumed their victuals with long continuance there, and have been so pestered with multitude on board, that it would have endangered a sickness amongst them. The second was the taking all ships and vessels that were seen, which kept the enemy from intelligence. The third was the intercepting of the flyboats from Cadiz, whither we were bound, who assured us our coming was nothing suspected, which made us more careful to haul from the coast than otherwise we should have been. They told us, likewise, of the daily expectation of the galleons to come from San Lucar to Cadiz, and of the merchantmen that were bound for the Indies. These intelligences were of great moment, and made the Generals immediately to contrive their business both by sea and land, which otherwise would have taken up a longer time to have discussed after their coming thither; and whether all men would have consented to attempt their ships in harbour if they had not known the most part of them to consist of merchants, I hold doubtful. The fourth, and most fortunate of all, was the taking of the flyboat by the John and Francis, which the Swan let go. For if she had reached Lisbon, she had been able to make report of the number and greatness of our ships, and estimated the quantity of our men, and might have endangered the loss of the whole design, she seeing the course we bore, and that we had passed Lisbon, which was the place the enemy most suspected, and made there his greatest preparation for defence. But had the enemy been freed of that doubt, he had then no place to fear but Andalusia, and Cadiz above the rest; so that having had the least warning, the town might have been

strengthened, and we put to great hazard. He might also have secured his ships by towing them out with galleys, and, howsoever the wind had been, might have sent them into the Straits, where it had been in vain to have pursued them, or over the bar of San Lucar, where there had been no attempting of them.

We have experience what an advantage it is to have intelligence of an enemy both in ourselves and the Spaniards. Ourselves of the good in 1588, for how suddenly had we been taken, and surprised when we least suspected, had it not been for Captain Flemyng? Of the ill, in the year before this, by the Spaniards taking a bark of Sir Francis Drake's fleet, which was the occasion of the overthrow of himself and his action. [2]

The 20th of June we came to Cadiz, earlier in the morning than the masters made reckoning of. Before our coming thither, it was determined in council that we should land at St. Sebastian's, the westermost part of the island, and thither came all the ships to an anchor, every man preparing to land as he was formerly directed. But the wind being so great, and the sea so grown, and four galleys lying to cut off our boats, there was no landing there without the loss of all.

This day was spent in vain, in returning messengers from one General to another; and in the end, they were forced to resolve upon a course which Sir William Monson, captain under my Lord of Essex, advised him to the same morning he discovered the town, which was to surprise the ships, and to be possessors of the harbour, before they attempted landing. [3] This course being now resolved on there arose a great question—who should have the honour of the first going in? My Lord of Essex stood for himself; but my Lord Ad-

miral impugned it, knowing if he miscarried it would hazard the overthrow of the action; besides, he was straightly charged by her Majesty, that the earl should not expose himself to danger, but out of necessity.

When my Lord of Essex could not prevail, the whole council withstanding him, he sent Sir William Monson that night on board my Lord Admiral, to resolve what ships should be appointed the next day to undertake the service. Sir Walter Ralegh had the vanward given him, which my Lord Thomas Howard hearing, challenged in right of his place of Vice-Admiral, and it was granted him. But Sir Walter having order the night before to ply in, came first to an anchor but in that distance from the Spaniards as he could not annoy them, and he himself returned on board the Lord General Essex, to excuse his coming to anchor so far off, for want of water to go higher; which was thought strange, that the Spaniards which drew much more water, and had no more advantage than he of tide, could pass where his ship could not; but Sir Francis Vere, in the Rainbow, was appointed to second him, who passing by Sir Walter Ralegh's ship, Sir Walter the second time weighed, and went higher. The Lord General Essex, who promised to keep in the midst of the fleet, was told by Sir William Monson that the greatest service would depend upon three or four ships; and Sir William put him in mind of his honour, for that many eyes beheld him. This made him forgetful of his promise, and to use all means he could to be foremost in the fight. My Lord Thomas Howard, who could not be suffered to go up in his own ship the Merhonour, betook himself to the Nonpareil, and in respect the Rainbow, the Repulse, and Warspite, had taken up the best part of the channel by their first coming to an

anchor, to his grief, he could not get higher. Here did every ship strive to be the headmost; but such was the narrowness of the channel, as neither the Lord Admiral, nor any other ship of the Queen's, could pass one by the other. There was commandment given that no ship should shoot but the Queen's, making account that the honour would be the greater if the victory were obtained with so few. This fight continued from ten till four in the afternoon: the Spaniards then set sail, thinking either to run higher up the river, or else to bring their other broadsides to us because of the heat of their ordnance. But, howsoever it was, in their floating they came aground and the men began to forsake the ships, whereupon it was ordered, that all the hoys and vessels that drew least water should go to them. Sir William Monson was sent in the Repulse's boat with like directions. We possessed ourselves of the great galleons, the Matthew and Andrew; but the Philip and Thomas fired themselves, and were burnt down before they could be quenched.

I must not forget to describe the manner of the Spanish ships and galleys riding at an anchor in Cadiz Road at our first coming thither. The four galleons singled themselves from out the fleet and came to an anchor in the mouth of the bay, seeming to be guards to their merchants. The galleys were placed to flank us with their prows at our entry; but, when they saw our approach the next morning, the merchants ran up the river of Port Royal, and the men-of-war to the point of the river, and brought themselves into a good order of fight, mooring their ships ahead and astern to bring their whole broadsides upon us. The galleys then betook themselves to the guard of the town, which we put them from before we attempted the ships.

But, because I have promised in the beginning of my discourse to particularize such errors and miscarriages my capacity would permit me to judge of, before I proceed further on this voyage I will declare a main oversight in the Spaniards.

After the galleons had (as you have heard) brought themselves to the mouth of the Bay of Cadiz, and found themselves unable to withstand us, if, instead of running to the point of Port Royal, they had put themselves under the defence of the town, they had found the assistance of Fort Philip, which had added a strength to theirs; or being overcome, as afterwards they were, they might with more security have run themselves aground near the town, which would have succoured their men in spite of us, and not as they did where there was no fort to rely upon, nor any stand of soldiers on shore to retire unto. And moreover the men thus escaping into the town, might have defended it with their numbers, that, though we had taken the place, it must have been upon harder conditions. [4]

But to proceed: the victory being obtained at sea, the Lord General Essex landed his men in a sandy bay, which the castle of Puntal commanded. But they seeing the success of their ships, and mistrusting their own strength, neither offered to offend his landing, nor to defend the castle, but quitted it, and so we became possessors of it. After my Lord's peaceable landing, he considered what was to be done; and there being no place from whence the enemy could annoy us but the bridge of Suazo, which goeth over from the mainland to the island, and by our making good of that bridge the galleys could not escape us, he sent three regiments under the command of Sir Conyers Clifford, Sir Christopher Blount, and Sir Thomas Gerard, to the bridge. Who, at their first coming, were encountered by the

enemy, but yet possessed themselves of it, with the loss of some men; but whether for want of victuals, or for other reasons to themselves best known, quitted it, and the galleys breaking down divers arches, passed it, and by that means escaped.

My Lord of Essex despatched another messenger to my Lord Admiral, intreating him to give order to attempt the merchants that rode in Port Royal, for that it was dangerous to give them a night's respite, lest they should convey away their wealth, or take example by the Philip and Thomas to burn themselves. This message was delivered by Sir Anthony Ashley and Sir William Monson, even as my Lord Admiral was in his boat, ready with his troops of seamen to land, who, fearing the Lord General Essex should be put to some distress with his small companies, which were not many more than three regiments, hastened by all means to second him, and gave order to certain ships the next day to pursue them.

Since I have undertaken to except against the oversights committed in any of our English voyages, such as were committed here, I will not forbear, without fear or flattery, to make them appear to the judicious reader.

Though the Earl of Essex's carriage and forwardness merited much honour, yet if it had been with more advisement, and less haste, it would have succeeded better for himself and the action. And if he were now living, he would confess Sir William Monson advised him rather to seek to be master of the ships than of the town, alleging that it was they that would afford both wealth and honour, for that riches in ships could not be concealed, or conveyed away, as in towns they might. And the ships themselves, being brought for England, would be always in the eyes of men, and put them in

remembrance of the exploit in gaining them. As for the town, perhaps it might be soon won, but probably not long enjoyed, and so quickly forgotten. And, to speak indifferently,* by the earl's sudden landing, without the Lord Admiral's privity, and his giving advice by a message to attempt the ships, which should have been resolved upon mature deliberation, was a great oversight in him,† and questionless the Lord Admiral found his honour a little eclipsed, which perhaps hastened his landing for his reputation sake when as he thought it more reason to have possessed their fleet. [5]

Before the Lord Admiral could draw near the town the Earl of Essex had entered it. And though the houses were built in such manner that every house served for a platform, but yet through the valour of our men they were forced to quit them, and retire to the castle. My Lord at last, in despite of the enemy, gained the market-place, where he found the greatest resistance from the houses thereabouts, and here it was where that worthy gentleman Sir John Wingfield was unluckily slain.‡ The Lord General Essex caused the drum to sound throughout the town, that all that would yield should repair to the townhouse, where they should have promise of mercy, and those that would not to expect no favour. The castle desired respite until the next morning, being in that confusion that they could not suddenly determine. Which being granted by one consent, they surrendered themselves to the two Lord Generals' mercy. The chief persons, men and women, were brought into the castle, where they remained a little space and were sent away

* Impartially.

† 'Was a great oversight in him' occurs only in Sl. 1.

‡ For Monson's own narrow escape when Wingfield was killed see Book V. section *Stratagems*.

with honourable usage. The noble treating of the prisoners has gained everlasting honour to our nation, and the Generals in particular.

It may be supposed the Lord Generals had no leisure to be idle the day following, having so great business to consider of as the securing the town and enjoying the merchant ships: and, for the speedier dispatch, they had speech with the best men of the city about the ransom to be given for their town and liberties. One hundred and twenty thousand ducats was the sum concluded on; and for security thereof, many of them became hostages. There was likewise an overture for the ransom of their ships and goods, which the Duke of Medina Sidonia hearing of, rather than we should reap any commodity by them he caused them to be fired.

We found by experience, that the destroying of this fleet (which did amount to the value of six or seven millions), was the general impoverishing of the whole country;* for when the pledges sent to Seville, to take up money for their redemption, they were answered, 'That all the town was not able to raise such a sum, their loss was so great by the destruction of their fleet.' And, to speak indifferently, Spain never received so great an overthrow, so great a spoil, and so great an indignity at our hands as in this journey to Cadiz; for our attempt was at his own home, in his port that he thought as safe as his chamber,† where we took and

* B and R read 'of this fleet, which in the return from the Indies, if they had had the fortune to come back, would have amounted to many millions, was a general impoverishing,' &c.

† 'Chamber' is used in the sense of capital; Henry V., departing in 1415, bid the citizens 'to keep well his chamber,' and 'the city of London the King's chamber' (Sharpe, *London and the Kingdom*, i. p. 258, ii. p. 2). Again, 'London, the most precious place, and as it were the chamber of this realm' (*Foljambe MSS.* Hist. MSS. Com. App. to 15th Rep. pt. v. p. 93).

destroyed his ships of war, burnt and consumed the wealth of his merchants, sacked his city, ransomed his subjects, and entered his country without impeachment. [6]

To write all the accidents of this voyage were too tedious, and would weary the reader. But he that would desire to know the behaviour of the Spaniards, as well as of us, may confer with divers Englishmen that were redeemed out of the galleys in exchange for others and brought into England.

After we had enjoyed the town of Cadiz a fortnight, and all men were grown rich by the spoil of it, the Generals embarked their army, with an intent to perform greater services before their return. But such was the covetousness of the better sort, who were enriched there, and the fear of hunger in others, who complained for want of victuals, that they could not willingly be drawn to any farther action to gain more reputation. The only thing that was afterwards attempted was Faro, a town of Algarve in Portugal, a place of no resistance or wealth, only famous for the library of Osorius, who was bishop of that see; which library was brought into England by us, and many of the books bestowed upon the new-erected library of Oxford.

Some prisoners were taken, but of small account, who told us, that the greatest strength of the country was in Lagos, the chief town of Algarve, twelve miles distant from thence. They commended the place for strength, the rather because most part of the gentlemen thereabouts were gone thither, to make it good, expecting our coming. This news was exceedingly acceptable to my Lord of Essex, who preferred honour before wealth: and having had his will, and the spoil of the town of Faro, and country thereabouts, he

shipped his army, and took council of the Lord Admiral, who had been utterly against his landing at Faro, how to proceed. My Lord Admiral out of his judgment diverted his purpose from Lagos, alleging the place was strong, of no wealth, always held in the nature of a fisher-town belonging to the Portuguese, who in their hearts were our friends; that the winning of it, after so eminent a place as Cadiz, could add no honour; though it should be carried yet it would be the loss of his best troops and gentlemen, who would rather desire to die than to receive the indignity of a repulse. My Lord of Essex, much against his will, was forced to yield to these reasons, and desist from that enterprise. [7]

About this time there was a general complaint for want of victuals, which proceeded rather out of a desire that some had to be at home than out of any necessity; for Sir William Monson and Mr. Darell were appointed to examine the condition of every ship, and found seven weeks' victuals, drink excepted, which might have been supplied from the shore in water; and this put the Generals in great hope to perform something more than they had done. The only service now to be thought on was to lie in wait for the carracks, which in all probability could not escape us, though there were many doubts to the contrary, but easily answered by men of experience. But in truth some men's desires homeward were so great, that no reason could prevail with, or persuade them.

Coming into the height of the Rock, the Generals took council once again; and then the Earl of Essex and the Lord Thomas Howard only offered, and that with great earnestness, to stay out the time our victuals lasted, and desired to have but twelve ships furnished out of the rest to stay with them. But this would not be granted, though the

squadron of the Hollanders also offered voluntarily to stay.* Sir Walter Ralegh alleged the scarcity of victuals, and the infection of his men. My Lord General Essex offered, in the greatness of his mind, and the desire he had to stay, to supply his want of men and victuals, and to exchange ships with him for his better accommodation and ease. But all proposals were in vain, for the riches of Cadiz kept them that had got much from attempting more, whereas if they had been poor, want, and not honour, would have enforced them to greater enterprises.

The staying for the carracks being the last hopes of the voyage, and his propositions being generally resisted, it was concluded to steer away for the North Cape, and afterwards to view and search the harbours of Coruña and Ferrol; and if any of the King of Spain's ships chanced to be there to give an attempt upon them. [8]

The Lord Admiral upon his coming thither sent in a carvel of our fleet into these two harbours, and apparelled the men in Spanish clothes to avoid suspicion. This carvel returned the next day with a true relation, that there were no ships in those two ports: and now, having passed all places where there was any hope of doing good, our return for England was resolved upon. And whilst they were in consultation upon it the wind chopped up from the south-west to the north-west, which if it had so held with the same gale of wind most part of the fleet had been embayed and enforced into the harbour of Ferrol. But the wind suddenly shifting it brought my Lord Admiral with the greatest part

* So C, D, Sl. 1, and Sl. 2. A reads, 'the Holland squadron voluntarily offered to stay, but this motion was neither granted to nor accepted of;' B and R . . . 'offered to stay, but this motion was so far from being granted that it was not accepted of.'

of the fleet into Plymouth the 8th of August; and the Lord General Essex two days after, who stayed to accompany the St. Andrew, one of the two galleons taken at Cadiz, not being so good of sail as the rest, and formerly taken into his squadron. He arrived at Plymouth the 10th of the same month, where he found the army in that perfect health, as the like has not been seen, for so many soldiers to go out of England to prevail in such great enterprises and to return home again so well.

My Lord himself rid post to the Court immediately upon his landing to persuade and advise with her Majesty about the winning of Calais, his army being ready for so important an enterprise, the Spaniard having taken it five months before when himself with 3,000 or 4,000 soldiers had been ready to set sail from Dover for the rescue of it. Here was a brave opportunity to have regained the ancient patrimony of England. But for all the King of France's testimony of love to her Majesty, to whom he was more bound than ever prince was to another, he would not consent unto it, making account that he might with more ease regain it from the Spaniard, who was his enemy, than recover it again from us who were his friends, so great force hath matters of state among princes that they value benefits rather than all obligations of friendship.

My Lord Admiral, staying not above two days at Plymouth with the fleet, went to the Downs, where he landed, and left the charge of the navy to Sir Robert Duddeley and Sir William Monson, who, passing through the King's Channel towards Chatham, endured more foul weather and trouble than in the whole voyage besides, by reason of the unwieldiness of the St. Andrew when she came to work in the narrow channel among the sands. [9]

[1] The following is the fleet list: —[1]

The Lord Admiral's squadron:—

Ships.	Men.	Commanders and Period of Commission.	Masters.
Queen's Ships:			
Ark Royal .	380	Lord Howard of Effingham, 7th April-26th Aug.	W. Jones.
Lion . .	245	Sir Robert Southwell, 12th April-28th August.	W. Parsey.
Dreadnought.	180	Sir Alex. Clifford, 12th April-24th August.	Jas. Beare.
Truelove .	70	Sir Rich. Leveson, 1st April-19th August.	J. Manne.
Lion's Whelp.	45	William King,[2] 1st April-19thAugust	—
London Men-of-war:			
Darling . .	100	—	—
Delight . .	74	—	—
Swan . .	20	Sir Richard Weston	—

With eighteen transports and victuallers, carrying 1,500 troops.

[1] *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2234; *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclvii. 60; cclix. 2. Classification was not strict in the sixteenth century, and the Truelove, although given here and in some other lists as a man-of-war, was not a Queen's ship. She seems to have belonged to Howard: 'The Truelove sold by the Lord Admiral unto the States in the Queen's time' (*Cott. MSS.* Otho E. ix. f. 377). The Admirals and officers were to have the same pay as that given to officers of similar rank in 1588 (*State Papers*, cclvi. 103). For the pay in 1588 see Laughton, *Armada Papers* (Navy Records Society). Another list (*Cott. MSS.* Julius F. vi. f. 278) differs slightly from those used, giving sixty-five transports and victuallers. Both English and Spanish observers said that the whole fleet numbered some 150 ships, the remainder being made up by those sent from the coast towns and paid by the local authorities or private owners. The fullest list is that given by Sir W. Slingsby in his account of the voyage (*Naval Miscellany*, vol. i. Navy Records Society). He names Southwell and Clifford, Vere and Wingfield, Duddeley and Mansell, and Crosse and Gifford, as the Vice- and Rear-Admirals of their respective squadrons. His list differs in some details from the official *Pipe Office Account*.

[2] 'Captain and master.' *Sloane MSS.* 2203, is a description of the Channel soundings by Jas. Beare, master of the Dreadnought.

The Earl of Essex's squadron :—

Ships.	Men.	Commanders and Period of Commission.	Masters.
Queen's Ships :			
Repulse. .	340	The Earl of Essex, 7th April–27th August.	Thomas Grove.
Rainbow .	240	Sir Wm. Monson,[3] 12th April–26th August.	John Grey.
Vanguard .	240	Sir Robert Mansell, 12th April–27th August.	James Woodcott.
Charles . .	45	Sackville Trevor, 7th April–24th August	Edmond Musgrave.
London Men-of-war :			
Lioness . .	105	—	—
Gamaliel .	74	—	—
With fifteen transports and victuallers, carrying 1,700 troops.			
Lord Thomas Howard's (Vice-Admiral) squadron :—			
Queen's Ships :			
Merhonour .	390	Lord Thomas Howard, 12th April–23rd August.	John Hankyn.
Nonpareil .	245	Sir Robert Duddeley, 12th April–30th August.	John Endycke.
Crane . .	95	Jonas Bradbury, 12th April–20th August	Math. Woodcott.
Moon . .	40	Henry Moyle, 12th April–25th August	Robert Kelly.
London Men-of-war :			
Alcedo . .	135	—	—
Golden Dragon	75	—	—
Salomon .	75	—	—
Violet . .	74	—	—
Reuben. .	74	—	—
With fifteen transports and victuallers, carrying 1,510 troops.			

[3] The *Pipe Office Account* says 'under the charge of Sir Wm. Monson and Wm. Parker, gent.' Sir Francis Vere was in the Rainbow,

Sir Walter Ralegh's (Rear-Admiral) squadron :—[4]

Ships.	Men.	Commanders and Period of Commission.	Masters.
Queen's Ships :			
Warspite .	290	Sir Walter Ralegh, 12th April–31st August.	Roger Hankyn.
Mary Rose .	245	Sir George Carew, 12th April–30th August.	Thomas West.
Swiftsure .	180	Sir Robert Crosse, 12th April–18th August.	J. Whiskynges.
Quittance .	95	Sir George Gifford, 12th April–18th August.	Thomas Tenant.
London Men-of-war :			
Roebuck .	104	—	—
Centurion .	80	—	—
With fourteen transports and victuallers, carrying 1,770 troops			
Tramontana [5].	—	William King, 1st April–22nd Aug.	William Coste.

and is always described as her captain, but he had never been to sea, and no doubt Parker was in command when Monson went to the Repulse. Parker was probably the privateer captain who sacked Puerto Bello in 1602. Vere was certainly not paid as captain of the Rainbow, nor was Wingfield, although Monson calls him captain of the Vanguard. Amyas Preston, also, is not officially recognized.

[4] The four squadrons wore crimson, orange tawney, blue, and white flags, 'which were appointed to be so made for the distinguishing of the four squadrons of the fleet' (*Pipe Office Accounts*, 2232). The crimson flag was the Lord Admiral's—his 'bluddy colours' waved over the fort of St. Philip (*Stowe MSS.* 164, f. 90), and Essex probably flew the orange tawney. The coloured drawings in *Slingsby's MS.*, reproduced by the society, do not however correspond with this official description of what was made and paid for.

[5] Not given in the *State Paper* lists as belonging to a squadron, but appears in the pay list. It will be observed that Wm. King's name is attached to both the Tramontana and the Lion's Whelp. Slingsby says that Don Christobal, son of Don Antonio, was on board the Tramontana. That she was at Cadiz is certain, because an Irish Catholic, who had joined her to obtain a cheap and quick passage to Spain, deserted from her before the fleet left (*Col. de Doc.*

There was a Dutch squadron of twenty-four vessels, of which eighteen were fighting ships. The force was under the command of Jan van Duyvenvoord, as Admiral, Jan Gerbrandtsen, of Enckhuisen, as Vice-Admiral, and Cornelius Lensen, of Flushing, as Rear-Admiral. The Dutch flagship was of 400 tons, the vice-flagship of 300 tons, and the others seem to have been of from 150 to 250 tons burthen.[6]

The foregoing list gives a total of 6,480 soldiers. Sir Robert Crosse, writing on 30th May,[7] estimated an available force of 6,200 English and Dutch soldiers, and that 1,200 English and 90 Dutch seamen[8] could be landed in addition from the fleet. Another list of the regiments[9] gives, in round numbers, 6,400 men, besides some hundreds of volunteers. The army possessed the usual headquarters staff: a marshal (Sir Francis Vere), sergeant-major (Sir Conyers Clifford), master of the ordnance (Sir Geo. Carew), camp master (Sir John Wingfield), quartermaster-general (— Lambert), commissary of victualling (Marmaduke Darell); trench, carriage, and muster masters; provost-marshal, corporals of the field, and the secretary of war (Sir Anthony Ashley), sent to watch over the Queen's interests. Vere, who in virtue of his post was second in command of the troops, was not satisfied with the staff appointed by Essex, in the selection of which favour rather than experience was the leading motive, and said that they were 'chosen rather for favour than for long continuance in service.'[10] The troops were divided into eight regiments under Essex, the Lord Admiral, Sir Francis Vere, Sir John Wingfield, Sir Thomas Gerard, Sir Christopher Blount, Sir Richard Wingfield, and Sir Conyers Clifford, and the men seem to have been better equipped and to have presented a better appearance than was usual.[11]

Inéd. xxxvi. p. 338; Deposition of Dan. Real [Qy. Riley], of Tipperary.) Five other Irishmen had stolen away from the fleet, but they had no information of any interest to give.

[6] The States had promised to send eight ships of 400, eight of 300, and eight of 200 tons.

[7] *Cecil MSS.* Crosse to Robert Cecyll.

[8] 90 is no doubt a clerical error for 900.

[9] Birch (*Bacon Papers*, ii. p. 15). When the expedition returned the Council supposed that 5,000 soldiers had come back (*Cott. MSS.* Otho E. ix. f. 335, 10th August); the losses had been very small. The other *Cott. MS.* (Julius F. vi. f. 278) gives 6,772 English seamen; — Dutch; 6,360 soldiers, and 1,000 volunteers. Sir W. Slingsby says 6,800 soldiers.

[10] *Commentaries*, Cambridge, 1657, p. 26. For the duties of staff and regimental officers see *Harl. MSS.* 168, and Sir Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, pp. 52 *et seq.*

[11] 'The army is very fair . . . as well for the armour as the coun

The winter of 1595–6 passed with fewer of the customary mutual alarms. Elizabeth knew that Philip was occupied with anxieties about Drake and Hawkyns, and he, on his side, believed that with them and their ships absent she had no strength to spare for a further attack on him. Moreover, the result of their operations was not yet known, and for all that either sovereign knew a staggering blow might have been dealt to Spanish power. Politically, Elizabeth was possessed by perplexing negotiations with the States and with Henry. From the States she was threatening as usual to withdraw all help unless they paid off some of their debt and promised maritime assistance; Henry, instead of carrying on the war vigorously, was allowing province after province to make a truce with the Spaniards and was supposed to be dallying with the Pope's offer of mediation. Philip had had to consider who should replace the Archduke Ernest, who died early in 1595, as his representative in the Netherlands, and had finally appointed the Cardinal Archduke Albert, the Viceroy of Portugal in 1589. Yet, comparatively calm as matters appeared to be on the surface, both sovereigns were in reality preparing more energetic measures than either had undertaken for some years. Bodley's instructions for his negotiations with the States-General show that, as early as August 1595, Elizabeth had in mind an expedition on a large scale for which extraneous maritime assistance would be advisable,[12] and in November she tried to borrow ships from the King of Denmark for the same purpose.[13] For several years Antonio Perez had been urging the English

tenance and promptness of the men' (Anth. Standen to Bacon, 23rd May); 'at least 10,000 soldiers, as tall, handsome men as ever I cast eye on' (same to same, 30th May). No doubt the 2,000 English veterans brought over from the Low Countries helped to improve the appearance of the army. The volunteers, too, glittered bravely, 'five hundred gentlemen covered over with silver and gold lace,' or 'three hundred green-headed youths covered with feathers, gold, and silver lace' (Birch, *Bacon Papers*, ii. pp. 11, 15). Among the volunteers were Count Louis Gunther of Nassau, a nephew of William the Silent, and Don Christobal, a son of the pretender, Don Antonio. The Spaniards were extremely interested in Don Christobal, and in the supposed presence of Antonio Perez in the fleet, and closely examined every prisoner about them both.

[12] Birch (*Bacon Papers*, i. pp. 288, 331, 389).

[13] Forty-sixth Annual Report of the Dep. Keeper of the Public Records, Appendix ii. p. 35. On 10th February, 1596, Christian IV. wrote in answer to Elizabeth's letter of 12th November, 1595, that he could not lend her eight ships, because it would be contrary to his treaties with Spain. The King took the opportunity to request her to repress her subjects' piratical attacks on Danish merchantmen. No doubt what Christian called piracy Elizabeth called seizing contraband of war.

Government to attack Cadiz,[14] and he seems to have found his most effective supporter in the Lord Admiral Howard, for although Essex joined eagerly in the plan he disavowed all the honour or responsibility of authorship.[15] During the remainder of 1595 preparations were being quietly made, and Elizabeth seems to have shown a quite unusual tenacity of purpose; in November the States-General dutifully acceded to the Queen's request to provide thirty ships, and in December the City of London was asked for twelve ships and two pinnaces, which were quickly promised.[16] From October onwards orders were sent into the inland counties for the preparation of five months' victuals for 12,000 men, and the port towns were directed to provide ships; against the latter demands several of the towns protested as being too heavily burthened. The secret was still well kept, and Essex, writing on 16th January, 159§, to the Earl of Mar, only referred to an intended strong Channel squadron to be ready in April. Even Henry IV. was kept in ignorance although a knowledge of what was in the air might have smoothed the asperities of negotiation during 1595. Henry, by his conversion, had disarmed the less fanatical adherents of the League and had so far strengthened his position that he committed himself to a formal declaration of war with Spain in

[14] Don C. Fernandez Duro writes that Perez was continually recommending Elizabeth's advisers to attack the silver fleets and Cadiz, and that the Government, while perceiving the principle, would never have known of the weak points, but for him, 'which will weigh eternally on his memory' (*Armada Española*, iii. p. 118; see also Forneron, *Hist. de Philippe II.* iv. p. 265). The suggested occupation of Cadiz, a step in advance of anything before proposed, may have been his; but that Cadiz and the Flotas were crucial points of attack was thoroughly appreciated long before he came to England.

[15] 'For the project of going to Cadiz I have ever confessed it was my Lord Admiral's, my colleague's' (Birch, ii. p. 57). But Perez held an intimate correspondence with Essex, and is not known to have had any but casual communication with Howard, therefore if MM. Forneron and Fernandez Duro are right, Howard must have been put forward so prominently in order to gain his support. However, in a long letter from Essex to Perez, written after his return in September 1596 (Birch, ii. p. 40), he does not in any way imply that the expedition or any of the proposed steps in it were the suggestion of Perez, unless a request to the latter not to condemn him for its shortcomings until his *Apology* had been issued, may be considered to signify a certain responsibility to an originator. Sir W. Slingsby has a note, 'The project for the surprise of Cadiz was long before secretly propounded by Captain Wm. Morgan, who had lived many years in that port with the Adelantado; who, for their better direction, went a passenger in his Lordship's (Howard's) ship.' Morgan may have recommended the project, but could not have been an agent of importance in securing its adoption.

[16] Birch, i. p. 331; *Cecil MSS.* 7th January, 159§.

January 1595. Elizabeth, either satisfied to see him irrevocably compromised or because she thought his position secure, immediately withdrew the troops serving under Norreys. By his conversion Henry had regained Burgundy, Provence, and Languedoc, and the Catholic party generally was rallying to him, but he was losing ground in Picardy, where he had to oppose a direct Spanish attack from the Low Countries. The result of the summer campaign was so unfavourable to him that he again appealed to Elizabeth for assistance, and, in September, Sir Roger Williams was sent over with an offer from the Queen to garrison Calais, Dieppe, Boulogne, and other coast towns.[17] Seeing that Henry urgently wanted a field force, and that the ports, if only moderately well defended, might be considered to be in perfect safety while England commanded the Channel, it was an impudently transparent offer, and the King answered it by a declaration that he would be compelled to accept the Pope's mediation if Elizabeth gave no help. After a further exchange of despatches, Sir Henry Unton was sent over in December to find out whether Henry really meant to obtain a peace with Spain or was using the threat only as a means to move Elizabeth; in the former case he was to offer substantial aid, in the latter case he was to do nothing but talk. That Henry should be under no mistake as to the position, Unton bore with him secret instructions from Essex to the King, explaining the situation, and directing him how to play his part to impress Elizabeth with the sincerity of his intention to come to terms with Spain.[18]

Although relations with Henry were thus unsatisfactory, those with the States were unruffled. In January 1596, Bodley applied to the States-General to allow Sir Francis Vere to come to England to confer about the best measures to be taken. He came over, but nothing seems to have been definitely decided upon at the time, since, in March, he wrote to Essex that he was still ignorant of the plan to be adopted, but that if it was intended to seize and hold a port, Coruña or Cadiz would be the best, and

[17] *An Historical View of the Negotiations between the Courts of England, France, and Brussels . . . from the MS. of Sir Thos. Edmondes*, London, 1749, p. 25.

[18] Birch, i. p. 353. Essex seems to have played the double game safely, but it must have been a very dangerous one. Elizabeth would hardly have been moved by the argument that it was done for her good. In view of our knowledge of the secret communications between Henry and Essex, Unton's despatches (*Cecil MSS.* 12th January, 4th February, 4th March, 1595; Murdin's *Burghley Papers*, pp. 701 *et seq.*) make very amusing reading. Henry played his part with the fire and *abandon* of a born actor, and here, as elsewhere, justified Napoleon's remark that there was a touch of the charlatan in his character (Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, s.v. 24th December, 1815).

preferably Cadiz, but that unless a sufficiently strong and sufficiently well-equipped force was sent, 'neither can be of other use than one summer's bravery.'[19] Both he and Bodley wrote at various times that the States were giving every assistance, and assenting to every demand. In the meantime the Lord Admiral, Ralegh, and Lord Thomas Howard were busy with the work of mobilization; in March the former wrote to Robert Cecyll that they were hurrying up and down the river daily, and that the Thames division of the fleet would not be ready until 15th April, a fortnight later than had been anticipated, but that he consoled himself with the knowledge that no general had ever been punctual as to time by two months or more.[20] On 18th March the commission to Essex and the Lord Admiral as 'lieutenant-generals and governors of her Highness's navy and army' was issued, with power to them to levy 5,000 troops, and their council was to be composed of Vere, Sir John Wingfield, Gerard, Clifford, and Blount for the army, and Lord Thomas Howard, Ralegh, Carew, and Southwell representing the navy. These formed the 'selected company,' but a full council which included the captains and masters of the ships was also arranged for.[21] Beyond the usual purpose of intercepting the treasure fleet and ravaging the Spanish coasts, the especial object of the expedition, in Essex's mind, was to make 'a continual diversion,' to hold Cadiz after seizing it, and leave 'a thorn sticking in his foot.'[22] In the long despatch to the Privy Council, written just before his departure, in which these expressions occur, Essex discussed the advantages to be gained by such a proceeding, the methods to be followed, and promised to give the name of the place and full particulars in his next letter; in the mean time the members of the Council were, he besought them, to bring the Queen to accept the general principle. As late as 20th March even Burghley was ignorant of what the Generals proposed to do, and noted that they should be called upon to declare 'what coast or port of Spain or Portugal they intend enterprising.' Therefore, if the proposal to hold Cadiz was due to Antonio Perez, he, Essex, and Howard had kept the secret well between them; or possibly when Essex assigned the authorship of the design to Howard, he was speaking merely of an ordinary raid, and the pendant of garrisoning Cadiz, particular to Perez and himself, had been intended from the first to be sprung on the Council, and the Queen at the last

[19] *Cecil MSS.* 7th March, 1596. [20] *Ibid.*

[21] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclvii. 47. But see note 23.

[22] *Ibid.* cclix. 12; Essex to Privy Council. Endorsed as received 13th June, and with a note by Burghley, 'Query the name.' Essex had ordered that the despatch was not to be delivered until he had been away, with a favourable wind for a week. See Introduction, *ante*, pp. 79 *et seq.*

moment. Vere's letter of 7th March certainly suggests that he was aware of a plan to hold some Spanish port, but the Instructions to the two commanders, as given by Elizabeth and recapitulated in a later despatch,[23] were 'first to attempt the taking of the King's ships and destroying of the same, and of all magazines and provisions.' For that purpose so many soldiers had been given to them. Then, 'those kind of services being done, you would retain[24] a great number of your land soldiers, and

[23] *MS. Council Register*, 7th August. An undated copy of the Instructions exists in a mutilated condition (*Cott. MSS.* Otho E. ix. f. 343), and is printed by Lediard (*Naval History*, Lond. 1735). They recite that the first motive moving the Queen was the report that a greater fleet than that of 1588 was preparing in Spain, but that having heard that part had been sent after Drake and Hawkyns there was no reason to fear anything more than assistance to be sent to Ireland in the summer. Knowing that the way to prevent this 'was most certainly to be made by burning the King's ships of war in his havens before they should come forth to the seas and therewith also destroying his magazines,' the Queen had accepted the Generals' offer to undertake this work. They were to ascertain Philip's intentions, and whether he really proposed to invade Ireland or to send a force to Calais to join troops sent by the Archduke, and from there to invade England; 'in the searching to come to knowledge hereof, we advise you not to give sudden credits to single reports, but circumspectly to compare your intelligence together.' This clause resembles the direction given to Drake and Norreys in 1589 to find out whether there was any prospect of a rising in favour of Don Antonio before they committed themselves. If Elizabeth, with the resources of statecraft at disposal, did not know Philip's intentions, the Generals were not likely to be better informed or to increase their knowledge by cross-examining ignorant prisoners. They were to destroy any such ships prepared for an invasion, but if they could not hear that a fleet was in readiness were to sail to the port where they would find most ships and stores and there work destruction, but without risking the Queen's ships or men; after that, which was to be considered the principal object, they might attack the town belonging to the port if the result appeared certain. Then they were to send home the surplus troops and look for the Flota and the carracks. The Generals ignored all these conditional orders from the first, and the assault on Cadiz was resolved upon before they left England.

The advisory council consisted of Lord Thomas Howard and Ralegh for naval affairs, and Vere and Clifford for military operations. Every step proposed was to be debated and approved by them. If the Generals differed the decision of the majority was to be carried out, but if the votes were equal the proposal under discussion was to be dropped if it was one involving risk of life.

[24] *Sic*, but no doubt a clerical error for 'return.' Elsewhere in the letter occurs the phrase 'your determination to send away the number of the land soldiers after the service is by them done.' See also preceding note.

would, with some convenient number of ships, attempt the interrupting of the East Indian carracks and the fleet of the West Indies.' Therefore, not only had no instructions been given to hold Cadiz, but Essex's letter of 13th June had either been ignored or his request refused,[25] and when he persuaded his council of war, on 29th June, to hold the city and send to England for supplies, he must have been acting on his own responsibility. In view of the proviso that the despatch was not to be delivered until the possibility of the fleet being driven back by contrary winds was out of the question, it would seem that the General did not expect permission, and was determined to force Elizabeth's hand by announcing as an accomplished fact the occupation and garrisoning of Cadiz for an indefinite period.

During the first three months of the year Elizabeth had experienced fewer than was usual of her mental gyrations. All things seemed going well: reports were continually coming in that Drake and Hawkyns had sacked the Havana or obtained other successes in the West Indies; the States-General was, if not satisfied, obedient; Henry IV., if still obstinate, did not appear to be in any immediate danger; there was a momentary cessation of fears of invasion, and altogether there was nothing to rouse even the Queen's nervous sensitiveness to possibilities. It was hoped that Philip would be given sufficient to occupy him in his own waters, and it was shown that if he did get a fleet into the Channel during the absence of Essex there would be—with the Drake-Hawkyns fleet shortly due back—nineteen Queen's ships besides small craft to form a nucleus for the armed merchantmen.[26] Some of these pleasing illusions were now to be dispelled; it was known authoritatively on 25th March, that the Admirals had been badly repulsed at Puerto Rico and that Hawkyns was dead, and within a week came the news that the Archduke Albert had moved suddenly on Calais and that help had to be prompt to be effective. The Dutch were probably less surprised than the English, for in November 1595 they had expressed their fears to Bodley, who had thought them sufficiently well-grounded to be reported to Essex.[27]

Philip's new governor-general arrived at Brussels in February, and some information of his slow march across Europe from the Mediterranean to the north had been occasionally sent to England. He was supposed to be coming with thousands of men and millions

[25] 'My letter was neither answered nor liked.'—Apology (*State Papers Eliz.* cclxix. 71).

[26] *Cott. MSS.* Otho E. ix. f. 316.

[27] Birch, i. pp. 333, 335. The States-General took the information so seriously as to send troops to Calais, but the governor would not allow more than two companies to enter (Meteren, *Hist. des Pays-Bas*, ed. 1618, p. 386).

of ducats, but as he approached his destination number and amount both dwindled. Within the past twenty-eight years Philip had thrown upwards of 300,000,000*l.* in present values into the bottomless pit of the Netherlands war,[28] and, whatever his promises to the Archduke Albert, he was even less able to keep up regular remittances now than he had been in previous years when the combinations of his ablest servants had failed again and again for lack of money. During the winter Henry had been besieging La Fère, in Picardy, and the Archduke, having collected 18,000 horse and foot at Valenciennes, was expected to move forward to its relief. He did advance with his main body in the direction of La Fère, but suddenly detached a division under M. de Rosne, a French renegade in his service, to attack Calais, where he appeared on 30th March.[29] The governor of the town had been M. de Jourdan, who had filled that position with tact in 1588, but he had recently died and had been succeeded by his nephew the Sieur de Vidosan, 'to whom he had left much money but little experience,' says Meteren, and who had allowed the defences to go to ruin and the garrison to fall below its proper strength. It is said that Vidosan had been warned of his danger a fortnight previously, and being urged by the captains of his two Dutch companies to repair and rearm the Rysbank fort which commanded the harbour, had refused on the plea of poverty.[30] So long as the Rysbank was held by the defenders, men and provisions could always be thrown in from the sea, rendering the place practically impregnable, but de Rosne, apparently knowing the circumstances of the defence, promptly attacked and took without difficulty the fort and the Nivelet bridge, thus isolating the town by sea and land, and at once reducing it from a condition of security to one of the most imminent danger. M. de Rosne immediately fortified the Rysbank, the Archduke arrived with the main body of his army on 1st April, and when a Dutch squadron carrying troops and supplies arrived off the harbour, the fort was sufficiently formidable to bar the entrance; on $\frac{7}{17}$ April the governor evacuated the town and retreated into the citadel, engaging to yield that also unless relieved within six days. Of course the news caused considerable dismay in London; on 3rd April Essex was at Dover, whence he had sent a messenger to Boulogne to Henry to inquire what steps the French were taking to assist the place, and where he received a message from Sir Henry Palmer, who had appeared off Calais the previous night, saying that twelve Dutch ships were already there but unable to enter, and enclosing an appeal for help from the

[28] *State Papers Ven.* $\frac{21\text{st Dec. 1595.}}{1\text{st Jan. 1596.}}$

[29] Demotier, *Annales de Calais*, Calais, 1856. The siege commenced on 29th March, according to Birch (i. p. 459).

[30] Meteren, *ubi sup.*

governor. Henry also had sent direct to Elizabeth, but it would seem that after the first moment of surprise, when immediate help was promised, the necessity for urgent action was not understood at the English court, and that Elizabeth expected to make her profit by refusing assistance unless the town was placed in English hands. While Essex was striving to collect men and writing furious letters, Elizabeth was formulating terms, and it was not until 9th April that orders were given to levy 6,000 men in London and the home counties and send them to Dover within forty-eight hours at furthest.[31] At the same time Sir Robert Sidney was sent to Henry at Boulogne with the Queen's conditions, on hearing which Henry for once lost his temper and declared that, if he had to be eaten by a lion or lioness, he preferred to be the victim of the lion. In fact, if he had had the best will in the world, he no more dared to put Calais in English possession than he had dared in 1594, in view of national feeling, to put Brest or Morlaix in their power. In the meanwhile the English local authorities must have been bewildered by the succession of contradictory orders; on the 10th April the orders of the previous day were countermanded, and on the 11th they were put in force again with directions that the men were to be at Dover not later than the night of the following day.[32] On the 13th April a commission as general of the relieving force was issued to Essex, but with instructions not to carry over his troops unless Henry agreed to deliver up the town, and unless there was a strong French force to co-operate with him. Elizabeth did not seem to appreciate that if a strong French force had been available her assistance, always regarded by her allies as an extremely unpleasant necessity, would not have been asked, but that Henry's army was occupied with the siege of La Fère, and in any case could not be moved in time. Essex was fretting at Dover over the enforced delay and vainly writing letters to everyone;[33] on 14th April he wrote to Burghley, who appears on this occasion to have been on the side of action: 'I remember how much I saw your lordship afflicted for the alteration of the Queen's former order to succour Calais, and I doubt not but that your lordship is as much grieved that her army should be levied and we sent down, and yet by an instruction our hands bound behind us. I am he whom the Queen commanded by letter to the Count St. Pol to promise succour directly without condition. . . . I am named to the service and I lie here to be witness that the citadel doth hold out

[31] *MS. Council Register.*

[32] *Ibid.* 'These so many changes breed hard opinion of counsel,' wrote Palmer.

[33] On 13th April he wrote four letters to the Privy Council and to Robert Cecyll.

well and is only lost for our not keeping troth.'[34] On the 15th the troops were said to be embarking, but on the 17th the expedition was finally countermanded,[35] for on the 14th the castle had been carried by storm, most of the Dutch troops, who had borne the weight of the defence, dying in the breach.[36]

To us the chief interest of the fall of Calais is in watching the influence the event had on the mind of Elizabeth in respect to the more important Cadiz voyage. That Calais should be in Spanish possession was, to England, more mortifying and injurious to private interests than nationally dangerous. Like Dunkirk, Sluys, and Nieuport, it promised to become a privateer lair capable of inflicting untold injury on English commerce, unless continuously blockaded, but, as a small harbour which only vessels of moderate size could use, and that such could only enter or leave at high tide, it was of as much use as the three others—that is to say, of none at all—as a base for an ocean fleet. The preliminary operation of obtaining the command of the sea, which Philip had been prepared to fight for in 1588, he was now inclined to evade, but he was still no nearer the necessary port, and he admitted the uselessness of Calais in 1596 and 1597, when his fleets sailed with instructions to seize an English port to serve as a base.

While Essex was moving heaven and earth to obtain troops and permission to save Calais, Vere warned him that the place was certain to fall, and that it was unwise to dissipate his strength and shake the Queen's resolve by engaging in what was after all a secondary operation. He rightly held that the war 'cannot prosper with us if in time we bring it not nearer to them.'[37] Besides Calais and the unknown terrors its loss foreshadowed there were other reasons influencing Elizabeth to hesitation. The recent events had converted Henry, who now seriously required English aid and did not desire to see English strength employed on a purpose of no immediate benefit to him, into an ardent opponent of the Cadiz expedition. He now wanted to use in France the troops raised for Essex, and shortly before Calais surrendered, the Baron de Sancy was sent over to beg the Queen at least to suspend the departure of the expedition until the matter had been more fully debated.[38] He pointed out, further, that the withdrawal of the troops under Vere would prevent the States giving him effective assistance in the ensuing campaign, and that he would

[34] *Lansd. MSS.* 82, f. 1. [35] *MS. Council Register.*

[36] The Spaniards found forty-three English guns in the place, which had been put there by Henry VIII., and bore the arms of that king.

[37] Compare Ralegh, 'If we be once driven to the defensive, fear were my part' (*Cecil MSS.* 13th November, 1595; Ralegh to Robert Cecyll); and Santa Cruz to Philip (1/3 January, 1586), 'Many mishaps happen to princes who confine themselves to defensive war.'

[38] Birch, *op. cit.* i. p. 461.

be left to bear the weight of the Archduke's attack. Towards the end of April, the Duc de Bouillon crossed as a special ambassador to enforce these arguments and, if possible, to conclude a treaty; but before his arrival, and almost concurrently with the news of the loss of Calais, the real result of the Drake-Hawkyns voyage was known in London.[39] Seeing the persistent rumours of ultimate success, even after the defeat at Puerto Rico was known, the truth must have been proportionately depressing, and no doubt the effect was intensified as the ships straggled home with crews disabled by death and disease. Added to these discouragements were rumours of fresh measures taken by Philip in Brittany, although he was now as harmless there in reality as in the Black Sea. Various reports had come in of his preparations at home and of reinforcements for Brittany, but the real condition was accurately described in a letter to Essex, and it is to the latter's credit that for the past six months he had continuously measured Philip's offensive capacity at its true dimension. Guicciardini wrote to him, in sending information, 'The King of Spain has neither vessels, nor means, nor preparations sufficient to make an enterprise against England, but alleges such an enterprise in order to keep the Queen in suspicion and prevent her sending forces against Havana and the Indies.'[40] That had been his policy and a successful one for seven years, for Elizabeth had always taken it seriously and would continue to do so until her death, though it is perhaps unfair to blame her for doing what historians with much fuller information at command have also done. Guicciardini went on to repeat the advice of greater men—to seize or destroy the Flota—for to succeed once in that would leave Philip helpless, and, sagaciously enough, added that though he still had Blavet it was useless to him.

The Duc de Bouillon arrived in England during the third week in April and remained here until the middle of May, when, by playing the trump card of the threat of a separate peace with Spain, he obtained the promise of an English contingent for service in Picardy. On 28th April Essex was at Plymouth,[41] and remembering his and Bouillon's discordant aims, it is not surprising to read that the latter 'found a great and sudden change in his lordship's carriage.' The countercurrents and intrigues at court, of which we have only the shadowy indications, must have at last overborne Essex's scanty patience, for, in answer to this he broke out into a characteristic outburst: 'I am about to do more for

[39] On 24th April (Birch, i. p. 472).

[40] *Cecil MSS.* $\frac{24\text{th April}}{4\text{th May}}$, 1596.

[41] De Thou says that Bouillon had an interview with Essex at Dover; Sir Anth. Standen (Birch, i. p. 467) says that the earl went to sea to avoid him.

the public and for all our friends than they can hope for. But they are unquiet hearted and know not our Queen and State so well as I do; for they feed the Queen in her irresolution, wherein, though they first undo me they shall next undo themselves, for the Queen wrangles with our action for no cause but because it is in hand. If this force were going to France, she would then fear as much the issue there as she doth in our intended journey. I know I shall never do her service but against her will.' It is refreshing to have a glimpse of the 'Peerless Oriana' as she really appeared to those about her when they lost their tempers sufficiently to tell the truth. The success of Bouillon's negotiation may explain why 'the Queen is daily in change of humour about my lord's voyage, and yesterday almost resolute to stay it,'[42] and at last she ordered the two Generals to return to court, intending, she said, to send an inferior officer in command, which of course meant that the character and scope of the expedition was to be entirely changed and diminished. This order evoked a formal protest, signed by all the chief sea and land officers,[43] to the effect that if the Queen intended to give the command to one of them no one would accept it. That if the two Generals were recalled the prospect of doing good service would be much lessened, because many had come to serve under them who would not serve under others; the lower sort would desert, and the volunteers would not obey a commander of less rank than Howard and Essex. On the same day Vere wrote separately to Robert Cecyll to the same purpose, and Essex begged that he might be rid 'of this hellish torment' and quit of the uncertainty. He also wrote to the Privy Council asking a series of questions for the 'envious crossers of our journey to answer.' What, he asked, was to be done with the victuals and stores provided; what was to become of the preparations of London and the coast towns; and how could it be expected that they would show such alacrity again when they saw their exertions thus thrown away? What was to be said to the States-General, and to what purpose the waste of money already expended in England and Holland?[44] Then he went on to protest against sending a fleet without a landing force, if a port was to be attacked, in words which have significance not so much in relation to this voyage, as to his course of action when commanding the fleet of the following year.[44a] How, he said, can anyone reduce a port without troops to land?—'next, how will he distress or burn the maritimes of Spain if he go not to them where

[42] However, the Duc de Bouillon denied that, beyond giving Elizabeth Henry's letter to that intent, he had used any means or argument to stop the voyage.

[43] *Cecil MSS.* 18th May, 1596.

[44] Birch, *op. cit.* ii. p. 8.

[44a] *Post*, ii. p. 56.

they are? or how he dare go into them or shall be able to take such forts as they make for their defences in the harbours if he have not a land force to command the shore? Lastly, when he has spent his victuals and must return . . . why shall not the Spaniard, that without impeachment prepares all that while, follow him?' All these arguments, and perhaps Elizabeth's horror of wasting the money already spent, prevailed over the objections, and by 24th May the Generals had received their final orders to go forward, the Queen now composing a prayer for their welfare and a loving letter to Essex, with a message to 'my most faithful Charles.'

Essex's troubles were not confined to combating Elizabeth's hesitations. Ralegh did not join until 21st May, having been delayed by unwilling or lazy shipmasters and the difficulty of obtaining men. At Plymouth the earl was overwhelmed with work 'bringing all this chaos into order,' and not the least of his anxieties was the ruinous expense in which the long stay at Plymouth was involving him, for he wrote to Robert Cecyll that he had spent 'an infinite sum' of his own in supporting his officers and in 'paying lendings' to more than 5,000 soldiers.[45] But more serious than overwork and pecuniary difficulties were the underlying personal jealousies, old and new, which threatened to burst into flame, and did eventually prevent him reaping the full advantage of the successfully executed attack. In 1587 Essex had written of 'that knave Ralegh,' and, 'such a wretch as Ralegh'; in 1588 he had challenged Ralegh to fight, and now the chances of politics gave him his enemy as his Rear-Admiral. Somewhat more friendly relations, it is true, existed between them, although Essex was still keeping Ralegh out of favour and office at court, but malicious pens were at work stirring up the old hatreds. While Ralegh was struggling with difficulties in the Thames, Anthony Bacon wrote to his brother that his 'slackness and stay by the way is not thought to be upon sloth or negligence, but upon pregnant design,' and no doubt he did not fail to make the same suggestion to his patron the earl. Essex was of far too open and generous a nature to listen to hints or to be content with a half reconciliation if confidence was possible, and he wrote to Ralegh, 'When you are come I will make you see I desire to do you as much honour and give you as great contentment as I can. For this is the action and the time in which you and I shall both be taught to know and love one another.'[46] Ralegh was not nearly as honest a man as Essex, but there is no reason to doubt that he was here acting straightforwardly and had determined to maintain the best relations with his chief. An observer at Plymouth noticed that 'his carriage to my lord of Essex is with

[45] *Cecil MSS.* 12th May, 1596. [46] *Ibid.* 3rd May.

the cunningest respect and deepest humility that I ever saw or have trowed.' Ralegh, in any case, was a subordinate, but more delicate were Essex's relations with his colleague, the Lord Admiral. If it be true that the expedition was planned by Howard, it must have strained his patience sorely to find Essex, a man of comparatively little experience and of not nearly equal official rank, placed in equal authority and exercising far more than equal influence. Yet whatever he may have thought he was silent, as far as we know, until the commission issued to Essex to take the sole command of the Calais relief force found the breaking point of his endurance. At Dover he wrote a letter to Robert Cecyll, which is probably the third of a series of which the first two are missing, in which the pent-up passion flames out;[47] he vowed that he would never serve again unless in a private capacity, for he wished that he had been drowned before receiving such a letter from Cecyll, for it had never been known that troops landed in France or Scotland had not been under the Lord Admiral's command. Howard seems to have drawn a distinction—or to have been forced to draw a distinction—between operations in countries where his predecessors had always been in both naval and military control, and the new method of proceeding in Spain and the Low Countries where the military command was an independent one. He went on, 'therefore I humbly beseech her Majesty that by her order some other may take my place . . . my commission in being joined with the earl is an idle thing for I am used but as the drudge . . . therefore I pray you for the other journey let me not be pressed, for I vow to God I will not stir in it . . . and thus I leave for ever farther to deal in martial causes.'[48] The reference to his having been used as a 'drudge' in the other, that is the Cadiz, journey shows that whatever his grievances, they had been long rankling. Essex wrote to Cecyll trying to allay the storm and asking him not to show Howard's letter to the Queen, for 'it may break all our actions if she take him at his word.' By the 16th April Howard had calmed down, and wrote in a more peaceful way, and eventually that particular trouble was allayed. But there are signs that if things afterwards went smoothly, it was only by the exercise of much tact and circumspection on Essex's part. In one letter he could not refrain from hinting his difficulties with 'the great spirits of our state; and sometimes I am as much troubled with them as with all the troops.' In another he called it a purgatory 'to govern this unwieldy body and to keep these sharp humours from dis-

[47] *Cecil MSS.* 13th April, 1596. This letter was in answer to one from Cecyll, which was likely to have been a reply to a protest from Howard.

[48] Endorsed 'a passionate letter.'

tempering the whole body.' Sir George Carew wrote to Cecyll that the Generals 'do yet hold their good correspondentie and I do not find any doubt of the continuance of it,' in which if the writer found no doubt we may plainly see his wonder; but during the same week that Carew wrote this, Essex had, half jestingly, to explain to Cecyll that his signature was cut out in his and Howard's joint letter because the latter would have no one sign as high on the page as himself.[49] Thus it is no matter for surprise that the strained relations between the Generals come out clearly in Essex's vindication of his conduct, the suppressed *Omissions of the Cales Voyage*, in which he imputes the deficiencies in performance to the Lord Admiral's consistent opposition to every measure he proposed. How far Howard's opposition was due to personal jealousy, or how far to an honest fear of incurring Elizabeth's anger by running undue risks or overrunning his instructions, for he had always one eye fixed on the Court and court favour, must remain uncertain.

The union of the Generals being thus constrained, it was natural that their subordinates should show the same temper. Quarrels about precedence arose between Ralegh, Vere, and Sir Conyers Clifford, which were settled by Ralegh being given precedence at sea and Vere on land, and, to avoid further disputes, Vere drew up a paper, in which the duties and rank of all the staff and regimental officers were fully explained.[50] Vere and Ralegh disputed angrily at table in the presence of the Generals and the Dutch admirals, and the quarrel being taken up by Arthur Throckmorton, Ralegh's brother-in-law, that officer was cashiered. The narrator of the scene adds: 'For all this voyage I see already the fire kindled that must consume us inwardly.'[51] Sir Anthony Sherley, who was at Plymouth during May with a squadron with which he was sailing on his own account, remarked that 'the preparation of the very chief members of the body was of a most strange compact, the very body itself was fallen sick and distempered with so many discontentments as he had never in his life seen spring in any company so soon.'

On 8th May Essex wrote that he was drawing up regulations for the army; those for the navy had been issued in April,[52] and were to be read out twice a week in every ship at service-time. There were the usual regulations forbidding swearing, brawling, gaming, and theft, and the order that Common Prayer was to be used twice a day was amplified by an injunction against disputing

[49] *Cecil MSS.* 24th, 29th May, 1596. See also *post*, p. 378.
[50] *Harl. MSS.* 168, f. 120.
[51] Sir Anth. Standen to Anth. Bacon (Birch, ii. p. 11).
[52] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclvii. 47. Printed in full in Devereux's *Lives of the Devereux*, ii. p. 495.

on religious subjects, 'for it is not fit that unlearned men should openly argue of so high and mystical matters.' The safety of the ships was to be regarded by care in favouring the topmasts, especially on a wind, by using no candles except in lanterns, and by ships and squadrons keeping well clear of each other. If a strange sail was sighted the nearest ship was to chase, but not more than one was to go unless the squadron Admiral put out two or more flags over each other, in which case the number of vessels thus indicated was to chase; and if the Admiral himself went, the whole of his squadron. Every evening each captain was to speak the Admiral of his squadron to obtain the course for the night, and the Admiral was to speak the Generals. A St. George's cross half-mast high on the main mizen called the captains and masters of the fleet to council on the General's ship; 'a flag of arms'—the royal arms of England—the higher council of war. The signal of distress by day was a gunshot; by night, two shots and two lights hoisted vertically. The private signal, after losing company, was to strike and hoist the main topsail, or the main mizen twice 'or as often as they list,' and to wear a white pendant at the mizen yard. Further instructions related to the treatment of prizes, safety of prize goods, and matters of discipline; and the article about prizes included a promise that 'for your loyal and faithful service to be done in this journey' her Majesty granted a third part of all plunder, not being treasure, jewels, or the cargo of a carrack, over and above wages.

On 24th April Essex and Howard published a Declaration of the Queen's purpose in preparing her armament.[53] The fleet was sailing, they said, 'against such mighty forces as now are advertised from all parts of Christendom, to be already prepared by the King of Spain' They announced that they were strictly ordered to forbear all offence against any but Philip's subjects, or such as aided him with ships, munition, or victuals. All such persons were exhorted to withdraw in time their ships and stores from the Spanish service and harbours, in which case they might freely return to their own countries or have the protection of the English fleet. Any failing to take advantage of this permission were to expect to be treated as enemies and to hope for no redress. The Declaration was to be translated into French, Spanish, Italian, and Dutch, and distributed as widely as possible.

[2] Monson's rather full-bodied satisfaction at getting south without detection seems excessive, because not only was there no Spanish force capable of disputing their progress, but if the Spanish authorities are to be trusted, the course of the fleet was perfectly well known, and only the incapacity of Philip's Govern-

[53] *State Papers Dom.* cclvii. 41.

ment prevented Cadiz being warned in time. It was, of course, good management to have scouts and light vessels out to pick up anything that was met, but the jubilation over the doings of the four vessels appointed to that service shows how unusual was the precaution. How much Philip knew of the preparations and purpose is doubtful, but as such an armament could not be equipped without drawing the attention of Western Europe, we may suppose that he had not neglected a matter in which he was so closely interested. In the spring of 1596 Philip was dreaming of an effective counter-attack to be made in Ireland, and in May he had received from two officers he had sent to examine the *terrain* a detailed report on the harbours, roads, bridges, and the military assistance to be expected from Tyrone, and that necessary to give him. On 1st June, the day Essex put to sea, the Venetian ambassador at Madrid was informing his Government that the Portuguese had complained that no steps were being taken to meet the English preparations: 'A sharp answer was returned from here that the governor had written in exaggerated alarm, for the conquest of Calais, the death of Drake, and the dispersal of his fleet, would undoubtedly cause the Queen to change her plans.' This was a sufficiently accurate picture of the seeming condition of things after the fall of Calais, but as the preparations continued, Philip sent some look-out vessels into the Channel. One returned and reported that 190 sail left the Channel on $\frac{7}{17}$ June; another put into Lisbon with the news that it had actually accompanied the English fleet to within thirty leagues of the Tagus.[84] This circumstantial statement is supported as well by the Venetian ambassador, who refers to a vessel having been sent into the English Channel to watch Essex.[85] At this time Philip was very ill, and haltingly as affairs progressed when he was well, they lagged still more when his unresting, if slowly acting, supervision was lacking. It was not until the scout reached the Tagus that the news was believed, and then the panic was so great in Lisbon that it was said that any sort of force could have entered and sacked the place. Brochero de Anaya was in the river with eighteen ships, but badly armed and otherwise unready, and it was thought that if the enemy did come reliance could be placed only on the forts.[86] With Philip incapacitated, the conduct of affairs was largely in the hands of his Portuguese favourite, Christovão de Moura, but no measures of any sort appear to have been taken, except at Lisbon, where a hasty system of defence was improvised, and it is said that on Moura's attention being called to the possibility that the English

[84] *Cecil MSS.* $\frac{\text{8th June}}{\text{8th July}}$, Italian Relation.

[85] *State Papers Ven.* $\frac{1}{11}$ June.

[86] Herrera, *Historia General*, iii. p. 632.

destination was Cadiz, and his orders to arm and fortify the place asked, he dismissed the request with a jest.[57] There is no doubt that not only in Spain, but on board the English fleet itself, nearly everyone thought that the objective was Lisbon, and the attention of the Spanish authorities was fixed on that city. Cadiz was practically defenceless; as early as 1575 Philip had been urged to fortify it more strongly, but the walls on the land side were still under repair and easier to scale from the outside than from within, the few guns mounted were old and more dangerous to the defenders than to the enemy, the organization of the defence was left to civilians, and there were, at the most, but 200 regular troops in garrison. In consequence of the drain of men from Spain to fill the ranks of the armies, the defence everywhere was thrown upon an untrained militia, but these men were not even supplied with powder and guns. At Seville, the capital of the district, powder was so scarce that a pound of silver could not purchase a pound of it, and it was necessary to scour the country a hundred leagues round for muskets.[58] Altogether, the conditions suggested a peaceful Arcadia rather than a district peculiarly liable to attack in the midst of a great war.

One of the most interesting accounts of the expedition that have come down to us is that by Dr. Roger Marbecke, the Lord Admiral's physician,[59] and although the doctor seems to have sailed with the intention of saying pleasant things all round, he was obliged, at the outset of the voyage, to notice the relations existing between the two Generals. Almost his first remark is that 'even now, at the very first time of their setting out, there fell a certain great strife and contention between the two Lords Generals. And albeit it appeared somewhat manifestly while their lordships were ashore, yet did it now begin more apparently to bud and to show itself while they were a shipboard, yea, and increase every day more and more till they were fully returned into England, and, as far as I can see or conjecture, is like enough always to continue.' Both chiefs were liked by their men, but Essex more among the soldiers, for whom he avowed his preference as being one of themselves. Of Howard's way with the

[57] Abreu, *Hist. del Saqueo de Cadiz*, Cadiz, 1866, p. 16. A contemporary account.

[58] Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, iii. p. 120; *State Papers Ven.* $\frac{28\text{th June}}{8\text{th July}}$; *Col. de Doc. Inéd.* xxxvi. pp. 237, 240; Abreu, *op. cit.*

[59] *Stowe MSS.* 159, f. 353. This was the source of the Hakluyt account, but was edited and mutilated almost out of recognition. Marbecke was provost of Oriel in 1564, and admitted M.D. in 1573. He became physician to Elizabeth and died in 1605, having been from 1579 the first Registrar of the Royal College of Physicians (Munk, *Roll of the Roy. College of Physicians of London*).

seamen, Marbecke draws a pretty picture, telling us of his 'making inquiry how they did, and calling to them by name to know in what case they stood and what they did lack, bidding them boldly to utter their wants and they should have present relief.' Such a description enables us to understand how, in 1588, Howard got his men, 'kindly handled,' to bear with any hardship for his sake.[60]

On 9th June the fleet was off Finisterre, when a council of the superior officers was held, and sealed orders issued in case of separation, the destination being still unknown generally.[61] The incidents that Monson dates as occurring on the 10th and 12th are dated by Marbecke as happening on the 12th and 13th June. On the 13th and the two following days some caravels were taken as well, carrying some friars as passengers, and on board one captured on the 14th was a Franciscan, who, with a companion, a Biscayan, relates an interesting conversation with Essex.[62] He describes Essex as dressed in white satin with a short cloak of brocade,[63] and, so far as information was concerned, the earl knew more than his prisoners. The conversation then became theological, with the usual result; Essex soon began to revile his prisoner, abused his faith, called him a dog, and carefully dissociated him from his Biscayan companion, who, he said, was a gentleman and man of his word. On the 15th the fleet was seen off Lagos Bay, and the alarm went flying inland, but the news did not reach Cadiz or the Duke of Medina Sidonia, the unfortunate commander of 1588, and now Governor of Andalusia and Captain-General of the Ocean, until the afternoon of Saturday, the 19th. On the 18th a Waterford vessel, which had left Cadiz on the previous day, was brought to, from which they learnt that twenty-eight or thirty ships were in the port, and that their approach was then unknown. A council was called[64] to discuss

[60] *Ante*, p. 165.

[61] Marbecke. Slingsby, however, says that the council at which the two Generals proposed the attack on Cadiz, and the issue of the sealed orders, was held on 2nd June in Cawsand Bay, and that the council held off Finisterre only discussed the manner, but coming to no conclusion decided to postpone further consideration until arrival off the port.

[62] Marbecke; *Col. de Doc. Inéd.* xxxvi. p. 285, Deposition of Francisco Esteves.

[63] Later in the year an Italian traveller in England wrote that Essex 'is about twenty-six years of age (he was twenty-nine), fair-skinned, tall, but wiry; on this last voyage he began to grow a beard which he used not to wear' (*State Papers Ven.* 2nd November, 1596). He wrote to Antonio Perez that he had lost his complexion in the voyage.

[64] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclix. 17. The 'former resolve' may refer to a council Slingsby says was held on 15th June, but the only

this intelligence, at which it was decided that the 'former resolve' should be altered, that Essex with the transports carrying troops should assault the city, and that the rest of the fleet under Howard, except two squadrons detached under Ralegh and Sir Alexander Clifford,[65] was, at his choice, either to attack the Spanish fleet or only watch it until Essex had taken the town. What the 'former resolve' was is not clear; perhaps it was to go straight in and assail the Spanish fleet. On the 19th another council was called,[66] at which it was decided 'upon better evidence and good consideration (upon the Lord Admiral's motion)' to alter the resolution of the 18th. The assault now was to be purely a military one upon the city: Howard was to anchor, with the bulk of the fleet, at the west end of the city and cover a landing in force under Essex in the Caleta of Santa Catalina; when Essex had gained a footing Howard was then to throw a second force ashore on the tongue of land east of the city. In the meanwhile Ralegh, with his own and the Dutch ships, was to anchor at the mouth of the harbour and prevent the enemy coming out, but was 'not to attempt to fight or invest[67] any of them' unless in his own defence or to assist Clifford; nor was he 'to fight, board, or invest,' that is, to lay his ships alongside. He was not to expect any further orders from the Generals once the action had begun. Although Ralegh was not present at this council, being away with his squadron in accordance with the decision of the 18th, he explains the cause of the alteration, 'my Lord Admiral being careful of her Majesty's ships, had resolved with the Earl of Essex that the town should be first attempted.'[68] This, together with the fact that the change of plan was 'upon the Lord Admiral's motion,' bears out Ralegh's further statement that Essex desired from the first to go into the bay and destroy the Spanish fleet, but was opposed by Howard.

result of its deliberations that he gives is a form of orders to be observed in landing the troops.

[65] Ralegh was detached on the same day to stand inshore along the coast to prevent any vessels slipping out from Cadiz to San Lucar. Clifford with a squadron, which included the Vanguard and the Rainbow, was to stand in along the northern shore, and if the galleys were in St. Mary Port was to blockade them there. If they were out he was to chase them, and in any case prevent them harassing the fleet (*Cecil MSS.* vi. p. 216).

[66] *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclix. 18.

[67] From the Spanish *embestir*, to attack furiously, to board.

[68] *Relation of Cadiz Action* (Works, viii. ed. 1829). In his account in this Book Monson simply states the fact that it was decided to land in the Caleta of Santa Catalina; in Book II. (section *The Coast of Spain*) he says that if the landing had been attempted not a man would have returned. On the other hand, Slingsby was of opinion that it would have succeeded easily.

The fleet was off Cadiz before daylight of 20th June, and when dawn broke afforded the Spaniards the sight, in their own words, of 'the most beautiful fleet that ever was seen.' In the city the responsible authorities had been making the best of their time since the previous afternoon; it is difficult to establish who, if anyone, was at the head of the defence, but Don Agustin Giron de Zuñiga, as the corregidor, was the chief civil official. However, Don Pedro Gutierrez Flores, the president of the Casa de Contratacion [69] at Seville, happened to be at Cadiz superintending the despatch of the outward Flota, and he seems to have taken the lead. In the port were eighteen galleys under Don Juan Portocarrero, four galleons of the Indian convoy guard, the three treasure frigates which had brought home from Puerto Rico the silver Drake had failed to seize, upwards of thirty of the Flota ships, practically unarmed, and twelve Biscayan, Italian or Portuguese, and Levantine vessels, of which only two were armed to any strength.[70] The senior naval officer was Diego de Sotomayor,[71] in command of the King's galleons, but the relations between the sea and land authorities were very bad, and ended in mutual accusations after the defence failed. During the 19th the militia from the districts around came in to an uncertain number,[72] but everything was in confusion in the city; no one was in authoritative command, powder was lacking, and there was not one day's provisions available. There was plenty of enthusiasm—some companies of Augustinian and Franciscan friars were organized and armed—but there was a lack of military direction, and the only trained soldiers, some companies of the Tercio of the Indies, belonged to the galleons and were kept on board them. A consultation held on the afternoon of the 19th decided to send Portocarrero with his galleys to occupy the passage between the Puercas and the Diamante reefs, and he was in position by four o'clock. Orders were given to strengthen the landing place at the Caleta Santa Catalina with trenches and breastworks of casks filled with sand, but, says Herrera, 'everything was done without order or discipline on account of the inexperience of the leaders.' Behind the galleys the four galleons and those other ships thought able to assist [73] were anchored in a line stretching across the Bay

[69] See *post*, ii. p. 312.

[70] Herrera; Abreu; *Col. de Doc. Inéd.* In reality the number of ships in the harbour is very uncertain, no two authorities agreeing. The weight of defence fell on the four galleons.

[71] Don Francisco Coloma was the General of the galleons, but he was away, as was also Sancho Pardo, another experienced officer.

[72] Herrera says that there were 600 horse and 7,000 foot altogether, that being the highest estimate, and must include the townsmen.

[73] Thirteen ships says one eye-witness (*Col. de Doc. Inéd.* xxxvi. p. 347).

from the shoals under the castle of St. Philip towards the opposite shore. These positions were held during the night of the 19–20th. In the meantime, on the mainland, the Duke of Medina Sidonia was taking all the measures experience suggested to meet the unexpected danger. Orders were sent far and near to raise the country levies, to obtain arms and stores, to warn other Spanish and the African ports, and every man who could be obtained was sent into Cadiz at once. One of his first precautions was to direct that warning should be sent to the Azores and to meet the homeward Flota,[74] and he himself set out for Cadiz after garrisoning the important position of the bridge of Suazo with two companies of regulars, probably all the reliable troops he had. He had ordered all the superior naval and civil officers of Cadiz to meet him at Puerto Real on the morning of the 20th to hold a council, but the morning of the 20th gave them other subject for thought, and the duke saw from Matagorda the ruin of the Spanish fleet on the 21st.

[3] When the fleet was outside Cadiz on the morning of the 20th, it was high tide at 5.27 A.M., and, as the ebb runs out very strongly, if there was any intention of going in there was no time to lose. Notwithstanding the decision of the council on the 19th, there seems to have been some irresolution as to the course to follow, perhaps because Ralegh had not yet rejoined. Monson, it seems, had urged Essex at daylight to enter the harbour, but although, from his joy when Ralegh succeeded in persuading Howard it is evident that the landing was much against his will, the Lord Admiral was senior where naval affairs were concerned, and if he would not attack the fleet the earl could but accede to the alternative line of action. He came up with his squadron after the Lord Admiral and the bulk of the fleet, and it would appear that even at the last moment he had some hope of being permitted to lead a direct attack on the Spanish fleet, for he wrote later that 'if I had been followed the first morning of our coming before the harbour when I bare with it,' the enemy would have had no opportunity to destroy the Flota,[75] 'but,' he continues, 'the first morning when I bore with the harbour almost all the fleet came to an anchor by the Point St. Sebastian, a league wide of me.' Vere also implies that there was some hesitation After remarking that there were forty or fifty Spanish ships drawn up across the bay,[76] he adds that 'because it was thought these

[74] It is said that altogether twenty-four *avisos* were sent to meet and order back the homeward bound Flota, nearly due; and that not one of the *avisos* found its quarry, 'which was held for a marvel,' says Herrera.

[75] *Omissions of the Cales Voyage.*

[76] Which must include the Flota merchantmen behind the fighting line.

could not escape us in putting to sea, the first project of landing our men in the Caleta went on,' which suggests that a second project had been discussed and left open even to that hour. If that were so it would explain why Essex thought the alternative course still open to him and was disgusted at not being followed. Ralegh rejoined two hours after the fleet had anchored half a league from St. Sebastian,[77] having been occupied, during his independent command, in chasing some merchantmen which had tried to get through from San Lucar into Cadiz harbour. Uncertainty had existed in the Spanish councils whether the English were bound for Cadiz or San Lucar, and the former was considered the safer port of refuge. There had been bad weather the previous night and wind and sea were again rising, but the time had been occupied in sounding and putting down buoys and getting the men into the boats. Four galleys under the Marquis of Santa Cruz, the son of him who died in 1588, were in position to protect the landing place, 'but we little reckoned of them,' says one present. When Ralegh came up the sea was so heavy that already several of the boats with troops lying alongside the Repulse had been swamped and some soldiers drowned, but whatever men thought, no one had made any open objection until the Rear-Admiral came on the scene.[78] Essex, either sulkily determined not to expose himself to any fresh rebuff or thinking that a further protest would be ascribed to want of courage, had resolved to go on until Ralegh came on board, and the latter's arguments against landing under such circumstances were supported by all the officers present. It is evident that Ralegh only persuaded an already convinced man who was held by temper to a course his reason condemned, and Essex in reply could only lay the blame on Howard and bid Ralegh go and persuade him. Ralegh did so, and not only succeeded in persuading Howard to countermand the landing, but to alter the plan of action and attack the fleet in the bay. Essex's relief of mind, when Ralegh coming back shouted the news to him, was shown when 'he cast his hat into the sea for joy.' By this time it was mid-day and blowing a storm from the south-west, and some hours passed before the troops were re-embarked; then followed further difficulties in weighing owing to the heavy sea and the nearness of the ships to each other, so that although the tide was favourable during the afternoon the opportunity was lost. Ralegh accepts the responsibility for the delay until the following morning,

[77] The Spanish accounts say that they were within cannon range, no doubt the nearest ships.

[78] There seem to have been others of the same mind, although their position did not entitle them to volunteer opinions (*Sloane MSS.* 1303).

giving several reasons, but the one statement that 'neither could our fleet possibly recover all their men in before sunset' is, if correct, sufficient alone to exonerate him.[79] Some ships moved towards the new position to be taken up in the mouth of the bay about five o'clock and then exchanged fire with the fort of St. Philip and the galleys for about two hours at a quite harmless range. During the evening much discussion took place between the leaders in arranging the plan of action for the following morning, in which Ralegh says he bore a prominent part. It was finally agreed that he was to lead the van in the Warspite, supported by the Mary Rose, Lion, Rainbow, Swiftsure, Dreadnought, Nonpareil, the twelve London ships, and some transports to be used to board or fire the enemy.[80] A final council was held on board the Ark early Monday morning.[81]

The Spaniards had been watching anxiously all day the English proceedings, and thought that at the sight of the galleys and ships they would not venture to attempt to enter. However, when Santa Cruz and Portocarrero saw the English disanchoring they both came to the conclusion that an attempt on the bay was certain. The probable position of the Spanish ships in the station taken up the previous evening was with the left flank resting on the shoals eastward of St. Philip,[82] and with the front therefore partly covered by its fire, and extending across to the shoal water on the opposite shore, a position which would help to protect the city while not exposing a much wider front than if withdrawn to the Puntal. But on consideration this was held to be too broad a front seeing that the enemy could bring many ships to bear on them and that others could slip through, and a council of officers decided to withdraw them to the Puntal, supporting them by the galleys at the sides. Such an alteration would leave the city more exposed, but it was thought to be sufficiently secure with the present garrison and the reinforcements continually coming in. The retrograde movement commenced on the evening of the 20th, but the south-west gale prevented its rapid execution and shots were exchanged between the galleons and the

[79] The account in *Stowe MSS.* 164, f. 90, supposed by Mr. Corbett to be by Howard's secretary, corroborates Ralegh in also saying that it was dark before the men were re-embarked and the anchors weighed. The president, Gutierrez Flores, says that the English weighed at six o'clock and came to anchor again between St. Philip and the fort of Santa Catalina on the mainland.

[80] The authorities differ slightly in the number and arrangement of the ships to be employed. Slingsby says that Howard was so 'jealous,' *i.e.* careful, of the Ark Royal, Repulse, and Merhonour that he would not permit them to be used.

[81] *Sloane MSS.* 1303.

[82] *Col. de Doc. Ined.* xxxvi. p. 215.

leading English ships taking up their new station in the mouth of the bay. Several officers appear to have protested against the retirement as the action of 'a clerical president [83] meddling with what he did not understand,' and the moral effect on the garrison and townspeople is said to have been injurious.

It will be observed that although Cadiz in its situation pre-eminently invites a combined land and sea attack, no simultaneous association of the two was in the minds of the Generals. Although Slingsby says that some of those present at the council of the 18th were in favour of a combined operation, the decision of the majority was for the landing, Ralegh's duty being only to contain the Spanish fleet. When it was decided to alter this to a sea attack, a force so large was assigned to the purpose that most of the ships composing it were never in action, and even then a large part of the fleet was left unemployed. The landing place chosen, the Caleta, was the most strongly defended point of the city and was, as they found, impracticable with a westerly sea running in. Nevertheless the tactics of Essex and Howard compare very favourably with those of Cecyll in 1625 and of Ormonde and Rooke in 1702. Although the Generals did not know it, and in any case would not have been entitled to act upon the belief, the probability is that any form of attack adopted would have succeeded, for, however energetic and skilful were the officers on the spot, the Spanish defence was foredoomed to failure. When a government leaves a great naval and commercial port, even after the warning of a previous descent, unarmed, unprovided, and ungarrisoned, without even a professional soldier to take charge of the improvised resistance, nothing but still more egregious blundering on the side of the assailants can save a city. No unexpected genius for war was shown by any of the civilians suddenly called upon to command, but they acted with commendable promptitude and good sense. The decision to withdraw the ships from the advanced position to the Puntal was a wise one, for if, as events showed, they were unable to hold a narrow channel less than half a mile broad, there would have been still less likelihood of defending a front occupying at least double that distance.[84] In 1625 the fort at Puntal mounted only eight guns, and even then proved a very formidable obstacle to the English attack; here the defence was practically dependent on the four galleons, unsupported, and the inherent racial inferiority of the Spaniards on board ship rendered the result certain. As the city was

[83] Gutierrez Flores, the president of the Casa, was a churchman.

[84] Moreover, the outer station left the weak right flank, which had not even the few guns of St. Philip to support it, liable to be crushed by an English movement through the North Channel—the passage between La Galera and the mainland.

incapable of resistance by itself, even to the slight extent of withstanding the cessation of supplies for twenty-four hours, its fall necessarily followed on the destruction and capture of the galleons, but as it is not the province of a fleet to save a place from a *coup de main*, the responsibility rests with Philip, who left it helpless, and not with the defenders. An engineer officer sent afterwards to inspect the city reported to the King that 'the simplest negroes from Guinea would have had better fortifications,' and did not seem to appreciate that he was writing a caustic criticism of his sovereign.

[4] When Ralegh led the way in on the morning of the 21st, the Spanish retreat was not completely effected, and the four galleons, closely chased, anchored between the Puntal and Matagorda athwart stream, presenting their broadsides seaward and supported by the other fighting ships, the three frigates being on the Matagorda side and the other vessels behind them. The galleys were left in shoal water under the town, their sterns to the shore and the bows presenting a flanking fire to the English advance;[85] later, when driven off by the Rainbow and the Repulse, they took up a position wherever there was room for them between the galleons. The passage in was very slow as the tide was ebbing,[86] and the time when the action really began is doubtful;[87] the fight teaches nothing in the way of tactics, and degenerated, as Sir Clements Markham observes, into a schoolboy scramble for the first place. There were about six ships in action, roughly in line abreast, which had put themselves in position to be raked, and the only lesson to be deduced is that to be raked by the strongest battleships of Spain was not a serious matter. The galleon fire might have been more efficacious had the material been better; 'their artillery carries twice as far as ours, not because the guns are better, but because the powder is,' wrote a Spaniard, and the Spanish shot cannot have retained much smashing power when the mark was reached. The city could give the ships no help; the few guns in fort St. Philip were quite out of range, the two or three pieces in the fort at Puntal immediately dismounted

[85] The galley carried artillery only in the bows. Usually there was a central heavy gun, a thirty or forty pounder, and two lighter pieces each side of it. The guns could be traversed only by the movement of the galley itself. These galleys at Cadiz pulled twenty-four, twenty-six, and twenty-eight oars a side.

[86] It was high tide at eight minutes past six A.M.

[87] Monson says it lasted from ten o'clock until four; Marbecke said it commenced between five and six in the morning; another writer (*Stowe MSS.* 164, seven o'clock. Monson was not in a leading ship, and his time must be a little late, because Ralegh speaks of being closely engaged at ten o'clock. A Spaniard gives the hour as eight o'clock.


CADIZ HARBOUR
AND APPROACHES
A Lord Admiral and bulk of fleet (first position).
B Essex first position, before joining Lord Admiral.
C English, second position (evening of 20th).
D Spanish galleys (first position).
E do (second position.)
F Spanish ships (first position).
G do. (second position).
H Flota.
ROTA
Bonanza Pt
Banco de Rota
Pta Catalina
Rio Guadalete
Rio de Sta Petri
Los Puercos
Sta Catalina
Calota de Sta Catalina
San Sebastian
CADIZ
Matagorda
LEON ISLAND
Rio San Pedro
Martires Bank

by the sight of disaster under their eyes, would have strengthened the defence is not evident.

[5] Essex, Vere, and the soldiers were for an immediate landing; Monson urged that the opportunity of seizing the Flota should not be lost. Both were right, and only the tactical weakness of one or both of the Generals' plans, all through the assumption that only one thing at the time could be attempted, prevented the simultaneous execution of both movements. But, except that he does not seem to have had any personal communication with his colleague all the morning, Essex was the least to blame, for the land operations were his particular duty and the fleet might well be expected to secure the fruits of victory. Monson's words '*another* messenger' imply that the earl had already sent to Howard before despatching Monson and Ashley, but his censure of Essex for landing without any consultation with Howard is undoubtedly a just one. In his defence Essex wrote 'my persuasions nor protestations could make them that were sea commanders go or send up to possess the fleet of the Indies while we assailed the town,'[93] but the one step that might have been effective to that end, his personal communication with Howard, he did not take, in which no doubt we may see a result of the bad relations between them which made Essex, at any rate, unwilling to meet his coadjutor. If Essex clearly saw that the occasion was one for simultaneous action, it must have been equally clear to him that it was of sufficient importance to call for a meeting with Howard, rather than for messages which in delivery might easily suggest orders. But either he did not feel it so clearly at the time, as when he sat down long afterwards to write the *Omissions*, or else his private feelings outweighed his sense of the importance of the operation and he was content, having given his advice, to leave the responsibility for neglecting it with the Lord Admiral. Monson's account hints that Howard was piqued by the landing being undertaken without any communication with him and at being advised as to his course of action by messages; added to that was his knowledge that Essex was going under fire, with the earl's known recklessness in fight, and his consciousness that Elizabeth would hold him responsible if anything untoward happened to her favourite.

Vere brings a distinct accusation, which can only be against Ralegh or Lord Thomas Howard, that the capture of the Flota 'was committed to and willingly undertaken with the sea forces by a principal officer of the fleet,' and that it was left undone, 'whether of design and set purpose, or negligence.'[94] Lord Thomas was ashore with the naval contingent; Ralegh says that although wounded in the leg by a splinter he was carried on shore, but, being

[93] *Omissions of the Cales Voyage.* [94] *Commentaries.*

compelled by pain to return to his ship, went back the same evening, finding 'no admiral left to order the fleet'—which implies that Lord Thomas Howard remained in Cadiz with the Lord Admiral—and most of the crews gone to join in the sack. At daylight the next morning he sent ashore, he says, for permission to go up after the Flota, but the confusion and press of work was so great that he could get no satisfactory answer.[95] Any uncorroborated statement made by Ralegh when he is accused of anything is not of much value; the same may be said of anything brought against him by Vere who was his personal enemy. But it is in his favour that Monson, who would hardly have omitted his name if he could possibly have been held responsible, does not mention him; that Essex, in the passage quoted above, uses the plural 'sea commanders,' and does not confine his censure to any one of them; and that Ralegh was always too keen after plunder to permit us to suppose that he purposely neglected what appears to have been the great chance of his life in that direction. Meteren says that Conway, Blount, and Gerard desired to send up the soldiers in boats after the Flota, but that Ralegh insisted that it was the privilege of the seamen, and proposed to finish the work that night; but that the Generals decided to wait until the next day, and ordered him back to the fleet in case of any attack by the galleys, and that when Ralegh sent ashore the next morning they only requested him to come to them to consult about the matter. Except in the circumstance of the initial refusal—one that Ralegh was quite likely to omit—this account agrees fairly well with his own, but it seems unlikely that when there was glory to be gained in the landing, then being prepared, the colonels should have wanted to stay and plunder merchantmen. The evidence is conflicting, but even if Ralegh refused the assistance at first offered he was not so far responsible for the consequences as was the Lord Admiral, who was on the spot, and to whom he was obliged to refer for orders. Probably Howard thought that everything at that moment should yield to the necessity for following Essex, and later in the day there were not men enough available to send boats up to Port Royal. If, afterwards, Ralegh refrained from explicitly clearing himself at the expense of Howard the political conditions at court sufficiently explain his reticence.

[6] So far as the written accounts go, the sudden landing was in the nature of a happy thought on the part of Essex, but a surmise may be ventured that it was not quite so haphazard a decision as it appears, and that the earl and Vere had determined to steal a march on Howard's precisian methods of councils and discussions. Both men would be acting according to their temperaments. Boats filled with soldiers had for some time been kept

[95] *Relation of the Cadiz Action.*

towing astern, which looks like a preparation for contingencies. Vere describes the formation of the boats at equal distances from each other in ranks and advancing in this formation, the oars dipping to the beat of drum, a stately and measured progression easy to carry out in the absence of all opposition. The force[96] landed under the Puntal fort, which had long since silenced itself, and the regiments of Blount, Gerard, and Clifford were at once detached eastward to cut off communication with the mainland, while Essex's and Vere's moved towards the city, the intention being to choose a suitable site for a camp and to prepare the ground for the breaching guns.

Charles V. gave Cadiz the title of 'very noble and very loyal' city; a modern author adds also 'very heroic,' although it hardly seems to have earned its right to the last designation on this occasion. During the night of the 20th–21st the townspeople had kept up their courage with music and song, and expressed themselves as eager to come to blows with the English; the reaction at the unexpected collapse of the fleet was all the greater, and wild confusion now existed in the town. The corregidor, however, got together some 500 militia and with these sallied to meet Essex, his men being perhaps consoled by the knowledge that they had the walls of the city behind them to cover their possible retreat. But the wall on the eastern or land side hardly offered much security, being in process of reconstruction, and the earth thrown up against it from the new works rendered it easy to scale from the outside. The English leaders had, at first, anticipated a regular siege, but it seems that when Vere saw the Spanish sally the possibility presented itself to his mind of not merely repulsing them, but of entering the city with them in their rout. This he suggested to Essex, who not only agreed to the attempt but wisely left the management in his hands. Vere then ordered a body of 200 men under Sir John Wingfield to advance to the attack, to pretend to run beaten, and thus draw on the Spaniards within reach of the main body. It was, perhaps, a dangerous manœuvre, but the English soldiers were mostly Low Country veterans and the feint was carried out precisely. The corregidor's raw levies suddenly finding that, instead of chasing and massacring a beaten enemy, they had come upon Vere and Essex waiting for them, at once broke and ran for the refuge of the city, hotly followed by the English. Those of the Spaniards who first got in through the gate in the centre of the wall shut it in the face of their comrades left outside; these clambered over the wall in various places, and although Vere had failed to carry out his intention exactly, they thus showed him the way in. We do not know precisely what was going on inside the city, but it may be imagined

[96] Vere says not quite 2,000 men; Blount, 1,600.

that the undisciplined peasants hastily brought in, lacking professional leadership, and demoralized by a fresh defeat, were less reliable than ever, and that confusion reigned unchecked. An assault was delivered in three places, and the city successfully entered. Vere came in through the gate and met Essex in the central square; the former says that there was, as might be expected, little resistance, only some street fighting which he compares to an 'inward tumult and town fray,'[97] that is to say an ordinary street riot. The corregidor said afterwards that he had only 400 reliable troops, presumably those just routed, and in the general disorganization no strenuous opposition was possible or to be expected. The chief inhabitants retired into the castle, the fort of St. Philip, and the monasteries, and strove to make terms, and in one of the latter Vere found Gutierrez Flores, the president of the Casa, and two other gentlemen from whom, more fortunate than most of the other officers, he subsequently obtained a ransom of 10,000 ducats. Essex was now joined by the Lord Admiral with the 'sea regiment' of 800 men and, resistance having ceased, the place was given up to sack. Not only were all the troops ashore, but the seamen, who should have remained on board the ships, left them to get their share of the plunder, there being, says Ralegh, 'few or no people in the navy, all running headlong to the sack.'[98] He adds that the troops were out of hand, and in this fact and the want of men, we may find, perhaps, the explanation of the neglect in following up the Flota after the city was taken. The English are said to have at once ceased killing when the Spaniards threw down their arms, but the Dutch 'who did little or nothing in the fight used merciless slaughter.' If they did they were but copying—they could not possibly have improved—the lesson set them by the Spaniards in the Netherlands, and there seems to be no reason why they, of all people, should have been expected to inaugurate an example of Christian forgiveness. But the plebeian Dutchmen only killed men; neither religion nor training had educated them to the level of Spanish chivalry in the violation and torture of women.

The regiments sent to the eastward had reached the Suazo

[97] *Commentaries*, p. 41. Marbecke represents the street fighting as having been hard, but Vere is a better authority on such a subject than a peaceful doctor. Blount puts the total loss during the whole of the 21st at 100 men (Birch, ii. p. 51); another soldier after saying that some of Essex's knights merited the honour, adds, 'but the rest deserved as I did, and that was to march from Puntal into the market place with an armour on my back and a pike on my neck in an extreme hot day' (*ibid.* p. 98). Motley says that the English and Dutch lost twenty-five men in the storm of the city, but does not give his authority.

[98] *Relation of Cadiz Action.*

bridge and came into contact with the regular troops placed there by Medina Sidonia. These seem to have given a good account of themselves, for on the 22nd Clifford retreated, the opposing force having been increased by Portocarrero's galleys, and that officer immediately broke down the bridge to secure his passage to the sea. The Spaniards claimed to have killed 200 English in the fighting at Suazo, and two prisoners taken there were brought to the duke, who reported that they were 'very stupid and miserable creatures, as I believe they all are.'[99]

On the morning of the 22nd the castle and St. Philip were summoned to surrender, and some of the chief men penned up in them sought to make terms. The corregidor was among them, but the spokesman was Dr. Francisco de Quesada, a clergyman, and he, with others, went to the town hall where Essex and Howard were awaiting them. A demand for unconditional surrender was met by the reply that Spaniards were not accustomed to such conditions and would prefer to be put to the sword. They began by offering 12,000 ducats for the ransom of the lives of the inhabitants and such clothes and jewels as the women were wearing. There was a good deal of discussion, which Howard cut short by suggestively remarking that it was not a time for eloquence but for a decision, and the Spanish offer finally rose to 120,000 ducats, 'and,' says Quesada, 'if they had asked as many millions we should have agreed to it because we did not trouble ourselves as to how it would be paid, but only of saving the lives of the thousands with the sword at their throats.' One hundred and fifty hostages were delivered to the Generals to secure the payment, but, although it was never paid, most of the hostages managed to escape before the English departure. All through the English occupation Quesada was busied in getting the starving townspeople across to the mainland; he says that the gentlemen treated him courteously, but the common soldiers yelled 'Hang the pope!' at him and threatened violence. On one occasion only Howard's presence on the quay prevented a savage onslaught on the fugitives waiting for boats, or at least the doctor thought so.[100]

On the same day the owners of the cargoes in the Flota ships lying at Port Royal commenced some unofficial negotiations with the view of saving their property, but they were anticipating the negotiations by emptying the holds as fast as possible. The superior Spanish officers were not content, however, to let

[99] A Dutch map of the taking of Cadiz, diagrammatic in character, and of little historical value generally, indicates severe fighting at Suazo.

[100] Relation of Dr. Francisco de Quesada (*Col. de Doc. Inéd.* xxxvi. p. 347).

the two processes go on simultaneously, and Sotomayor and Alfonso Flores decided to fire the fleet,[101] perhaps on the point of honour, perhaps fearing an immediate attack and capture. Disastrous as was the loss, it was, as Monson remarks, trifling compared to the value of a homeward Flota, and the shock that even the lesser destruction was to Spanish credit was a strong argument for those who would devote naval efforts to capturing or stopping the treasure fleets. But Monson is hardly accurate in saying that the loss prevented the payment of the ransom money; Dr. de Quesada endeavoured to induce the Generals to accept bills for the amount, Medina Sidonia being willing to guarantee the solvency of the merchants on whom they were drawn, but not that they would be duly met, a significant distinction.[102] In reality, the injury to Spanish merchants themselves was much slighter than would at first appear, for they were seldom the owners of the goods, but were usually merely commission agents for foreigners. Taxation, depopulation, the cost of war, the deadweight of the Church, and economic fallacies had destroyed the nascent manufacturing and export trade of Spain, and nearly all the necessaries and luxuries sent to the colonies were obtained from abroad, although the regulations required them to be exported in Spanish owned ships and in the names of Spanish owners.

After the excitement of the first two days officers and men settled down to a systematic sack of the city, in which the lower class of Spaniards are said to have joined. But, for most, the results were disappointing, 'rich towns taken in fury and not by composition run all to spoil, as well appeared in this city, which was pillaged to a farthing, yet many nothing the better for it,' wrote Sir George Carew,[103] who was one of the unlucky, having got only a piece of plate worth fifty shillings, he said.[104] Some

[101] Herrera. Another writer says that it was done on the advice of Francisco Tello, a subordinate official of the Casa, but the opinion of a civilian probably would not weigh with them either way. The Duke of Medina Sidonia does not seem to have known of the deed until it was done; Herrera says that the two officers did it 'without a second thought.' However, some official papers in the Munoz MS. collection represent the offer of 2,000,000 ducats ransom as having been made with the permission of the King's officers, and that the ships were burnt by order of Medina Sidonia. The value of ships and cargoes was estimated at 12,000,000 ducats.

[102] *Col. de Doc. Inéd.* xxxvi. p. 365.

[103] *Cecil MSS.* 9th July, 1596.

[104] On his return Carew was charged with concealing a substantial amount of treasure. He wrote to Cecyll that the suspicion that he would conceal anything from the Queen 'wounds me greatly,' and that if it were true he would deserve to be 'exempted from God's mercies'

of the officers had chartered ships, before leaving England, to bring home the anticipated plunder; others now took up vessels, some of which had sailed with the fleet on the chance of obtaining such freight, to run home with the spoil before there would be any questions asked at the seaports.[105] The search for treasure was keen, but, apparently, not thorough enough; Essex was informed afterwards that much, buried in the churchyards and hidden in the vaults underneath the churches, had been missed. There was much recrimination and quarrelling over what were considered unfair advantages and favouritism, the feeling between the army and navy being especially bitter. When the expedition returned 'the mariners envying and repining at the soldiers, who, as it fell out, had gotten most, purloined and detained their chests and packs of baggage.' The writer, Vere, applied to the Lord Admiral, who promised to keep his men in order, but the soldier says that some of the chief sea officers were in sympathy with the men, and when these told Vere that the seamen deserved something he answered—referring to the burnt Flota—that 'they had none to blame for their poverty but their officers . . . this answer was taken to heart and not forgotten to this hour, of which I feel the smart. The jealousy between the two arms was, so far as the leaders were concerned, born of court rivalry, and continued after the return of the expedition, as it had existed before its departure.

(*Cecil MSS.* 9th August). But Captain Bradgate wrote to Howard that Carew 'was only good for himself and nobody else' in the matter of plunder (*ibid.* 15th October).

[105] *Cecil MSS.* 29th August. Examination of the officers of the Diamond of Portsmouth, taken up at Plymouth by Captain Lancaster, of the Alcedo, on agreement to have one-third of all goods sent in to her. Monson sent forty chests of sugar on board, which were sold at Lyme, the master of the Diamond retaining one-third of the proceeds. See also *Cecil MSS.* 15th August.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME

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

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
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